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Foreword
Almost six years ago, when I embarked upon this book project, the preliminary
concept I had in mind was very different from the end result. My plan was to write
a comprehensive micro-history of the international commission that was dis-
patched to Ottoman Syria after the violent summer of 1860. Along the way—and,
I must confess, not soon after I began the project—a set of questions struck me,
upended the book’s structure, and resulted in an enormous review of my inten-
tions: by what right, I wondered, did the so-called European Great Powers claim
the responsibility to supply security in the Levant in the long nineteenth century
even when the sovereign authority was opposed to their intervention? On what
legal grounds? How did it all begin?
At first, I thought of explaining these in a long background chapter before
I delved into the history of the commission. But this didn’t quite work. The more
I read the fascinating existing literature on the several episodes that formed the
prehistory of 1860, the more questions I was left with about these events, about
their connections with one another, their micro-global nuances, and the historical,
political, legal, and economic continuities. The ambitious endeavour to address
them almost organically led me to a massive restructuring of the manuscript half-
way through the project.
What was supposed to be a book about the years 1860–62 thus turned into a
study of nearly a century of European Great Power interventionism in the Levant,
and the reception and implications of these acts, as well as persistent patterns, and
cultures of security. My task then became writing a history that hinges together the
existing literature, filling the gaps as far as I was able—a book that highlights the
long-standing vectors, overt or covert, previously noticed or unnoticed, but
without losing sight of the ideas, ideals, emotions, and observations of several
historical figures whose lives and biographical experience have usually remained
un- or under-explored in previous studies.
Yet, in doing so, my aim has hardly been to write another Saidian, anti-
Orientalist or post-Orientalist book. Instead, I have endavoured to uphold a
third narrative that goes beyond both Orientalism and its (corrective) rejection,
beyond the likes of both Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami and Edward Said. This
narrative embraces the complexity of the historical reality through in-depth and
multi-archival research to offer a more substantiative and less impressionistic
analysis of interventionism and violence in the Levant.
The very same consideration led me to propose a new paradigm, and to use
security as a driving force of political and social change, rather than producing
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another history of westernization, modernization, or secularization of the
(Ottoman) Middle Eastern societies after their ‘encounter with the West’. Since
the spatial scope of the book is limited to the eastern Mediterranean coasts, and
since I devote only very limited space to the events that simultaneously transpired
in areas including Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula, I have decided to use
the term ‘the Levant’ as the geographical focus of the book, even though the region
that became a theatre of interventions covered in the book has come to be known
as ‘the Middle East’ as of the early twentieth century.
Dangerous Gifts came into being as part of a larger project funded by the
European Research Council (ERC), ‘Securing Europe, Fighting Its Enemies’.
Thanks to this, I have been able to cooperate with several brilliant scholars. One
of them, the prime investigator of the project, Beatrice de Graaf, read the draft
chapters of the book and made most useful comments. With her patience and
encouragement, with the occasional lunch and dinner meetings she organized, she
has been a source of immense moral support. Constantin Ardeleanu, Erik de
Lange, Annelotte Jensen, Wouter Klem, Melle Lyklema, Trineke Palm, Joep
Schenk, and Jossie Til-Duijsters as assiduously read my draft chapters and offered
insightful comments. Susanne Keesman has been of great help in guiding me
through the bureaucratic minutiae of the project as well as helping me to settle in
the Netherlands. Myrthe van Groningen and Andrea Dörr kindly helped me to
sort out copyright and other practical issues in the final stages of the project. Erik
Goosman designed the appealing maps used in this book.
The ERC funding has also allowed me to enlist the support of a number of
research assistants whose linguistic and/or logistical reach brought to my consid-
eration primary and secondary sources in several languages and from numerous
archives, which I would not otherwise have been able to make use of. Markus
Wegewitz, Dominik Loibner, and Theresa Herzog supplied me with materials
from archives and libraries in Berlin and Vienna, working with the challenging
Kurrentschrift, taking notes, and translating their notes from German into
English. Elena Linkova found and dispatched sources from the archives and
libraries in Moscow and St Petersburg. Zienab al-Bakry and Tarek Sabra provided
assistance with locating, taking notes, and translating Arabic primary (mostly
archival) and secondary materials from Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Filiz
Yazıcıoğlu has been tremendously generous in offering her support. Not only
did she hasten to the Ottoman archives and Islamic Research Institute in Istanbul
and send me copies of an archival material or a book whenever I needed her
urgent help. She also helped me ‘decipher’ some of the more intricate Ottoman
texts. I am indebted to Pavlos Kardoulakis for taking copies of archival materials
in Britain and France for my use.
The task of freeing the manuscript from my linguistic mistakes was skilfully
taken up by Alastair Paynter.
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Selim Deringil, Jonathan Conlin, and Jonathan Parry have read the draft
manuscript and provided me with excellent feedback. I was lucky to find Selçuk
Dursun (abi) within reach whenever I needed his support with the transliteration
of subtle Ottoman sources.
My editors at Oxford University Press, especially Stephanie Ireland, believed in
the project from the beginning. Together with Katie Bishop and Cathryn Steele,
she displayed an impressive degree of professionalism in arranging for timely peer
reviews and putting together the contract. Stephanie, Katie, and Cathryn have
patiently responded to my endless questions and inquiries during the various
stages of this publication journey. My copy-editor Sarah Barret was admirably
diligent, while Saravanan Anandan has been a model professional during the
production of the book.
Devoting nearly six years of my life to researching and writing a historical book
has been a demanding endeavour, to say the least, which sometimes entailed a
hermit-like-life style, spending weeks in archives, and sacrifices of sorts, especially
on the part of those I love. My dearest family and friends have tirelessly supported
me all along even when I disappeared from their lives for extended periods of time.
They have shown an indefatigable faith in me and the project, which has been my
main source of motivation and energy. Esther Meininghaus has also helped me
with the transliteration of Arabic sources, while patiently listening to me for hours
rambling about the contents of the book. Julia Kozak has assisted me with the
transliteration of Russian sources, and uncomplainingly read all draft chapters,
telling her honest opinion even when I wouldn’t like it. I am grateful to all of them
for their endless patience, support, and, above all, for their presence.
Grateful I am also to all the truly helpful archivists and librarians I met during
research, and my numerous colleagues and students, whose names I unfortunately
cannot list in the little space I have here. I can, however, say that I have been
privileged to have the opportunity to discuss the very questions I asked myself
while writing the book—not only with expert scholars but also with my students,
hundreds of them, from all walks of life and literally from all over the world,
during the teaching of several course modules. Nearer the completion of the
project, I shared with my students the draft chapters of the manuscript, and
fine-tuned its contents and tone following their suggestions. They even conducted
research into the various subjects covered in the book as part of their assignments,
which introduced me to new literature and primary sources that I had not been
aware of.
‘I like reading stories,’ one of my students at Utrecht once told me, not soulless
scientific analyses. Among the several challenges in writing a book on entangled
histories, the most difficult one has been to develop out of a fiendishly complex
story a narrative that is both intelligible and captivating for readers. They should
be the judge of the extent to which I succeed in this.
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In short, Dangerous Gifts has been the result of a tireless team effort. The fact
that my name appears as its single author ought not to outshine the degree of
collaborative labour which allowed it to materialize. Without my research team,
without the support of my colleagues, without my family and friends, and without
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Note on Transliteration
Arabic names, words, and titles are transliterated according to the system of the
International Journal of Middle East Studies. Russian names, words, and titles are
transliterated according to the GOST 7.79-2000 system. Modern and Ottoman
Turkish names, words, position, and titles are kept in their original or used with
Ottoman transliteration. Pașa instead of pasha or pacha, vali instead of wali,
Şeyhülislam instead of Sheikh-ul Islam, etc.
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Introduction
Justice is a balance set up among mankind.
Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah¹
Two months after his arrival in Ottoman Syria in September 1860, the Prussian
bureaucrat Johann Ludwig Guido von Rehfues (1818–97) and his colleagues set
off on a hauntingly memorable journey to Damascus.² Leaving Beirut early in the
morning, they rode first up Mount Lebanon. From all the heights to which their
path took them, they could see the smoke-stained rubble of once flourishing
villages in the countryside.³ The picturesque hills did not hide the grim fact that
a civil war had struck there half a year earlier. It was the last day of November and
the men on horseback were representatives of the European Powers at the
commission they had been tasked with setting up: Pierre Jean Adolphe de
Weckbecker (1808–71) was the Austrian plenipotentiary, Leon Philippe Béclard
(1819–64) the French, and Evgenii Petrovic Novikow (1826–1903) represented
Russia. Since he was unwell, the British commissioner, Frederick Hamilton-
Temple-Blackwood, 1st Marquess of Dufferin and Ava (1826–1902), had stayed
in Beirut.
The five commissioners had been dispatched to Syria for what was arguably a
‘humanitarian’ mission to investigate the origins of violence, monitor the retribu-
tion and indemnification processes, and reorganize the country’s administration.
They were the first men to establish an international security institution in the
Levant.⁴ After crossing the plains of the Bekaa valley and overcoming the chal-
lenges of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, the companions made their entrance into
Damascus behind an Ottoman imperial cavalry unit on 1 December. The streets
¹ Ibn Khaldun,Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, vol. 2, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 145.
² In 1860, the term ‘Syria’, or Bilâd al-Sham, referred to the area that encompasses present-day Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine: Bruce Masters, ‘Syria’, in Encyclopaedia of the Ottoman Empire, ed.
Bruce Masters and Gábor Ágoston (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 550.
³ Johann Ludwig Guido von Rehfues to Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von Schleinitz, 2 Dec.
1860, GStA, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7568, f. 385.
⁴ By the term ‘Levant’ I refer here not only to the Arab mashriq but to the region along the eastern
Mediterranean coasts of the late Ottoman Empire that stretched from Alexandria in Egypt to Izmir/
Smyrna, the Straits that connect to the Black Sea, the eastern Greek coasts, and their hinterland. The
term ‘Levantine’ will be used to denote the inhabitants of these spaces. For a recent study on the
concept of ‘Levant’, see Rana Issa and Einar Wigen, ‘Levantine Chronotopes: Prisms for Entangled
Histories’, Contemporary Levant 5(1) (2020): 1–12.
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were filled with a compact crowd attracted by the curious sight.⁵ When they
arrived at their residence, Rehfues immediately went to the Christian quarter to
see for himself the town’s condition. During the course of half a day, he conducted
a thorough investigation, and visited the locations at which the killings had taken
place in July, which resembled, in his words, ‘persecutions in the earliest time of
the Christian calendar’. He frequently halted in his journey, and only a strong
desire to observe the tragic scenes for himself gave him the strength to carry on.
Although five months had passed since the events, and the bodies of those
murdered had been taken away or at the very least covered with rubble, the
manifold remaining traces still painted a disturbing picture of what had happened
there. In the hours he spent at the site, it was as if Rehfues had witnessed the
horror for himself. The next day, he wrote in a dispatch to Berlin that he would
never forget what he had seen in Damascus.⁶
In the lands the European commissioners rode past during those two days,
more than 10,000 people had perished and tens of thousands had been displaced
between late May and early July 1860. The worst violent outburst in late Ottoman
Syria, the Druze–Maronite civil war, later sparked the killing of around 3,000
Damascene Christians on 9–10 July.⁷ The news alarmed European capitals,
attracted immense public attention, and provoked fury and consternation on
the part of the Ottoman government. Even though Sultan Abdülmecid
I appointed Fuad Pașa (1814–69), one of his eminent ministers, as special envoy
to suppress the ‘disturbances’ and establish order and tranquillity in the country,
the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Sublime Porte⁸ would not be enough to prevent
the dispatch of a French expeditionary army to ‘aid the Sultan’ in protecting the
Christian populations.⁹ Nor would they suffice to avoid the establishment of an
international commission which, Ottoman ministers believed, infringed the sov-
ereignty of their empire.
The 1860 intervention was only one of many European interventions in the
Levant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Starting with Napoleon
Bonaparte’s occupation of Egypt in 1798, the self-defined five Great Powers (in
alphabetical order, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia) had previously
assumed responsibility, either individually or collectively, for supplying security in
the region. They had staged hitherto unprecedented military occupations ‘for the
benefit of the locals’. They had drawn lines, partitioned lands, and imposed rules,
⁵ Leon Béclard to Antoine Thouvenel, 12 Dec. 1860, AMAE 50MD/139.
⁶ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 2 Dec. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7568, 385.
⁷ On the Damascene events, see Eugene L. Rogan, ‘Sectarianism and Social Conflict in Damascus:
The 1860 Events Reconsidered’, Arabica 51(4) (Oct. 2004): 493–511.
⁸ ‘The Sublime Porte’ or Bâb-ı Âli (‘the Porte’) is a term used by European and Ottoman agents as of
the late 18th c. to refer to the Ottoman imperial ministries.
⁹ R. Edwards, La Syrie, 1840–1860. Histoire, politique, administration, population, religions et
mœurs, événements de 1860 d’après des actes officiels et des documents authentiques (Paris: Amyot,
1862), 164.
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laws, administrative systems, and treaties on the locals, usually against their will.
They had also ventured on the first so-called ‘humanitarian’ interventions in
history, before establishing as-yet-unknown international security institutions,
such as the commission on Syria that Rehfues and his companions were tasked
with setting up.¹⁰
My book is about these eighteenth- and nineteenth-century foreign interven-
tions in the Levant—their making, theatres, reception, and repercussions. It traces
the genealogy of these unique practices of recent history, asking how it all began—
how, from the late eighteenth century, the threat perceptions and interests of the
Western Powers and Levantine inhabitants became interwoven, and how and why
historical actors, both imperial and peripheral,¹¹ European and Levantine, unwar-
ily grappled with a vicious and intricate paradox there: an ever-increasing demand
for security despite its increasing supply.¹²
After each major European Great Power intervention, i.e. the use of force or
pressure by one or more dominant states ‘to interfere with and exert power over
the affairs of a weaker sovereign entity’, eastern Mediterranean coasts were further
destabilized and became vulnerable to civil wars.¹³ First, the strife in Ottoman
Egypt (1802–11) that followed the French occupation of 1798–1801 and over-
lapped with the British intervention of 1801–3; then, following the 1827 Navarino
interference, the civil war between the pașa of Egypt, Mehmed Ali, and the
Sublime Porte that engulfed the entire Ottoman world (1832–41); and, finally,
the hostilities between the Druze and Maronites (1841–60) in Ottoman Syria
between the Quadruple Alliance’s intervention in 1840 and the 1860 armed
intervention. All these outbreaks of violence had diverse and compound origins
rooted in numerous, predominantly domestic, factors. Yet, at the same time, they
were all fuelled by international dynamics, connections, and interactions, and
were then quelled almost always through the filter of global imperial interests.
*
There is already a rich and diverse literature on the historical episodes considered
in this book. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798, the so-called ‘humanitarian’
¹⁰ For discussions of what makes these interventions in the Ottoman Empire ‘humanitarian’, see esp.
Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Random House,
2008); Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla, Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century:
Setting the Precedent (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015); and Davide Rodogno, Against
Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire (1815–1914) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2011).
¹¹ I use the term ‘periphery’ as a structural metaphor to demarcate the hierarchical, asymmetrical,
and exploitative nature of both the Ottoman and global imperial systems, whereby the main bene-
factors of the asymmetries were the imperial centres (metropoles).
¹² On the notion of ‘security paradox’, see Christopher Daase, ‘On Paradox and Pathologies:
A Cultural Approach to Security’, in Transformations of Security Studies: Dialogues, Diversity and
Discipline, ed. Gabi Schlag, Julian Junk, and Christopher Daase (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 86.
¹³ On the definition of ‘foreign intervention’, see Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa:
From the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3.
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interventions in the Ottoman Empire, the conflict between Mehmed Ali Pașa and
the Sublime Porte, and the crises in Ottoman Lebanon have all been analysed in
numerous fascinating studies.¹⁴ Here I will hinge together, and critically augment
and complement, this diverse literature, rather than examining each episode in
isolation and omitting their immediate links or the long-standing vectors that
connected these episodes.¹⁵ Nor will my focus be on Western perceptions and
conceptions of security only.
As Davide Rodogno, one of the leading authorities on the history of humani-
tarianism, candidly admits, no book in the rich literature on ‘humanitarian’
interventions in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire has historicized the
experience of the ‘target state’.¹⁶ The lives, ideas, emotions and threat perceptions,
and interests of Levantines themselves have rarely been mentioned or specifically
foregrounded in historical analyses of security, with the exception of a few studies
that focus on violence in the region episodically.¹⁷ Here I will look to fill these
gaps. Without attributing to the so-called peripheral Levantine actors the sole role
of ‘bargaining chips’, ‘junior partners in the power game’, or ‘trouble-makers’,
I will pay particular attention to the part that the local actors played in enabling
interventionism and in the production of violence in the Levant.¹⁸
¹⁴ See esp. Juan Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007); Khaled Fahmy,All the Pasha’sMen:Mehmed Ali, His Army and theMaking ofModern Egypt (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Gilbert Sinoue, Le Dernier Pharaon. Méhémet Ali (1770–1849)
(Paris: PygmalionGerardWatelet, 1997); CarolineGaultier-Kurhan,Méhémet Ali et la France 1805–1849.
Histoire singulière du Napoléon de l’Orient (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005); Marsot A. L. Al-Sayyid,
Egypt in the Reign ofMuhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Vernon J. Puryear,
International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the
Levant, 1834–1853 (Stanford, CA: Archon, 1969); LetitiaW. Ufford, The Pasha: HowMehemet Ali Defied
the West, 1839–1841 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007); Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965); Leila T. Fawaz, An Occasion for War (London: I.B. Tauris,
1994); Caesar E. Farah, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–61 (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2000); Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Yann Bouyrat,
Devoir d’intervenir. L’intervention humanitaire de la France au Liban, 1860 (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2013).
¹⁵ The few exceptions are: Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for
Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999);
M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1966); Alexander L. Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774–1923 (Harlow: Longman, 2013).
¹⁶ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 2–3. For two recent studies that form, to an extent, the exception
here, see Will Smiley, ‘War Without War: The Battle of Navarino, the Ottoman Empire and the Pacific
Blockade’, Journal of the History of International Law 18(1) (2016): 42–69, and Hakan Erdem, ‘ “Do
Not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers”: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of
Independence’, in Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey, ed. Thalia Dragonas and
Faruk Birtek (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 67–84.
¹⁷ Makdisi, Culture; Farah, Politics.Moreover, owing to the abundance of Great Power interventions
in civil wars in the global south since the Second World War, a rich social-scientific literature has long
examined how foreign meddling has extended the duration of civil wars and increase the intensity of
violence. Some of these studies build their arguments on 19th-c. cases without specifying which cases
these were. See e.g. Dylan Balcj-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce, ‘Third-Party
Intervention and the Civil War Process’, Journal of Peace Research 45(3) (2008): 345–63.
¹⁸ Pınar Bilgin, ‘The “Western-Centrism” of Security Studies: “Blind Spot” or Constitutive
Practice?’, Security Dialogue 41 (2010): 617; Bahgat Korany, ‘Strategic Studies and the Third World:
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My argument is that Great Power interventions in the nineteenth-century
Levant need to be considered not only in reference to their immediate causes,
theatres, and implications. It is essential to take into account the continuity that
European and Levantine actors saw in regional affairs from the late eighteenth
century through until at least the mid-nineteenth. There is a need to foreground
the persistent patterns or ‘cultures of security’ within which violence was gener-
ated and sustained, and how imperialism—the practices, ideologies, and systems
of building or sustaining empire¹⁹—and security—defined in this book broadly as
‘the anticipated state of being unharmed in the future’²⁰—acted as organizing
principles of international relations. Here I will place the European and Levantine
quests for security in a wider historical context as the driving forces of an
entangled history, which offers us new ways to construe the vicious cycles of
Great Power interventions and civil wars that enveloped the Levant. This analysis
helps us discern the complexity of the situation the historical actors were
embroiled in, and identify who spoke authoritatively about security at the time,
what the threat and interest perceptions of the diverse historical actors were,
which discursive practices they adopted, who were the net beneficiaries and, where
applicable, who paid for security—that is, whose financial responsibility it was
ultimately.
Historicizing the Eastern Question
In the eighteenth and long nineteenth centuries, one of the persistent paradigms
that causally linked the Great Power interventions in the Levant was ‘the Eastern
Question’. A near-perfect historical embodiment of the otherwise abstract and
ambivalent imperialism–security nexus, the Eastern Question originated with
endeavours in the eighteenth century to deal with the alleged decadence of the
Ottoman Empire.²¹ Like all security issues, it turned ‘its eye exclusively to the
A Critical Evaluation’, International Social Science Journal 38(4) (1986): 547–62; Tarak Barkawi and
Mark Laffey, ‘The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies’, Review of International Studies 32 (2006):
343–4.
¹⁹ I define the term ‘empire’, relying on the admirable work of Burbank and Cooper, as ‘large
political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain
distinction and hierarchy as they [strive to] incorporate new people’. Jane Burbank and Frederick
Cooper, Empires in World History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 8. For a slightly
adjusted definition, see Jennifer Pitts, ‘Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism’, Annual Review of
Political Science 13 (2010): 213.
²⁰ Beatrice de Graaf and Cornel Zwierlein, ‘Historicizing Security: Entering the Conspiracy
Dispositive’, Historical Social Research 38(1) (2013): 52.
²¹ Recently, historians have invited us to invoke social-scientific theories, such as securitization
theory, i.e. the identification of issues as security threats in order to convince an audience (the decision-
makers) to take extraordinary measures against these perceived threats, while historicizing security. De
Graaf and Cornel Zwierlein, ‘Historicizing Security’, 49. However, the narrow focus of securitization
theory on legitimacy—and for that matter on the nation states and the polities better equipped to voice
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future’.²² According to the mainstream narrative, the major European empires
perceived a shared, existential threat in the dreadful prospect of the dominance of
one or another of the Great Powers over the strategic, prize morsels of the
Ottoman Empire (such as the Straits or the Suez area, the transportation routes
to India and Central Asia). They believed that such a geostrategic advantage
obtained by one European empire might adversely affect the balance of power
among them and threaten the existence of the others.
Historically speaking, the Eastern Question emerged in a period that coincided
with the independence of the Americas and the shift of global colonial competi-
tion to Asia. It was then, in the nineteenth century, that the Levant became a
strategically crucial gateway for the new and now vitally important colonies that
supplied Europe with resources and markets, which sustained their economies
and permitted political stability in the metropoles. In connection to this, global
capitalism increasingly expanded into the Levant—now a strategically and eco-
nomically central region—where it met with the local owners for profit.
The interlocking of geostrategic and economic undercurrents generated new
questions. These included the need for overseas empires to preserve international
commerce, ensuring the uneven flow of capital, goods, and resources, and secur-
ing the newly acquired territory and property, as well as integrating the sometimes
reluctant, or even resistant, local populations into the new economic and financial
structures, from a position of power and hierarchy. At the same time, growing
Christian missionary activity engendered problems with respect to the protection
of denominational agents and establishments. They were increasingly viewed by
Levantines, regardless of the religious inclinations of the latter, as both threats to
local cultures and instruments for moral empowerment.
In fact, the capitulations—the legal agreements with the Ottoman Empire that
granted commercial and legal privileges to European subjects—had allowed the
European Powers to interfere in legal security issues in the Ottoman world since
the sixteenth century.²³ But these were usually limited to individual experiences.
And even though France and Russia had assumed the responsibility of protecting
their threat perceptions and to persuade their audience—brings into serious question its applicability in
imperial historical contexts. Benedikt Stuchtey and Andrea Wiegeshoff, ‘(In-)Securities across
European Empires and Beyond’, Journal of Modern European History 16(3) (2018): 325–6.
²² De Graaf and Zwierlein, ‘Historicising’, 52.
²³ For insightful overviews of capitulations and extraterritoriality in the Ottoman Empire, see
Edhem Eldem, ‘Capitulations and Western Trade: Western Trade in the Ottoman Empire.
Questions, Issues and Sources’, in The Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 281–335; Umut Özsu, ‘Ottoman Empire’, in The
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 446; and his ‘The Ottoman Empire, the Origins of Extraterritoriality,
and International Legal Theory’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, ed.
Florian Hoffmann and Anne Orford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 123–37; also see Turan
Kayaoğlu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire and
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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the Catholic and Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman sultans since the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, these long remained merely rhetorical gestures. They
appeared to serve more to bolster affective ties than to actually produce concrete
actions.
What changed in the late eighteenth and particularly the nineteenth century
was that, as Buzan and Lawson have shown, with the global transformation that
resulted from the uneven and combined development of societies worldwide,
unprecedented differentials in the modes of political, economic, military, and
technological power gradually emerged between a small group of so-called
‘leading-edge’ European empires and the rest.²⁴ These disparities were time and
again proved by easy victories won by the superordinates in wars and through
territorial annexations and uneven commercial treaties. They engendered the
creation of new hierarchies in world politics whereby internationalized contro-
versies were almost exclusively addressed with the interference of the dominant
Powers.²⁵
It was in the age of global transformation and the emergence of hierarchies that
generations of European and Levantine actors (statesmen, bureaucrats, diplomats,
military and naval officers, secret agents, journalists, merchants, missionaries,
bankers, feudal or oligarchical lords, etc.) established new transimperial networks
amid the shared threat posed by the Eastern Question. These agents looked to
further their common interests in maintaining the Ottoman Empire or procuring
benefits from her alleged weakness, if not total destruction. To these ends, they
mobilized their resources (armies, navies, weapons, technologies, norms, funds,
etc.) across, between, and beyond imperial borders.²⁶ They developed diverse,
sometimes unprecedented repertoires of power: military occupations conducted
for the ‘benefit of the locals’, the so-called ‘humanitarian’ interventions, slow
evacuation of occupying armies, surrogate or proxy wars, pacific naval blockades,
the establishment of international and extraterritorial security institutions, tran-
simperially mediated local administrative structures, partitions by international
agreements or treaties, or the dispatch of military, naval, and civilian advisers, etc.
These discursive practices²⁷ were (self-)justified by means of the deployment of
²⁴ Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making
of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
²⁵ Hierarchy is considered here as a ‘system through which actors are organized into vertical
relations of super- and subordination’: Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Theorising Hierarchies: An Introduction’, in
Hierarchies in World Politics ed. Ayşe Zarakol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1.
²⁶ Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Hee, ‘Transimperial History: Connectivity, Cooperation and
Competition’, Journal of Modern European History 16(4) (2018): 432.
²⁷ The concept of ‘discourse’ is used here to refer to linguistic and non-linguistic practices, ‘a system
of representation that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of meanings’
and materialized in concrete practices and rituals: Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gasterson, and
Raymond Duvall, ‘Introduction: Constructing Insecurity’, in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities
and the Production of Danger, ed. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gasterson, and Raymond Duvall
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 16.
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new sets of religiously imbued and Enlightenment norms and principles from
which a positivist and universalized international law was spawned.²⁸ In due
course, they turned into recurring behavioural patterns or the modus operandi
of security in the Levant.²⁹ A transimperial security culture was thus woven
spontaneously around the Eastern Question.
*
The French invasion of Egypt was an opening moment of this culture of security.
In the beginning, particularly during the global Coalition Wars (1792–1815), the
unfolding repertoires of power were characterized by rivalry among the major
European and Ottoman empires. For example, the inter-imperial (1798–1801)
and proxy (1802–11) wars in Ottoman Egypt were the direct fruits of the Anglo-
French/Ottoman struggle for domination along the eastern Mediterranean coasts.
In the 1810s, however, inter-imperial competition in the Levant went through
an early metamorphosis. When the Coalition Wars came to a definitive end,
during the peace talks at Paris, Vienna, and later at Aix-la-Chapelle between
1814 and 1818, the (then self-defined) European Great Powers fostered an under-
standing of security as a public good that could be obtained most effectively
through cooperation.³⁰ Based on an adaptation of the idea of a ‘balance of
power’ to meet the the postwar realities of Europe, they forged an exclusive
system, the Concert of Europe, to supervise first European and then global affairs,
by means of mediation among themselves and in order to inhibit any return to the
horrors of a European total war.³¹ They endorsed collective action and conference
diplomacy, and upheld new principles and codes of conduct such as non-
intervention in each other’s affairs or the necessity of approval by the Great
Powers for territorial changes.³² Each time the Eastern Question pressed on the
²⁸ On the imperialist origins of international law, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and
the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gerry Simpson,
Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
²⁹ For an astute yet West-centric description of the notion of security culture as a tool for studying
interventions, see Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow, ‘From Military to “Security Interventions”: An
Alternative Approach to Contemporary Interventions’, Stability: International Journal of Security and
Development 4(1) (May 2015): 1–12.
³⁰ Patrick Cottrell, The Evolution and Legitimacy of International Security Institutions (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 68–9. See also Matthias Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das
europäische Konzert der Grossmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009).
³¹ Louise Richardson, ‘The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the Nineteenth
Century’, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendom,
Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 51; Jennifer
Mitzen, Power in Concert: The Nineteenth Century Origins of Global Governance (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2013), 30; Maartje Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics,
1815–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 40–41.
³² Michael Jarret, The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after
Napoleon (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 362; Eric D. Weitz, ‘From the Vienna to the Paris System:
International Politics and Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing
Mission’, American Historical Review 113(5) (Dec. 2008): 1313–43; Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna
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international agenda—such as the Greek crisis (1821–32), the Egyptian question
(1832–41), the Syrian question (1841–64), and the Russo-Ottoman wars (1828–9
and 1853–6)—ministerial and ambassadorial conferences were convened (or, at
least, proposed) with the ultimate purpose of preventing the Powers from step-
ping on each other’s toes or fighting with one another in the Levant, as elsewhere
in the world.
Thenceforth, the major European Powers came to consider cooperation as the
ultimate instrument for containing the potentially destructive implications of their
enduring competition. Put another way, convergence among the Powers (the
evolution towards strategic cooperation) proved not to be the binary opposite of
divergence (their differing interests and rivalries), but its logical completion: the
only means to ensure European security while maximizing global imperial inter-
ests was to act together, making concessions for a greater good.
While the emergence of the Eastern Question in the late eighteenth century and
the French invasion of Egypt symbolized a new beginning and intensified inter-
imperial rivalries in the Levant until the early twentieth century, the Vienna order
held these rivalries in check by urging concerted action among the Powers. It thus
changed the nature of European dialogue to a considerable extent. In most cases,
the new international order reined in bellicose unilateral action. But, as we will see
in this book time and again, it also facilitated interventions by the Great Powers by
means of placing them on a quasi-legal platform, the Concert of Europe.
This became a pattern in nearly every episode of the Eastern Question. Along
the way, like most security issues, the Eastern Question itself took on different
meanings at different historical moments.³³ It was never a static paradigm.³⁴ In the
late eighteenth century, even before the term was coined, it pertained mostly to
(inhibiting) the Russian plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire and, after
the 1789 revolution, French expansionism in the Levant. In the 1810s, it was a
matter of placing the sultan’s empire under the guarantee of European public
law in order to address Russo-Ottoman differences.³⁵ In the 1820s, it referred to
the diplomatic quandary over the ‘Greek crisis’. A decade later, it was about
Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?’, American Historical Review 97(3) (June 1992): 683–706; Brian
E. Vick, The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014); Beatrice de Graaf, Brian Vick and Ido De Haan, Securing Europe After
Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2019), ‘Introduction’; esp. Beatrice de Graaf, Fighting Terror after Napoleon: How Europe Became
Secure after 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
³³ Lucia Zedner, ‘The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative Analysis’, Legal Studies 1
(153) (2003): 154.
³⁴ This has been shown in recent scholarship; Macfie, The Eastern Question; Lucien J. Frary and
Mara Kozelsky, ‘Introduction’, in Russian–Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered,
ed. Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).
³⁵ In the 1810s, the so-called ‘Polish question’ was also discussed under the heading of the Eastern
Question. Hüseyin Yılmaz, ‘The Eastern Question and the Ottoman Empire: The Genesis of the Near
and Middle East in the Nineteenth Century’, in Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical
Concept, ed. Michael E. Bonine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 12.
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suppressing a civil war in the Ottoman world that had enabled Russia to
establish dominant control over the Porte. And then, in the 1840s, it was
repurposed as an issue of ‘civilization’ to be dealt with globally.
The French author, conservative politician, and prominent advocate of dem-
ocracy Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1840–41 that the events unfolding in Asia
from India to the Black Sea were demonstrating the disorganization, depopula-
tion, and anarchy of the East, where ‘societies are shaken’ and ‘religions are
weakened’. ‘Civilized’ Europe had to remain dominant and active in the name
of humanity. It had to ‘puncture, envelop, and tame the fallen beast that was
Asia’.³⁶ It had to consider the Eastern Question not as a divisive factor among the
Powers, but as one that united them in a condominium.
From 1840-41 onward, as far as supplying security in the Levant was con-
cerned, the position and influence of the Powers steadily grew stronger. Despite
the Crimean War of 1853-6, which undermined the Concert of Europe, they
came together and collectively intervened again in Syria in 1860. Yet, in all this,
the agency of the Levantine actors was in fact far more central than has been
documented to this day.
Silence, Civil Wars, and Lives
Behind the Eastern Question lay an imagined bifurcation between East and West
which viewed the oriental world as a homogeneous entity, the ‘weak’ and ‘unciv-
ilized’ ‘other’, in a state of degradation. The East was repeatedly likened to a
‘woman’ and ‘the flesh’, while the ‘civilized’West was the ‘superior’ and abler man,
possessed with ‘the spirit . . . of industry and science’.³⁷
As is well known, Edward Said was one of the first to point out this dichotomy
and underscore the ‘agency’ problem. He discussed how ‘the Oriental woman’ in
Western literature, who in fact represented the entire East, ‘never spoke of
herself, . . . never represented her emotions, presence, or history . . . [F]oreign,
comparatively wealthy, male, and [dominant], [the Western actors] spoke for
and represented her.’³⁸ This epistemic exclusion or the ‘Oriental silence’ has
permeated much of the literature on the Eastern Question.
³⁶ Alexis de Tocqueville, Écrits et discours politiques, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 270, 280, 315.
³⁷ Pamela Pilbeam, Saint-Simonians in the Nineteenth Century France (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), 108–9.
³⁸ Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 14. Said’s postulations on
‘silence’ have been picked up by the social scientific literature on security. See esp. Lene Hansen, ‘The
Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School’,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29(2) (2000): 285–306; Sarah Bertrand, ‘Can the Subaltern
Securitize? Postcolonial Perspectives on Securitization Theory and Its Critics’, European Journal of
International Security 3(3) (2018): 281–99.
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Owing in part to logistical and linguistic barriers, but mostly to the belief that
the Eastern Question was a ‘European question’ (a belief upheld even by some late
Ottoman writers as well as contemporary historians today³⁹), scholarship has
usually concentrated on the Western ‘great men’, how they dealt with the pre-
dicament of the Ottoman Empire, piloted her reforms, and resolved her diplo-
matic quandaries, usually leaving little (if any) space in their analysis for the
discursive practices of the so-called ‘Eastern’ actors, their internal struggles,
ambitions, emotions, insecurities, or agency in the widest sense.⁴⁰
My point here is that it is not entirely possible—in fact it is a parochial
endeavour—to attempt to historicize and construe the Eastern Question without
taking into account the other side of the coin and placing European and (in our
case) Levantine conceptions and practices of security within the same analytical
framework with a contrapuntal awareness.⁴¹ It is now time to reconceptualize the
‘most complicated . . . and dangerous question’⁴² in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century international politics as an inherently intersubjective constellation that
formed through at least four relational dynamics: (i) diplomatic and strategic affairs
among the Great Powers of the time in their attempts to deal with the alleged
weakness of the Ottoman Empire, (ii) the interest relations of the European powers
with the Levantines (as well as with the peoples of the Balkans, the Arabian
peninsula, Mesopotamia, eastern Anatolia, and the Caucasus), (iii) the intra-
imperial power struggles in both Europe and the Ottoman dominions (amongst
the imperial elites or between Levantine actors), and, finally, (iv) intersectoral
relations or the interplay between strategic, legal, economic, financial, religious, or
cultural factors—that is, how one sector affected the other(s) during the decision-
making processes. Omitting—or at least not acknowledging—the existence of one
or more of these relational dynamics tends to limit our historical understanding; it
results in the production of incomplete histories of how the Eastern Question
persisted well into the twentieth century.
³⁹ There is only one study in the English language that places emphasis on the ‘apologetic and
defensive’ Ottoman perspective on the Eastern Question in the late 19th c.: Nazan Çiçek, The Young
Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century (London: I.B. Tauris,
2010).
⁴⁰ Anderson, The Eastern Question; Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841:
Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question (New York: Humanities Press, 1969); Albert
Sorel, La Question d’Orient au XVIIIe siècle. Le partage de la Pologne et le traité de Käinardj (Paris:
Plon, 1902); Edouard Driault, La Question d’Orient, depuis ses origines jusqu’à nos jours (Paris:
F. Alcan, 1905). More recently, Miroslav Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern
Question (Pilsen: TYPOS, 2013).
⁴¹ Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 50; Geeta Chowdry,
‘Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Intervention in International
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 36(1) (2007): 101–16; David Bartine, ‘The
Contrapuntal Humanism of Edward Said’, Interdisciplinary Literary Studies 17(1) (2015): 59–85; Pınar
Bilgin, ‘ “Contrapuntal Reading” as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR’, International
Studies Review (2016): 1–13.
⁴² P. W. Schroeder, ‘The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure’, World
Politics 39(1) (Oct. 1986): 6.
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It is true that European imperial elites often strove to secure their interests by (to
borrow once more from Said) looking at the distant realities of the Levant and the
global ‘East’, ‘subordinating them in their gaze’, constructing the regional histories
‘from their own point of view’, and considering ‘its people as subjects whose fate
could be decided by what the imperial decision-makers thought was best for
them’.⁴³ Europeans usually imagined the East through an ‘imperial gaze’, which
looked at but usually failed (or chose not) to see the people gazed at; which assumed
that the power, licence, and responsibility to supply security lay with them.⁴⁴
In reality, however, the situation was much more intricate than Said’s account.
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the threat perceptions, interests,
and discursive practices of the European Powers and local inhabitants of the
Levant continuously interacted, transformed each other, and became interwoven
in the fabric of the Eastern Question. The Eastern Question was not simply a
quandary that European decision-makers imagined, formulated, and dealt with on
their own. It also formed a central threat and, on occasion, a well-established trope
for Levantines to manipulate.
Ottoman imperial authorities and subject peoples recognized the military, eco-
nomic, and technological power differentials between Europe and the rest. They also
shared the belief that the Ottoman Empire was in decline. They pondered how to
deal with her alleged weakness, or how to transmute decline into diplomatic
leverage. In doing so, they unmistakably acknowledged the ‘European’ undertones
of the question—how the destruction of the Ottoman Empire might lead to a general
war in the world—and tried to adapt inter-imperial competition and cooperation
among the Powers to their own ends—at times by inviting the Powers to intervene,
at other times by fending off their attempts to intrude.
All the while, like all other major empires of the time, the Sublime Porte was
caught in a state of ontological insecurity.⁴⁵ Distressed after tragic defeats in
battles, territorial losses, domestic riots, and the grim financial situation of their
empire, Ottoman ministers looked to define the place of the sultan’s dominions in
the overall global imperial order ‘of which their empire formed a part and upon
which [her] fate depended’ now.⁴⁶ They gradually accepted European public law.
They tried to reform their armies, bureaucracies, and laws, and (as we will see)
revised their empire’s underlying philosophical vocabularies of security such as
the ‘circle of justice’. Despite their initial rejection during the Congress of Vienna
⁴³ Edward Said, ‘Blind Imperial Arrogance’, Los Angeles Times, 20 July 2003.
⁴⁴ E. Ann Kaplan, Looking at the Other: Feminism, Fame and the Imperial Gaze (New York:
Routledge, 1997), 61–73.
⁴⁵ In using the notion ‘ontological insecurity’, I draw inspiration from Ayşe Zarakol’s article ‘States
and Ontological Security: A Historical Rethinking’, Cooperation and Conflict 52(1) (2017): 48–68. The
term is defined here as questioning ‘a consistent sense of self . . . affirmed by others’.
⁴⁶ Feroze A. K. Yasamee, ‘European Equilibrium or Asiatic Balance of Power? The Ottoman Search
for Security in the Aftermath of the Congress of Berlin’, in War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish
War of 1877–78 and the Treaty of Berlin, ed. Peter Sluglett and Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: Utah
University Press, 2011), 61.
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(1814–15) of proposals to protect the sultan’s European dominions by European
public law, just over a decade later the Ottoman Empire even looked to become a
member of the Concert of Europe herself.
Even though numerous orientalist stereotypes regularly featured in the publi-
cations of the day as well as in the correspondence of historical actors in Europe, it
was the Porte’s agents who were the first to describe the sultan’s empire in 1833 as
‘sick’ and in need of foreign ‘medicine’, not Tsar Nicholas I, who is known to be
the first to call the Ottoman Empire the ‘Sick Man of Europe’. In the late 1830s
and early 1840s, Ottoman ministers adopted European discursive practices such
as the bifurcating language of ‘civilization’, drawing demarcation lines with their
own ‘other’, inaugurating what later commentators have termed ‘Ottoman
Orientalism’ in the critical moments of the Eastern Question—in the first place,
to enlist Great Power interventions, not to fend them off.⁴⁷ Shortly afterwards,
however, the same ministers came to use the very same vocabulary to put an end
to the inexorable interference of the Great Powers.
The peripheral actors in the Levant (the so-called peripheries of the periphery)
such as the Mamluks of Egypt, the Greeks, the Syrians, or the Lebanese, for their
part played an active role in the formation or sustenance of transimperial networks
and affective ties with European Powers. Ever since the French invasion of Egypt in
1798 and the British intervention in 1801, they came to realize that ensuring their
security or advancing their political, economic, and religious interests depended on
aligning their interests with those of the Powers. While looking to acquire at least
partial independence and respite from the draining domination of their Ottoman
overlords, they therefore repeatedly resorted to European support.
The asymmetric ‘chains of influences’ (to cite an early nineteenth-century actor)
between European empires and the Levantine subject peoples created new channels
for the supply of security by means of the transfer of intelligence, ammunition,
provisions, or even manpower.⁴⁸ At the same time, these ‘chains’ paved the way for
the intensification of existing domestic political, economic, and/or religious (sect-
arian) conflicts, and their conversion into the first proxy wars in the history of the
Levant. More often than not, the peripheral actors became the prime agents of the
Eastern Question, while their lives were radically altered by it.
*
This study is, then, an ‘entangled history’ (histoire croisée) of European interventions
in the Levant in the age of the Eastern Question. It focuses on ‘empirical
intercrossings’, and documents the complex histories of the imperialist and peripheral
quests for security and how they inflamed a vicious cycle of civil wars in the region.⁴⁹
⁴⁷ Ussama Makdisi, ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, American Historical Review 107(3) (June, 2002): 768–96.
⁴⁸ Major General Stuart to Lord Hobart, 28 Feb. 1803, in LPM vol. 1, 388.
⁴⁹ Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the
Challenge of Reflexivity’, History and Theory 45 (Feb. 2006): 30–50, at 30.
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I must note at the outset that the episodes of violence in question here are
categorized as ‘civil wars’ not simply in the interest of sculpting them into an easily
intelligible or overgeneralized description.⁵⁰ My purpose here is to emphasize the
simultaneously domestic and global nature of violence in the Levant. Otherwise, as
the British historian David Armitage has shown, there has never been a time
‘when [the definition of civil wars] was settled to everyone’s satisfaction or when
it could be used without question or contention’.⁵¹ ‘[T]o call a war “civil” is to
acknowledge the familiarity of the enemies as members of the same community:
not foreigners but fellow citizens.’ It is ‘a form of framing’.⁵²
It is true that the same conflicts—say, the Greek crisis of the 1820s or the clash
of Mehmed Ali, the pașa of Egypt, with the Sublime Porte in 1832–41—can be
viewed as rebellion, revolutions, independence wars, or civil wars depending on
the perceptions of the beholder or the political motives of the narrator. My
framing of these episodes of violence as civil wars results from a desire to avoid
the reconstruction of their histories from either a state-centric (imperial) or
anti-state-centric (peripheral) perspective, but rather to blend these two in one
narrative, with the belief that the notion of civil war does not carry a ‘moral
connotation’ and does not ‘signal siding with one party to the conflict.’⁵³
The episodes in question here were physically violent conflicts between ‘com-
peting social orders’, which historical actors (i.e. contemporaries) labelled civil
wars. During each conflict, the physical fighting took place between the subjects/
citizens of one polity (the Ottoman Empire) and within its boundaries. And the
parties were politically organized and fought for the monopoly of physical force in
a given region, if not the entire country, but not necessarily to overthrow the
existing government or its regime.⁵⁴
⁵⁰ As an under-theorized concept, social-scientific definitions of the notion of civil war often suffer
from various subjectivities and randomness. According to Gersovitz and Kriger, for example, a civil war
is ‘a politically organised, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country
principally among large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly
of physical force’: Mark Gersovitz and Norma Kriger, ‘What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of its
Definition and (Econometric) Consequences’, World Bank Research Observer 28(2) (Aug. 2013):
160–61. But what ‘large-scale’ or ‘numerically important’ refers to here remains rather ambiguous. In
another, frequently cited study, Sambanis deals with this ambiguity to some extent, offering a more
quantitative description: a conflict is a civil war, he writes, when it is in ‘an independent state with a
population of at least 500,000’, where ‘in the start year there are at least 500 to 1000 deaths’, and where
there is an ‘effective resistance’ against the government ‘as represented by at least 100 deaths inflicted’:
Nicholas Sambanis, ‘What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational
Definition’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6) (2004): 814–58. For a 19th-c. historian, quantifications
of this kind seem arbitrary, since they make the definition of civil wars more obscure given both the
absence of numerical data in hand and the demographical differences between past and present.
⁵¹ David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), 12.
⁵² Ibid. 13.
⁵³ Adam Backzo, Gilles Dorosnoro, and Arthur Quesnay, Civil War in Syria: Mobilization and
Competing Social Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 2.
⁵⁴ Ibid. 18. Although the notions of ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ and particularly ‘civil war’ can denote
different categories, I will use them interchangeably here, especially in view of the fact that the
quantitative classifications offered in social-scientific literature are often inapplicable in historical
cases in which the number of casualties is often unknown or difficult to confirm. For an excellent
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The reason for making these episodes of violence the centre of analysis—their
number could usefully be augmented given the broad and contested definition of
civil wars and the composite context of the Ottoman world—is fourfold. First,
they were the earliest examples of inter-imperialized civil wars in the late Ottoman
Levant. As Backzo, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay observe, ‘the effects of the inter-
national system on civil war[s] can be difficult to isolate for a single case, but they
become visible when civil wars are examined in series.’⁵⁵ Therefore, second, the
aim is to determine the international and global dynamics of these cases by serially
contextualizing them. Third, they all followed Great Power interventions and were
in a partial cause-and-effect relationship with each other, taking place in the same
geographical area (i.e. eastern Mediterranean coasts of the Ottoman Empire),
which allows us to consider the continuities between them in relation to the
strategic, legal, economic, financial, and religious specificities of the region. And
finally, besides geography, these wars were tied together by the lives, ideas, beliefs,
and ideals of a number of Levantine and (to a lesser degree) European individuals
who lived through them and forged networks and cultures of security at the time.
The stories of these historical actors—who range from a lonely sultan to a
Caucasian slave, from a swashbuckling gangster to a leading feudal family in
Lebanon or international commissioners sent to Syria—serve as an analytical
window to ‘see through life’ the connections between what may otherwise be
considered as separate episodes of violence taking place in different historical
epochs.⁵⁶ As ‘connected singularities’, they not only highlight the degree of the
complexity of such historical entanglements, but also serve as facilitators that
deem these complex histories more intelligible and even relatable.⁵⁷
*
The book is divided into three parts which follow a loose chronological order.
Part I, ‘Avant le mot’, discusses in three chapters the beginnings of Great Power
social-scientific overview of the notions of conflict, war, small war, and civil war, see Jolle Demmers,
Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
⁵⁵ Backzo et al., Civil War in Syria, 14.
⁵⁶ Alice Kessler-Harris, ‘Why Biography?’, American Historical Review 114(3) (June 2009): 625–30,
at 626.
⁵⁷ In this respect, this book unintentionally follows the ‘biographical turn’ in Middle Eastern
historiography, following the compelling works of Philliou, Fortna, and Sajdi: Christine M. Phillou,
Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2011); Benjamin C. Fortna, The Circassian: A Life of Eşref Bey, Late Ottoman
Insurgent and Special Agent (London: C. Hurst, 2016); Dana Sajdi, The Barber of Damascus:
Nouveau Literacy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Levant (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2013). For a very insightful review of these books, see Metin Atmaca, ‘Biography, Global
Microhistory, and the Ottoman Empire in World History’, Journal of World History 30(1) (2019):
1–8. This being said, in using life stories as a narrative tool to render complex histories more intelligible,
I have found inspiration in the work of Robert Nemes, Another Hungary: The Nineteenth-Century
Provinces in Eight Lives (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). I would like to thank Christian
de Vito and Laura Almagor for inspiring me to think of life stories as connectors between diverse
singularities. For a nuanced discussion of the notion of ‘connected singularities,’ see Christian de Vito,
‘History Without Scale: The Micro-Spatial Perspective’, Past & Present, Supplement 14 (2019): 348–72.
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interventions in the eighteenth century under the shadow of the unfolding Eastern
Question. It considers the origins of the French invasion of Egypt in 1798 in
relation to changing perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the European imagin-
ation as a source of danger (Chapter 1). It discusses how the occupation was
received in the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul and how the Napoleonic wars affected
Ottoman conceptions of security under Selim III (Chapter 2), before explaining
the outbreak of a tripartite civil war in Egypt in 1802–11 that followed the 1798
expedition (Chapter 3).
Part II, ‘The Invention of the Eastern Question’, places under scrutiny the
implications of the formation of the Vienna Order in Europe for the Levant at
the time when the term ‘Eastern Question’ was coined and gradually became
prevalent in international political parlance. It considers the attempts in Vienna
and Istanbul in 1814–15 to guarantee the territorial integrity of the sultan’s empire
under European public law, and, how, after this attempt failed, the European
Powers intervened in the Greek ‘crisis’ in 1827 (Chapter 4). This is followed by an
analysis of the influence of the 1827 intervention over the outbreak of another,
larger-scale civil war in the Ottoman world, between Cairo and Istanbul
(Chapter 5). It charts how this civil war was temporarily quelled by the active
intervention of Russia in 1833 and the establishment of her dominant influence in
Istanbul (Chapter 6). It continues with the Porte’s efforts to enlist Great Power
support to its cause against Cairo and to end Russian control over its politics by
means of domestic reform, such as the proclamation of the Gülhane Edict in 1839
and signing free trade treaties with European powers (Chapter 7). The second part
concludes with the 1840 intervention of the Quadruple Alliance (Austria, Britain,
Prussia, and Russia), which consisted of instigating a rebellion in Mount Lebanon
and launching a military mission in Syria, with the purpose of definitively
suppressing Egyptian objectives, though at the risk of a general European war
(Chapter 8).
In Part III, ‘The Mountain’, the book shifts its perspective from high politics in
the imperial metropoles to Mount Lebanon, which during the 1840 intervention
became the epicentre of the Eastern Question. Concentrating on the Jumblatts, a
Druze family that had lived through wars and violence in the Levant for centuries,
it considers how the intervention changed the lives of the Lebanese themselves.
It evaluates the beginnings of class and sectarian violence in Ottoman Lebanon
during the early decades of the century (Chapter 9). This final part of the book
then details inter-imperial competition in the mountain and the Ottoman efforts
to reform, both of which brought the Eastern Question within the feudal manors.
The competition provoked a new cycle of civil wars in 1841, 1842, and 1845, years
which witnessed legal and administrative interventions from the Great Powers
(Chapter 10), and a particularly brutal episode in 1860 (Chapter 11), which, after a
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very fierce diplomatic and propaganda tug of war (Chapter 12), prompted another
armed intervention that was accompanied by an international commission on
Syria (Chapter 13). The book ends as it began, with the experience of the com-
missioners, of Rehfues and his companions, and how their work embodied the
forging of a new culture of security, before concluding with the implications of the
genealogy of Great Power interventions in the Levant: what do the late eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century ordeals tell us about the region and the world today?
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Crossing the Mediterranean
In the spring of 1798, the French port town of Toulon was unusually busy. Tens of
thousands of soldiers, sailors, physicians, cartographers, engineers, and savants
that had gathered there in April and early May were now making their final
preparations for France’s next major military expedition.¹ Few of them, however,
knew their destination.² The secret had been masterfully kept by their young
general, the Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), in order to protect his
forces from an enemy assault. He knew that the British navy, commanded by
Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758–1805), was patrolling the Mediterranean so as to
locate and devastate French ships.
In the town, and indeed across all Europe, rumours spread around as to what
the target of the expedition would be. Many believed that the French army would
turn west and then sail toward Britain for an unexpected offensive. Some claimed
they would occupy Portugal. But when experts of Arab culture and language were
summoned to the port days before the expedition, rumours that it would sail for
Egypt became prevalent.³ They were right.
Having lost her toehold in the south of India at Pondicherry to the British,
France was looking to deal, in the words of Bonaparte, ‘the surest and most
palpable blow’ on ‘perfidious Albion’.⁴ Even though her ultimate object was to
attack Britain and thus knock out France’s archenemy, a more realistic option for
now could be to cut her ‘jugular vein’.⁵ Contact had been established with anti-
British Persian and Indian elites such as Feth Ali and Tipoo Sultan of Mysore with
the aim of forging allegiances.⁶ To complement these machinations France would
seize a proper eastern Mediterranean naval base (Malta) and then occupy Egypt.⁷
¹ Alexander Mikaberidze, The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2020), 74.
² Vivant Denon, Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt, in Company with Several Divisions of the French
army, during the Campaign of Napoleon Bonaparte in that country, trans. Arthur Aitkin (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 30.
³ Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 1.
⁴ Alain Silvera, ‘Egypt and the French Revolution, 1798–1801’, Revue française d’histoire d’outre-
mer 269(257) (1982): 307.
⁵ Robert T. Harrison, Britain and the Middle East, 1619–1971 (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 26.
⁶ Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 11.
⁷ M. Jacques Bainville, ‘L’Expédition française’, in Précis de l’histoire de l’Égypte. L’Égypte ottomane,
l’expédition française en Égypte et le règne de Mohamed-Aly (1517–1849), vol. 3, ed. Etienne Combe,
Jacques Bainville, Edouard Driault (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire, 1933),
131–6; Edward Ingram, Commitment to Empire: Prophecies of the Great Game in Asia, 1797–1800
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 42–52; Pascal Firges, French Revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire:
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Thus had Bonaparte and foreign minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand
(1754–1838) planned since the previous year, and their scheme for an expedition
was approved by the Directory regime in March 1798. It was now time to bring the
plan to fruition.
On 19 May, when the French Army of the Orient set sail across the ‘indigo
Mediterranean’ for the unknowns awaiting them in the Levant, the 54000 or so
men at sea ‘eroticised an Orient’ they imagined to be stunning yet corrupt and
backward.⁸ They were spellbound by the allegedly grandiose importance of their
mission. On the day of their departure, Bonaparte told his men that the eyes of
Europe were on them, and that the conquests they were about to undertake would
have a colossal effect on the ‘civilization and commerce of the world’.⁹
That the expedition did not go as planned is well known. Three years after they
landed in Alexandria in July 1798, the French army was driven out from Egypt by
joint Anglo-Ottoman forces and the resistance of the local inhabitants. Yet the
expedition did indeed have a transformative impact on Ottoman, Egyptian, and
European politics and commerce in several ways.
Not that it succeeded in ‘civilizing the Levant’ or inaugurated a period of
capitalist and bureaucratic modernity in the Middle East. These orientalist
Map 1. The French expedition to Egypt
Diplomacy, Political Culture and the Limiting of Universal Revolution, 1792–1798 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 89.
⁸ Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 8, 10–11.
⁹ ‘Au soldats de terre et de mer de l’armée de la Méditerranée’, 10 May 1798, in Correspondance de
Napoléon Ier, vol. 4 (Paris: Impériale Première, 1860), 129; Cole,Napoleon’s Egypt, 11. Bonaparte’s men
found out that the final destination of the expedition was Egypt only after the conquest of Malta.
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postulations have long been unravelled by the revisionist literature.¹⁰ What
changed in 1798 is not limited to the well-known fact that the Levant was
drawn into the cortex of global imperial rivalry and an Anglo-French competition
for economic and strategic domination in this part of the world began, or to the
fact that the foundations for the scientific study of the Orient were laid out.
As we will see, the invasion also epitomized a discursive practice whereby
European Great Powers of the time looked to supply security beyond their
imperial territories (in the Levant) by military expeditions, allegedly for the benefit
of the locals even if against the will of the regional sovereigns—in this case, the
Ottoman imperial rulers.¹¹ The architects of the 1798 occupation, Bonaparte and
Talleyrand, portrayed their expedition as one for the benefit of Selim III. It was not
a hostile invasion, they argued, but a ‘grand service’ to the sultan. Talleyrand even
planned a visit to Istanbul to convince the Ottoman authorities of the good will of
¹⁰ See e.g. Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1998). I would like to thank Isa Blumi for drawing my attention to this source.
¹¹ After the Crusades, perhaps no other Western occupation in the Levant has attracted as much
scholarly attention as the French expedition to Egypt in 1798. Many volumes have been produced on
the subject, some even emerging before French forces evacuated the Levant in 1801. Louis-Alexandre
Berthier, Relation des campagnes du General Bonaparte en Égypte et en Syrie (Paris: P. Didot l’aîné,
1800); Copies of Original Letters from the Army of General Bonaparte in Egypt: Intercepted by the Fleet
under the Command of Admiral Lord Nelson (London: J. Wright, 1798); Shmuel Moreh, ‘Reputed
Autographs of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti and Related Problems’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 28 (1965): 524–40; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, ‘A Comparative Study of ‘Abd al-
Rahman al-Jabarti and Niqula al-Turk’, in Eighteenth-Century Egypt: The Arabic Manuscript Sources,
ed. Daniel Crecelius (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1991), 115–26; cf. Darrely Dykstra, ‘The French
Occupation of Egypt, 1798–1801’, in The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. 2:Modern Egypt from 1517 to
the End of the Twentieth Century, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
113–14. Detailed analyses have been made on the military aspects of the expedition. E.g. Clément
Étienne de La Jonquière, L’Expédition d’Égypte, 5 vols (Paris, 1899–1907); cf. Dykstra, ‘The French
Occupation’, 114. Bonaparte’s character and adventures during his Oriental odyssey have been placed
under analysis in a plethora of work. Percival G. Elgood, Bonaparte’s Adventure in Egypt (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931); François Charles-Roux, Bonaparte, gouverneur d’Égypte (Paris: Plon,
1936); and J. Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); cf. Dykstra,
‘The French Occupation’, 115. More recently, Cole,Napoleon’s Egypt; Irena A. Bierman (ed.), Napoleon
in Egypt (Los Angeles, CA: Ithaca Press, 2003). Dykstra explains that Arab scholars have more recently
reconstructed the history of the expedition as the first example of Western imperialist encroachment
and the heroic domestic (Arab) resistance to it. E.g. Muhammad Qindil al-Baqli, Abtalal-muqawamab
al-sha’abiyah li-l’hamla al-faransiya fi misr (Cairo: n.d.); ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Shinawi, ‘Umar makram:
batal al muqawamab al-sha’biyyah (Cairo, 1967); ‘Abd al-’Aziz Hafiz Dunya, al-Shabid muhammad
kurayyim (Cairo, n.d.; Muhammad Faraj, al-Nidal al-sha’bi diddal Hamla al-faransiyya (Cairo, 1963);
cf. Dykstra, ‘The French Occupation’, 115. European nationalist literature has likewise wrought its own
heroic stories out of the expedition—the stories of Admiral Nelson, General Kleber, Admiral Sidney
Smith: see Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (Tucson, AZ: Fireship Press, 2009); Christopher
Lloyd, The Nile Campaign: Bonaparte and Nelson in Egypt (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973). And a
number of studies have detailed the expedition’s political, economic, and intellectual origins: François
Charles-Roux, Les Origines de l’expédition de l’Égypte (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1910); and Le projet français
de conquête de l’Égypte sous le règne de Louis XVI (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale du
Caire, 1929); ‘France, Égypte et Mer Rouge de 1715 à 1798’, Cahiers d’histoire égyptienne 3 (1951):
117–95.
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France, and to reassure them that the aim of the expedition was only to overthrow
the Mamluks who menaced the sultan’s authority in Egypt.¹²
In reality, the 1798 expedition was the outcome of a diverse set of geostrategic,
political, economic, and financial determinants that constituted the Eastern
Question of the time. This chapter will consider these constituent determinants,
before turning in the following two chapters to the repercussions of this first major
European imperial intervention in the Levant—the repercussions that Talleyrand
and Bonaparte failed to see or, perhaps, chose to ignore. What did the Eastern
Question pertain to before the nineteenth century then? And how did 1798 relate
to it? I will examine these two questions first.
Defining the ‘Eastern Question’
Since its conquest of south-eastern European territories in the fourteenth century,
the dynasty of Osman Bey, later styled the Ottoman Empire, became a chief source
of danger and invulnerability in the political imagination of her western neigh-
bours.¹³ The Ottomans remained so for at least three centuries thanks to the
relative military prowess which rested on their effective management of human
and economic resources across a territory that stretched from Hungary and the
Crimea in the north to Yemen in the south, and from Algiers and Tunis in the
west to Iraq in the east, and because of their continuous expansionism and
drive for universal empire.¹⁴
The epic rivalry between the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and Spain,
Venice, and the Habsburg Empire, on the other, in the Mediterranean as well as
in the Balkans fostered in the sixteenth century alone the publication of more
than 3,500 titles in Europe about the ‘Turks’—a literature also known as
‘Turcica’.¹⁵ In this literature, the Ottoman imperial system was often depicted
as a ‘menace’ to European peace and order, and as the ‘Islamic other’, the
‘oriental’ being associated with dread, danger, and atrocities while at the same time
¹² Bonaparte to Citoyen Talleyrand, Ambassadeur à Constantinople, 11 Dec. 1798, Correspondance
V, 203. See also Silvera, ‘Egypt and the French Revolution’, 313.
¹³ For excellent analyses, see Noel Malcolm, Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in
Western Political Thought, 1450–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 68, 70, 72, and Selim
Deringil, ‘The Turks and “Europe”: The Argument from History’, Middle Eastern Studies 43(5)
(Sept. 2007): 709–23.
¹⁴ Gábor Ágoston, ‘The Ottoman Empire and Europe’, in The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern
European History, 1350–1750, vol. 2: Cultures and Power, ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 626.
¹⁵ Ibid. See also Aslı Çırakman, From the ‘Terror of the World’ to the ‘Sick Man of Europe’: European
Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth (New York: Peter
Lang, 2001); Alain Grosrichard, The Sultan’s Court: European Fantasies of the East (New York: Verso,
1998).
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peripheralized as ‘exotic, unchanging and acted upon by the Powers of ruling
authorities in Europe’.¹⁶
In reality, there was hardly a ‘cultural iron curtain’ between the Ottoman world
and its western neighbours.¹⁷ Their relations were always characterized by com-
plex diplomatic, commercial, and economic liaisons and exchanges.¹⁸ Despite
religious demarcations, and in spite of the beliefs upheld by such figures as
Martin Luther and Desiderius Erasmus that the ‘Turks’ were ‘the sheer wrath of
God’ towards Christians, the Ottomans continually participated in inter-imperial
cooperation with their Christian neighbours in politics, commerce, and even
military campaigns.¹⁹ And they were ‘actively engaged with and in [the emerging
European state] system’ all the while as a balancer, with their alliances and support
for the rivals of the Habsburgs.²⁰ In other words, the sultans’ empire was part and
parcel of European strategic and security considerations from the beginning.
In Europe, in fact, the term ‘security’ did not become an organizing principle
of international thought until the early decades of the nineteenth century.
Derived from the Latin term securus (sine ‘without’, cura ‘worry’), its early
usage in the Roman context—animi securitas—referred to peace of mind and
stability in the inner conditions of the state.²¹ Over centuries new meanings
were attached to ‘security’ in both a moral and a political sense. It was associated
with indolence in early Christianity, in the Middle Ages, and also by Reformers
such as Calvin, and with peace and order under the Holy Roman and Habsburg
empires which postured ‘as protecting shields for Christians’ and enabled the
delivery of ‘imperial goods’.²²
¹⁶ Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 5. See also Edhem Eldem, ‘Istanbul: From Imperial to Peripheralized
Capital’, in The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul, ed. Edhem Eldem,
Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 138.
¹⁷ Halil İnalcık, ‘The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case’, in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman
Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press,
1996), 21–3; Molly Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern
Mediterranean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Suraiya N. Faroqhi, The Ottoman
Empire and the World Around It (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Ian Coller, ‘East of Enlightenment:
Regulating Cosmopolitanism between Istanbul and Paris in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of World
History 21(3) (2010): 447–70; John-Paul A. Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in
Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013);
cf. Firges, French Revolutionaries, 4.
¹⁸ Ágoston, ‘The Ottoman Empire’, 626. İnalcık argues us that ‘the idea of a Europe unified on the
basis of Christian ideology and a holy war against the Ottomans’ was likewise ‘either a myth or an effort
to exploit public opinion in Europe in order to legitimize the policies of the individual states’: İnalcık,
‘The Meaning of Legacy’, 21. See also K. M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571, 4 vols
(Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society, 1976), 84.
¹⁹ Malcolm, Useful Enemies, 81.
²⁰ A. Nuri Yurdusev, ‘The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International
Society’, in International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level, ed.
Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 71, 73, 74.
²¹ Ole Waever, ‘Security: A Conceptual History for International Relations’ (MS, Copenhagen,
2012), 24–5.
²² Ibid. 33–5.
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The Ottomans were both ‘the alien other’ to be guarded against and at the same
time a major determinant in the strategic calculations of princes and kings. In
the sixteenth century, Francis I of France acknowledged the sultan’s empire as ‘the
only force to prevent the emerging states of Europe from being transformed into a
Europe-wide empire by Charles V’, while the English Queen Elizabeth I considered
that ‘the sultan could balance the Habsburgs in the East and consequently relieve
Spanish pressure upon England’, even arguing that ‘Protestantism and Islam were
equally hostile to “idolatry” ’.²³
The Ottoman sultans, for their part, keenly sought to influence their western
neighbours’ politics according to the interests of their empire, with the belief that
the European balance of power, which at the time meant the prevention of
Habsburg domination of its Protestant rivals, was ‘useful and perhaps sometimes
essential’ to maintaining their political sway.²⁴ In this period, what would later
prove to be a major source of weakness for the Ottoman Empire, the capitulations,
were introduced as commercial and legal privileges granted to European mer-
chants in Ottoman lands and seas. They ‘began their career’, to cite Özsu, ‘as
instruments of Ottoman, not European, imperialism’.²⁵ Ottoman officials made a
conscious effort to hamper the dominance of one state in Levantine trade by
favouring rival nations, pitting one Italian state against the other, and the British
and the Dutch against the French.²⁶With the capitulations, they also looked to tie
the major Powers of Europe to the political interests of the sultans.
All these dynamics gradually changed with the turn of the eighteenth century.
The equilibrium of military power that characterized the sultan’s relations with his
western neighbours was unsettled. A pivotal factor here was the rise of the
Romanovs in the northeast, but at play more decisively were a complex set of
domestic and international developments, such as (if I may simplify a little) the
detrimental socioeconomic repercussions of the swollen number of Ottoman
soldiers in peacetime, the dwindling economic importance of the sultan’s lands
after the discovery of the Americas, the advance of political, economic, military,
and technological modes of power in Europe largely thanks to new geographical
²³ Ibid. 73; Herbert Butterfield, ‘The Balance of Power’, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the
Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1966), 143; Roderic H. Davison, ‘Ottoman Diplomacy and its Legacy’, in Imperial Legacy,
174–99; Roderic H. Davison, ‘The Westernization of the Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth
Century’, in National and International Politics in the Middle East, ed. Edward Ingram (London:
Frank Cass, 1986), 54–65; Deringil, ‘The Turks’, 709.
²⁴ G. R. Berridge, ‘Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III’, in Ottoman Diplomacy:
Conventional or Unconventional, ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 114;
Yurdusev, ‘The Middle East Encounter’, 72–3.
²⁵ Özsu, ‘Ottoman Empire’, 446.
²⁶ On Ottoman imperialism through capitulations, see esp. Halil İnalcık, The Economic and Social
History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Halil İnalcık, ‘The
Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe’, in The Ottoman State and its Place in World
History, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 51–8.
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discoveries and the triangular (African slave) trade, and subsequently the uneven
and combined development of societies all over the globe which adversely
affected the Ottoman world.²⁷ Historians tend to agree that after the failed
siege of Vienna in 1683 the Ottoman military defeats at the hands of the armies
of the Holy League (Russia, Austria, Sweden), the conclusion of the Peace of
Carlowitz (1699), and the almost incessant loss of lands thereafter reflected a
shift from balance to imbalance of power in the Ottoman Empire’s relations with
her western neighbours.²⁸
*
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the emergence and expansion of the
Romanovs into Ottoman dominions pressured Istanbul to follow a more defensive
policy. The sultans gradually and grudgingly adhered to European norms and
notions in international law. According to Rifa’at Abbou-El-Haj, the negotiated
agreements of 1699 and 1700 between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League
‘implied in their territorial delimitations at least two modern principles of inter-
national law: acceptance of a political boundary and adherence to the concept of
the inviolability of the territory of a sovereign state.’²⁹ A Venetian participant in
the peace negotiations, Cavaliere Carlo Ruzzini, similarly noted: ‘It certainly was
an object of admiration of the world as well as a rare case in the memory of history
to see the Turks willing to submit to negotiation as equals with others and to
tolerate the slow formalities of that method.’³⁰ From then on, observing the
military discipline and technological advances of their western rivals, the
Ottoman elites admitted the importance of peace in their relations and acted in
²⁷ For sociological analyses on the subject, see e.g. Kerem Nişancıoğlu, ‘Combination as “Foreign
Policy”: The Intersocietal Origins of the Ottoman Empire’, in Historical Sociology and World History:
Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée, ed. Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 73–92; in the same volume, Jamie Allison, ‘Revisiting the
Transformation of the Nineteenth Century and the “Eastern Question”: Uneven and Combined
Development and the Ottoman Steppe’, 93–110. Even though a large body of work since the 18th c.
has argued that the power differentials between the Ottoman Empire and its Western neighbours
resulted mainly from an alleged ‘Ottoman decline’, this argument has recently been called into serious
question. Revisionist scholars have drawn attention to the repercussions for the sultan’s empire of
global uneven and combined development and the need to evaluate Ottoman power in juxtaposition to
her rivals, yet not simply as an organic unit in the Ibn Haldunic sense that rises, stagnates, and declines
in isolation from its international environment. E.g. Cemal Kafadar, ‘The Question of Ottoman
Decline’, Harvard Middle East and Islamic Review 4(1–2) (1999): 30–75; Jonathan Grant,
‘Rethinking the Ottoman Decline: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth
to Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of World History 10(1) (1999): 179–201; Caroline Finkel, ‘ “The
Treacherous Cleverness of Hindsight”: Myths of Ottoman Decay’, in Re-Orienting the Renaissance:
Cultural Exchange with the East, ed. Gerald M. Maclean (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),
148–74.
²⁸ Fikret Adanır, ‘Turkey’s Entry into the Concert of Europe’, European Review 13(3) (2005): 397;
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 24.
²⁹ R. A. Abou-El-Haj, ‘The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699–1703’, Journal
of the American Oriental Society 89 (1969): 467–75, at 468; also see his ‘Ottoman Attitudes toward
Peace Making: The Karlowitz Case’, Der Islam 51 (1974): 131–7; Adanır, ‘Turkey’s Entry’, 397.
³⁰ Abou-El-Haj, ‘Ottoman Attitudes’, 131.
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accordance with the norms of jus publicum Europeum. They would accept for the
first time ‘a Christian power as a mediator’ and ‘a neutral ground as the location of
negotiations’ in the early eighteenth century.³¹
At this juncture, the ‘Turk’ was still symbolic of danger in the European
imagination.³² This was no longer because of the military might they possessed,
however, but rather because of the alleged lack thereof. In 1715, an Austrian envoy
in Istanbul would (a little exaggeratedly) report that the empire of the sultan had
become so weak that ‘a Habsburg army could march with ease to the Ottoman
capital, and expel the Turks from Europe altogether’.³³ One might, at least prima
facie, conclude that the purported predicament of the Ottomans meant a reduced
threat for Austria at their southeastern borders. However, an altogether different
picture dictated European political considerations thence.
The fact that Russia contemplated the perceived feebleness of the Porte as an
opportunity ‘first to expand to the Black Sea, then into the Balkans, and finally to
Constantinople’ engendered for the courts of Europe, and—due to her geograph-
ical proximity—especially for Vienna, a new source of threat from the 1760s.³⁴
Afterwards, the fate of the Ottoman Empire became a matter of haggling among
the major Powers for sustaining the European balance of power, which now came
to mean also the prevention of Russian aggrandizements in the south or simply
her control over the Straits and the prized parts of the Levant and Asia Minor.
The Romanovs’ policy with respect to their southern neighbours changed
incongruously in accordance with the predilections of each monarch that came
to the throne.³⁵ Even though under Tsar Peter I (r. 1682–1725) an ‘eternal peace’
had been proclaimed between St Petersburg and Istanbul, during the reign of
Anna Ioannovna (r. 1730–40), the idea of complete destruction of the Ottoman
Empire gained traction among Russian military officers and rulers. When
Catherine II (r. 1762–95) ascended to the throne, she saw that the future of her
empire lay in the political and economic initiatives to be taken in the south.³⁶ The
annexation of the Crimea became a major security objective, both to suppress the
³¹ Adanır, ‘Turkey’s Entry’, 398–9; Fatma Müge Göçek, East Encounters West: France and the
Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
³² Çırakman, From the ‘Terror of the World’.
³³ Karl A. Roider, Jr, Austria’s Eastern Question (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982),
4–5.
³⁴ Ibid. 47–8, 194.
³⁵ Alexander Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society, 1815–1833
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 19–26.
³⁶ L. A. Nikiforov, Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii v Poslednie Godi Severnoj Vojny (Moscow:
Nishtadtskij Mir, 1959); V. P. Lyscov, Persidskij Pohod Petra I (Moscow: n.p., 1950); A. K. Bajov,
Russkaya Armiya v Tsarstvovanie Imperatricy Anny Ioannovny: Vojna Rossii s Turciej, V, 1736–1739
(St Petersburg: n.p., 1906), 199. For a recent account of Catherine’s southern policy, see Kelly O’Neill,
Claiming Crimea: A History of Catherine the Great’s Southern Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2017).
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endless raids of the Crimean Tatars and to gain a foothold at the Black Sea.³⁷
During her reign, border disputes in the Balkans, Ottoman opposition to the
partition of Poland, and the situation of the Crimea prompted two major wars
with the Sublime Porte in the second half of the eighteenth century.
The first of these wars, in 1768–74, saw Russian engagements in the eastern
Mediterranean coasts—our focal region in this book—in order to foment Mamluk
and Druze revolts against the Ottoman sultan. However, Russia’s interests lay
mainly at the northern Black Sea, and her ephemeral engagement in Egypt and
Syria barely created a global shift of political attention at the time. The signing of
the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of peace in 1774, by contrast, did. With this treaty,
Russia obtained several ports on the Black Sea, the right of free navigation for her
merchant marine in the Straits and the Mediterranean, favourable commercial
concessions for merchants, and ‘the right to make representations at the Porte on
behalf of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the sultan’.³⁸ The Crimea was granted
the status of an independent khanate, which Russia could now easily influence.
The 1774 treaty is usually considered in historical literature as the beginning of
the ‘Eastern Question’, though the term was possibly never used by the historical
actors in the late eighteenth century.³⁹ It is true that the new Russian foothold on
the shores of the Black Sea was viewed by her western neighbours, and particularly
by the Habsburgs, with dread, as a tragedy for Sultan Abdülhamid I (1725–89),
but also as a danger for European peace. The treaty’s provisions, as Johann
Amadeus von Thugut (1736–1818), the Austrian internuncio in Istanbul wrote,
contained ‘a grim portent for the future’. With their ports in the Black Sea, the
Russians could now launch ‘an amphibious assault’ directly at Istanbul, bringing
20,000 men in about 36 hours or even less, and end the Ottoman Empire before
the news of occupation reached Vienna, the nearest major European capital.⁴⁰ The
risk of destabilizing the power balance among major European Powers was more
present than ever. This was why Thugut would conclude that that the treaty was a
terrible blow not merely to the sultan’s empire but ‘to the rest of the world’.⁴¹
For Austria, the existence of a weaker Ottoman Empire as a southeastern
neighbour was welcome; but a strong Russia would threaten Austrian interests
even more gravely.⁴² The difficulty for the Court of Vienna lay in the fact that it
³⁷ E. I. Druzhinina, Kyuchuk-Kajnardzhijskij Mir 1774 goda (Мoscow: Ego Podgotovka i
Zaklyuchenie, 1955), 65, 66; S. F. Oreshkova, ‘Osmanskaya imperiya i Rossiya v svete ih geopolitiches-
kogo razgranicheniya’, Voprosy istorii. Ezhemesyachnyj zhurnal 3 (2005): 40.
³⁸ Adanır, ‘Turkey’s Entry’, 401. See also Roderick H. Davison, ‘ “Russian Skill and Turkish
Imbecility”: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered’, Slavic Review 35 (1976): 463–83; Brian
L. Davies, The Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774: Catherine II And The Ottoman Empire (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2016).
³⁹ Anderson, The Eastern Question; Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question.
⁴⁰ Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question, 152.
⁴¹ Thugut to Kaunitz, 3 Sept. 1774; cf. Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question, 152. ⁴² Ibid. 154.
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was too risky to fight the Romanovs for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. Yet at the same time the Habsburg rulers were aware that, if Austria
formed an alliance with the Romanovs and joined the partition of the sultan’s
empire, they could gain a strategic advantage over their Prussian rivals in the
north, which could spark a war with the latter.
This persistent dilemma formed the underlying element of what Roider calls
Austria’s emerging ‘Eastern Question’ during the course of the eighteenth century.
It soon became a question for the other major Powers to grapple with too: would
European Powers fight with each other for the destruction of the allegedly
precarious Ottoman Empire or collaborate in her partition and establish new,
more dangerous neighbourhoods with powerful rivals, as happened after the
partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795? Or would they neutralize the threat
by preventing the fall of the empire so that no European power could seize her
most prized domains and upset the European balance? How could all major
European Powers enjoy the same commercial privileges, given that the Russian
merchants had now acquired a privileged status? The Ottoman Empire came to be
seen at this juncture as an object of these strategic and economic considerations, as
the ‘acted upon’ whose fate was to be decided by European imperial rulers who
drastically lacked knowledge of her realities.
The Austrian response to these questions was to maintain the Ottoman terri-
torial status quo as much as possible, and contain Russian aggression toward
Istanbul. This could be obtained, not by confronting the Romanovs, but rather in
forming reluctant alliances against the Ottomans to hold in check Russian
aggrandizement.⁴³ For example, in 1782 the Austrian King Joseph II accepted
Empress Catherine II’s infamous ‘Greek Project’, i.e. the dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a new Greek empire in her place, with a
capital at ‘Constantinople’ and her grandson, Constantin, as the emperor. But
Joseph II vacillated, desiring the involvement of France. When the plan failed after
disagreements between the two Powers concerning their policy over Prussia, the
Austrian king was not overly disappointed.⁴⁴
The formula of cooperation to compromise belligerent competition was
implemented time and again, set a precedent for European inter-imperial politics
in the nineteenth century, and formed the core of the nascent transimperial
security culture that grew around the Eastern Question. The latter was hardly
ever a monolithic question. It came with multiple propositions, sub-questions,
and risks that some were ready to take and others dared not. In each historical
moment, it not only maintained pseudo-divisions between the so-called European
world and the Ottoman Empire, but also engendered the emergence of rival camps
among the ruling elites of the major Powers in Europe with respect to how to
⁴³ Ibid. 161. ⁴⁴ Ibid. 162, 164.
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tackle it. These differences of opinions were fundamental in understanding the
policies and key decisions of the Powers towards the Ottomans in the late
eighteenth century. They were fundamental also in understanding why France
decided to invade Egypt in 1798, and how it was framed as a ‘service’ to the
Ottoman sultan.
France and the Ottoman Empire
Franco-Ottoman relations in the eighteenth century were oftentimes character-
ized by mutual succour and warm gestures.⁴⁵ In 1739, for instance, after the
sultan’s disastrous war with Russia, the ambassador of France, the Marquis
L. S. Villeneuve (1675–1745), acted as an intermediary in concluding peace with
not too unfavourable conditions for Istanbul. The Ottoman administration had
then considered him almost a saviour, and agreed to grant France new capitula-
tions in 1740 that made the latter the Porte’s ‘most favoured nation’.⁴⁶ In 1768, it
was France that had encouraged Sultan Mustafa III to declare war on Russia in
order to have a say in the Polish question.⁴⁷ And in 1774, after the signing of the
humiliating Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, the Ottoman ministers had received the
support of Paris in slowing down the implementation of the treaty’s stipulations.⁴⁸
Yet it was also then, around the time of the 1774 Treaty, as major European
Powers came to believe more firmly in the inability of the Ottoman Empire to
defend herself against a strong European military, two opposing political groups
emerged within France, each putting forward diametrically opposite policies on
how best to deal with the perceived feebleness of the sultan’s empire. The so-called
‘clan interventionniste’ gathered around the Secrétaire d’État de la Marine and
advocated abandoning the Ottoman Empire and sharing her lands with Russia
and Austria, with France’s share consisting mainly of Egypt.⁴⁹
Previously, Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642) and the German philosopher
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) had both advocated the geopolitical and
strategic importance of establishing a strong French influence in Egypt, calling
the latter ‘the Netherlands of the East’ due to its strategic location as a maritime
⁴⁵ İsmail Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri (1789–1802) (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 9–22; Orville T. Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes:
French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719–1787 (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1982), 54.
⁴⁶ Oreshkova, ‘Osmanskaya imperiya i Rossiya’, 39; Özsu, ‘Ottoman Empire’, 434.
⁴⁷ Murphy, Comte de Vergennes, 151–61; Munro Price, Preserving the Monarchy: The Comte de
Vergennes, 1774–1787 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 8.
⁴⁸ Rodier, Austria’s Eastern Question, 152.
⁴⁹ Pascal W. Firges, ‘Gunners for the Sultan: French Revolutionary Efforts to Modernize the
Ottoman Military’, in Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History, ed. Pascal
Firges, Christian Roth, Tobias P. Graf, and Gülay Tulasoğlu (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 180.
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centre. Yet their suggestions had not been taken up by French strategists.⁵⁰ The
idea had been resuscitated in the mid-eighteenth century with the reports of the
two foreign ministers René Louis d’Argenson (1744–7) and especially Étienne-
François (duc) de Choiseul (1758–70), both of whom stressed the economic
importance of annexing this rich country.
The appeals for an invasion of Egypt found inspiration partly amid the mount-
ing food crises and economic and financial suffering in the south of France and in
part in the strategic considerations of Paris. As the historian Peter Gran rightly
argues, ‘France became increasingly interested in Egypt as a source of grain,
especially to supply the region of Marseille’, in times of poor harvests, inflation,
and grain crises.⁵¹ Yet at the same time, following the expansion of the Austrians
and Russians into the borders of the eastern Mediterranean, and especially after
the 1774 treaty, the European balance was close to being unsettled. Britain had
managed to compensate for the loss of its thirteen colonies in the Americas by the
conquest of India. And the diplomatic attention in Europe was recentring on a
region that stretched from Poland to Egypt, with the Ottoman Empire remaining
in between.⁵² France had to make her own move now.
The 1774 pamphlet written by the leader of the interventionists, the first clerk
of the Ministry of the Navy, Jean-Charles-Nicolas Amé de Saint-Didier (1740–81),
underscored that the French should occupy Egypt to conserve her trade in the
Levant.⁵³ Another outspoken member of the group was the famous Franco-
Hungarian military officer François baron de Tott (1733–93), who had served
under the authority of Sultan Mustafa III, reforming the Ottoman military during
the 1768–74 war.⁵⁴ After the war, disgruntled by the lack of gratitude shown to
him by the Ottomans, he had become a ‘prophet of the impending disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire’. In 1777, de Tott was appointed as inspector general of
the Levant, and after his trips to Egypt and Syria, he produced a report in 1779
which laid the basis of a project of the occupation Egypt. ‘Can we not’, he asked,
‘see with certainty the imminent destruction of the Turkish Empire in Europe?’
He supplied the answer himself: ‘No event was ever announced by any more
⁵⁰ Mémoire de Leibniz à Louis XIV, sur la conquête de l’Égypte, ed. M. de Hoffmans (Paris, 1840);
Albert Andal, Louis XIV et l’Égypte (Paris, 1889); Charles-Roux, Les Origines, 22; Jacques Frémeux, La
France et l’Islam depuis 1789 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991); Virginia Aksan, ‘Choiseul-
Gouffier at the Porte, 1784–1792’, Studies in Ottoman Diplomatic History 4 (1990): 17–34; Ferenc Toth,
‘Un Hongrois en Égypte avant Napoléon. La Mission secrète du baron de Tott’, Revue historique des
armées 270 (2013): 14.
⁵¹ Gran, Islamic, liv, 7–10, 15.
⁵² Henry Laurens, Les Origines intellectuelles de l’expédition d’Égypte (Istanbul: ISIS Yayımcılık,
1987), 174.
⁵³ Charles-Roux, Le Projet français, 18.
⁵⁴ Charles-Roux, Les Origines, 61–5; Virginia Aksan, ‘Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott:
Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760–1830’, International History
Review 24(2) (June 2002): 253–77.
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certain signs, and never more interested in the political views of France and the
interest of her commerce.’⁵⁵
The interventionists’ schemes were also inspired by the Austrian Emperor
Joseph II. During his trip to France in 1777, and then later in 1783 (to speak
about Catherine II’s ‘Greek Project’ scheme), in fear of a Russian threat after the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the Austrian emperor aimed to recruit
France to the plan by twice proposing the occupation of Egypt, the richest
province of the Ottoman Empire, to French authorities. However, Charles
Gravier de Vergennes (1719–87), the minister of foreign affairs (1774–87) and a
former ambassador to Istanbul (1755–68), stood in the way of the plan on both
occasions.⁵⁶
*
Vergennes was the leading figure of the second group which opposed intervention
in the Ottoman Empire and her dismemberment.⁵⁷ In fact, he himself also
believed that the Ottoman Empire was in a state of decline. He also knew that
French trade in the Levant needed to be conserved, especially in view of the fact
that, after the successive wars fought in the Americas, the Bourbon monarchy was
under serious fiscal pressure. Yet the solution he proposed diverged from that of
the interventionists. He argued for strengthening the sultan’s empire by employ-
ing ‘all possible means to dispose [the Ottomans] to seek salvation in the study of
science and particularly military art’.⁵⁸
In 1783, when Vergennes opposed French involvement in the ‘Greek Project’,
to lure him, Joseph II offered him Egypt. ‘Egypt!’ the Frenchman exclaimed. ‘We
would not accept those Muslims if you gave them to us. France neither wants nor
needs new conquests.’ If Austria annexed Ottoman territory to maintain the
power equilibrium with Russia, he continued, then Prussia would want to grasp
something to maintain ‘the equilibrium with Austria, and so on ad infinitum. The
stability of Europe would be completely undermined by such a chain reaction.’⁵⁹
Vergennes moreover argued that with the partition of the Ottoman Empire,
Russian control over her lands and the accompanying uncertainty it would bring
⁵⁵ Bibliothèque municipale de Versailles, série Mss L. 277 (Lebaudy Mss 4 120), Inspection générale
des Échelles du Levant et de Barbarie faite de l’ordre de Sa Majesté par Monsieur le Baron de Tott, tome I
f. 2–4; cf. Toth, ‘Un Hongrois’, 3. See also Christophe Farnaud, ‘Culture et politique. La Mission secrète
du baron de Tott au Levant (1776–1779)’ (Mémoire de maîtrise, université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris
IV), 1988), 86–8.
⁵⁶ ‘Réflexions sur l’empire ottomane’, 1793, AMAE MD 15/154.
⁵⁷ Munro, Preserving the Monarchy, 195; Murphy, Comte de Vergennes, 339; Jean-François
Labourdette, Vergennes. Ministre principal du Louis XVI (Paris: Desjonquères, 1990), 87–8.
⁵⁸ Pierre Duparc, Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France, vol. 29 (Paris:
Félix Alcan, 1969), 475–8.
⁵⁹ Robert Salomon, La Politique orientale de Vergennes (Crimea: Les Presses Modernes, 1935),
179–89, 194–5.
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stood against the commercial interests of France.⁶⁰ Indeed, on the eve of the
French Revolution of 1789, there were more than 80 French commercial
companies operating in the Ottoman territories thanks to the capitulatory privil-
eges that had been granted to France in the sixteenth century and that had been
revised in 1673 and 1740.⁶¹ He would not want to jeopardize their future by
immense political changes. Economic considerations, not strategic ones alone, had
always been and would continue to be an integral component of the Eastern
Question. Although this may seem obvious, as we will see in this book, their
weight was actually greater in decision-making processes than has been shown in
the literature to this day.
Under the influence and guidance of Vergennes, the French policy homed in on
the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. In this period, France sent military
advisers and instructors to Istanbul to teach at the Imperial Academy of Naval
Engineering, which, as we will see in Chapter 2, created politically influential
synergies between French and Ottoman officers and mathematicians.⁶² The
French also strove to prevent further Russian aggrandisement at the expense of
the Ottoman Empire.
But, in the second half of the 1780s, Vergennes’s hand was weakened by the
news from Egypt, where the local Mamluk beys Ibrahim and Murad, forming an
understanding with Britain, reportedly harassed French merchants, confiscating
or destroying their properties.⁶³ The foreign minister was showered with petitions
by merchants for French intervention, especially when the harvest in the autumn
of 1788 was ‘disastrously short’, and the grain shortage became critical.⁶⁴ Even
though his pressure on the Porte to take action against the Mamluk beys received a
positive response, and in 1786 Sultan Abdülhamid I sent his grand admiral to
Cairo on a punitive mission, the ‘interventionists’ could never make sense of his
tenacity. At the death of Vergennes in 1787, Constantin François de Chassebœuf
(1757–1820), another outspoken interventionist known for his famous travelogue
on Egypt and Syria under the pseudonym Volney, wrote: ‘By a bizarre prevention,
[Vergennes] tried to stifle anything that might be detrimental to the Ottomans.
I said a bizarre intervention, because it was without foundation . . . a bad policy,
because the menaces . . . of the authority do not prevent the truth from reaching
the light of day . . . ’⁶⁵
⁶⁰ Gouffier to Vergennes, 10 Jan. 1785, AMAE CP Turquie 172; Gouffier to Montmorin 10 May
1787, AMAE CP Turquie 175; cf. Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, 39. See also Orville T. Murphy, ‘Louis XVI and
the Pattern and Costs of a Policy Dilemma: Russia and the Eastern Question, 1787–1788’, Consortium
on Revolutionary Europe 1750–1850: Proceedings 16 (1986): 264–74.
⁶¹ Gouffier to Montmorin, 19 Sept. 1787, AMAE CP Turquie 176. For the Franco-Ottoman relations
at the time, see M. Le Comte de Saint-Priest, Mémoires sur l’ambassade de France en Turquie (Paris:
Librairie de la Société Asiatique, 1877).
⁶² Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 122; Firges, ‘Gunners for the Sultan’, 173.
⁶³ See Ch. 3 for more detail. ⁶⁴ Gran, Islamic Roots, 8.
⁶⁵ C. F. Volney, Considérations sur la guerre actuelle des Turcs (London (i.e. Paris), 1788), 9.
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Two camps—one interventionist, the other conservationist—thus emerged in
Paris with respect to how to tackle the alleged decadence of the Ottoman Empire.
In the end, the death of Vergennes paved the way not only for his opponents, but
also for the war that he had long worked to foil—the one between Empress
Catherine II, who had taken advantage of the 1783 uprising in the Crimea and
intervened to annex it, and Sultan Abdülhamid I, who had striven to prevent her
intervention. For one last time in her history, Austria joined Russia against the
Ottoman Sublime Porte. The French king Louis XVI then decided not to upset
relations with his ally and brother-in-law, Joseph II. As Vergennes was no longer
in the picture, France withdrew her military advisers from Istanbul.⁶⁶
The dominance of the interventionists in Paris was short-lived: only two years
later, the French Revolution of 1789 occurred and a new situation emerged after
the revolutionaries gained power. New alliances formed in Europe, including one
between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire (1790). Austria and Russia needed to
reposition their armies at the eastern borders of republican France and in the
soon-to-be-partitioned Poland. Only months before the outbreak of the War of
the First Coalition in April 1792, peace treaties were concluded between Istanbul
and Vienna in Sistova in August 1791 and then between St Petersburg and
Istanbul in Iasi in January 1792.⁶⁷ But not before Austria and Russia ventured
on one last, and successful, offensive that gave them the upper hand in the peace
negotiations.
The Porte recognized the Russian annexation of the Crimea, which led many
contemporary Russian strategists to believe that the tsar’s empire had now reached
convenient geographical boundaries that no longer entailed expansionism toward
the south.⁶⁸ But, as we will see in Chapter 2, in Istanbul, losing the Crimea to
Russia left the Ottoman rulers with an immense desire for revenge on Russia with
the support of France. To this end, the Porte hoped to form an alliance with Paris
and act together in the long run. But French diplomacy would turn in a very
different direction by the end of the decade.
Preparation for the Egyptian Expedition
In fact, there was ample ground for the establishment of a solid Franco-Ottoman
alliance in the early 1790s. One immediate effect of the French Revolution of 1789
on Franco-Ottoman relations was a new episode of rapprochement.⁶⁹ In the early
⁶⁶ Firges, ‘Gunners for the Sultan’, 174.
⁶⁷ Ibid. 172. See also Karl A. Roider, Jr, Baron Thugut and Austria’s Response to the French
Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 262–92.
⁶⁸ Bitis, Russia, 21–2.
⁶⁹ Kemal Beydilli, ‘III. Selim: Aydınlanmış Hükümdar’, in Nizam-ı Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e
III. Selim ve Dönemi, ed. Seyfi Kenan (Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2010), 45–6.
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1790s, and more specifically in 1793, a large number of French military instruct-
ors, technicians, architects, artillery experts, caulkers, and carpenters moved to
Istanbul to help Sultan Selim III’s reform programme that was under way in the
Ottoman imperial capital.⁷⁰ Some of these specialists had been made redundant
during the revolutionary fervour in France and were looking for jobs elsewhere.
Others were deliberately sent by the new French regime to aid the sultan, help him
build a new fleet, improve city fortresses, and train his ‘New Order’ army.⁷¹
With a letter dated 17 September 1795, the young Corsican Bonaparte also
applied for a position in Istanbul to tutor the new Ottoman army—the very
soldiers that his men would fight half a decade later. But his application was
turned down, as the French government preferred to use his outstanding skills for
the more immediate interests of the Republic.⁷²
In the mid-1790s, Istanbul became a microcosm of European wars, where the
diplomats of belligerent states in the ambassadorial district competed with each
other to gain the favour of the sultan against their enemies. The French diplomats
enjoyed greater sympathy and interest from the Ottoman cabinet in part due to
Sultan Selim III’s admiration for France and partly because the enemy of the
Porte’s enemy (Russia) was seen as a greater friend than others. For its part, the
new republican regime in Paris looked to form closer diplomatic relations with
Istanbul because France was diplomatically isolated in the world. Twenty of
the 23 French foreign legations were terminated between early 1792 and late
1793, and her diplomatic representation was confined to the Ottoman Empire,
Switzerland and the United States.⁷³
This was why, the Republic’s first mission to the Porte had in view the
establishment of both defensive and offensive alliances with Sultan Selim III.⁷⁴
Due to the persistence of the Austro-Russian threat, which the sultan hoped to
thwart with the support of friendly Powers like France, a powerful ally could well
serve the security of the Ottoman Empire also. But at the same time, having just
signed peace treaties with Austria and Russia, the sultan was reluctant to be drawn
into European wars. In 1795, therefore, the Ottoman Empire declared neutrality
for the first time in her history, continuing the passive, non-belligerent policy that
she had employed for decades but this time looking to guarantee it by inter-
national public law.
Selim III re-evaluated his policy in May 1796 when Austria and Russia signed a
new alliance treaty earlier in the same year.⁷⁵ France had come up with new, highly
⁷⁰ See Ch. 2. ⁷¹ Firges, ‘Gunners’, 176. ⁷² Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, 162.
⁷³ Firges, French Revolutionaries, 1, 20. ⁷⁴ Firges, ‘Gunners’, 174.
⁷⁵ Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, 127, 132; E. de Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople. La Politique
orientale de la Révolution française II (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1927); Fatih Yeşil, ‘III. Selim Döneminde Bir
Osmanlı Bürokratı: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’ (master’s thesis, Hacettepe University, Ankara, 2002),
212–13; cf. Kahraman Şakul, ‘An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the Levant’,
(doctoral thesis, Georgetown University, 2009), 58.
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favourable terms for the sultan’s empire. It would be a purely defensive alliance.
The Porte would not be liable to intervene in the war between France and Britain,
while ‘in case of an attack on Ottoman territory, France would either send an army
of 30,000 men, or eight ships of the line and twelve frigates, or a corresponding
amount of subsidies.’⁷⁶ In return, France would be granted further commercial
advantages, including trade in the Black Sea, that would upend the privileged
standing of the Russian merchants.⁷⁷
However, when, in Paris, the Directory regime took power, it decided not to
ratify the treaty on the grounds that war with Russia would be too costly while
France would receive no support in the fight against Britain. The drift between the
courts of Paris and Istanbul began at this point. The new foreign minister,
Charles-François Delacroix (1795–7) found ‘neither equality nor reciprocity’ in
such a treaty, just as France had proved her military strength and turned into an
expansionist power in Europe.⁷⁸
The successive victories France obtained against the first Coalition in this
period had led to an adjustment of her policies toward the Porte. After the signing
of the Peace of Campo Formio in October 1797, France turned the Low Countries,
a large portion of northern Italy, and the Adriatic outpost of Corfu into client
states. In the following months, she overran the Papal States, Switzerland and the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in quick succession. And thanks to the alliance with
Spain, the Directory had, with the exception of Portugal, managed to isolate
Britain. In early 1798, the French leadership came to a crossroads: should they
make use of Britain’s isolation, adopt a strictly continental policy and acquire
further gains in Europe? Or should they pursue a colonial policy with an overseas
expedition?
*
Pivotal in the resolution of this question was the return of Charles Talleyrand
from exile in England and America in late 1796, and his appointment as the
new foreign minister in July 1797.⁷⁹ Even though all members of the Directory
ruled out the ‘colonial policy’ because the French navy was too weak to cope
with a potential British naval offensive, the new foreign minister considered
overseas expansion the solution to domestic disorder. As the former bishop of
Autun, Talleyrand was himself a product of the ancien régime. He favoured order,
restraint, and balance in Europe, and to this end envisaged an Anglo-French
entente that would seal peace and security in Europe.
⁷⁶ Firges, ‘Gunners for the Sultan’, 179. ⁷⁷ Marcère, Une ambassade, 263.
⁷⁸ Firges, ‘Gunners’, 179–80. See also Bailey Stone, Reinterpreting the French Revolution: A Global-
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 219–20, 232.
⁷⁹ Philip G. Dwyer, Talleyrand (Harlow: Longman, 2002), 60–61.
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Any excessive expansion in the continent beyond the natural limits of France,
he believed, would endanger the European equipoise. He also argued that the
colonies were ‘the only real and permanent sources of power’, and that, with
‘mutual territorial and colonial concessions’, a compromise could be obtained
with Britain. He wanted moderation and peace, and credulously maintained that
both Britain and the Sublime Porte could be persuaded to approve France’s next
démarche: the invasion of Egypt.
Inspired by the ideas of the interventionist duc de Choiseul, who had previously
suggested the cession of Egypt to France by the Porte, Talleyrand pointed out in a
widely popularized speech in July 1797 (later published under the title Essai sur les
avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles dans les circonstances présentes) that Egypt
was a most suitable country for such colonial expansion.⁸⁰ Since 1793, the political
isolation of France had led to her exclusion from world trade. The south of France
was dependent on Egyptian wheat, but, due to a domestic recession, the French
merchants were unable to pay the costs of trade. In the mid-1790s, as the Mamluk
beys Murad and Ibrahim returned to Cairo and controlled the customs of the
country, and when they pillaged the supplies of the indebted French merchants’
supplies, pressuring them out of the wheat trade, an active lobbying campaign had
begun once again for the French invasion of Egypt.⁸¹
The campaign was led by prominent merchant Charles Magellon, who returned
to Paris in 1795, and addressed to Talleyrand a memorandum (Mémoire sur
l’Égypte) in which he detailed the agricultural opportunities for France in
Egypt.⁸² At first, M. Dubois-Thainville was sent to Egypt to settle differences
with Mamluk Murad and Ibrahim Beys, but the mission yielded no results. The
French merchants’ alert that the British were negotiating trade and transit priv-
ileges with the Mamluks against French interests raised eyebrows in the
Directory.⁸³ The lobby of merchants and diplomats confirmed that an expedition
to Egypt was now a matter of ever greater necessity.⁸⁴
At the same time, since late summer 1797, after his success in Italy, General
Bonaparte had been indulging in dreams of expanding his victories in the ‘Orient’.
He then began an eager correspondence with Talleyrand. Influenced since his
youth by the rich interventionist literature in favour of the occupation of Egypt,
Bonaparte too was persuaded that the dissolution of the sultan’s empire was
⁸⁰ Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Essai sur les avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles dans les
circonstances présentes (Paris: chez Baudoin, Imprimeur de l’Institut National, 1797), 14.
⁸¹ See Ch. 3.
⁸² Gran, Islamic Roots, 10. See also Isa Blumi, Foundations of Modernity: Human Agency and the
Imperial State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 22–4.
⁸³ David Kimche, ‘The Opening of the Red Sea to British Ships in the Late Eighteenth Century’,
Middle Eastern Studies, 7(1) (Jan. 1972): 63–71; Silvera, ‘Egypt and the French Revolution’, 309.
⁸⁴ Gran, Islamic Roots, 10.
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near.⁸⁵ In August–September 1797, when he spoke of the plan to invade Egypt for
the first time, he appeared to view the expedition as part of the greater idea that
was the partition of the ‘declining’ Ottoman Empire.⁸⁶
After the French annexation of the Ionian Islands, he believed that France had to
play a more proactive role in the Ottoman world. He made contacts with dissenting
Ottoman pașas (such as Ali Pașa of Janina) for potential future collaboration.⁸⁷ The
situation of that vast empire, he asserted, ‘puts us under the obligation of thinking
early to take steps to preserve our commerce in the Levant’.⁸⁸
What withheld France from acting straightaway was the fact that Louis Marie
de La Révellière-Lépeaux (1753–1824), the powerful leader of the Directory
regime in Paris, was still unconvinced. He was in favour of a direct attack on
their immediate enemies (Britain), finding it difficult to fathom why France
should weaken her armies, risk the disappearance of her last vessels, and break
off relations with the Porte.⁸⁹
It remained for Talleyrand, therefore, to persuade the Directory to defer the
planned attack on Britain and focus instead on an expedition to Egypt. In an
unsolicited report sent in January 1798, the French foreign minister argued that
their armies would be warmly received in Egypt for emancipating the local
inhabitants from the yoke of the Mamluks. And the Porte would be convinced
with a special mission that would show French dexterity in solving the Mamluk
problem. In another report in February, Talleyrand wrote that the French occu-
pation of Ottoman Egypt could be justified in relation to the partitions of Poland,
which had been endorsed by Britain and the other European Powers.⁹⁰ Years later
he added with hindsight in his memoirs that France was seeking compensation
then, even if it was at the Porte’s expense. She was seeking only to redress the
European balance.⁹¹
As their correspondence in late 1797 and early 1798 suggests, Talleyrand and
Bonaparte saw multiple benefits in the expedition plan. By capturing Egypt, the
Republic would control the shortest transportation and communication routes
between the British mainland and India. They would cut the ‘jugular vein’ of the
British Empire. The invasion would enhance the commercial relations between
France and the Levant, which had become more significant for the Republic. The
⁸⁵ Bonaparte reportedly read Volney’s travelogues in the Levant. C. F. de Volney, Voyage en Égypte
et en Syrie pendany les annees 17783, 174 & 1785 (Paris: Voland, 1787); Bainville, ‘L’Expédition
française’, 136; Thomas Kaiser, ‘The Evil Empire? The Debate on Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-
Century French Political Culture’, Journal of Modern History 72(1) (2000): 18–22; Christopher Herold,
Bonaparte in Egypt (New York: Pen & Sword Books, 1962), 16.
⁸⁶ Philipp G. Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power, 1769–1799 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 338; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 16 Aug. and 13 Sept. 1797, in Charles-Roux, Les Origines,
297, 298, 300.
⁸⁷ Mikaberidze, Napoleonic Wars, 73. ⁸⁸ Ibid.
⁸⁹ Michel Poniatowski, Talleyrand et le Directoire (Paris: Librairie académique Perrin, 1982), 446.
⁹⁰ Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 16 Aug. and 13 Sept. 1797, in Charles-Roux, Les Origines, 300.
⁹¹ Duc de Broglie (ed.), Mémoires du prince de Talleyrand, vol 1. (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1891), 259.
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occupation of Italy, Albania, and the Ionian Islands in 1797 had made it a
neighbour of the Ottoman Empire. Invading Egypt would enable the dismissal
of the Mamluk beys, who, the Directory thought, were hampering French trade
and risking domestic stability, as the south of France was in the brink of starvation
due to poor harvests, and the Republic was isolated from world trade. Moreover,
Talleyrand and Bonaparte wrote to each other that the invasion would permit the
internal development of Egypt, since the toiling yet docile fellahin (Egyptian
peasants) would finally be freed from the Mamluk yoke. France would bring
‘civilization’ and prosperity, they believed.⁹² In return, she would gain a new key
colony, with resources that could replace St Dominique and the Antilles in the
rivalry with Britain.⁹³
Perhaps most importantly, the occupation of Egypt would be the centrepiece
for the realization of a dream shared by Talleyrand and Bonaparte: the transform-
ation of the Mediterranean into a French lake through satellite republics as a
colonial zone as well as a buffer against the British navy.⁹⁴ The overarching idea of
the expedition plan was to wither away the threats posed by Britain to the global
imperial interests of France.⁹⁵ In Bonaparte’s view ‘a descent upon Egypt’ was the
only means for attaining French dominance over the Mediterranean.⁹⁶ To
Talleyrand, ‘[o]nce the French controlled the ports of Italy, Corfu, Malta and
Alexandria’, their objective would be obtained.⁹⁷ This would endow France not
only with greater leverage in the competition against Britain. With a foothold in
the Ionian Islands and North Africa, it would also give her a firmer grip on the
future of the Ottoman Empire. Paris would be able to open ‘a route to India via
the Red Sea, and [recover] Pondicherry and other French possessions on the
Corromandel and Malabar coasts’.⁹⁸ Egypt, as a colony, would replace the prod-
ucts of the West Indies and, as a route, give France the commerce of India—‘for
everything in commerce resides in time, and time would give us five trips against
three by the ordinary road’.⁹⁹
Like Vergennes, Talleyrand believed that the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire was near. Again, like Vergennes, he was against any radical move that
would break apart European balance for the spoils of the ‘Turkish empire’. But,
unlike Vergennes, he called for moderation in aggression, seeking the middle way
between the realist ideas of the interventionists, who focused on the strategic and
⁹² Charles-Roux, Les Origines, 327–8.
⁹³ Ibid. 2, 303. See also Gaultier-Kurhan,Méhémet Ali, 19;Mémoires du maréchal Marmont, duc de
Raguse de 1792 à 1841, vol. 1 (Paris: Halle, 1857), 350; M. le Cte Boulay de la Meurthe, La Directoire et
l’expédition d’Égypte (Paris: Victor Palme, 1880), 12–13.
⁹⁴ Talleyrand, Essai, 14.
⁹⁵ Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994), 179.
⁹⁶ Silvera, ‘Egypt’, 310. ⁹⁷ Marcère, Une ambassade, 357.
⁹⁸ Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 14.
⁹⁹ Talleyrand to Bonaparte, 23 Sept. 1797; cf. Charles-Roux, Les Origines, 304.
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economic benefits, and the postulations of the opponents of the expedition—
previously Vergennes and his entourage and now the Directory, however different
their reckonings were. He himself could see the risks of a war with the Porte and
the participation of other powers in this war in the event that the expedition went
through. This was why, as he wrote to Bonaparte in September 1797 after reading
the latter’s ambitions in the East, he presented the expedition as one ‘for the
[Sublime] Porte’, and against what he believed to be the chronic Russian and
British intrigues in this ‘unfortunate country’. It would be ‘[u]n si grand service
rendu aux Turcs’.¹⁰⁰
Talleyrand saw great benefits for Selim III and the indigenous fellahin in the
French occupation of Egypt, and persuaded himself that the sultan knew about
British and Russian intrigues, that the Mamluks were a menace to his own rule as
much as to the French trade, and that Selim would appreciate such a pre-emptive
assault by a friendly and strong ally ‘to keep the province from falling into enemy
hands’.¹⁰¹ He framed the plan as a gift from France to Selim. He even suggested
going to Istanbul himself to talk to the sultan and explain to him the reasons of the
expedition when it was already under way.
In the end, Talleyrand’s moderate aggressionism received endorsement, and
on 5 March 1798, when the Directory regime confirmed the expedition plan,
Bonaparte was instructed to ‘maintain, as much as it is in his powers to maintain
good understanding with the [ultan]’.¹⁰² As Cole correctly puts it, Talleyrand
became the first, ‘but by no means the last, Western politician to overestimate the
gratitude that would be generated among a Middle Eastern people by a foreign
military occupation’.¹⁰³ As a matter of fact, the French plan was not received with
appreciation in Istanbul at all. When the news of the expedition broke in the
Ottoman imperial capital, Sultan Selim III burst into anger in the Topkapı Palace.
¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 303. Emphasis mine. ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
¹⁰² Instructions pour Bonaparte, 12 Apr. 1798, in Albert Sorel, L’Europe et la révolution français,
vol. 5 (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1904), 301; also in Firges, French Revolutionaries, 90.
¹⁰³ Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 14.
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2
The Circle of Justice and the
Napoleonic Wars
What implications did the French expedition to Egypt in 1798 have for the
wider Ottoman world? In the rich literature on the history of Bonaparte’s enter-
prise, this question has usually received little attention.¹ This is unfortunate,
because taking into account how Sultan Selim III and his ministers perceived
and reacted to the French venture enables us to see the limits of the French
imperial vision and knowledge of the ‘Orient’ as well as the workings of the diverse
relational dynamics that constituted the unfolding Eastern Question.
We discussed in Chapter 1 the eighteenth-century inter-imperial dynamics
among the European Powers to some extent, as well as the intra-elite debates in
France with respect to how to deal with the alleged feebleness of the Ottoman
Empire. Here we will switch our focus to the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul. After the
humiliating defeats at the hands of Romanovs and Habsburgs since the late
seventeenth century, and the mounting domestic unrest in different areas of
their empire, the Ottoman sultans and their ministers and advisers also came to
believe that their empire was decadent. How to deal with her alleged feebleness
was first and foremost an Ottoman question.
The Ottoman response to this was an attempt to revive their empire by means
of reforms that would ensure the efficacy of her guiding principle, the ‘circle of
justice’ (daire-i adalet). The ruling elites in Istanbul differed among themselves as
to how to do this. Yet by the 1790s they realized that the success of domestic
reform required redefining the position of their empire in the world, warranting
her standing among the major European Powers, and reconstructing her identity
as an eternal polity—not one doomed to fall.
Consequently, Ottoman ministers altered both the tone and nature of their
diplomacy with their European neighbours. The sultan’s empire sprang up in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries not only as a stationary object, as
traditional, Europe-centric analyses of the unfolding Eastern Question would have
¹ The few exceptions are Enver Z. Karal, Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797–1802)
(Istanbul: Milli Mecmua Basımevi, 1938); Faruk Bilici, L’expédition d’Égypte, Alexandrie et les
Ottomans. L’Autre Histoire (Paris: Boccard, 2017); T. Y. Kobishanov, ‘Dzhihad–Neveruyushhim,
Soyuz–Nevernym. Vysokaya Porta v Pervye Mesyacy Posle Francuzskogo Vtorzheniya v Egipet’,
Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta Vostokovedenie 13(2) (2010): 1–19; Şakul, ‘Global’.
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us believe.² The Porte actively sought to define the empire’s standing in the global
imperial (dis)order of the time while at the same time looking to regenerate her by
means of an ambitious reform programme. Yet realization of one was dependent
on the attainment of the other. The years surrounding the French expedition to
Egypt in 1798, its run-up and aftermath, were a vivid testament to this.
The Circle of Justice
Nine years before France’s venture in Egypt began, a new sultan, Selim III
(1761–1808), had ascended the throne in Istanbul in April 1789 to great expect-
ations. Many wished that he would be the next cihangir, or the ‘warrior-conqueror’
sultan, who could finally upend the misfortunes of the ‘Well-Protected Domains’, as
the Ottomans called their empire. As a matter of fact, Selim was different, but
arguably too different to possess the qualities of a ‘conqueror sultan’. His social
graces, lenience, aversion to violence, and intellectualism—traits that characterized
few other sultans—have led historians to describe him as an exceptional monarch,
and an ‘enlightened’ ruler.³ He was perhaps many things, but a warrior he was not.
Selim’s singular features are usually attributed to his unusual upbringing as a
young şehzade (prince). Before his birth no heir had been born for the Ottoman
dynasty for 36 years. During the eighteenth century, the imperial palace had been
struck by epidemic illnesses (mainly smallpox) which had claimed the life of two
of his cousins. Since his childhood, he had therefore been seen by the inhabitants
of the Topkapı Palace as the rescuer of the dynasty.
After his father, Mustafa III, passed away in 1774, the young şehzade was
brought up with great care, which sometimes entailed breaches of palace customs.
In Ottoman political culture, şehzades remained in seclusion in their room in the
imperial palace until their rise to power, in order to preclude any dynasty conflicts.
However, his uncle Sultan Abdülhamid I, who had himself been locked in for
40 years, permitted Selim a degree of freedom, letting the şehzade spend time outside
his room. Moreover, contrary to the customary practices, his mother, Mihrişah
Sultan, was allowed to remain with him in the Topkapı Palace after his father died.
These not only provided Selim with emotional support and a fine education but
also let him be in touch with prominent Ottoman bureaucrats and men of letters
of his time who informed him about the politics of the empire as well as the wider
world. He found the opportunity to nurture interest in poetry (writing poems
under the pseudonym İlhâmî), and in oriental and western music, as well as in
the Islamic arts of hat and ta’lik. He attended parties with European diplomats in
² See the Introduction for a discussion of the literature.
³ Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 27. See also Aysel Yıldız, ‘ “Louis the XVI of the Turks”: The Character of a
Sultan’, Middle Eastern Studies 50(2) (2014): 272–90.
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Pera and the Belgrade forests, a practice he continued after ascending to the
throne. His time of liberty came to an abrupt end in 1785, when his name was
implicated in a conspiracy against his uncle and he was consequently placed in
confinement. But he was given limited freedom again once his innocence was
proven the following year.⁴
As of 1786, with the help of the French ambassador Marie-Gabriel-Florent-
August de Choiseul-Gouffier (1752–1817), the seasoned Ottoman statesman
Figure 1. Selim III’s childhood. Topkapı Palace Museum, 17/117
⁴ Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 29; see also Ahmed Cevdet Paşa Tarihi, vol. 4 (İstanbul 1309 [1891]), 270–71.
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Ebûbekir Râtib Efendi (1750–99), and his butler, Ishak Efendi, Selim began to
exchange letters with the French King Louis XVI on statecraft, the arts of war, and
social and political institutions.⁵ His chief aim in these exchanges was to acquire
for his empire in the long run a reliable ally in her rivalry against Russia, which he
hinted at many times.⁶ He once told Choiseul-Gouffier, perhaps with great
naivety, that in face of an enemy such as Russia, he would ‘always be friendly to
[his] friends and even-handed with [his] enemies, and with the help of God the
Exalted, [he] would conform all [his] acts to this principle.’⁷ Yet his correspond-
ence with the French king became as much a source of frustration as inspiration
for the şehzade. He was offended when he sensed a patronizing tone in the king’s
letters. He begrudged the lack of any mention of a potential alliance between the
Porte and Paris. He was even more resentful against Louis XVI’s obvious advice to
wage war against Russia only if and after he reformed his empire and especially
improved his military.⁸ The şehzade drafted a reply that showed his discontent:
‘Do you think I am a child . . . a blindfolded falcon in a cage?’ alluding to his life of
seclusion.⁹
This exchange of letters had no considerable adverse effect on his admiration
for Louis XVI though. It instead increased his willingness to ascend the throne at
once. By the time he was crowned, Selim had become most eager to reform his
military, form alliances against his Habsburg and Romanov rivals, and reconquer
the territories that the Porte had lost during the eighteenth century, especially the
Crimea.¹⁰ Yet, in 1789, he had to make a choice first: would he end the ongoing
war with Russian and Austria and start the reforms he wanted to undertake? Or
would he just continue the war?
The loss of the Crimea was vital for the defence of Istanbul and the mainten-
ance of the Ottoman Empire, as it signified the fall of an important buffer region
between Russia and the imperial capital. And since in Ottoman political tradition,
as well as in Qur’anic teaching, Muslims were not to abandon their territorial
possessions to the ‘infidels’, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the fighting
continued. In 1790, Selim wrote to his commanders that until the capture of the
Crimea, no true peace was to be concluded with Russia.¹¹ But his military power
would not suffice for this, and he would in the end surrender more lands.
Embittered by losing the Crimea and further posts along the Black Sea shores,
⁵ Kemal Beydilli, ‘Şehzade Elçisi Safiye Sultanzade İshak Bey’, İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi 3 (1999):
73–81; Salih Münir Paşa, Louis XVI et Sultan Selim III (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1912); Yıldız, ‘The
Character’, 277; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ‘Selim III’un Veliaht İken Fransa Kralı Lui XVI ile
Muhabereleri’, Belleten 2(5–6) (1938): 191–2.
⁶ Yıldız, ‘The Character’, 280. ⁷ Ibid. ⁸ Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 30.
⁹ Yıldız, ‘The Character’, 281.
¹⁰ From Choiseul-Gouffier to Vergennes, 10 July 1786, AMAE CP Turquie 174; cf. Yıldız, ‘The
Character’, 272; Şakul, ‘Global’, 9–10. Ali Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman
Order in the Age of Revolutions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 19.
¹¹ Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hat-ti Hümâyunları, Nizam-ı Cedit, 1789–1807 (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 43.
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Selim dedicated his 18-year reign to ensuring the ‘security’ (emniyet) of his empire
against the Russian threat in the Black Sea.¹² It was this quest for security that
would cost him first his throne, and then his life.
*
In the end the utmost duty of an Ottoman sultan was to maintain domestic order
and tranquillity, and shield his empire from external threats. Since the founding
decades of their five-centuries-old imperial system, the Ottoman elites had con-
sidered the ‘Well-Protected Domains’ as ‘a walled fortress giving protection from
[alien] attack’ and bringing security (hifz-u hirâset) to lands and seas as well as to
the variety of subjects with an ‘ever-victorious army’ in the timeless struggle
between dâr-ul harb (the territories of war) and dâr-ul Islam (the territories
of Islam).¹³
In late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century parlance, besides emniyet, the terms
asayiş (order, public tranquillity, repose), te’min (protection), and nizam (order)
were used interchangeably to refer to the maintenance of state and public security
within the walls of the ‘Well-Protected Domains’.¹⁴ These could be obtained by
way of the enforcement of law which was based on a dual system that harmonized
the sultanic laws (kanun) with the Islamic law (shari’a, according to the Hanafi
school of law) and the operations of social control that were directed at the
identification and neutralization of perceived threats (such as dissent and revolts)
and their suppression.¹⁵ For all these purposes the Porte, like other states, utilized
police and counterintelligence operations.¹⁶ In the imperial capital and major
¹² Ibid. 36–7.
¹³ My heartfelt thanks to Colin Imber, who drew my attention to the notion of hifz-u hiraset as a
premodern counterpart of ‘security’ in Ottoman political thought: Colin Imber to Ozan Ozavci, e-mail
correspondence dated 9 Nov. 2017. There is considerable need for a study on early Islamic as well as
early Ottoman conceptions of security, which is beyond our scope here. A quick catalogue search in the
Ottoman imperial and the Topkapı Palace archives suggests that the word emniyet, the contemporary
counterpart of security, freedom from fear, safety, or the police in the Turkish language, appears in
archival documents in as early as the 1550s. It appears usually within the phrase ‘emniyet ve selamet’
(security and peace).
¹⁴ Maurus Reinkowkski, ‘The State’s Security and the Subject’s Prosperity: Notions of Order in
Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)’, in Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman
Rhetoric of State Power, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 200.
See also Engin Akarlı, ‘Maslaha from “Common Good” to “Raison d’État” in the Experience of Istanbul
Artisans, 1730–1840’ in ‘Hoca Allame puits de science: Essays in Honour of Kemal H. Karpat, ed. Kaan
Durukan, Robert Zens, and Akile Durukan Zorlu (Istanbul: Isis, 2010), 63–79.
¹⁵ While the sultanic laws were generated through legislation issued by the sultans, the Islamic laws
‘served as the sole base for adjudicating issues concerning individual rights, family law, inheritance,
commerce, and the rights of foreign subjects’. The highest judiciary authorities issued fatwas that
invested the sultans ‘with authority to legislate based on the principle of protecting the public interest’.
See Colin Imber, Ebu’s-Su’ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1997), 622; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Short History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008), 18.
¹⁶ Karen Barkey, ‘In Different Times: Scheduling and Social Control in the Ottoman Empire, 1550 to
1650’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 38(3) (1996): 460–83; Dejanirah Couto, ‘Spying in
the Ottoman Empire: Sixteenth-Century Encrypted Correspondence’, in Cultural Exchange in Early
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towns, the Janissaries—an army unit that originated from a small section of war
captives in the fourteenth century and then gradually became the backbone of the
Ottoman military—served as ‘guardians of the city, responsible for . . . policing
order’ along with other units in the imperial army such as the navy, cebeciler
(armourers), and topçular (gunners).¹⁷ In the countryside, imperial order was
usually entrusted to beneficiary office-holders, who were responsible for collecting
taxes from administrative units assigned to them (timar or zeamet), though,
paradoxically enough, bandits were sometimes also used as intermediaries to
supply imperial security.¹⁸ Here there was limited policing, with the exception
of the immediate surroundings of sipahi cavalries and military garrisons.¹⁹ Local
kadıs appointed by the ulema (Islamic clerics) were in charge of judicial affairs.
Zimmîs (non-Muslim believers of the Book) were placed under imperial protec-
tion with special contracts (zimmet and aman).
In the event that the zimmîs violated the zimmî pact by rebelling against the
sultans, they were declared harbîs (enemies) that waged (at least in theory) an
attack on the imperial state.²⁰ The zimmîs were accommodated by imperial
decrees on taxation and criminal law, which formed the basis of its millet
system—a system of self-management for zimmîs by their own religious author-
ities who undertook the tasks, amidst others, of education, religious justice, and
social security.²¹ The rights of foreign residents or travellers (müstemins) were
secured through capitulations, which, as of the sixteenth century, granted them
aman (safe conduct), ahdnames, and berats, i.e. ‘privileges of residence on or
safe passage through Ottoman territory, made immune from the jurisdiction of
Modern Europe, vol. 3: Correspondence and Cultural Exchange in Europe, 1400–1700, ed. Francisco
Bethencourt and Florike Egmond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 274–312; Francis
Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the
Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1974); Fatih Yeşil, ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman Diplomatic Mind: The Emergence of the
Licences Espionage’, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 101 (2011): 467–79; Betül
Başaran, Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Between
Crisis and Order (Leiden, Boston: E. J. Brill, 2014).
¹⁷ Cemal Kafadar, Kim var imiş biz burada yog iken (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009), 29–37; Gülay
Yılmaz, ‘Blurred Boundaries Between Soldiers and Civilians: Artisan Janissaries in Seventeenth Century
Istanbul’, in Bread from the Lion’s Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities, ed.
Suraiya Faroqhi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 175–93; cf. Ali Yaycıoğlu, ‘Guarding Traditions
and Laws—Disciplining Bodies and Souls: Tradition, Religion and Science in the Age of Ottoman
Reform’, Modern Asian Studies 52(5) (Sept. 2018): 1549; see also Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare
1500–1700 (London: University College London Press, 1999), 16–17. On the military units that were in
charge of the public order and policing until the 1820s, see Ramazan Fındıklı, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde
Güvenlik ve Polis’, in Osmanlı, vol. 6, ed. Güler Eren, Kemal Çiçek, and Cem Oğuz (Ankara: Yeni
Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 295–300.
¹⁸ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 25. For an inspiring study, see Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The
Ottoman Route to State Centralisation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
¹⁹ Douglas A. Howard, A History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2017), 59–60.
²⁰ Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged (Harlow: Pearson, 2007), 299.
²¹ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 24–5.
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Islamic courts, and provided with the benefit of tax exemptions and low
customs duties’.²²
In a similar vein to earlier Islamic empires, the guiding principle (or the
standard doctrine) of Ottoman imperial governance was ‘the circle of justice’.²³
This was ‘an ancient concept of justice in which the [ruler] at the top of society was
seen as dependent on the peasants at the bottom; they could only provide him
revenue if he provided them justice.’ It was portrayed in eight sentences that
cyclically lead to one another, and are found in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Sirr al-
Asrār or Secretum Secretorum (The Secret of Secrets), which was reproduced by
the Arab scholar Abu Yahya Ibn al’Batriq in the tenth century:
The world is a garden for the state to master
The state is power supported by the law
The law is policy administered by the king
The king is a shepherd supported by the army
The army are assistants provided for by taxation
Taxation is sustenance gathered by subjects
Subjects are slaves provided for by justice
Justice is that by which the rectitude of the world subsists.²⁴
In Ibn al’Batriq’s edition, these sentences are used repeatedly in different vari-
ations and attributed not only to Aristotle but also to the Sassanid ruler Ardashir,
the Persian king Anushirvan, the fourth caliph, ‘Ali ibn Ali Talib, and the Muslim
conqueror of Egypt ‘Amr ibn al-Al, which suggests that a variety of earlier sources
referred to the circle of justice.²⁵ The concept evolved through a fusion of ancient
Persian, Greek, Roman, Indian, and Islamic readings over centuries, and became a
fundamental element of Ottoman political thought well into the nineteenth
century.²⁶
²² Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origin, and Nature (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 70–86; Özsu, ‘Ottoman Empire’, 431, 446; Yurdusev, ‘The
Middle East’, 74.
²³ Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı’da Devlet, Adalet ve Hukuk (Istanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2005); Linda
T. Darling, ‘Islamic Empires, the Ottoman Empire and the Circle of Justice’, in Constitutional
Politics in the Middle East, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 12–32.
²⁴ ThomasW. Lentz and Glenn D. Lowry, Timur and the Princely Vision: Persian Art and Culture in
the Fifteenth Century (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1989), 12.
²⁵ Linda T. Darling, ‘Medieval Egyptian Society and the Concept of the Circle of Justice’, Mamluk
Studies Review 10(2) (2006): 2. For more on Sirr al-Asrār, see Mahmoud Manzalaoui, ‘The Pseudo-
Aristotelian “Kitab Sirr al-Asrār”: Facts and Problems’, Oriens 23/24 (1974): 147–257.
²⁶ For historical analyses of the term, see Linda T. Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political
Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization (London: Routledge,
2013), and ‘Islamic Empires’; Jennifer A. London, ‘The Circle of Justice’, History of Political Thought
32(3) (autumn 2011): 425–47. For the different uses of the ‘circle of justice’ in Ottoman political
thought, see Marinos Sariyannis, Ottoman Political Thought Up to the Tanzimat: A Concise History
(Rethymno: Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas, Institute for Mediterranean Studies,
2015), 32, 39 n. 27, 40, 41, 55, 139, 178.
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The ‘circle of justice’ emphasized the interdependence of ruler and subjects,
drawing an undeviating link between security, legitimacy, and prosperity.²⁷
Justice, in this sense, referred not only to lawfulness but also to ‘peace, protection,
good organization and a functional infrastructure’. It meant harmony between the
different spheres of society: the rulers, the army, the treasury, and peasants,
artisans, and merchants. It also formed the basis of Ottoman security culture,
the underlying philosophy of which was the fact that security could be obtained
most effectively through the path of nizam (harmonious order) and maslaha, i.e.
maintaining order by means of negotiations, accommodating demands, and
collective engagement between the diverse components of the empire.²⁸
Prosperity (rahat, istirahat, refah) was considered to be the ‘immediate out-
come and positive product’ of security. When this ideal order of ‘security cum
prosperity’ was upset by ‘the negative events’ or ‘evildoers’, nizâm-ımemleket (the
order of the country), temin-i asayiş (the maintenance of security), or temin-i
ibadullah (the protection of the servants of God) were to be obtained first by
istimalet (persuasion, coaxing) or—when it suited better the interests of the
state—by the principle of oblivion (ma madaa or ‘let bygones be bygones’). The
last resort was to tehdid (threat), terhib (intimidation), or kuvve-i cebriyye (com-
pulsory force).²⁹ As Abou el-Haj summarizes, ‘the proper order of the [Ottoman]
world is predicated upon all knowing their place and function and remaining in it,
exhibiting no further ambition or aspiration for social mobility.’³⁰
During the era of Selim III, imperial decrees were replete with the notions of
maintaining security and order (nizâm-ı memleket, temin-i asayiş), protecting the
servants of God (temin-i ibadullah), and purging (tathir) the empire of mischief
and deceitful behaviour (fesad, fitna, tezvirat). This was partly because Selim’s
ascendancy to the throne in 1789 overlapped with a period of increasing
²⁷ As an 11th-c. author wrote about Fatimi rule in Egypt, ‘The people are so secure under the
Sultan’s reign that no one fears his agents, and they rely on him neither to inflict injustice nor to have
designs on anyone’s property . . . The security and welfare of the people of Egypt have reached a point
that the drapers, moneychangers, and jewelers do not even lock their shops—they only lower a net
across the front, and no one tampers with anything.’ Nasir-i Khusraw, Naser-e Khosraw’s Book of
Travels (safaratnama), trans. W. M. Thackston Jr (New York: SUNY University Press, 1986), 55–57; cf.
Darling, ‘The Circle of Justice’, 4.
²⁸ Darling, ‘Islamic Empires’, 19. In the writings of such writers as Ahmedi (c.1334–1413),
Kınalızade Ali Çelebi (c.1510–72), and Koçi Bey (d. 1650), and the latter two’s nasihatnames (advice
literature) that idealized the ancient order, the ‘circle of justice’ became a tool to pinpoint the weak
chains of governance. Anne F. Broadbridge, ‘Royal Authority, Justice, and Order in Society: The
Influence of Ibn Khaldun on the Writings of al-Maqr|z| and Ibn Taghr|bird|’, Mamluk Studies
Review 7(2) (2003): 231–45, at 233; Cornell H. Fleischer, ‘Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and
“Ibn Khaldûnism” in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 18
(1983): 198–219. On the notion of maslaha, see Engin D. Akarlı, ‘The Ruler and Law Making in the
Ottoman Empire’, in Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors, ed. Jeroen Duindam, Jill D. Harries,
Caroline Humfressand, and Hurvitz Nimrod (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 87–109.
²⁹ Maurus Reinkowski, ‘ “Let Bygones Be Bygones”: An Ottoman Order to Forget’, Wiener
Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 93 (2003): 191–209.
³⁰ Rifaat Abou-el-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, 16th to 18th Centuries
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 32.
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domestic social and fiscal crises.³¹ His empire was still enduring the devastating
consequences of the 1768–74 wars. The heavy military defeats suffered on the
front, the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, and the large debt incurred due to
war indemnity had increasingly weakened social stability by the 1790s.
In the major Ottoman towns, including the imperial capital, the worrisome
‘food shortages, unemployment, increasing prices and psychological costs of
relentless wars, fires and epidemics and unprecedented urban uprisings’ were
jeopardizing imperial political legitimacy. In order to dissolve the domestic threats
to the ‘Well-Protected Domains’ and ‘exert direct control over the inhabitants’,
Selim III took authoritarian measures for social regulation, control, and surveil-
lance.³² A new language of ‘disciplining society’ (terbiye) came to be employed by
the Ottoman bureaucrats.³³
The central chains of the ‘circle of justice’ and the main instrument for internal
and external security in the Ottoman Empire were the army and taxation. Selim
III well knew that the undisciplined behaviour of the Janissary forces, which
formed the backbone both of the army and police and of the corps of firemen,
was also the vulnerable point of his Well-Protected Domains. The Ottoman army
had suffered excruciating setbacks at the hands of outnumbered enemy armies in
the last wars with Austria and Russia in the 1790s, when the Janissary forces had
refused to join the expeditions, fled the army even before reaching the battlefield,
or gone on strike during the fighting.³⁴
Historians have shown that due to the uncontrolled inflation in the number of
residual soldiers after the wars with Austria, Spain, and Venice in the west, and
with Persia in the east, and the fiscal crises these had brought about since the
seventeenth century, the Janissaries had gradually been incorporated into ‘the
general urban public and artisanal organizations’ besides their main profession as
soldiers. By virtue of their connections with the Islamic Bektaşi religious orders,
they had developed an immense social base by the late eighteenth century and had
gained an unwavering social prestige. More than once in the past they had
prevented reformist statesmen ‘from openly articulating the possible abolition of
the corps’ and the establishment of more advanced army units within the
Ottoman military.³⁵ When necessary, they had violently overthrown the sultans.
³¹ Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire, 19.
³² Başaran, Social Control, 4; see also Tülay Artan, ‘From Charismatic Leadership to Collective Rule:
Gender Problems of Legalism and Political Legitimation in the Ottoman Empire’, in Histoire
économique et sociale de l’empire ottoman et de la Turquie (1326–1960). Actes du sixième congrès
international tenu à Aix-en-Provence du 1er au 4 juillet 1992 (Paris: Peeters, 1995), 572; H. T. Karateke,
‘Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis’, in Legitimizing the Order:
The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power, ed. H. T. Karateke and M. Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005),
13–52.
³³ Başaran, Social Control, 218. ³⁴ Ágoston, ‘The Ottoman Empire’, 630.
³⁵ Yaycıoğlu, ‘Guarding Traditions’, 1567; Frederic Hitzel, ‘Une voie de pénétration des idées
révolutionnaires. Les militaires français, Istanbul’, in Mélanges offerts à Louis Bazin par ses disciples,
collègues et amis, ed. Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont and Louis Bazin (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1992), 88.
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As Ali Yaycıoğlu tells us, despite their role as ‘the guardians of the city . . . some
young commoners who claimed Janissary status gathered together in amorphous
paramilitary groups and unruly gangs and were often viewed as rowdy riffraff by
other city dwellers’.³⁶
*
Against this precarious backdrop, Selim III initiated an ambitious agenda of
military and bureaucratic reform in the 1790s.³⁷ At his enthronement, the sultan
gathered a grand șura (a consultative assembly) to deliberate on a new reform
programme.³⁸ He then asked 22 of the ulema and scribal corps in the Sublime
Porte, as well as two foreign advisers, to pen layihas (pamphlets) for him on how
to undertake new reforms.³⁹ Some of these recommended actions that no other
sultan before him had dared to take. In the end, Selim III’s became the last yet
most comprehensive of a series of reform attempts made in the Ottoman Empire
during the eighteenth century.⁴⁰
Here I must underscore again: Ottoman statesmen and writers also believed
that their empire was in decline, lacking the moral and institutional strength of her
heyday in previous centuries. Ensuring the circle of justice and reforming their
military were therefore of paramount importance to prevent one or another major
European Power of the time, and particularly Russia, from embarrassing the
Porte, and, worse, existentially threatening the Ottoman Empire and ending her
existence. For them, and for a few other statesmen in Europe such as Vergennes,
the alleged frailty of the Ottoman Empire prompted but one question: how to
revive her?⁴¹
Past experience with military transformation was worrisome. For example, after
the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, the military reform programme that Selim’s
uncle, Sultan Abdülhamid I, and Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Pașa had initiated
was actively opposed by the Janissaries.⁴² It was eventually dropped by the half-
hearted sultan.⁴³ In his layiha to Selim, the prominent Ottoman Armenian
Catholic dragoman, Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson (Muradcan Tosunyan)
(1740–1807), therefore advised that once the sultan and his entourage entered
³⁶ Kafadar, Kim var, 29–37; Yaycıoğlu, ‘Guarding Traditions’, 1549.
³⁷ Shaw, Between Old and New, 87. ³⁸ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 32.
³⁹ Ethan L. Menchinger, The First of the Modern Ottomans: The Intellectual History of Ahmed Vasıf
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 165; Shaw, Between Old and New, 72–4.
⁴⁰ Mehmed Mert Sunar, ‘Ocak-ı Amire’den Ocak-ı Mülgā’ya Doğru. Nizam-ı Cedid Reformları
Karşısında Yeniçeriler’, in Nizam-ı Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e III. Selim ve Dönemi, ed. Seyfi Kenan
(Istanbul: ISAM Yayınları, 2010), 498.
⁴¹ For an insightful analysis of the Eastern Question as an attempt ‘to recover’ the Ottoman Empire,
see Malcolm E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East (London: Longman, 1987), Ch. 2.
⁴² Avigdor Levy, ‘Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the
Eighteenth Century’, Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1982): 227–49, at 239.
⁴³ Thomas Caff, ‘Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III,
1789–1807’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 83(3) (Aug.–Sept. 1963): 295.
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into the path of reform there could be no room for hesitancy: the process of
innovation and reform would have to be irreversible.⁴⁴ As was the case with most
other pamphlets, his also proposed inviting European military officers to establish
new military schools and train Ottoman units. Other writers such as Mehmed
Hakkı (1747–1811) called for the training of pious soldiers, of good morals,
educated and armed with a sound knowledge of their religion, all in accordance
with the science of war.⁴⁵ Mehmed Emin Behiç (d. 1809) viewed society as an
integral part of the reform programme, and suggested the establishment of tighter
social controls with regular censuses, passport controls, and the dispatch of spies
to monitor, control, and discipline the urban space.⁴⁶
Almost all advisers to the sultan considered the new armies in Europe (often
referring to the Russian example) as a model, and admitted that imitating the
victorious infidels—their new equipment, discipline, and training—while simul-
taneously restoring ancient laws, revised as necessary, and adhering to the shari’a,
was the way to survive.⁴⁷ The Ottoman reform programme thus simultaneously
looked to past experience that had once ensured the glory of the empire and to the
future with a new understanding of irreversible temporality. In line with the ‘circle
of justice’, Selim III believed that the path of reform had to be an all-inclusive one;
governmental affairs were interlinked like ‘the wheels of a watch’, and in order for
the reforms to be successful they had to involve a wide range of social, political,
and economic affairs.⁴⁸ Elaborated under his rule from the early 1790s and
through until the 1800s, his reform scheme brought about the establishment of
new military, fiscal, and administrative institutions that trained and staffed mili-
tary units, created funds for these by means of taxation of a large amount of
goods, and operated these funds within state bureaucracy that was established
concurrently.
These at once incited public opposition, especially from the Janissaries. Such
opposition was countered, at least at first, by an alliance, albeit loose, of dynastic
and military/bureaucratic elites. They involved Selim’s childhood friend and
brother-in-law Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pașa and his wife, Esma Sultan,
who were predisposed to revolutionary France, and Selim’s mother, Mihrişah
Sultan (Valide Sultan), and her steward, Yusuf Agha, who was known to be pro-
Russian. They received the support of the navy and some rural notables. Most
importantly, they were inspired and backed by a transimperial Naqshbandi-
Mujaddidi network—a Sunni–Sufi order ‘organised around charismatic sheikhs,
doctrines and rituals’ with a wide range of followers that dispersed from ‘India and
⁴⁴ BOA HH 13309, 9 Jan. 1793; cf. Kemal Beydilli, ‘Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson (Muradcan
Tosunyan)’, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 13 (1983–4): 261.
⁴⁵ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 33. ⁴⁶ Ibid. 36.
⁴⁷ Virginia H. Aksan, ‘Ottoman Political Writing, 1768–1808’, International Journal of Middle East
Studies 25(1) (Feb. 1993): 63.
⁴⁸ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 146–8; Sunar, ‘Ocak’, 499.
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Central Asia to the Balkans’ since the early fifteenth century.⁴⁹ This is to say that
Selim’s reform programme was neither purely a westward movement nor a
modernist-secular drive against conservative-Islamist resistance, as it is often por-
trayed. Instead, at its source was an amalgam of orthodox Islamist (Naqshbandi)
ambitions and Western methods.⁵⁰
Another driving force of the sultan’s programme was the Imperial Academy of
Naval Engineering. Established in 1776 by Abdülhamid I, it had become a
contact zone for European (predominantly French) engineers sent by the
French foreign minister Vergennes (see Chapter 1) and local mathematicians
and engineers. Through the academy, the belief became increasingly widespread
among the Ottoman kalemiye (bureaucratic administration) that matching the
military power of the foreign neighbours entailed appropriating the sciences
in military technology. Moreover, observations made during the wars against
Austria and Russia, notably concerning the enemy’s military discipline and war
strategies, resulted in the desire to establish European-style armies. In 1793, the
Naval Engineering Academy was renamed the Imperial Academy of Military
Engineering. French trainers were brought in, and new military units manned
by Russian renegades—later joined by Austrian war captives, Turkish peasants,
and Anatolian tribesmenwere formed.⁵¹ These new units were called the army of
the ‘New Order’, or theNizâm-ı Cedid, a phrase that has since been used to refer to
the set of military and fiscal reforms introduced under Selim.
The New Order army was designed to differ from earlier military units as a
well-drilled, morally and militarily disciplined and dynamic army that acted
together ‘as part of a large, impersonal war machine, rather than as individual
fighters graced with valour, courage and good reputation’.⁵² They wore European-
style uniforms and used advanced equipment.⁵³ The number of men that formed
these new units amounted to 2,536, with 27 officers in 1797, and some 9,263 with
again 27 officers in 1801. By 1806, the numbers rose to 22,685 men and 1,590
officers.⁵⁴ A new engineering school was opened in 1795 and a printing house was
established within its premises in 1797.
With the purpose of regulating the resources that were made available by
internal borrowing and that were channelled to fund the ‘New Order’ army, a
new treasury with new management mechanisms was created. Heavy taxes were
⁴⁹ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 41–2; Yaycıoğlu, ‘Guardians’, 1584.
⁵⁰ Kahraman Şakul, ‘Nizam-ı Cedid Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami Modernleşme’, Divan 19
(Feb. 2005): 120; Aysel Yıldız, Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in
the Age of Revolution (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 137–42, 204–9; see also Yaycıoğlu, ‘Guardians’,
1589–90.
⁵¹ Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The Origins of Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III’,
Journal of Modern History 37(3) (Sept. 1965): 291–306, at 293; see also Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The Nizam-ı
Cedid Army under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1809’, Oriens 18/19 (1965/6): 170.
⁵² Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 38–9. ⁵³ Ibid. 37, 41; Şakul, ‘Global’, 12; Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 38.
⁵⁴ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 37.
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levied on a variety of goods by the İrade-i Cedid Hazinesi (the New Treasury)
including alcoholic beverages and grains, sparking public discontent.⁵⁵ And
finally, an empire-wide mercantilist (economic protection) policy was enforced
to upend what the Ottoman ministers believed to be European commercial
‘misdemeanours’ that led to ‘a steady fiscal haemorrhage for the Ottoman state’.⁵⁶
The problem here was that protectionism and the implementation of new
customs tariffs on imports and exports without the consent of the European
Powers was a violation of the existing capitulatory agreements. The sultan’s
ministers considered financial independence to be the ultimate means for the
survival of their empire and their reform programme. This, however, went against
the grain of their European interlocutors, which interlocked imperial domestic
reform with defining the position of the ‘Well-Protected Domains’ in the global
imperial (dis)order of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
With the new military and fiscal reforms inspired by transimperial epistemic
(European/local engineers and mathematicians) and religious (Naqshbandi-
Mujaddid) networks, and with the diplomatic alliances he formed (even if these
did not last long due to peace obtained between Prussia and Austria, and between
Sweden and Russia), Selim III began his reign with proactive and, at least initially,
decisive measures. Domestically, however, his campaign did not go as smoothly.
On the one hand, revolts that sprang up due to diverse aspirations of local notables
in Anatolia, the Arab provinces, and the Balkans—especially the Pasvanoğlu
uprising (with links to the Janissaries, who largely frowned upon the New
Order)—frustrated the reform programme, diverting resources and energy.⁵⁷ On
the other hand, the training of the new army without adequate instructors and
funding proved much more difficult, the resulting clumsy and occasionally unsuc-
cessful practices provoking ridicule from foreign observers.⁵⁸ While dealing with
these, the sultan’s aim was to keep his empire away from the European wars until
he rebuilt his army and navy. However, he would not be able to maintain the
Porte’s neutrality. The French expedition to Egypt in 1798 unexpectedly drew the
Ottoman Empire into the Napoleonic Wars.
The Sultan’s Bafflement
Throughout the 1790s, Selim III’s agents closely monitored political developments
in revolutionary France and war-torn Europe. While still at war with Austria and
⁵⁵ For inflation in Istanbul, see Shaw, Between Old and New, 446.
⁵⁶ Liston to Abbot, 23 July 1794, NLS MS 5579; Yaycıoğlu, ‘Guarding’, 1567–8; Fatih Yeşil,
‘İstanbul’un İaşesinde Nizam-ı Cedid. Zahire Nezaretinin Kuruluşu ve İşleyişi (1793–1839)’, Türklük
Araştırmaları Dergisi 15 (2004): 113–42.
⁵⁷ Shaw, Between Old and New, 211.
⁵⁸ Robert Ainslie to Foreign Office, 21 May 1794, TNA FO 78/15.
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Russia, they looked to take advantage of the system of balance of power in Europe
and therefore forged alliances with Protestant northern European countries that
rivalled the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. It was then that Ebûbekir Râtib Efendi,
Selim’s mentor and the envoy to Vienna, advised expanding the ‘circle of justice’
with an additional sentence on inter-imperial affairs. A disciplined army, he
wrote, was impossible without a fairly administered financial system. For this,
loyal ministers and responsible civil servants were indispensable. Such imperial
servants could only raise large state revenues without justice if the people at large
were prosperous and content. Contentment rested on the security provided by a
foreign alliance and an alliance would not be available to the state unless it had a
disciplined, respected army.⁵⁹
Yet, when the War of the First Coalition (1792–7) broke out, the Porte was
divided over which policy to follow. Francophile Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed Pașa
(r. 1794–8), Şeyhülislam Dürrî-zâde Arif Efendi, and Grand Admiral Küçük
Hüseyin Pașa believed that an alliance with France could help the sultan retain
the lost territories of his empire.⁶⁰ The anti-French and more conservative
Mihrişah Sultan and her steward, Yusuf, by contrast suggested not forging alli-
ances in order not to be sucked into European rivalries. After the failed defensive
alliance talks with France in 1795–6 (see Chapter 1), the sultan preferred to wait
and see, channelling his funds to the more urgent New Order programme. At the
same time, under the leadership of Mehmed Rașid Efendi (1753–1798), Selim’s
able and experienced Reisülküttâb (or Reis Efendi, the equivalent of minister of
foreign affairs in the Ottoman Empire), the foundations of a new Ottoman
diplomacy were laid on realist and rationalist principles.⁶¹
The Porte put an end to its unilateralist policy and established permanent
embassies in European capitals for the first time in Ottoman history—initially
in London in 1793, and then in Vienna, Berlin, and Paris in 1795—to collect
intelligence with respect to the European Powers’ military policies and observe
their administrative, political, and economic institutions.⁶² As the chronicler
⁵⁹ Shaw, Between Old and New, 95–8; Enver Z. Karal, ‘Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi’nin ‘Nizam-ı Cedid’
Islahatında Rolü’, in Türk Tarih Kongresi Ankara 12–17 Nisan 1956. Kongreye sunulan tebliğler
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1960), 347–55; Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman Encounters, vol 1., 78.
⁶⁰ Frederick Hitzel, ‘Les Relations franco-turques a la veille de l’expédition’, in La Campagne
d’Égypte, 1798–1801. Mythes et réalités, ed. Paul Nirot (Paris: In Forma, 1998), 43–4.
⁶¹ For account of Ottoman diplomacy prior to Selim III, see Berridge, ‘Diplomatic Integration’;
Güneş Işıksel, ‘II. Selim’den III. Selim’e Osmanlı Diplomasisi: Birkaç Saptama’, in Nizam-ı Kadim’den
Nizam-ı Cedid’e III. Selim ve Dönemi, 43–55; Mehmed A. Yalçınkaya, ‘Türk Diplomasisinin
Modernleşmesinde Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi’nin Rolü’, Osmanlı Araştırmaları 21
(2001): 115.
⁶² Şakul, ‘Global’, 13, 41; Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 46. By contrast, the first residential ambassador of
France had arrived in Istanbul in 1535, the British in 1583, and the Dutch in 1612: Tarih-i Cevdet,
vol. 6, 88, 231, 257; see also Şakul, ‘Nizam-ı Cedid’, 124.
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Cevdet Pașa writes, from an Ottoman perspective, European diplomacy in the
times of the European wars was considered to be devoid of any ethical principles.⁶³
Indeed, in his pamphlet to the sultan, Mehmed Emin Behiç described politics
(politika) as ‘a European term that in our times means to act through trickery
and deceit . . . ’ He contrasted Ottoman political philosophy with ‘European
politicking’, concluding that while one was ‘ethical’, the other ‘no better than . . .
[a] ruse’.⁶⁴
This was perceived as a continuing threat to Istanbul. Ottoman ministers
apprehensively observed the partition of Poland for the third time in 1795. In
1797 Venice, despite not being at war with France, was split between Paris and
Vienna. The Porte was vexed, considering the fate of Poland and particularly
Venice as a conspiracy against a neutral actor.⁶⁵ Questions lingered in the minds
of the sultan and his ministers: would the ‘Well-Protected Domains’ be the next
prey of European imperial encroachments? In 1797, the inhabitants of Topkapı
Palace were on tenterhooks. With France’s annexation of the Ionian Islands,
another powerful neighbour had emerged on the western coasts. Reports multi-
plied concerning the agitation of revolutionary ideas by French agents in the
Balkan provinces and hidden support to the rebellious Pasvanoğlu family.⁶⁶ The
belief that France was transforming from a friend to a foe steadily became
prevalent in Istanbul.⁶⁷
*
At this moment, Selim III’s first response to the mounting threats signifies the
implications of the unfolding Eastern Question to him, i.e. his empire’s precarious
status vis-à-vis the other major European Powers as a polity whose identity and
durability was under question. Yet, to reiterate, the Ottoman Empire was not
merely a passive object here. Conscious of his empire’s insecure standing in
Europe, Selim III looked to reconstruct her identity as a continuous polity—not
one doomed to end in the same fashion as Poland and Venice, but one that could
reverse her misfortunes with her reformed military and bureaucracy.
To this end, the sultan asked his trusted bureaucrats to pen a series of pamph-
lets to introduce, legitimize, and propagate his reform programme. A dozen were
prepared in the late 1790s, some just before the French expedition to Egypt began.
The pamphlets aimed, on the one hand, to gain domestic popular support for the
sultan’s programme by explaining its rationale and underscoring its urgency,
given that it was above all the people that carried the burden of the heavy taxes
it occasioned. On the other hand, the pamphlets were conceived to function as a
⁶³ Şakul, ‘Global’, 49. ⁶⁴ Menchinger, The First of the Modern Ottomans, 189.
⁶⁵ BOA HAT 229/12769; BOA HAT 172/7388, and esp. BOA HAT 171/7310.
⁶⁶ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 58–9, 63; Kobishanov, ‘Dzhihad’, 5.
⁶⁷ See e.g. Fatih Yeşil, ‘Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib
Efendi’s Observations’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 70(2) (2007): 283–304.
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notice to the potentially aggressive European audience, a single message that the
‘Well-Protected Domains’ were not as weak as depicted in biased European
accounts and that the Ottoman imperial military was rapidly growing stronger.
For example, Mahmud Raif noted in his pamphlet that ‘The current state of the
Ottoman Empire’s [military] forces and its revenues is largely unknown in almost
the whole of Europe; there is no work which gives a correct notion of it’, before
detailing the futures of the innovations, complete with embellished (sometimes
exaggerated) notes on the condition of the Ottoman military.⁶⁸ This was why a
majority of the pamphlets were printed only in French and were allocated to
European bureaucrats immediately after printing.⁶⁹
The sultan thus looked to ensure, against the threats posed by Russia, Austria,
and now also France, his empire’s ontological security by having her position
affirmed among the militarily strong Powers of Europe.⁷⁰ But the plans made in
Istanbul would not suffice to halt the French, nor any other aggressive power at
the time.
Warnings poured into Istanbul. Seyyid Ali Efendi (1757–1809), the sultan’s
ambassador in Paris from 1797, cautioned the Porte about the aims of the French
revolutionaries, identifying the latter with fesad-u fitne (malice and sedition).⁷¹
Reports from Russian agents implied that France was planning an expedition to
Egypt—St Petersburg was one of the first capitals to identify the French target—
though Russian agents also suspected, albeit falsely, that there might be a deal
between Paris and Istanbul.⁷² According to them, France would pay a large sum of
money to the sultan, sell some islands taken from the Venetians, and there would
be free export of grain from Egypt to Istanbul.⁷³ Ottoman agents in Vienna and
Morea likewise sent reports of a possible French attack.⁷⁴
⁶⁸ Mahmoud Rayf Efèndi, Tableau des nouveaux règlements de l’empire ottoman (Constantinople:
n.p., 1798), 4. For an analysis of the pamphlet, see Kemal Beydilli ve İlhan Şahin, Mahmud Raif
Efendi’nin Nizam-ı Cedide Dair Eseri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001).
⁶⁹ E.g. there was only one Turkish (original) version of Mahmud Raif Efendi’s Nümune-i Menazım-i
Cedid-i Selim Hani (1798). It was translated into French (Tableau des nouveaux règlements de l’empire
ottoman) immediately; 200 copies were distributed among European diplomats. Şakul, ‘Nizam-ı Cedid
Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma’, 122, 125–9.
⁷⁰ On ontological security and its application to historical analyses, see esp. Jennifer Mitzen,
‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal
of International Relations 12(3) (2006): 342–70; Ayşe Zarakol, ‘States and Ontological Security’; Martin
J. Bayly, ‘Imperial Ontological (In)Security: “Buffer States”, IR, and the Case of Anglo-Afghan
Relations, 1808–1878’, European Journal of International Relations 2(4) (2014): 816–40.
⁷¹ BOA HAT 142/5882, 10 Apr. 1798; cf. Şakul, ‘Global’, 61–2.
⁷² Report of Simolin, 13/24 Apr. 1798, AVPRI, f. 93, o. 93/6, d. 525, ll. 104–5.
⁷³ Ibid. 21 May/1 June 1798, AVPRI, f. 93, o. 93/6, d. 525, ll. 130–31. These were indeed ideas that
Talleyrand had entertained to persuade the Porte but possibly not communicated to Istanbul.
⁷⁴ Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi: Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri, 1789–1856 (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 28. Reports of nationalist and revolutionary agitation by French agents in
Greece and the Balkans abounded in Istanbul: Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 280–81.
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As a result, Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed Pașa asked Seyyid Ali Efendi to make
new inquiries in Paris. The latter’s reports temporarily mitigated Ottoman anxie-
ties, as he summarized all the rumours in France and concluded in April 1798,
with reservations, that the French activity in Toulon was aimed at an expedition to
Britain, not to the Ottoman territories.⁷⁵ The grand vizier nonetheless noted on
the margins of one of these reports that the Porte had to remain alert and act with
caution.⁷⁶
Seyyid Ali Efendi was perplexed in late April when the French press claimed
that the destination of the expedition would be Egypt. At the Grand Vizier’s
orders, he immediately asked Talleyrand to share with him, not the exact ‘secret’
destination of the expedition as such, but just whether it was in Ottoman lands or
not. Talleyrand denied this, ambiguously stating that the republic was neither at
war with the sultan’s empire nor had any wish to start a war against it. Thanks to
diplomatic secrecy in Paris, even after the French navy invaded Malta in late May,
Ottoman strategists did not know where Bonaparte would head next.⁷⁷
On 19 June, the grand vizier summoned the French chargé d’affaires in
Istanbul, Pierre-Jean-Marie Ruffin (1742–1824), only to receive his assurances
that the Directory government would by no means accept General Bonaparte’s
rumoured plans in Egypt, given the historical amity and alliance, commercial
relations, and centuries-long peace that had existed between France and the
Ottoman Empire.⁷⁸ Ruffin could not, however, state that the rumours in news-
papers and diplomatic circles as to the French occupation of Egypt were false.
Even so, if Bonaparte indeed aimed to invade Egypt, he said, it would be only for
the punishment of the Mamluks and to cut off Britain from India. It would be a
friendly act toward the Porte, not a hostile one.⁷⁹ Nevertheless the grand vizier
took the precaution of sending an agent, Ahmed Erib Efendi, to fortify Egyptian
shores against a potential attack.⁸⁰ But he was too late. Before his arrival, French
flags had been already raised in Alexandria.
*
First, in late June, a Greek ship had seen a French naval force of 400 vessels
approach the coast of Egypt. The Greek captain then rapidly sailed to the north,
and informed the Ottoman authorities in Rhodes.⁸¹ When Selim and his entou-
rage received the news (soon after a second dispatch informed them that French
troops had landed in Egypt on 1 July 1798), they did not feel shocked, as is
portrayed in the literature.⁸² Nor did they think that French aggression was simply
⁷⁵ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 62; Kemal Beydilli, ‘Seyyid Ali Efendi’, IA, 45–7.
⁷⁶ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 62–3. ⁷⁷ Kobishanov, ‘Dzhihad’, 8.
⁷⁸ M. Bianchi, Notice historique sur M. Ruffin (Paris: Dondey-Dupré, 1825), 14–15; Karal, Osmanlı, 28.
⁷⁹ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 320–23; Şakul, ‘Global’, 78.
⁸⁰ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 291; Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 70. ⁸¹ Ibid. 84.
⁸² For a recent example, see Menchinger, The First of the Modern Ottomans, 188.
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a stab in the back.⁸³ But aggression from a friendly nation was of course painful,
provoking consternation and fury.
Seyyid Ali Efendi, for his part, was still unaware of subsequent developments, as
Talleyrand continued to insist that Bonaparte had no other instructions than the
occupation of Malta. In August, the Ottoman ambassador reported to Istanbul
that there was not much to worry about even after France had already invaded
Alexandria. ‘What a donkey!’ exclaimed the disgruntled sultan after reading his
agent’s misinformed intelligence.⁸⁴
Soon after the details of the occupation were dispatched from Cairo, an
imperial firman was prepared in Istanbul and sent out for circulation in all
provinces of the empire. ‘One of the French commanders, the general named
Bonaparte’, it read,
some time ago appeared in the Mediterranean with a large fleet . . . [On] the
seventeenth day of the month of Muharrem [July 2], [he] suddenly attacked
Alexandria . . . penetrating it, seized it by force . . . he detained the Muslims and
non-Muslim traders of my Sublime Empire, and even sequestered the ships of the
Ottoman traders—although no notice had been received from the Republic
regarding the break-up of the peace existing between my Sublime Empire and
the French.⁸⁵
Fearing that the Republic would attack other areas of his empire, and knowing
that his military and navy would be overpowered by the aggressor’s army, Selim
III did not hurry to declare war.⁸⁶ His peevish and embittered orders and poems
written at the time, as well as the tone of his letters to co-religionist sultans, were
evidence enough of his anger.⁸⁷ Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed Pașa and Şeyhülislam
Dürrî-zâde Arif Efendi were sacked and exiled for failing to foresee the occupa-
tion, and for their pro-French inclinations. But, in fact, with this, Selim also aimed
to obtain the support of the disgruntled Janissaries and the ulema (religious
leaders) by appointing Yusuf Ziyauddin Pașa (d. 1819), a prominent conservative,
as the new grand vizier, and the allegedly reactionary Ömer Hulusi Efendi as the
new şeyhülislam.⁸⁸
The New Order programme was then halted. Preparations for war began.⁸⁹ The
French consul, Ruffin, was arrested and imprisoned in the Yedikule dungeon.
⁸³ Şakul, ‘Global Moment’, 50. ⁸⁴ Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, 242; Karal,Hat-ti Hümâyunlar, 179.
⁸⁵ Joseph Cabra, ‘Quelques firmans concernant les relations franco-turques lors de l’expédition de
Bonaparte en Égypte (1798–1799)’, in Cahiers de la Société asiatique vol. 10 (Paris: Imprimerie
nationale, 1947); cf. Gaultier-Kurhan, Méhémet Ali, 19.
⁸⁶ Hatt-ı Hümayun 1214, TSA 1173/13/478/26. See also Henri Dehérain, La vie de Pierre Ruffin,
orientaliste et diplomate, 1742–1824 (Paris: Geuthner, 1929), 138–9.
⁸⁷ Karal, Osmanlı, 29. ⁸⁸ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 351–5.
⁸⁹ [?] to Johann Amadeus Franz de Paula Freiherr von Thugut (Vienna), 25 July 1798, HHStA StAbt
Türkei VII 40.
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Islamic communities (the umma) and all vilayets and sanjaks along the coasts of
the Mediterranean were asked to prepare for a potential French attack, to aid
the Porte, and to welcome the British navy in the event of its arrival in their
ports.⁹⁰ New, more energetic governors were appointed to Morea and Cyprus as a
defensive measure.⁹¹ The Barbary corsairs in Algiers were ordered to cut the
connections of the French navy with its mainland, though the latter did not
comply with this order. And dispatches were sent out to Bekir Pașa, the governor
of Cairo, to rally the population for jihad against France.⁹² Selim III ordered the
governor and the Mamluk beys not to cede to the ‘rogue infidels’ even ‘a handful
of Egyptian sand’.⁹³
Letters were sent also to Morocco and India, to Sultan Moulay Suleyman
(r. 1792–1822) and the Tipoo Sultan of Mysore in India, Feth Ali, who at that
time had troubled relations with the British and was cooperating with France.⁹⁴
Selim’s letter to India luridly portrays the sultan’s emotions. He described the
French invasion of Egypt as an act of ‘treachery and deceit, notwithstanding the
observance of long subsisting friendship’. The ‘infidels’ had in view ‘subduing all
Muslims in the world so as to erase the name of Muhammad’s religion and nation
from the world’, as well as dispatching troops to India through Suez
wherever they had roamed, they had violated the international law, preying on
dominions, killing people, and pillaging like bandits . . . The Frenchmen were
such plunderers and liars that they even overran the dominions of the Pope . . .
[Venice] professed neutrality and friendship towards France to no avail . . . [and
their] government . . . was now erased from the surface of the earth.
The letter concluded by advising Feth Ali not to engage in an alliance with France,
and to inform the Porte of his grievances against Britain ‘so that [the sultan]
would remove them to Ali’s satisfaction’.⁹⁵
When the news that the British fleet commanded by Admiral Nelson had
destroyed the entire French fleet at Abu Qir on 1 August 1798 arrived in
Istanbul, Selim was delighted. But he still remained diffident in making alliances
with the European Powers, including Britain, due largely to his distrust of them.
⁹⁰ Firman of the declaration of Jihad, 18 July 1798, BOA A.DVNSNMH.d 9/1. Moreover, a firman
was sent to Tunis to arrest the French consul and dragoman, BOA AE.SSLM.III 3/343.
⁹¹ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 86–7.
⁹² BOA C.DH 7764/3806, cf. Yüksel Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ Koca Hüsrev Pașa (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 14.
⁹³ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 88.
⁹⁴ Letter dispatched to Mevla Ismail bin Mevla Muhammad, the hakim of Morocco, 19 Jan. 1799,
BOA A.DVNSNMH.d 9/395; letter dispatched to Mevla Suleyman, the hakim of Morocco, 14 Sept.
1798, BOA A.DVNSNMH.d 9/386; letter dispatched to Tipu Sahib, ruler of the kingdom of Mysore,
12 Dec. 1798, BOA A.DVNSNMH.d 9/388.
⁹⁵ Hikmet Bayur, ‘Maysor Sultanı Tipu ile Osmanlı Padişahlarından I. Abdülhamid ve III. Selim
Arasındaki Mektuplaşma’, Belleten 12(47) (1948): 643–50; cf. Şakul, ‘Global Moment’, 4.
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He decided to wait and see the results of the initial measures taken by his forces
before making an alliance with the eager Britain and Russia. He was unsure about
both, especially about Russia, the age-old enemy of his empire. He had been
hoping to join forces with France against Russia only a few years ago. Now he
found himself having to decide whether to open the Straits to the fleet of the
Romanovs for an alliance against France. ‘My vizier,’ he wrote in a note, ‘we
should gain time like this . . . I am [normally] very brave in such acts, however,
I cannot dare [to act this time].’⁹⁶ The entry of the Porte into an alliance with
either nation was unprecedented, and its call for an alliance with the foreign
powers could expose the internal decrepitude of his empire. As one of his
ministers told the sultan, this could prove to be the ‘most dangerous’ threat to
the ‘Well-Protected Domains’.⁹⁷
*
France repeatedly implied to the Porte that the occupation targeted the enemies of
the Ottoman state. Bonaparte’s army was a friendly power to both the Porte and
the religion of Islam. This, his agents claimed, was evidenced by the release of
Muslim prisoners fromMalta and the tolerance shown to the Egyptian population
after the occupation, though a revolt had broken out in Cairo on 21 October and
some 2,000 inhabitants and 300 French had died.⁹⁸ Before his arrest, the French
consul, Ruffin, had even shared with the Ottoman authorities the instructions of
the Directory to Bonaparte by which the latter was ordered to maintain good
relations with the sultan.⁹⁹ Ruffin maintained that once the Mamluks were
destroyed ‘the darkened Ottoman moon would rise like the sun’ in Egypt.¹⁰⁰
But all in vain. For Selim and his agents, the French aggression was unaccept-
able. Seyyid Ali Efendi told Talleyrand in Paris that it would be only a territorial
violation if revolts emerged in Marseille and the Porte intervened without the
permission of Paris. The sultan officially declared war on France on 25 September
1798 after much hesitation—due in part to the insinuations of the pro-French
party in his court, and to the relative weakness of his army before the French—and
only after the news of the destruction of the French fleet by the British reached
Istanbul in mid-August.
Eight days later he sent a note to the representatives of the European Powers, in
which he explained his position: even though the Ottoman Empire and France
had entertained friendship for centuries, and the Porte continued this friendship
even after the French Revolution when France was isolated by other Powers, the
French had reciprocated with hostility. Bonaparte had sent agents to incite revolts
in Ottoman provinces after occupying Italy, and even though the Directory regime
⁹⁶ BOA HAT 34/1682. ⁹⁷ Kobishanov, ‘Dzhihad’, 15–16.
⁹⁸ Mikaberidze, Napoleonic Wars, 77. ⁹⁹ Ruffin to MAE, 2 Aug. 1798, AMAE CP 198.
¹⁰⁰ Kobishanov, ‘Dzhihad’, 16.
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promised the Porte that Napoleon’s policy would be terminated, further piratical
(korsan) action was undertaken with the occupation of Egypt. The note concluded
that the plan of France was ‘overturning the world order, destroying customs of
nations and peoples, staging a coup in the government regimes of all well-
organized Powers . . . [F]or the order and security of not only the [Ottoman
Empire] but perhaps all European states, . . . it is obvious that the elimination of
the tyrannical [French] rulers whose [only job] is malice and sedition [fitne ve
fesad] is necessary.’ The Porte was therefore hoping for the friendly Powers’
immediate succour, ‘both explicit and implicit’.¹⁰¹
As will be detailed in the next chapter, Britain had already acted against French
aggression in the Levant as it threatened her connections with India, which had to
be shielded for the security of the British Empire. Under Tsar Paul I, Russia had
once again reversed her policy from the ‘Greek Project’ to an ‘Ottoman project’
which provided for the preservation of the sultan’s empire within the orbit of
Russian influence.¹⁰² The tsar now desired to sweep the French off the Balkans and
the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁰³
In early September, with the permission of the sultan, a Russian squadron
under the command of Vice Admiral F. F. Ushakov crossed the Straits, which was
a first-time sight for the Istanbulite population and which commenced a decades-
long dilemma that would occupy international diplomacy over the passage rights
of warships in these strategically key routes.¹⁰⁴ Following the success of the joint
Russo-Ottoman campaign in the Aegean Sea, the sultan felt more assured of the
necessity for cooperation.
Consequently, Selim III signed alliance treaties with Russia on 23 December
1798 and Britain on 5 January 1799 (both for a duration of eight years) as well as
with the Sicilian kingdoms.¹⁰⁵ These were the Porte’s first alliance with both
empires in history, and took place when the Ottoman Empire effectively started
the War of the Second Coalition.
While Russo-Ottoman forces immediately captured the Ionian Islands from the
French, the news of the successful defence of St. Jean d’Acre by Ahmed al-Jazzar
Pașa with British and Russian naval aid were received in the Topkapı Palace with
great excitement. The ‘unbeatable’ armies of Bonaparte had been defeated for the
first time by the Anglo-Russian-assisted Ottoman forces since the beginning of the
expedition. But this was an ephemeral victory. After the failed siege in Acre,
¹⁰¹ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 412; Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 96–7; Kobishanov, ‘Dzhihad’, 19.
¹⁰² T. Y. Kobishanov, ‘Politika Rossii na Blizhnem Vostoke v Gody ‘Еkspedicii Napoleona
Bonaparta v Egipet i Siriyu (1798–1801)’, Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta Vostokovedenie 13(1)
(2010): 4.
¹⁰³ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 99–101.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 102; J.C. Hurewitz, ‘Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the
Problem’, World Politics 14(4) (July 1962): 605–32.
¹⁰⁵ BOA A.DVNSNMH.d 9/493, n.d.; Karal, Osmanlı, 30–36. For the sultan’s hümâyun to Yusuf
Ziya Pașa, 17 Sept. 1799, TSA 1173/29/478/42; Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 96–7.
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Bonaparte routed the landing Ottoman forces and captured their artillery and
ammunition, a tremendous dent to the morale of Selim and his men. Then, the
French general secretly quit the Levant in 1799: the British leaked false news in the
Levant of French defeats in Italy and the Rhine through fake newspapers, prompt-
ing Bonaparte to head back to Europe to fight for his patrie.¹⁰⁶
Soon after General Kleber took over the French command at the end of 1800,
French forces managed to establish control in all major Egyptian towns.¹⁰⁷ And, in
late 1799, due to his differences with Britain regarding the dispatch of Russian
troops to Egypt and frustration resulting frommilitary setbacks, Tsar Paul withdrew
from the war with France, though he strove to prevent either Paris or London
establishing a dominant influence in the Levant through his agents in Istanbul.¹⁰⁸
These new developments made Britain the only major ally of the Porte fighting
against the French at the time. The British parliament had approved the dispatch
of land forces to reinforce the Ottoman resistance against France in Egypt.
However, Ottoman authorities, and particularly Selim, were disinclined to see
the British troops in Ottoman lands. The sultan instead suggested their installa-
tion in the Mediterranean islands and the restriction of their departure for Egypt
subject to Ottoman authorization.¹⁰⁹
According to Thomas Bruce, earl of Elgin (1766–1841) and the British ambas-
sador to Istanbul, Ottoman reluctance stemmed from its rulers’ jealousy and
desire to ‘assume the appearance’ in Egypt so as not to leave a hazardous
impression in the minds of their own subjects, ‘but also in view of guarding
against any claim we might be inclined to assert, or any step we might take
towards establishing ourselves in Egypt on the expulsion of the French’.¹¹⁰ Lord
Elgin was partially correct. Selim III was indeed suspicious of British objectives,
and feared that the British troops might never leave Egypt once they had
landed.¹¹¹ The sultan was moreover reluctant to cover the substantial expenses
that would be incurred by the British expedition.¹¹²
Meanwhile, peace talks in Paris between Seyyid Ali Efendi, Talleyrand, and
Bonaparte were under way. In February 1800, the two architects of the French
expedition continued to tout their policy as a favour to the sultan. Talleyrand told
Seyyid Ali that they were unhappy with the state of war that Paris and Istanbul
were ‘dragged into’, and that they would leave Egypt only after French interests in
the Levant were secured.¹¹³ He asked Seyyid Ali to ensure that Britain and Russia
would not invade Egypt after the French occupation. Bonaparte, for his part,
looked to come out on top. ‘The Porte followed a false path,’ he complained; ‘[i]t
cooperated with its enemies and formed an alliance against its friend . . . Our aim is
¹⁰⁶ BOA HAT 226/12584. ¹⁰⁷ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 118–19.
¹⁰⁸ Schroeder, The Transformation, 202–9; Kobishanov, ‘Politika Rossii’, 10–18.
¹⁰⁹ BOA C.HR 23/1120, 7 Jan. 1800.
¹¹⁰ Lord Elgin to Baron Grenville, 9 Feb. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 2. ¹¹¹ BOA HAT 34/1682.
¹¹² BOA C.HR 102/5076. ¹¹³ Karal, Fransa-Mısır, 130.
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not to keep Egypt. In fact we never intended to occupy it.’ Puzzled by these words,
the Ottoman agent Seyyid Ali responded that the only path to peace between the
Porte and the republic was the latter’s unconditional evacuation from Egypt. But
the differences were too sharp between the French and Ottoman statesmen. News
of the assassination of Kleber in Cairo in June 1800 heightened tensions during the
talks in August and September, which came to a dead end for the time being.¹¹⁴
Seeing that peace with France was difficult to obtain, and that the Ottoman
armed forces were proving incapable of driving the French army out of Egypt, first
Reisülküttâb Atif Efendi and then the new grand vizier, Yusuf Pașa, and finally
Sultan Selim III reluctantly accepted the involvement of British land troops in the
expedition. They were assured by Lord Elgin as to the goodwill of Britain in
landing her troops in Egypt. In September 1800, British preparations began. And
in the spring of 1801, 20,000 British and Ottoman forces landed in Abu Qir.
Britain also brought some 15,000 men from India through the Red Sea. And
finally, the Ottoman imperial army of some 60,000 men under the command of
Grand Vizier Yusuf Pașa arrived from Syria.
Detached from the motherland by the Anglo-Ottoman blockade, and over-
powered by the arrival of these armies in waves, the French forces in Egypt were
compelled to surrender. They did so on 27 June (Cairo) and 2 September 1801
(Alexandria) respectively. The one condition that French commanders set out was
that French savants were to be permitted to send (in secret) their significant hoard
of antiquities to France. It was accepted, with the exception of the Rosetta stone,
which was then transported to London the same year.¹¹⁵
The inter-imperial war in Egypt was thus brought to an end. This was the last
colonial war Britain and France ever fought with each other. It resulted in the first
alliance between London and Istanbul, and also in the least likely one, between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Straits were opened to Russian warships in
this peculiar context, and from then on until 1936, it became a matter of disputes
among the international actors.
For Selim, the French expedition was a wake-up call. He saw that the line
between friends and enemies was too thin and could easily be transgressed amid
the European politics of the time. He was baffled. Where would his empire locate
herself now in this chaotic system? He knew better than ever, though, that there
was an absolute need to hasten the ‘New Order’ programme and to acquire more
concrete results. The new army, still limited in number, had not proved entirely
efficient in Egypt. He had sacked his pro-reform ministers during the war in order
to mobilize the Janissaries. And France had withdrawn her officers who had been
training the Ottoman army. One year into the war, he had also pardoned all
rebellious local notables, including the Pasvanoğlu family in the Balkans, and had
¹¹⁴ Ibid. 131–2. ¹¹⁵ Silvera, ‘Egypt and the French Revolution’, 314.
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even promoted them, to ensure domestic stability during the inter-imperial war.
Yet the example of the Pasvanoğlus, as an Ottoman Greek observer wrote at the
time, set the stage for future disorder, as ‘many started to follow his example,
dissatisfied with [the New Order]’.¹¹⁶
The Wrecked Victory
News of the victory in Egypt was greeted with huge celebrations in Istanbul.
Dazzling fireworks illuminated the skies of the imperial capital at night, and a
certain Selim Efendi, a man of British origin, flew a hot air balloon during the
day to entertain the city’s inhabitants.¹¹⁷ The triumph was recounted to the
Istanbulites as an epic story of courage and bravery, a great success of Ottoman
troops against the more advanced French forces in the battlefield. It was received
with astonishment, inspiring awe among the population.
All this gave Selim III’s reform programme new momentum. He now aimed to
enlarge his ‘New Order’ army by involving soldiers beyond Anatolia. His next move
was recruitment in Rumelia, where a majority of the Janissaries were originally
from. Yet his plans at once aroused doubt and suspicion among the opponents of
the ‘NewOrder’movement, and most prominently among the Janissaries, who were
worried about the future of their units.¹¹⁸ The financial pressures wrought by the
war against France had led to an increase in food prices and thus to public
resentment. Observing this, Selim held back and put a temporary hold to recruit-
ments, thus offering some relief against the rising tides of discontent.
In the next half-decade, the opponents of the ‘New Order’ programme gained
greater strength in the face of the unfolding international developments. In fact,
after the evacuation of the French forces from Egypt, the relationship between
France and the Ottoman Empire had swiftly normalized. During the peace
negotiations in 1801, Bonaparte assured Selim:
[the] expedition from Egypt was not made with hostile views against the Ottoman
Empire. But finally God wanted it to serve as a pretext for the rupture of the two
nations, to convince us, on both sides, that our real interest is union and peace.
Here we are brought back. If Your Highness shares the feelings which animate the
French government, the past will be forever forgotten, and a solid peace, a mutually
advantageous trade, will consolidate the prosperity of [both] nations.¹¹⁹
¹¹⁶ Philliou, Biography, 68. ¹¹⁷ Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 47.
¹¹⁸ Sunar, ‘Ocak-ı Amire’den’, 511.
¹¹⁹ Bonaparte to Selim III, 11 Oct. 1801, in Baron I. de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane
avec les puissances étrangères, vol. 1 (Paris: Amyot, 1864), 502.
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One month after receiving this ‘friendly message’, the Sublime Porte decided to
accept a preliminary peace agreement in Paris, which unconditionally restored
Egypt to Ottoman control.
The Franco-Ottoman deal was sealed with a peace treaty of 25 June 1802, three
months after Britain and France concluded peace with the Treaty of Amiens on 27
March. An important point here, usually omitted in the literature, is the fact that
after the French occupation of Egypt the customs tariffs between the Ottoman
Empire, on the one hand, and France and Britain, on the other, were re-regulated
for a period of seven years (to be renewed again). The second and third articles of
both treaties stipulated that the capitulations of whatever description that had
existed prior to the war were renewed in their fullest extent. The free navigation of
the Black Sea was ensured to France with the same rights, privileges and preroga-
tives that she had enjoyed on the other coasts of the Ottoman Empire before the
war.¹²⁰ These, in effect, launched a period that saw the gradual opening up of the
Ottoman Empire to European trade by the 1860s, though, as will be discussed in
the following chapers, the commercial agreements were only selectively imple-
mented by the Ottoman authorities during and after the Napoleonic Wars.
One reason why Selim III succumbed to these economic concessions was the
fact that he was feeling threatened by the continuous presence of 80,000 Russian
soldiers in the Balkan borders with the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, as we will see
in Chapter 3, despite the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens, by the end of 1802
British forces had still not evacuated Egypt, which, Selim had feared, could turn
into a permanent occupation.¹²¹ Colonel Horace François Bastien Sébastiani de La
Porta (1771–1851), who had been dispatched by Bonaparte to Istanbul to com-
plete the peace negotiations and mend relations with the Porte in 1802, reported
back that the ‘Turks detested’ the Russians and the British; ‘If the Porte succeeds in
delivering the British out of Egypt, and if peace brings her closer to France, she will
surrender herself entirely to us, but until then Britain will dominate her.’¹²²
Sebastiani had a point. When it had become clear in 1800 that the French forces
could be driven out of Egypt only with the help of the British forces, Britain had
come to exercise immense controlling influence over the Porte through her
ambassador Lord Elgin. But now the Porte was in need of French aid to drive
the British out of Egypt. At this hour of struggle for influence over Istanbul
between Britain and France—and, as we will see in the next chapter, of the struggle
between British and Ottoman agents on the spot as to how to secure Cairo and its
environs—the Anglo-French peace was shattered by the outbreak of a new episode
¹²⁰ [Downing Street] to Arbuthnot, 1804, NLS MS 5625/29.
¹²¹ Romain Rainero, ‘Napoléon et la grande stratégie diplomatique en Orient. La première mission
d’Horace Sébastiani dans l’empire ottoman (1801–1802)’, Cahiers de la Méditerranée 57(1) (1998):
289–305; ‘Rapport du Colonel Sebastiani sur sa mission à Constantinople en date du . . . 1802’, in Testa,
Recueil, vol. 1, 508.
¹²² Ibid. 508–9.
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of Napoleonic Wars. London and Saint Petersburg joined the third coalition
against France.
*
During the War of the Third Coalition (1803–6), Selim III pursued the same
policy he had tried to follow in the 1790s. He wanted to isolate his empire from
European wars and channel his funds towards domestic reform. Yet he again
could not. In the mid-1800s the Ottoman imperial capital once more became a
microcosm of European rivalries, ‘teeming with European diplomats vying to win
the Ottomans over to their cause’.¹²³ The sultan was urged to make a decision as to
whose side he would take in the European wars.
Bonaparte personally wrote to Selim III in January 1805: ‘If Russia has an army
of 15,000 men at Corfu, do you believe that it is directed against me? Armed
vessels have the habit of hastening to Constantinople. Your dynasty is about to
descend into oblivion . . . Trust only your true friend—France.’¹²⁴ Throughout the
year, the Corsican piled pressure onto the Porte through Halet Efendi
(1761–1822), the sultan’s agent in Paris.¹²⁵ Halet found himself on the receiving
end of repeated threats from the French emperor as to the forging of an alliance
between Paris and Istanbul or the complete break-off of their relations.¹²⁶ In
November 1805, when the French ruler sent an ultimatum to Istanbul and no
positive response came from Selim, Bonaparte pulled his agent from the Ottoman
imperial capital.¹²⁷
The Porte was unwilling to form an alliance with France at that point, mostly
because he believed that the Russian threat was more immediate and imminent.
With his greater number of soldiers at Ottoman borders, Tsar Alexander I was in a
far better position to attack the ‘Well-Protected Domains’. Moreover, a leading
member of the French camp in his entourage, Küçük Hüseyin Pașa, had passed
away in 1803. Finally, mounting Serbian nationalist activities in the Balkans could
be more easily confined, Selim believed, if he could cut Russian support to their
co-religionists. Accordingly, he decided to throw in his lot with St Petersburg
and London.¹²⁸ A defensive alliance treaty was signed with St Petersburg on
23 September 1805.¹²⁹
¹²³ Karsh and Karsh, Empires, 12.
¹²⁴ Napoleon to Selim, 30 Jan. 1805, in Correspondance de Napoléon I, publiée par ordre de
l’empereur Napoléon III (Paris: Henri Plon, 1858–1870), vol. 10, no. 8298; cf. Karsh and Karsh,
Empires, 11.
¹²⁵ See Ch. 4 for more on Halet’s experience in Paris and its repercussions.
¹²⁶ Enver Z. Karal, Halet Efendi’nin Paris Büyükelçiliği (Istanbul: İstanbul Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1940),
71–7.
¹²⁷ Shaw, Between Old and New, 332–3.
¹²⁸ D’Italinsky to Czatoryski, 30 Nov. 1805, VPR vol. 2, 640–42. ¹²⁹ Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 49.
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With this treaty, Selim III agreed on cooperating with the Triple Alliance
against France by authorizing the free passage of their ships from the Straits,
and by backing Russian efforts to involve other neutral states in the alliance.¹³⁰
And with the leverage he entertained, he managed to reject the Russian demands
to include articles permitting Russia to intervene on behalf of the Orthodox
subjects of the Ottoman Empire, mitigating, to an extent, the pressures on
Istanbul that had been engendered by the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1774.
This procured Selim with temporary security from the Russian threat.¹³¹ But
Bonaparte did not give up. Getting the Straits closed to Russian ships and exerting
influence over the Balkans to counterbalance Russia was of paramount import-
ance to his war strategy. After his victories over the armies of Russia and Austria at
Ulm (17 October) and Austerlitz (2 December), he made a newmove. He included
in the Treaty of Vienna on 15 December 1805 an article with which France
obtained a guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire from the Berlin
court.¹³² All the while, he continued to decry Russia to the Ottoman authorities as
the greatest threat to the Porte’s territorial integrity.
Impressed by Bonaparte’s victories and flattered by his willingness to preserve
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in early 1806 Selim’s policy again gradually
turned toward France. There was certainly a strong degree of opportunism in the
sultan’s move. As the Russian ambassador, the Chevalier d’Italinsky, reported to
St Petersburg from Istanbul, this resulted from the constant anxiety in the
Topkapı Palace especially after the French territorial increments and the latter’s
return to the Ottoman borders in the Balkans as a dangerous neighbour.¹³³ ‘The
Sublime Porte’, d’Italinsky wrote, ‘fears that in case of its refusal, Bonaparte may
undertake an invasion [in its territories].’¹³⁴
The Russian agents were anxious. Foreign Minister Prince Adam Jerzy
Czartoryski (1770–1861) ordered d’Italinsky to do everything possible to fully
expose Bonaparte’s ‘subtle duplicity, explaining to the Porte that it has nothing to
fear from Russia, while it could expect anything from the French’.
Could it not be possible to finally get the Ottoman Ministry to understand that
the manner of action of the imperial court from the time of the conclusion of
the Treaty of Iasi [of 1792] must completely dissipate all doubts about his
intentions . . . that exactly [Russia], along with Britain, saved the Ottoman
Empire during the invasion in Egypt . . . that precisely [Russia’s] constant concern
contributed mostly to its preservation to this day . . . that exactly [Russia] will
always be truly interested in its integrity, while Bonaparte thinks only about
¹³⁰ Shaw, Between Old and New, 334. ¹³¹ Karal, Halet, 80–82.
¹³² BOA HAT 1284/49818; ‘Nota poslannika v Konstantinopole A.Ja. Italinskogo tureckomu pra-
vitel’stvu’, 4 Feb. 1806, VPR vol. 3, 37–8.
¹³³ Ibid. ¹³⁴ Ibid.
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profit at its expense? After all, if we assume that Russia has intentions that are
dangerous for the Porte, who could prevent it from carrying them out?¹³⁵
According to Czartoryski, Bonaparte’s territorial acquisitions and his direct and
indirect control over the continent had given him such dominance that no state
would dare to go against him or even cause him displeasure. Russia and Britain
therefore had to act together immediately; and if one of the central pieces of their
joint policy was Prussia in the north, the other had to be the Ottoman Empire in
the south.¹³⁶
France or Russia? With whom would Selim side? His final decision was dictated
by Bonaparte’s new pledges in December 1805. The French chargé d’affaires in
Istanbul, Ruffin, promised the sultan that France would help Selim regain the
Crimea from Russia. This was the most exciting pledge the emperor could offer
the sultan. Restoring the Crimea to his rule had been Selim’s ultimate goal ever
since he had ascended to the throne. He could meet that great expectation of his
people. He could be the conqueror they hoped he would be.
As a result, in February, Selim recognized Bonaparte as emperor.¹³⁷ And after
the French victory at Jena in October 1806, he felt reassured about which side to
take.¹³⁸ On the advice of Bonaparte’s special envoy to Istanbul, Sebastiani, he did
not ratify the alliance treaty with Russia.¹³⁹ Instead he appointed a pro-French
hospodar in the Danubian principalities, withdrawing the Phanariotes (Ottoman
Greek subjects working in the service of the Porte) that Russia favoured. He did
not renew the existing alliance with Britain, closed the Straits to foreign war ships,
and declared the neutrality of his empire in the European war. These acts sufficed
for Tsar Alexander I to order his units already stationed on the Ottoman borders
to invade the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia in November
1806. One month later, Selim III declared war on Russia.
Within the space of a few months the Porte thus shifted from cooperation to
war with the Triple Alliance. Consequently, through her ambassador to Istanbul,
Charles Arbuthnot (1767–1850), Britain constantly pressured the sultan to revert
his position once more and declare war on France.¹⁴⁰ Arbuthnot believed that
Selim III was more afraid of the British imperial fleet than of the French soldiers
stationed in the Balkans. This is why, as a last-ditch effort, a British squadron
under the command of Admiral General John Thomas Duckworth (1748–1817)
entered the Dardanelles, destroyed the Ottoman ships that tried to stop it, and
¹³⁵ Ibid. ¹³⁶ Czartoryski to S. R. Vorontsov, 14 Feb. 1806, VPR vol. 2, 44–7.
¹³⁷ ‘Nota poslannika v Konstantinopole A.Ja. Italinskogo tureckomu pravitel’stvu’, 4 Feb. 1806, VPR
vol. 3, 37–8.
¹³⁸ Shaw, Between Old and New, 352. ¹³⁹ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 43.
¹⁴⁰ Shaw, Between Old and New, 335; Fatih Yeşil, ‘İstanbul Önlerinde Bir İngiliz Filosu’, in Nizam-ı
Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e III. Selim ve Dönemi, 404–5.
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blockaded Istanbul on 20 February 1807.¹⁴¹ However, suspecting that his ships
could be trapped in the Straits if the Dardanelles were fortified before his return,
Admiral Duckworth lifted the blockade after ten days.
*
For Selim, despite the revolution in France and the ideological differences with the
French rulers, this scheme of inter-imperial politics was probably how things
should have been in the first place, given his admiration for France since his
childhood and his desire to regain the Crimea from Russia. The truth was that it
was impossible to control the chaos of politics at the time, as abrupt changes were
taking place in the blink of an eye. And one of these would hit the sultan at home.
The departure of the British fleet from Istanbul prompted great jubilance in the
imperial capital in early March 1807. But the ten-day blockade had also incited
immense horror, panic, and tragedy.¹⁴² Never before had Istanbul been subject to
such a blockade. Never before had its population seen a hostile navy at their shores
since the city fell under Ottoman rule in 1453. That tens of thousands had been
recruited and were preparing near the walls of the city for the expedition against
Russia in the Balkans at the time of the blockade provoked tumult, drought, and
massive inflation. Domestic anger was directed against the ruling elites and more
so against the new institutions and the expenses incurred by the ‘New Order’
army. The city seethed with false rumours that the British fleet had arrived in fact
to bombard the Janissary barracks.¹⁴³
This was the crucial moment. The opponents of the ‘New Order’, and inter-
national and domestic foes of Selim’s reign, had already started coalescing:
Russian ambassador d’Italinsky had begun to support their cause openly as a
reaction to Selim’s inclination toward France. The pro-Russian Phanariotes,
having lost their posts when Selim appointed pro-French hospodars in the
Balkans, joined them. The idea of dethroning Selim and replacing him with his
older nephew, Şehzade Mustafa, with Russian and Phanariot funds grew stronger
among the powerful families in Istanbul and prevailing conservative figures such
as the janissary agha Ibrahim Hilmi (1747–1825) and scholar Mehmed Ataullah
Efendi (1770–1826).¹⁴⁴
The opportune time for this coalition arrived when Selim III’s popularity
further faded among the inhabitants of the capital. The news of Wahhabi attacks
on the Holy Lands and the British invasion of Egypt reached concurrently in
March 1807 and demoralized the imperial capital.¹⁴⁵ Soon after the sultan’s army
left for the expedition against Russia on 12 April, Istanbul found itself in tumult.
Led by an auxiliary Janissary unit under the leadership of Kabakçı Mustafa, a
¹⁴¹ Yeşil, ‘İstanbul Önlerinde’, 408–9; Shaw, Between Old and New, 358–9.
¹⁴² Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 50. ¹⁴³ Ibid. ¹⁴⁴ Shaw, Between Old and New, 375.
¹⁴⁵ See Ch. 3.
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revolt broke out. Between 25 and 29 May, the fighting claimed the lives of a few
dozen people including one of the prominent advocates of the ‘New Order’,
Mahmud Raif Efendi.¹⁴⁶ Anxious to stop violence at once, Selim accepted the
demands of the rioters without resistance, suspended the ‘New Order’ institutions,
and in the end agreed to his dethronement. He returned to a life of seclusion in his
room in the Topkapı Palace 18 years after his rise to power. While descending
from the throne, he told his nephew Mustafa (1779–1808):
I wanted the happiness of my subjects. However, I irritated the people that I love
and to whom I wanted to give back their glorious past. Since they do not want me
any more and I cannot do anything for their happiness, I quit the throne without
any grief and I sincerely congratulate you on your ascendance.¹⁴⁷
But the fall of Selim III did not bring tranquillity to the empire: Istanbul was
shaken by another shock soon after the new Sultan, Mustafa IV, ascended to the
throne in June 1807. Rumours of a secret agreement made between Bonaparte and
Alexander I (7 July) emanated from Tilsit.¹⁴⁸ The two rulers who had once each
pressured the Porte to join the war on their side against the other had made peace,
and were now discussing the partition of the Ottoman Empire.
The rumours were true. Bonaparte and Alexander had discussed but, in the
end, could not agree on the details of the partition, as the French emperor wanted
Austria to be involved in the sharing of the spoils of the sultan’s empire, and
denied the tsar’s annexation of Istanbul and the Straits.¹⁴⁹ Even then, Bonaparte
accepted the end of his alliance with the Porte and pressured Istanbul to make
peace with Russia.tonf
Defeated by French armies in Friedland in June, Alexander I, for his part, agreed
to recognize French conquests and hand back Wallachia and Moldavia to the Porte,
though this agreement never took effect. In the event that the Porte did not agree
peace with Russia, the two rulers established, France would join the war against the
Ottoman Empire and her European provinces would be shared between Paris and
St Petersburg as colonies, ‘leaving only Istanbul and Rumelian provinces to the
sultan’.¹⁵⁰
Diplomatically cornered, the Porte agreed to sign an armistice with Russia with
French mediation.¹⁵¹ But, as distrust and lack of coordination tarnished the
¹⁴⁶ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 43. For a French observation on the 1807–8 events, see Antoine Juchereau
de Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808, précédées d’observations générales sur
l’état actuel de l’Empire Ottoman (Paris: Brissot-Thivars, 1819); see also Ali Yaycıoğlu, ‘Révolutions de
Constantinople: France and the Ottoman World in the Age of Revolutions’, in French Mediterraneans:
Transnational and Imperial Histories, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorchin and Todd Shephard (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 21–51, at 41–3.
¹⁴⁷ Jucherau, Révolutions de Constantinople, 139; cf. Yaycıoğlu, ‘Révolutions de Constantinople’, 42.
¹⁴⁸ BOA HAT 1367/54128. ¹⁴⁹ Bitis, Russia, 27. ¹⁵⁰ Karsh and Karsh, Empires, 14.
¹⁵¹ BOA HAT 170/7254.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
        71
Franco-Russian alliance shortly thereafter, the war between St Petersburg and
Istanbul continued intermittently until 1812. It came to an end only after another
exhausting turn in European wars, when Bonaparte began his march on Russia
with his Grande Armée, as we will see in Chapter 4.
Amidst this immense web of ambiguity, quicksilver alliances, chaos, and
insecurity in international politics, and while the war with Russia was still under
way, Istanbul could hardly enjoy domestic stability. Fourteen months after Selim
III’s dethronement, another coup d’état took place in the imperial capital.
The proponents of the ‘New Order’ who had managed to survive the 1807 revolt
combined forces with the local nobility under the leadership of Alemdar Mustafa
Pașa (1765–1808) of Ruschuk. The latter had successfully fought against the
Russians in the Balkans, and with the winds in his sails, he was ready to march to
Istanbul, restore Selim III to his throne, and restart the ‘New Order’ programme.
In July 1807, Alemdar Pașa’s forces overwhelmed the Janissaries, managing to
seize political power shortly afterwards. On the 28th day of the month, the Pașa
arrived in Istanbul with 15,000 men. After routing all resistance on his way, he
entered the Topkapı Palace, burst open the grand doors of the palace, and then
proceeded past the Babüssaade (the Gate of Felicity). There before his eyes he
found a corpse placed on a mattress on the sofa next to the copper fireplace, just
under the pale pink rose decorations inscribed amidst the golden motifs on the
ceiling. It was none other than the star-crossed Selim, strangled at the order of his
nephew Mustafa.¹⁵² The other heir, Mahmud (1785–1839), whom Selim had
always favoured more, escaped the tragic fate of his uncle by hiding in the
bathroom. The same day, Alemdar placed Mahmud on the throne as the new
sultan, where he remained for 31 years.
Selim III’s death marked the end of a period of volatile inter-imperial relations
and the first efforts at comprehensive reforms in the Ottoman world. During no
other sultan’s reign was the Ottoman Empire engaged in wars and alliances with
almost all major European Powers in such quick succession. Though Selim wished
to avoid war in order to address the main social ills of his empire, and to guarantee
the security of the ‘Well Protected Domains’ by ensuring the circle of justice, the
Porte’s involvement in the Coalition Wars, by actually starting the second one in
1798, dealt a huge blow to his plans.
Thereafter, the reign of Selim became an era of unmanageable imperial anxie-
ties. He had learned that alliances with European Powers no longer truly meant
lasting security for his empire. Admiration for the military achievements of his
Western neighbours, need for their technology and know-how, and distrust of
their foreign policies were all enmeshed in his quest for security. These left the
¹⁵² Beydilli, ‘III. Selim’, 54; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 8, 308; Ottokar Freiherrn von Schlechta-Wssehrd,
Die Revolutionen von Constantinopel in den Jahren 1807 und 1808 (Vienna: Gerold, 1882), 72. On the
details and various accounts of the death of Selim, see esp. Aysel Danacı-Yıldız, ‘III. Selim’in Katilleri’,
Osmanlı Araştırmaları 31 (2008): 55–92.
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sultan in a continuous yet self-defeating cycle of haste and hesitation in grappling
with political issues in the early years of the nineteenth century.
The heightened insecurities during the Napoleonic Wars continued to inform
Ottoman policies for several decades. When Selim’s nephew Mahmud II ascended
to the throne in 1807, the latter consciously avoided forming alliances with any
European Power, or entrusting his empire to European public law. This lasting
cynicism became a central feature of political decisions taken by the Porte
especially when the Powers offered it to become a part of the Vienna system in
1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars.¹⁵³
The 1798 expedition not only left the sultan with an acute sense of loneliness in
inter-imperial politics. It also launched a history of ‘good-willed’ occupations and
interventions in the Ottoman periphery, laying the seeds of a new, transimperial
culture of security, wherein the Powers thenceforth saw it justifiable to intervene
in the Levant with the purpose of supplying security and by employing previously
unexampled instruments and tactics beyond their imperial borders, and often
against the will of the Porte. Talleyrand and Bonaparte believed that their invasion
of Egypt was for a just cause as the local actors in the Levant were hampering both
French commercial interests and the Ottoman political authority.
Yet they failed to see, or chose to ignore, that Selim had his own plan, one for
obtaining security in his ‘Well-Protected Domains’. Forging alliances had by the
turn of the century become an integral feature of the ‘circle of justice’, with the
reform of the military and maintenance of the continuity of the empire being
important prerequisites for this. This was the Ottoman disposition toward the
evolving Eastern Question of the time. However, the proponents of the ‘New
Order’ movement could not overcome the domestic and global hurdles they
confronted in order to realize their plan.
As Fernand Braudel has argued, the Mediterranean was not a wall or a barrier
that divided the societies around it, but a bridge, a contact zone connecting
peoples.¹⁵⁴ The crossing of the Mediterranean by French, British and Ottoman
forces indeed brought their policies and security considerations as well as those of
local actors in Egypt into the same equation at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Be it a service for the sultan, as Talleyrand thought, or an element of the partition
plan, as Bonaparte envisaged, the 1798 expedition also revived divisions and
animosities on the ground, and interlocked local insecurities and hostilities with
global imperial calculations. In Istanbul, it hit Selim III’s plans for guaranteeing
the security for his empire by bolstering the circle of justice, and marked the first
steps of a decades’ long process of the opening up of the Levant to European trade.
In Egypt, it left behind a malicious civil war.
¹⁵³ Ozan Ozavci, ‘A Priceless Grace? The Congress of Vienna of 1815, the Ottoman Empire and
Historicizing the Eastern Question’, English Historical Review (forthcoming).
¹⁵⁴ Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (Paris:
Armand Colin, 1949).
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3
The Chase in the Desert
Empires and Civil War in Egypt, 1801–1812
When Selim III declared jihad against France in September 1798, vizieral letters
were sent out from Istanbul all across the Ottoman Empire. In the course of the
war, the sultan’s subjects were repeatedly called to arms ‘to unite and drive out the
French invader’. All governors, district rulers, aghas, and other local chieftains
were instructed ‘to raise a volunteer force of [irregular troops, the başıbozuks], and
to send it to join the fleet of the [Kaptan-ı Deryâ (Grand Admiral) Küçük Hüseyin
Pașa] which was to convoy an expedition to [Abu Qir]’.¹ After receiving one of
these letters, Ibrahim Agha, Çorbacı (Chorbaji²) of Kavala, a small town on the
coast of the northern Aegean, followed the orders by summoning some 300
desperadoes from the district.³ This was an invaluable opportunity, he thought,
to also rid himself of his swashbuckling nephew, Mehmed Ali (1770–1849).⁴
About 30 years old at the time, Mehmed Ali was the heir to a tobacco business
and the leader of a small gang whose unruly conduct had on occasion undermined
the authority of his uncle.⁵ The only survivor among his ten siblings (for reasons
unknown), he was a blond, grey/hazel-eyed, hot-headed, and ambitious young
man of around 5 ft 6 in. in height.⁶ Because his business did not seem to offer
much prospect of an easy livelihood, he was effortlessly persuaded to join the
Ottoman forces as second in command of the Albanian başıbozuks, leaving behind
his wife, Emine Hanım, and five children.⁷
This was the beginning of an adventure, which soon became a career that
played a decisive role in two different episodes of the inter-imperial crises in the
¹ Cabra, ‘Quelques firmans’. ² A middle-rank Janissary leader.
³ D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century or Mehemet Ali and His Successors Until the
British Occupation in 1882 (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1898), 41; Nicolai N. Murav’ev-
Karskij, Turciya i Egipet Iz zapisok N.N. Murav’eva (Karskago) 1832 i 1833 godov v chetyrex tomax, s
Geograficheskim slovarem i kartinami, vol 1 (Moscow: Tipografiya A.I. Mamontova i K, Bolshaya
Dmitrovka, 1869), 20.
⁴ Cameron, Egypt, 41; Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 5.
⁵ Khaled Fahmy, Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt (Oxford: Oneworld,
2009), 8.
⁶ Sinoue,Méhémet Ali, 24; Marsot, Egypt, 28. While Mehmed Ali is widely known to be a Sunni, his
ethnic origins (some claim that he was of Kurdish origin) are less clear.
⁷ Cameron, Egypt, 41; S. Abū ‘Izz al-Dīn, Ibrāhīm Basha fī Sūriyya (Beirut, 1929), 2–3; Şinasi
Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pașa İsyanı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1945), 22–3.
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nineteenth century. One of these is relatively well known. After Mehmed Ali
became the pașa of Egypt and transformed the dominions under his rule into an
imperium in imperio, he launched a civil war against Istanbul in the 1830s that
marked a turning point in the history of the Eastern Question. This episode will be
considered in the Part II of this book.
There was yet another occasion when Mehmed Ali became a key actor of the
Great Power interventions in the Levant. A tripartite civil war broke out in Egypt
in the immediate aftermath of the French invasion of 1798–1801. It was then,
under the shadow of inter-imperial rivalries between Britain, France, and the
Ottoman Empire, that Mehmed Ali, once a junior soldier, emerged as a main
character in the diplomatic scuffle. He managed to rise to power in Egypt before
entertaining the dream of founding an independent empire of his own. Along the
way, he made skilful use of local interests, insecurities, and the chaos of the civil
war that was fought between the British-backed Mamluk beys of Egypt and the
Ottoman forces. The fighting eventually saw the appearance of the Albanian units
under Mehmed Ali’s command as a third belligerent party in their own right. It
was Mehmed Ali who obtained the succour of France for the Albanians’ cause, in
one of the many moments in his career when he strove, successfully, to jockey
inter-imperial differences and wars in his favour.
The civil war in Egypt in 1801–12 was not only an early example of the
coalescing of global imperial struggles and local animosities; it was also one of
the earliest instances of surrogate wars in the Levant. What follows pertains to this
civil war and its constitutive role in imperialism in the Levant—the imperialism of
both British and French, and of both the Ottoman Empire and, in due course,
Mehmed Ali.
I will begin the chapter with a discussion of the nature of politics and the
economy in Ottoman Egypt before the French occupation in order to better
explain how the country became a contact zone for inter-imperial rivalries that
engendered a new civil war there in the 1800s. After this, I will narrate how
Mehmed Ali acquired power during the fighting, and why the peculiar circum-
stances of violence in the 1800s affected the later phases of the Eastern Question.
Ottoman Egypt before the Eastern Question
Until the mid-nineteenth century a ‘chaotic pluralism’ characterized the Ottoman
administrative structure in the imperial periphery.⁸ Complex networks of large
and micro-regions, households of various sizes, garrisons and settlements
⁸ In fact, the same holds true for most empires in history; see Burbank and Cooper, Empires; Buzan
and Lawson, The Global Transformation, 131.
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parcelled out imperial authority and administrative decision-making to a wide
range of local intermediaries who were linked to the central administration in a
variety of forms. That is, the imperial capital fostered multivalent control over the
politics, economy, finance, and administrations of the regions under its jurisdic-
tion. The sultans’ authority and political sway was tighter in Asia Minor, large
parts of Greater Syria (Bilâd al-Sham) and Rumelia. But it remained weaker, if not
entirely nominal, in other provinces and posts. Basra, Baghdad, Kurdistan,
Yemen, and Hedjaz in Mesopotamia and the Arab peninsula, Algiers and Tunis
in North Africa, and Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bosnia in the Balkans were all
autonomous areas to varying degrees, linked to the imperial capital mainly by way
of the payment of tributes and the supply of men in times of war.⁹
Egypt was one of these less-controlled provinces. But it was the largest
and richest of all, and therefore the most important, distributing a great agricul-
tural bounty—including rice, wheat, sugar, and coffee—to other regions of the
empire.¹⁰Moreover, due to its geographical proximity to the Holy Lands of Mecca
and Medina, it was of vital strategic significance for the caliphate and the unity of
Muslims worldwide. It gained salience in European inter-imperial competition as
of the eighteenth century, when it came to supply grains and cotton to European
markets. The Napoleonic Wars and the 1798 French expedition magnified its
strategic and economic prominence. The tripartite civil war that ensued was an
immediate result of this increased importance.
*
Among the main political agents in Egypt in the run-up to the 1798 expedition
were the Mamluk beys. In many respects, their experience set an example for
Mehmed Ali, who looked to obtain and consolidate his power in the country as of
the 1800s. Their experience also reveals why Ottoman Egypt was hardly free from
civil wars and violence before it became an epicentre of global imperial rivalries,
and what changed in 1798.
It is difficult to clearly identify who the Mamluks were. Neither ethnically nor
religiously nor class-wise can we neatly place them in one unambiguous category.
They came from all vicinities—the Ottoman Empire, Europe, the Caucasus, and
Africa—and constituted different classes depending on their social mobility. Only
by over-generalizing can we say that the Mamluks were slave soldiers that had
ruled Egypt under their sultanate prior to its conquest by the Ottoman Sultan
Selim II in 1517. Theirs was a drastically singular system, wherein authority was
⁹ Yaycıoğlu, Partners, 20.
¹⁰ Daniel Crecelius, ‘Egypt in the Eighteenth Century’, in The Cambridge History of Egypt, ed.
M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 59–86, at 59; Jane Hathaway, ‘The
Military Household in Ottoman Egypt’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 27(1) (Feb.
1995): 39–52, at 39.
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passed not from the head of the household to his children but to one of his slaves
or ex-slave protégés, under the motto ‘Kingship has no progeny’.¹¹
When the Ottomans conquered Egypt, the Mamluk system was not disbanded.
The major households of Egypt were ruled by one Mamluk after another. The
system even swelled with the influx of new slaves from the Caucasus, Greece,
Sudan, as well as Europe.¹² Although the Ottoman governor of the country and
senior officials such as the kadı (the chief judge) were appointed by Istanbul as of
the early sixteenth century, the central administration simultaneously placed
several leading local figures, usually with Mamluk backgrounds, into key adminis-
trative positions (with the title ‘bey’) such as sub-provincial governorships, pilgrim-
age commanders, or treasurers to hold in check the power of its own governors
who might aspire to acquire further autonomy from Istanbul.¹³ The Mamluks’
influence in the Ottoman Empire thus continued. An ahistorical account by a
nineteenth-century French diplomat suggests that Mamluk rule was a military
oligarchy, supported by the ulemas (religious leaders), the Ottoman Janissaries,
Arab Bedouins, and Coptic writers who constituted the financial caste of Egypt.
According to this account, the whole policy of the beys consisted in an understand-
ing that there was no power that could subjugate them in Cairo.¹⁴
The Mamluks’ understanding was partially underpinned by the polymorphous
household organization in the country. Theirs was one of the two main groups
of households alongside those of the governors or senior officials sent by the
Ottoman imperial government.¹⁵ A third group emerged over time as the
Janissaries (ocaklı) established an economic-security network by offering protec-
tion (himaye) to local artisans and merchants in Cairo and the Bedouins in the
countryside, which procured for them large streams of revenue—a strategy that
Mehmed Ali would also follow after his arrival in Cairo. The Janissaries eventually
¹¹ Bruce Masters, ‘Semi-Autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces’, in The Cambridge History of
Turkey, vol. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 197; Cihan Y. Muslu, The Ottomans and the Mamluks: Imperial Diplomacy and
Warfare in the Islamic World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 5.
¹² Hathaway, ‘The Military Household’, 39; Gran, Islamic Roots, 15–17.
¹³ Selda Güler, ‘Mısır’ın SonMemluk Beyleri (1801–1806)’, Cumhuriyet Tarihi AraştırmalarıDergisi
11(22) (fall 2015): 232.
¹⁴ ‘Extrait d’un rapport à l’E. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères’, 10 July 1822, AMAE Papiers
Desages, 60PAAP/39/158.
¹⁵ The complexities of the Egyptian household system are beyond the scope of this book and have
already been detailed in Jane Hathaway’s groundbreaking book The Politics of Households in Ottoman
Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Hathaway warns us
that the use of the term ‘Mamluk households’, which is common in the literature, is somewhat
misleading. On the subject, see also D. Daniel Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the
Regimes of ‘Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760–1775 (Chicago: Bibliotheca
Islamica, 1981); Michael Winter, ‘Turks, Arabs, and Mamluks in the Army of Ottoman Egypt’,Wiener
Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 72 (1980): 97–122; Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and
Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1962); Gabriel Piterberg, ‘The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the 18th
Century’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 22(3) (Aug. 1990): 275–89.
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became involved in the lucrative coffee trade by controlling the supervision of
the Suez customs. Their financial strength allowed them to leave their barracks
and buy houses and slaves (or hire free-born Muslims) to form their own
households.¹⁶
Since the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul aimed to establish a balance between
these households and not permit one or the other to hold sway over Egypt, which
would otherwise threaten the imperial authority, they sometimes dispatched
agents to support the weaker households against the more powerful ones. This
early Ottoman imperialism had always been an integral element of the politics of
insecurity in Egypt. Partly as a result of imperial interferences and partly due to
incessant reciprocal rivalries and jealousies among or within the major house-
holds, social stability in Egypt was frequently jeopardized.¹⁷
To reiterate, just like Mount Lebanon, which we will discuss in Part III, Egypt
witnessed periodic civil wars of sorts before it became a focal point of the Eastern
Question. In 1711, a multi-partite war broke out because of the resentments
between the Mamluk beys and the Janissaries and the sudden decline of the coffee
trade which jeopardized the local economy. The civil war saw rapidly formed and
sundered alliances, and the assassination of several leading figures of the house-
holds.¹⁸ After the combat, the financial dominance of the Janissaries steadily
dwindled, while the household factionalism between the local grandees continued
and further exhausted the Mamluks.
Only three decades later, when the Kazdağlı family, with Mamluk background,
emerged as the new rulers (shaykhs al-balad), was partial political and fiscal
stability introduced in the country.¹⁹ Trade both within the Ottoman Empire
and (especially) with European states flourished. Between 1747 and 1754, under
the leadership of Ibrahim Kethüda, the Kazdağlı household professed obedience
toward Istanbul, delivering its obligations to the empire, i.e. receiving Ottoman
officials, dispatching requested troops to fight in imperial wars, sending the yearly
pilgrim caravans (haramayn) with money and crops, and shipping tributes and
supplies to Istanbul on a regular basis.²⁰
Ibrahim Kethüda’s Mamluk successor, Bulutkaptan ‘Ali Bey, however, aspired
to independence during his dominant leadership in 1760–66 and then again
from 1767 to 1772.²¹ Of either Russian or Georgian origin, Bulutkaptan looked
to resurrect the Mamluk sultanate and build his own empire in alliance with
St Petersburg, the sultan’s major enemy at the time.²² Some 60 years prior to
¹⁶ Crecelius, ‘Egypt’, 63.
¹⁷ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 11; Jane Hathaway, ‘The Household: An Alternative Framework for the
Military Society of Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Egypt’, Oriente Moderno 18(7) (1999): 55–66.
¹⁸ Crecelius, ‘Egypt’, 70–73. ¹⁹ Ibid. 73; Hathaway, Politics of Households, 88–108.
²⁰ Crecelius, ‘Egypt’, 78. ²¹ Ibid. 59.
²² See also Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, 17. Selda Güner, ‘Mısır’da Asi bir Memluk: Bulutkaptan Ali
Bey (El-Kebir) (1768/9–1773)’, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi 53(1)
(2013): 155–82, at 166, 168, 170, 173–5. See also E. I. Druzhinina, Kjuchuk-Kajnardzhijskij mir
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Mehmed Ali, he attempted to invade Palestine and Syria without the authorization
of the sultan.²³ To this end, he recruited mercenaries, and in order to be able to
fund his army, he enfeebled the Janissary corps by controlling the customs of
Alexandria, Rosetta, Damietta, and Suez. Moreover, he surrounded himself with a
group of Egyptian and foreign Christian advisers to build his trade, and assured
European merchants of his protection, while at the same time levying high taxes
on them.²⁴
*
It was at this point that the local economic organization of Egypt became
increasingly connected with world trade, and its gradual integration into global
capitalist networks commenced. Bulutkaptan lifted the Ottoman ban on European
shipping north of Jeddah (to protect Mecca and Medina) which had been in force
since the ousting of the Portuguese from the Red Sea in the sixteenth century.²⁵
This was highly satisfying for the British actors present, particularly the Levant
Company agent and future British consul George Baldwin (1742–1826), who had
great faith in the potential of the Red Sea trade, and believed its development
would give Bulutkaptan a vested interest in helping maintain the Suez route as a
vital line of British communications with India.²⁶
In 1770, Bulutkaptan invaded Mecca and got himself ordained by the sharif of
Mecca with the title ‘Sultan of Egypt’, and ‘Commander of the Two Seas’.²⁷ But his
reign did not last long. During his Syrian campaign in 1771–2, when his-brother-
in law Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dahab turned against him on the grounds that he
had handed the governance of Egypt to the Christians and turned against Sultan
Mustafa III, Bulutkaptan fled from Cairo and then died from wounds inflicted at
the time of his failed effort to retake the town in 1773.²⁸ As the new dominant
figure in Cairo, Muhammad al-Dahab immediately renounced the alliance with
Russia, declared his obedience to the sultan, and remitted sums owed to the
imperial capital that ‘Ali Bey had denied.
With the latter’s death in 1775, the days of relative peace, stability, and
prosperity came to an end in Egypt, and factionalism resurfaced between al-
Dahab’s Mamluks, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey. The country swiftly slid into
chaos. Both of Georgian origin and enjoying Russian support in secret while
Catherine II was entertaining her ‘Greek project’ (see Chapter 1), Murad and
Ibrahim deposed the pașas appointed by Istanbul in 1780, 1783, and 1784; they
1774 g. (Moscow: n.p., 1955); Stanford J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 4–5; S. K. Lusignan, A History of the Revolt of Aly Bey against the
Ottoman Porte (London: James Phillips, 1783), 146–7; Gabriel Guemard, Les Réformes en Égypte (d’Ali-
Bey El Kebir a Méhémet Ali) (1760–1848) (Cairo: Paul Barbey, 1936), 64–5.
²³ Crecelius, ‘Egypt’, 78. ²⁴ Ibid. 80. ²⁵ Ibid. 68.
²⁶ George Baldwin, Political Recollections Relative to Egypt (London: W. Bulmer & Co., 1802),
183–6, 203–6; Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman Encounters, vol. 1, 85–6.
²⁷ Kimche, ‘The Opening of the Red Sea’, 66. ²⁸ Crecelius, ‘Egypt’, 80–1.
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withheld tributes and food supplies from the imperial capital, and demanded
extraordinary taxes from the farmers. These overlapped with the food and finan-
cial crises in France. As the French merchants were unable to pay their debts to
Murad and Ibrahim, the beys harassed them, and then threatened to destroy their
houses and churches. They eventually tore down the Couvent de Prés de la Terre
Sainte (1786). This was the last straw for the French merchants, who then
appealed to their central government for help, ominously arguing that if the sultan
could not resolve their problem, their own governments should do it.²⁹
Even after the eleven-month Ottoman punitive campaign under the command
of Grand Admiral Hasan Pașa in 1786–7, the Mamluk beys could not be com-
pletely subjugated.³⁰ True, they were driven out of Cairo. Their belongings were
confiscated, and Ismail Bey, another Mamluk loyal to the Porte, was appointed as
the new shaykh al-balad.³¹ Hasan Pașa even reimposed the ban on Red Sea trade,
before he was recalled to the imperial capital after another war with Russia broke
loose. But, while leaving Egypt, to ensure regional security during the fight against
Russia, the Ottoman Grand Admiral made a compromise with Murad and
Ibrahim, pardoning them for their previous misdemeanours, appointing both as
sub-provincial rulers in the Upper Egypt, and accepting their vows to serve the
sultan and guarantee the security of the hajj routes to Mecca on his behalf.³²
This ephemeral solution proved insufficient when Ismail died of plague in 1791,
and Murad and Ibrahim returned back to Cairo, interpreting the events as
‘intimation from heaven to break their bounds’.³³ The two made their submission
to the Porte, which was duly accepted. But then, they resumed their former
conduct by withholding payment of tributes to the imperial capital and forcing
European as well as Muslim merchants, local guild members, and farmers to pay
heavy taxes. Anarchy in Cairo, coupled with a disastrous plague epidemic, would
lead to emigration and a large number of deaths, leading to a population decline
by nearly 40,000.³⁴
Even before the War of the First Coalition began in Europe in 1793, France and
Britain had already been engaged in open commercial competition over control of
the Suez lines. Despite their thin political influence, they both laboured to
persuade the Mamluk beys to offer their merchants concessions. British Consul
Baldwin made several overtures to keep Red Sea trade on a fixed tariff (his plan
²⁹ Ibid.
³⁰ BOA A. DVNS. MSR. MHM. d., no. 10:163, 77; cf. Ali Karahan, ‘Kaptan-ı Derya Cezayirli Gazi
Hasan Paşa’nın Mısır Seferi’, MUTAD 4(1) (2017): 75–85, at 78; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 3, 302.
³¹ BOA, HAT, no. 1318, 1320; TSMA E. 425/10, cf. Karahan, ‘Cezayirli’, 80; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 3,
320–22.
³² Güler, ‘Son Memluk Beyleri’, 232–3; also see Necmi Ülker, ‘XVIII. Yüzyılda Mısır ve Cezayirli
Gazi Hasan Paşa’nın Mısır Seferi’, Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi 9 (1994): 1–30; Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 12.
³³ BOA HAT 16/718; G. Baldwin (Alexandria) to Liston, 30 Oct. 1794, NLS MS 5580/35.
³⁴ André Raymond, Cairo, trans. Willard Wood (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000),
202–25.
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was to accord 3 per cent to the Porte and 6 per cent to the beys). The aforemen-
tioned 1795 French mission to Egypt (see Chapter 1), led by a special agent,
M. Dubois-Thainville, aimed at a similar settlement with Murad and Ibrahim.
Dubois-Thainville asked for steady provision of grain from Egypt to the agrarian
crisis-struck south of France, a pardon for indebted French merchants, and their
regular passage by Suez to the East Indies.³⁵ But, amid rivalry and conflicts with
each other, the Mamluk beys rejected these demands.
Three years later, when the French Army of the Orient set sail for the Levant,
Ottoman Egypt had thus already been distressed for decades by instability, civil
wars, and the Mamluks’ quest for dominance at the expense of the Ottoman
imperial authority. This was why the architects of the expedition considered their
mission to be a noble one, which would bring stability and order in Egypt. But
the harsh realities on the ground would hardly overlap with expectations in the
metropole.
Useful Allies, Dangerous Enemies
After the French forces landed in Alexandria in July 1798, they overcame the naval
defences of the town without much effort.³⁶ By 24 July, they had seized Rosetta,
routed the Mamluk forces that had mustered to halt the French advance at
Shubrakhit and Imbaba at the so-called Battle of the Pyramids (21 July), and
finally entered Cairo. Plunder and pillaging then began in this commercial centre
until Bonaparte himself arrived, established order, and declared that he was the
friend of the local population, ‘playing the role of a Muslim Sultan’. For this, he
was even styled as ‘Ali Bonaparte’.³⁷
However, even after the French gained control of all major towns and despite all
their propaganda, annihilating the Mamluks proved impossible. Ibrahim Bey fled
to Palestine, seeking shelter under the powerful Ottoman governor, Ahmed al-
Jazzar Pașa. Murad Bey and his Mamluks retreated to Upper Egypt, a pursuit force
under the command of General Louis-Charles-Antoine Desaix (1768–1800)
behind them.³⁸ Murad managed to outrun Desaix, as the latter was much dis-
tracted by the developments of the following weeks: the destruction of Bonaparte’s
fleet by the British, the Anglo-Ottoman blockade, popular uprisings in Cairo in
summer and October, and the failure of Bonaparte’s southern Syria campaign. All
these gave Murad Bey the space and freedom to hold longer.
³⁵ Liston to Baldwin, 8 Aug. 1795, NLS MS 5582/90.
³⁶ Dykstra, ‘The French Occupation’, 122. ³⁷ Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 125–6.
³⁸ For Hijaz’s support of Murad Bey, see Mordechai Abir, ‘Relations between the Government of
India and the Shariff of Mecca during the French Invasion of Egypt, 1798–1801’, Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society (1965): 33–4; Dykstra, ‘The French Occupation of Egypt’, 122.
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Following Bonaparte’s departure from Egypt in late 1799, the new commander
of the French forces, General Kleber, made a compromise with the Mamluk bey,
realizing that the Mamluks were the lesser of his enemies. Kleber recognized
Murad’s power in Upper Egypt as the governor of Said in return for his cooper-
ation in retaining French control in the Delta against local opposition. About one
and a half years after landing in Egypt, the French would thus come to depend on
one of the Mamluk beys whose violations, amongst other reasons, had led them to
undertake the expedition to the Levant in the first place.³⁹ An alliance was
accordingly formed between the enemies.
But it did not last long. The arrival of Anglo-Ottoman forces one by one dealt
heavy blows to the Franco-Mamluk alliance.⁴⁰ By mid-1801, after the French
surrendered and the inter-imperial war drew to an end, the Mamluks were in
difficulties. Due to unremitting fighting and plague, their population had sharply
declined, from 10,000–12,000 before the French expedition to some 1,200.⁴¹ The
French authorities had previously confiscated their lands and properties and cut
out their returns. Customs revenues were no longer under their control. The days
of affluence and luxury were gone. The beys were financially enfeebled.⁴²
When he returned from Palestine in September 1801, Ibrahim Bey was looking
much older and physically weaker. He would tell a French agent that all he had
known for a long time was ‘hunger, thirst, told, fatigue and deserts.’⁴³ It was at this
nadir that the beys, caught in the destructive current of war and poverty, found
and grasped another imperial hand—that of Britain—which presented itself
unexpectedly and helped the beys overturn their bad fortune at least momentarily.
*
British policy concerning the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the course
of the eighteenth century was in large measure confined to ‘commercial relations,
rather than abstract political ties’. London’s diplomacy, heavily dictated by the
Levant Company as well as the British imperial agents in Istanbul and Bombay,
aimed at sustaining ‘peaceful relations through participation of Ottoman conven-
tions of gift-giving, ceremonial, and petitioning’.⁴⁴ In 1794, when Robert Liston
(1742–1836) was posted to Istanbul as the new ambassador, he would report to
³⁹ Ibid. 129; Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 186.
⁴⁰ Edward Ingram, ‘Geopolitics of the First British Expedition to Egypt, III: The Red Sea Campaign
1800–1’, Middle Eastern Studies 31(1) (Jan. 1995): 146–69; Laurens et al., L’Expédition, 317.
⁴¹ Elgin to Reis Efendi, 20 June 1801, LPM vol. 1, 27; Marsot,Muhammad Ali, 38; Dykstra, ‘French
Occupation’, 136.
⁴² Shaw, Between Old and New, 275. ⁴³ Lesseps to Talleyrand, 19 Aug. 1803, LE 63.
⁴⁴ Michael Talbott, British-Ottoman Relations, 1661–1807: Commerce and Diplomatic Practice in
Eighteenth-Century Istanbul (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 212. For a new and well-
researched analysis of British policy in the Ottoman Middle East, see Jonathan Parry, Promised
Lands: Britain and the Ottoman Middle East (Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
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London that ‘it was only at the moment of a threatened or an existing rupture with
its neighbours that [the Ottoman Empire] deserved the notice of the rest of
Europe . . . I hesitate whether I ought to trouble you with the account of anything
that passes at Constantinople.’⁴⁵
British apathy concerning the political affairs of the Levant was abruptly shaken
by the French expedition to Egypt in 1798. For London, securing Egypt meant
shielding the transportation and communication routes to India.⁴⁶ As global
colonial rivalry had shifted from the Americas to Asia in the eighteenth century,
the French expedition made it even more apparent that the Ottoman Empire, in
general, and Egypt, in particular, were essential for the resources and the markets
that sustained the British Empire.⁴⁷
While fighting with the French was under way in 1801, there was still no set
British policy on how to secure Egypt against another French attack after the war.
In the absence of steamship lines and a telegraph system, which would be
introduced to Egypt only in 1854, it took at least two months to receive instruc-
tions from London or Paris to Egypt, and weeks from Istanbul or Bombay. This
meant that the imperial agents on the ground possessed a degree of liberty in
making decisions and taking action, sometimes in the heat of the moment and in
accordance with the immediate requirements of the time, which could on occasion
go against the first choices of their seniors in their imperial capitals.
The shape of British policy in Egypt in 1801 was a graphic example of this. It
took form with a pragmatic promise at first. More than a century before the
infamous 1915 McMahon–Hussein correspondence with which Britain pledged to
the Arab populations of the ‘Middle East’ the carving of an Arab Kingdom out of
the Ottoman Empire, the commander of British troops in Egypt, Major General
John Hely-Hutchinson (1757–1832), guaranteed the Mamluk beys British protec-
tion in return for their support during his offensive against the numerically
superior French troops at Rahmanie.
Hely-Hutchinson’s promise is documented in a letter dispatched in early May
1801. This was a letter of condolence: Murad Bey had just died and was succeeded
by his Mamluk, Osman Bey Bardisi. The major general wrote that, ‘together with
their great local knowledge’ the Mamluks would have been of ‘utmost utility to
[his forces],’ and that he had ‘received orders from the King to procure your
friendship and alliance, and to do for your advantage everything in my power. You
well know that when an English[man] speaks in the name of His King his word is
sacred.’ Hely-Hutchinson thus offered Osman Bey his protection ‘in the most
⁴⁵ Robert Liston to Sir W. Hamilton, 17 Nov. 1794, NLS MS 5579/45.
⁴⁶ G. Baldwin (Alexandria) to Liston, 30 Oct. 1794, NLS MS 5580/35.
⁴⁷ Edward Ingram, ‘Geopolitics of the First British Expedition to Egypt, I: The Cabinet Crisis of
September 1800’, Middle Eastern Studies 30(3) (July 1994): 435–60. Also see, Parry, Promised Lands,
Introduction.
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solemn manner, and you well know that the English Nation is pious towards God,
and just towards Man.’⁴⁸
The problem was that in fact Hely-Hutchinson had no explicit orders from
the king, nor from the Foreign Office or Lord Elgin, the British ambassador to
Istanbul. The last official letter Hely-Hutchinson had got possession of on the
subject of British policy towards the Mamluks was dated 23 December 1800. It was
from the under-secretary at the ministry of war, William Huskisson (1770–1830),
to Sir Ralph Abercromby (1734–1801), whose correspondence had included a
statement that ‘everything ought to be done to reconcile [the Mamluks] to the
British Government’. Hely-Hutchinson wrote to Lord Elgin that he had con-
sidered this to be an ‘instruction’. He knew well, though, that it was not.
A few months later Hely-Hutchinson confessed that the Mamluk question
caused him under ‘very serious embarrassments’, but reasoned that ‘under all
the circumstances of the case, even admitting that I had no instructions at all’, he
himself had to take on the responsibility of promising the Mamluks amnesty and
protection. ‘In short,’ he claimed, ‘it was my duty to have done anything which
would have prevented them [from] throwing themselves into the hands of the
French’, because he was aware ‘what useful allies or what dangerous enemies’ the
Mamluks could become.⁴⁹ According to Hely-Hutchinson, ensuring stability in
Egypt and thus repulsing another French campaign depended on supporting the
Mamluks.⁵⁰
After receiving Hely-Hutchinson’s promise, even though the beys did not
immediately leave their alliance with France and instead followed a wait-and-see
policy in the course of the fighting in Egypt, they did provide assistance to the
major-general, and after each British victory, their policy gradually shifted toward
Britain. Hardly any correspondence took place thereafter between the British
agents and the Mamluks, however, in which the latter did not remind the king’s
men of their promises of protection.
What transpired in the following years is in many respects comparable to the
questions that pertain to proxy relations in the contemporary Middle East,
enmeshed in civil war. To what extent are the promises delivered to local inhab-
itants by the imperial men on the spot tangible and credible? How do the imperial
and local actors form ‘special relationships’ in the first place? When do they
outgrow each other, and how?
A pragmatic promise by Hely-Hutchinson had in the first place prompted a
special tie between Britain and the Mamluks in 1801. Would the connection with
the Mamluks still need to be sustained after the war? Opinions differed among
British statesmen and officers with respect to this question. As the leading man on
⁴⁸ Hutchinson to Osman bey el Bardissi, 5 May 1801, LPM vol. 1, 9.
⁴⁹ Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 June 1801, LPM vol. 1, 40–42.
⁵⁰ Hutchinson to Robert Hobart, 2 June 1801, LPM vol. 1, 17.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
84  
the spot, Hely-Hutchinson still believed that the British policy should opt for an
alliance with the Mamluks, not the ‘Turks’.⁵¹
His opinion had great weight, but various alternative plans were discussed by
British agents in London, Istanbul, and Alexandria, some of which went as far as
to suggest keeping Egypt for the British Empire ‘upon the principle [of security]
which the French had adopted’ or destroying Egypt by inundation in the event
that it would be impracticable for Britain to keep that country. Another option
was to leave an armed force behind in Egypt, destroy the Mamluks, and secure the
country on behalf of the sultan in return for commercial privileges.⁵²
The quandary here was that Britain’s broader strategic and commercial inter-
ests relied on not losing the sultan to any French cause, while the Mamluk
presence in Egypt as surrogates against France was of vital importance for the
security of India.⁵³ In the end, the Addington cabinet pursued a via media wherein
neither the Porte nor the Mamluk beys would be offended. Reversing neither of
her previous policies, Britain opted for the ambitious and precarious agenda of
reconciling the interests of the Mamluks and the Sublime Porte. Her defence
system would build on leaving a British military contingent behind in Alexandria
until a stable order was established in the country between Mamluk and Ottoman
forces, all the while influencing the Mamluks to become attached to the British, as
well as loyal to the Porte.⁵⁴
The plan was ambitious because the Mamluk beys were extremely reluctant and
therefore cautious regarding the re-establishment of an Ottoman rule. They
distrusted the good faith of their (at least nominal) overlords.⁵⁵ But through a
patient policy, Hely-Hutchinson managed to secure the word of Osman Bey that,
to curry favour with the sultan, he and other beys would increase the tribute to the
Porte, accept the maintenance of Ottoman garrisons in the ports and towns, and
recognize the pașa sent by Istanbul as the governor of the country.⁵⁶He persuaded
them by pointing to the ‘most friendly nature’ of Ottoman Grand Admiral Küçük
Hüseyin Pașa’s approach towards the Mamluks during the battles against the
French, andmaking it clear to them that, although Britain was ‘very much interested
in them, she could never recognise them except as subjects of the Porte’.⁵⁷
Simultaneously in both Istanbul and Egypt, the British agents asked the
Ottoman ministers to trust the Mamluk beys, pardon their previous misdeeds,
and permit their return to their pre-occupation properties on the grounds that
⁵¹ Hutchinson to Henry Dundas (Minister of War), 3 Apr. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 5.
⁵² J. J. Morier to George Hammond (Undersecretary of State), 7 July 1801, LPM vol. 1, 30.
⁵³ Robert Banks Jenkinson (Lord Hawkesbury) (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Elgin, 19 May 1801,
LPM vol. 1, 12.
⁵⁴ Elgin to Hutchinson, 20 Aug. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 59.
⁵⁵ ‘Déclaration adressée par les Beys d’Égypte au Gouvernement ottoman’, LPM vol. 1, 145.
⁵⁶ Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 80.
⁵⁷ Hutchinson to Osman bey el Bardissi, 5 May 1801, LPM vol. 1, 9; Hutchinson to Reis Efendi, 23
July 1801, LPM vol. 1, 39.
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their conduct had been meritorious during the ousting of the enemy.⁵⁸ In late July
1801, Hely-Hutchinson wrote to the Porte that it was ‘absolutely necessary to rely
on the strength and local knowledge of the Mamluks’ in face of a likely recurring
attack by the French.⁵⁹
The British plan was precarious because it did not sit well with Ottoman
imperial policy at the end of the war. It did not take into account that Sultan
Selim III and his agents might have followed a pragmatic and tentative policy
towards the Mamluks before the French were driven out.⁶⁰ The lenience of Grand
Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pașa and Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya Pașa towards the beys
had stemmed from the latter’s ‘usefulness’ during the war more than from
anything else. This was why, in their verbal communications with British agents,
the Ottoman pașas had agreed to return the beys’ properties.
But this was before the grand vizier’s army entered Egypt, besieged Cairo in
September 1801, and made a preliminary peace with France the following month.
It was before Selim III wrote to Yusuf Ziya that control over Egypt (Mısır’ın zabtı)
could be obtained not only by driving out the French but also by entirely
eliminating (külliyen def ) the Mamluks whose offences the French had pointed to
as an excuse for their expedition.⁶¹ If the beys remained in Egypt, the sultan believed,
it would be impossible to establish the planned order (matlup olan nizâm), and the
situation of the country could turn out to be much worse than before.⁶²
At Selim III’s orders, the grand vizier and the grand admiral annulled all
pardons to the Mamluk beys.⁶³ They then mischievously arrested some of the
leading Mamluk leaders, trapping them at private receptions in Cairo and Abu Qir
on 22 October 1801, as a punishment for their ‘notoriously known’ misconduct
before the French occupation.⁶⁴ Four of the resisting beys were killed during an
attempt to flee.⁶⁵
Matters then came to a head between Ottoman and British agents. When
he heard the news of the arrest of the beys, Hely-Hutchinson was enraged.
What the Ottoman authorities had done violated his promises to the Mamluks
and the pledges of the Ottoman pașas to him. He therefore immediately
(23 October) demanded from the grand admiral and grand vizier the delivery to
him of the beys, both dead and alive, and warned them to ‘prepare for defence’
otherwise. Only after he marched a detachment of cavalry and four pieces of
⁵⁸ Elgin to Reis Efendi, 20 June 1801, LPM vol. 1, 27.
⁵⁹ Hutchinson to Reis Efendi, 23 July 1801, LPM vol. 1, 39.
⁶⁰ BOA HAT 3457; 6501, cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 21–2; also see Karal, ‘İngiltere’nin Akdeniz
Hakimiyeti Hakkında vesikalar’, 130; cf. Karal, Selim III’ün Hat-tı Hümâyunları, 142.
⁶¹ Ibid. 141. ⁶² Ibid. ⁶³ Shaw, Selim III, 277.
⁶⁴ BOA HAT 3457; İzzet Hasan Efendi, Ziyânâme, Sadrazam Yusuf Ziya Paşa’nın Napolyon’a Karşı
Mısır Seferi (1798–1802), ed. M. İlkin Erkutun (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınevi, 2009), 236; cf. Güner,
‘Mısır’ın’, 239; BOA HAT 3457, 6501. See also Yüksel Çelik, ‘III. Selim Devrinde Mısır’da Osmanlı-
İngiliz Rekabeti (1798–1807)’, in Nizam-ı Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e III. Selim ve Dönemi, ed. Seyfi
Kenan (Istanbul: ISAM Yayınları, 2010), 354–5.
⁶⁵ BOA HAT 157/6537, 26 Oct. 1801; Çelik, ‘Mısır’da’, 355.
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artillery to the Ottoman grand admiral’s tent did the latter agree to return to the
British the living Mamluk beys and the corpses of those killed.⁶⁶ As Küçük
Hüseyin Pașa reported to Istanbul, the allies, Britain and the Ottoman Empire,
were now ‘in a position of war’.⁶⁷
Hely-Hutchinson believed that British military presence in Egypt procured him
a legitimate right to have a say on how order should be established in the country
because, in the end, without British assistance, the sultan’s forces could hardly
retake Egypt from France. But for the Ottoman authorities, Hely-Hutchinson’s
move was nothing but a breach of their sovereign rights, no matter what had
brought the British forces to Egypt in the first place and what role they had played
in driving out the French. Hely-Hutchinson’s stance epitomized the self-granted
right of Great Powers to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Levant. As we will
see in the following chapters, this became a recurring discursive practice, and one
of the key features of the unfolding culture of transimperial security in the decades
to come.
*
When the grand admiral’s report on Hely-Hutchinson’s actions arrived in
Istanbul, the Porte immediately sent a protest to Lord Elgin. The British ambas-
sador assured the Ottoman authorities that Britain would by no means interfere
with the domestic affairs of Egypt, and sent instructions to Hely-Hutchinson to
this effect.⁶⁸ But before these instructions arrived in Egypt, he had kept up the
pressure in the field, this time on the grand vizier, who then also delivered the
Mamluks under his arrest to the British. For protection, the beys were dispatched
to Alexandria, where the British garrisons were stationed.
Sultan Selim III was exasperated by the embarrassment caused by all that had
transpired in his dominions. He was angry that his own men, including his
childhood friend Küçük Hüseyin Pașa, had been humiliated by British agents
and prevented from taking measures against the Mamluks. With these sentiments
he sent a letter to King George III in November 1801, explaining the offences of
the Mamluk beys in the past and why an amnesty could not have been granted to
them.⁶⁹ He pointed to the fact that the orders of the Ottoman governors had been
completely ignored or opposed by the Mamluk beys in the previous decades and
that, despite the promises the beys had delivered during the Ottoman punitive
missions in the 1780s, they did not make ‘the slightest scruple to elude execution’.
Selim III also reminded the king of the ‘atrocities and injustices’ the Mamluks had
committed towards Egyptian inhabitants and merchants, as well as the ‘incalcul-
able vexations against the Franks against the spirit of the Imperial Capitulations’.⁷⁰
⁶⁶ Hutchinson to Hobart, 24 Dec. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 159. ⁶⁷ BOA HAT 157/6537.
⁶⁸ Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları, 146. ⁶⁹ BOA HAT 3602; cf. Çelik, ‘Mısır’da’, 355.
⁷⁰ Selim III to Roi d’Angleterre, 23 Nov. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 136.
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King George III responded about three months later, assuring the sultan that it
had never been Britain’s goal to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, ‘except in
as far as respects the fulfilment of engagements which may have been contracted
in Our Name’.⁷¹ Britain had had enough of differences with the Porte because of
Hely-Hutchinson, and Lord Elgin was therefore ordered to remove the British
officer from Egypt. The order was duly put in motion and Hutchinson was
relocated due to his ‘declining health’.⁷²
A few weeks after the British major general left Egypt on 7 November, he wrote
to Lord (Robert) Hobart (1760–1854), secretary of state for war and colonies, that
his demeanour might have been wrong but that something vigorous had to be
done ‘in order to distinguish our conduct from the cruel policy and faithless
duplicity at all times adopted by those barbarians, the Turks’.⁷³ He was satisfied
with his mission, and believed that he had ensured the much-needed succour of
the Mamluks by protecting them from suppression by the Ottomans. He had kept
his promise.
The Tripartite Civil War
This was how the actions of the men of the spot became as pivotal as decisions
taken in the imperial metropoles in the formative years of the transimperial
security culture in the Levant. Hely-Hutchinson’s departure from Egypt in
November 1801 did not end Anglo-Ottoman rivalry, but only marked the begin-
ning of new tensions. At about the same time, the grand admiral and the grand
vizier also returned to their capital, in November and December respectively.
From that point on, the politics in Egypt was left largely in the hands of those
lower-rank imperial officers who remained.
Hüsrev Efendi, who had landed in 1800 and fought against the French as the
chamberlain of the grand admiral, was one of these officers. He had been pro-
moted as the pașa of Cairo on 16 September 1801.⁷⁴ With a small garrison of
6,000–10,000 undisciplined Janissaries and an Albanian contingent of irregulars,
each of whom loathed the other, his instruction was to subordinate the beys in
early 1802.⁷⁵ It was then that the Albanian ‘swashbuckler’ Mehmed Ali came to
⁷¹ King George III to Sultan Selim, n.d., LPM vol. 1, 217–18.
⁷² Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 80.
⁷³ Hutchinson to Hobart, 24 Dec. 1801, LPM vol. 1, 159.
⁷⁴ On the French evacuation of Egypt and the subsequent talks about its procedures, see Küçük
Hüseyin Pașa to Sultan Selim III, 29 Z 1214, TSA 1951/1/481/38. On the appointment of Hüsrev, BOA
HAT 6781; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 22; Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları, 140, 145, 146.
⁷⁵ Al-Jabarti writes that the Albanians ‘looked down on the Janissaries and regarded them with
contempt, in spite of the fact that the Janissaries held a high opinion of themselves and looked on
themselves as the mainstay of the empire, viewing the Albanians as their servants, their soldiers, and
their subordinates’: ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt.‘Aja’ib al-athār fī ‘l-Tarajim wa
‘l-Akhbār, ed. Thomas Philipp and Moshe Perlmann, vols 3–4, (Stuttgard: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994),
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serve under Hüsrev’s rule as a serçeşme, or second in command, of the Albanian
contingent.⁷⁶ As we will see in the following chapters, the two men would grow to
become lifelong enemies, and their enmity would existentially threaten both the
Ottoman Empire and European peace.
But, as yet, they were junior actors, tasked with establishing Ottoman authority in
Egypt. For this, Hüsrev invited the Mamluk beys to submit to his rule of their own
will in peace and quietness. But the beys rejected this.⁷⁷ He was then authorized to
give the Mamluk beys raay (pardon) and aman (security, safe conduct) if they
devoted themselves to the sultan and retired from Egypt to another region in the
empire with a handsome pension.⁷⁸ However, uncertain about their future else-
where in the empire, the beys again rejected the offer, choosing to remain in the one
place they considered home.⁷⁹
In the meantime, Hüsrev sent his forces, the Albanians under Mehmed Ali and
the Janissaries, to chase after the beys. The two chief Mamluk beys, Ibrahim and
Osman Bardisi, later joined by a third prominent figure, Muhammad Alfi, retired
to Djizze to shield themselves from Ottoman attacks. They repeatedly reminded
British authorities of ‘the sacred and solemn’ promises Hely-Hutchinson had
made on behalf of the king.⁸⁰ They complained that Britain could hardly keep
the Mamluks out of danger while their properties were still in the hands of the
Ottomans.
Violence ensued. In early 1803, a British agent reported from Alexandria that
Lower Egypt on the left bank of the Nile was plunged into ‘the miseries of a civil
war’ wherein Ottoman forces under Hüsrev Pașa were subjected to embarrassing
defeats by their Mamluk counterparts.⁸¹ Neither the Ottoman imperial army nor
the French had been able to fully eliminate the Mamluks by force before. Now the
Janissaries and Mehmed Ali’s Albanian troops were unable to match the speed,
local knowledge, and power of the skilful Mamluk cavalries either. The beys
continually received assistance from the British forces still stationed in
Alexandria, in the shape of ammunition. The king’s army had also made contacts
376. On the number of soldiers, Atilla Çetin, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın Mısır Valiliği. Osmanlı
Belgelerine Göre (Istanbul: Fatih Ofset, 1998), 25.
⁷⁶ Major Stuart (Alexandria) to Hüsrev Pașa, 16 Dec. 1802, AMAE CP Turquie 205/307; Major
Stuart to Hüsrev Pașa, 13 Feb. 1803, AMAE CP Turquie 205/422; Major Stuart to Hüsrev Pașa, 26 Feb.
1803, AMAE CP Turquie 205/450; Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 6.
⁷⁷ BOA TD.AVD. 53/25, 113; BOA C.DH 17108, 13–14 Feb. 1802; BOA C.ML 2466; BOA C.ML
2933; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 25; Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-Athār, vols 3–4, 244; Marsot, Egypt, 38.
⁷⁸ BOA HAT 3619; Çelik, ‘Mısır’da’, 358.
⁷⁹ BOA HAT 3604; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 7, 155; Netayic-ul Vuku’at, vol. 4, 85; Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ,
27; John D. Grainger, The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801–1803 (Woodbridge: Boydell &
Brewer, 2004), 160, 169.
⁸⁰ Ibrahim Bey and Osman Bey to General Stuart (written in the morning of their departure from
Gizeh), 25 Jan. 1802, LPM vol. 1, 172–4.
⁸¹ Major General Stuart to Lord Hobart, 28 Feb. 1803, LPM vol. 1, 386.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
     89
with Arab Bedouin tribes, and swayed them, in return for handsome financial
rewards, to support the beys militarily.⁸²
Even though Egypt had witnessed several episodes of violence and civil war
before, this one was different in that Britain (and eventually France) also had a stake,
and Britain’s imperial quest for security was outsourced to the local actors. It is true
that Russia had previously also backed the Mamluk beys in their endeavours to gain
independence from the Porte in the 1770s. But Empress Catherine II had supplied
succour in the hope of weakening the Ottoman Empire from within and then
dismembering it. What was different in 1803 was that the British authorities on the
spot were of the belief that their endeavour to protect the Mamluks was actually in
the interests of the sultan albeit against his will.
They remained loyal to their policy of reconciling the Ottoman authorities and
the Mamluks. Even though in the Treaty of Amiens signed between France and
Britain in March 1802, an article had stipulated that Britain would evacuate her
forces from Egypt within six months, as the months passed, London showed no
intention of complying with the agreement for fear of the return of the French to
Egypt.⁸³ Its 4,500 men in Alexandria, the so-called ‘emporium and key of Egypt’,
would not leave without first ensuring the security of the Mamluks.⁸⁴
*
The delayed or slow evacuation of the British forces paved the way for France to
once again become involved in the affairs of Ottoman Egypt.⁸⁵ It turned what was
initially ‘the Mamluk question’ into an 1800s version of ‘the Eastern Question on
the spot’.⁸⁶ The Sublime Porte welcomed French endeavours to help them urge
the British towards evacuation.⁸⁷ But eyebrows in Istanbul were raised when the
French agents wanted to mediate between the Ottoman authorities and the
Mamluks against the sultan’s orders.
Colonel Sebastiani, who had been sent to Egypt specifically for this purpose in
the autumn of 1802, could not obtain Hüsrev’s permission on the grounds that it
was now the policy of the sultan not to involve foreign actors in the internal affairs
⁸² BOA HAT 3454-A, 3619, 3638-A; cf. Çelik, ‘Mısır’da’, 362.
⁸³ Grainger, The Amiens Truce, 160.
⁸⁴ Ronald T. Ridley, Napoleon’s Proconsul in Egypt: The Life and Times of Bernardino Drovetti
(London: Rubicon Press, 1998), 24–7.
⁸⁵ Karol Sorby, ‘The Struggle between Great Britian and France to Influence the Character of
Government in Egypt’, Asian and African Studies 22 (1986): 161–89.
⁸⁶ ‘Rapport de chef de brigade Horace Sebastiani’, n.d., LE 3; Édouard Driault, ‘Mohamed-Ali et
Ibrahim’, in Précis de l’histoire de d’Égypte. L’Égypte Ottomane, l’Expédition Française en Égypte et le
Règne de Mohamed-Aly (1517–1849), vol. 3 (Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale du Caire,
1933), 202; Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a Great Power (London: Routledge,
1999), 183.
⁸⁷ Henry Laurens, ‘L’Égypte en 1802. Un rapport inédit de Sébastiani’, Annales Islamologiques 23
(1987): 99–116, at 100.
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of Egypt.⁸⁸ Yet the French agent insisted, arguing that since commerce in Egypt
had been interrupted due to the ongoing hostilities between the Mamluk beys and
Ottoman troops, it had become an important issue for many nations, including
France. It was by order of the first consul that he had to go to see the beys, and if the
pașa continued to obstruct Sebastiani’s mission, it would mean ‘coldness between
the Sublime Porte and the French Republic’ and disrespect to Bonaparte.⁸⁹
Even though Hüsrev rebuffed Sebastiani’s demand, the latter still got in touch with
the Mamluk beys by circulating among their partisans brochures that said Bonaparte
was their friend, and as their friend would exercise influence in their favour at the
Porte.⁹⁰ He went on to promise the beys that, unlike their sour involvement with
the British, the Mamluks could trust France to adhere to her engagements.⁹¹
In his return to Paris, the report Sebastiani presented to Bonaparte was possibly
the most important component of his mission. He described the appalling situation
of war-torn Egypt as an opportunity to seize the country. His remarks about the
attachment of certain Arab leaders in the Levant to Bonaparte alerted both London
and Istanbul.⁹² Bonarparte added a note in the margins of Sebastiani’s report: that
some 6,000 men would suffice to recapture Egypt. The note was pivotal in making
the British authorities believe that the Corsican was planning another expedition to
the Levant. They anxiously pondered when France would start this second exped-
ition. Bonaparte never did. But British apprehension sufficed to trigger panic.
It also expedited an Anglo-Ottoman agreement over the future of the Mamluks
in Egypt. The new scheme, drawn up by Ottoman Grand Vizier Yusuf Pașa in
early 1803, would permit the Mamluk beys to remain in Egypt but only in a
designated sub-province in Upper Egypt, Aswan, that consisted of islands upon
the Nile and a narrow strip between the western banks of the rivers and the
desert.⁹³ The British agents believed that this would secure for the Mamluks a
safe haven. Soon after, on 11 March 1803, the evacuation of their troops from
Alexandria began.⁹⁴
The Mamluk beys Osman, Mohammad Alfi, and Ibrahim were tremendously
disheartened by their relocation to Aswan and the British evacuation of troops.
Nobody had asked their opinion of the region allocated to them. They believed
that Aswan could barely afford themmeans of support, and were dismayed at now
being left on their own. Even though they began their march to Aswan in April
1803, their responses to the situation differed.⁹⁵
⁸⁸ Hüsrev Pașa to Talleyrand, 6 Nov. 1802, LE 26–7. ⁸⁹ Ibid.
⁹⁰ ‘Protocole résumé de la conférence tenue entre Housrew Pacha et Colonel Sebastiani’, n.d., LPM
vol. 1, 376–8.
⁹¹ Stuart to Hobart, 20 Jan. 1803, LPM vol. 1, 379–80. ⁹² Laurent, ‘Un rapport’, 113–14.
⁹³ Grand Vizier to Stuart, 19 Jan. 1803, LPM vol. 1, 373–4.
⁹⁴ BOA HAT 6845, 3525, 6537-C, 6571; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 36–7.
⁹⁵ General Stuart (Malta) to Major General Brownrigg, 6 Apr. 1803, LPM vol. 1, 396.
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Osman and Ibrahim felt tempted by a rapprochement with France. But the
third bey, Mohammad Alfi, a rival of Osman, saw greater value in maintaining the
alliance with Britain. He even requested to be sent to London as a ‘representative’
of the Mamluks, making large provisional remittances for this. British authorities
agreed, considering it a way to open and cultivate a ‘chain of influence’ and
cement Britain’s future influence in Egypt. Because Alfi was popular amongst
both Mamluks and Arabs, one argued, ‘he may be a forcible instrument in the
hands of [Britain] . . . to counteract any projects of the French to build a rival
interest with those parties on their disappointment at our departure.’⁹⁶
*
In May 1803, two months after the British evacuation of Alexandria, the War of
the Third Coalition broke out in Europe. The Great Power wars steadily coalesced
Map 2. Egypt
⁹⁶ Major General Stuart to Lord Hobart, 28 Mar. 1803, LPM vol. 1, 388.
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with the civil war in Egypt. As Europe descended into violence, the Mamluk beys,
Osman and Ibrahim, were on their way to Aswan, and Alfi to London. An
unexpected development in the Ottoman camp in April–May 1803 enabled the
return of Osman and Ibrahim to Cairo a few months later.
What occasioned this was a dispute over the Albanian contingent’s due pay-
ments in the Ottoman camp. As a result of governor Hüsrev Pașa’s desire to
disband their regiments and send the desperadoes back to Rumelia, the Albanians
revolted against the pașa, and insurrections took place in Cairo on 29 April and
2 May against his despised, repressive rule.⁹⁷ Hüsrev was forced to desert the city,
and posted himself to Mansoura.⁹⁸
Just when the Albanians took control, a fresh wave of plunder and fighting
began between the Janissaries and the Albanian contingents. The commander of
the Albanian troops, Tahir Pașa, was killed by two Janissary aghas, Musa and
Ismail. ⁹⁹ Mehmed Ali, together with the aghas Omer and Ahmed, then came to
the forefront as leaders of the Albanian detachments. In order to match the
military strength of the Ottoman authorities, they invited the Mamluk beys,
Osman and Ibrahim, to Cairo. The Mamluks eagerly accepted the invitation and
the gates of Cairo were once again opened to them.¹⁰⁰
This unexpected Mamluk–Albanian alliance ensured the suppression of
the Janissaries and ended the bloodbath, helped bring temporary order and
security, and allowed the resumption of ordinary business in the city.¹⁰¹ The
beys then established full control over Egypt for the first time since 1798—but for
the last time ever. They collected large sums of money from the Cairene, captured
Hüsrev, brought him back to Cairo as a captive, entered Rosetta and subdued
Fort Lesbe.¹⁰²
In the meanwhile, the Albanian commander Mehmed Ali came to shine amid
the limelight of politics and became immensely popular among the inhabitants. As
his biographer tells us, Mehmed Ali was a man who had mastered ‘the art of
staging spectacles and of influencing audiences’.¹⁰³ Making a ‘show of benevolence
and friendship’ to the local population—for example, taking their side during
times of heavy taxation or rapidly enforcing security for the local businesses in
times of turbulence—he quickly established key alliances with local religious
⁹⁷ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 18; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 7, 216–17; BOA HAT 3592; cf. Çetin,
Kavalalı, 35.
⁹⁸ Major Missett to Lord Hobart, 4 May 1803, LPM vol. 2, 13–14; L. E. Caffe, agent de la République
française, to Ministre des Relations Extérieures, 5 May 1803, AMAE CP Turquie 206; BOA HAT
86/3523; Güler, ‘Mısır’ın’, 249; Fahmy,Mehmed Ali, 17; Brune to Talleyrand, 10 June 1803, AMAE CP
Turquie 206.
⁹⁹ Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-athār, vols 3–4, 376–8, 382; Raif and Ahmed,Mısır Mes’elesi, 7; BOA HAT
3655, 3534, 2605; Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 18.
¹⁰⁰ Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 6–7; Missett to Hobart, 2 June 1803, LPM vol. 2, 20.
¹⁰¹ Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-athār, vols 3–4, 383.
¹⁰² Lesseps to Talleyrand, 9 July 1803, LE 55–7; BOA HAT 83/3447-P, 18 Aug. 1803; cf. Güler,
‘Mısır’ın’, 252; Missett to Hobart, 8 July 1803, LPM vol. 2, 23–4.
¹⁰³ Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 8–9.
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leaders and leading merchants.¹⁰⁴ Alongside the Albanian troops, he thus found
his greatest power base in his amicable relations with the elites of Cairo. This tour
de force helped him craft a place for himself among the locals, and ‘then to impose
his will on both the Mamluks and the [Porte]’.¹⁰⁵
Mehmed Ali also managed to make use of inter-imperial rivalries at this
moment. At first, however, he erred on the side of caution since he had not
enough power to wield for any political gain as yet, and both British and French
agents were looking to win the Mamluks to their cause. To be clear, ‘winning the
Mamluks’meant no more than exercising influence over their policies in favour of
British or French imperial interests. But the Anglo-French involvements did affect
the course of the civil war significantly.
After the departure of the British troops, Major Ernest Missett remained and
represented British interests, reporting on the military situation in Egypt. He was
mesmerized by the achievements of the Mamluk beys.¹⁰⁶ Even though he had been
instructed to conciliate between the Mamluks and the Porte, he considered
Mamluk control over Cairo as a precious opportunity to achieve security for
both Egypt and Britain, and gave the beys advice on where and how to fortify
against the likely return of the French.¹⁰⁷ By the summer of 1803, he had managed
to gain considerable influence over Ibrahim Bey.¹⁰⁸
France counteracted by sending two agents, Bernardino Drovetti (1776–1852)
and Mathieu de Lesseps (1771–1832—the father of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the
future developer of the Suez Canal project), as French consul and vice-consul.¹⁰⁹
They were ordered to establish connections with local actors and break Anglo-
Mamluk ties. Talleyrand warned his agents that, even though the British troops
had left Egypt, ‘the continuity of her relations with the [Mamluk] beys, whose
rebellion against the Ottoman Porte she had supported, the reception she gave to
[Alfi Bey] in London, can convince the [Sublime Porte] that [Britain] does not
look at the affairs of the Levant as fully completed for her.’¹¹⁰
In the following months, surrogate alliances were formed and dissolved
between British and French agents and Mamluk beys at bewildering speed.¹¹¹ In
the end, while Britain procured the support of both Osman and Ibrahim, the inter-
imperial competition concerning winning over the Mamluks imparted to the beys
a great degree of confidence that fate had brought Egypt under their rule. With the
same confidence, when the sultan sent a new governor, Ahmed Pașa, to assert
authority in Cairo, calling for maslaha, the beys defied him, signifying that their
¹⁰⁴ Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-athār, vols 3–4, 435. ¹⁰⁵ Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 21.
¹⁰⁶ Ridley, Drovetti, 26. ¹⁰⁷ Lesseps to Talleyrand, 9 July 1803, LE 55–7.
¹⁰⁸ Vice Consul Petrucci (a Maltese gentleman and British agent at Rosetta) to Missett, 13 Aug.
1803, LPM vol. 2, 30.
¹⁰⁹ Ridley, Drovetti, 26. ¹¹⁰ Talleyrand to Brune, 28 May 1803, LE, 50.
¹¹¹ Lesseps to Talleyrand, 20 June 1803, LE, 51; Missett to Hobart, 28 Oct. 1803 (received 29 Feb.
1804), LPM vol. 2, 47–8.
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only resolution was to submit to ‘no form of government but that which existed
when Egypt was invaded by the French’.¹¹² They then even killed Ahmed during a
skirmish in early 1804.¹¹³
Mamluk control over Egypt lasted until early 1804. On 14 February, when Alfi
Bey returned from London, the Mamluks were weakened from within. This was
because, after spending less than a year abroad, most of that time in Malta under
quarantine, Alfi had come back with bitter feelings towards Britain.¹¹⁴ Despite the
receptions organized in his honour in London, he could not get over the treatment
he had received during the quarantine. Nor could he have obtained any political
guarantees from the king’s government.
As soon as Osman and Ibrahim (both sympathizing with Britain now) heard
about the return of Alfi, they began their preparations for an attack on him before
he was able to threaten their authority. Alfi possessed considerable lands and had
great influence over the local population, which was imperilling Osman and
Ibrahim’s authority over their followers.¹¹⁵
The beys were then immediately embroiled in personal rivalries, hatred and a
struggle for power, which irreversibly debilitated their authority in the country.¹¹⁶
Their need for funds led them to stop recognizing the capitulatory agreements and
to pressure foreign merchants and consuls to summon some 150 purses. Refusal of
this demand led to violent threats.¹¹⁷Moreover, the arrears of the Albanian troops,
and perhaps most importantly the difficulties faced by the inhabitants of Cairo,
prompted the beys’ loss of popularity and authority.
*
It was then that the interests of the Albanians, the Cairene population, and the
French converged. And the one man that benefited the most from this proved to
be young Mehmed Ali. He obtained French support to get himself pardoned
before the Porte and help drive the British-backed Mamluks out of Cairo, thus
freeing the local population from their reign of terror.¹¹⁸ In February 1804, he
approached the French vice-consul, Lesseps ‘under the promise of secrecy’,
and told him that, as soon as the Albanian troops received some money, they
would ‘make a splash’ that would put them back in the good graces of the
Porte and destroy the Mamluks. ‘How’, he downheartedly asked, ‘can we count
¹¹² Missett to Hobart, 30 July 1803, LPM vol. 2, 27.
¹¹³ BOA HAT 11/983; BOA HAT 11/984, cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 51, 52, 58; Lesseps to Drovetti,
22, 25 Jan. 1804; Lesseps to Talleyrand, 7 Feb. 1804, Douin, LE, 147, 148, 155; Misset to Hobart, 4 Feb.
1804, LPM vol. 2, 97.
¹¹⁴ BOA HAT 84, 3450-E; cf. Selda Güner, ‘Londra’da bir Memlûk Beyi. Muhammed Bey Elfî
(Ekim-Aralık 1803)’, Akademik Bakış 9(17) (winter 2015): 53.
¹¹⁵ Çetin, Kavalalı, 73. ¹¹⁶ Fahmy, ‘The Era of Muhhammad ‘Ali Pasha’, 143–4.
¹¹⁷ Missett (Cairo) to Hobart, 11 Feb. 1804, LPM vol. 2, 102; Lesseps to Talleyrand, 23 Feb. 1804,
LE, 173.
¹¹⁸ Lesseps (Alexandria) to Talleyrand, 23 Feb. 1804, LE, 172.
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on [the Mamluk beys]? They are guilty of the most atrocious perfidy against their
brother[s], their comrade[s], and their friend[s] and we, their natural enemies,
what are we to expect?’¹¹⁹
British agents followed Mehmed Ali’s move anxiously. According to Missett,
the Albanian sergeant devoted himself to the French cause at this point. Having
rebelled against the Porte, the Albanian feared that his offence would never be
forgiven and that even if he were permitted to return to his country, some secret
measures might afterward be taken to destroy him and his family.¹²⁰ Lesseps
played on this insecurity to promote a revolution to drive out the Mamluk beys.
He promised Mehmed Ali the sum of £30,000 for this purpose.¹²¹
Just as the British agent anticipated, in March 1804 Mehmed Ali used his cordial
relations with the Cairene religious and commercial elites again and stood with
them during mass protests against the heavy firda tax which had been imposed by
Osman Bardisi.¹²² On 11 March, Albanian forces attacked Bardisi’s house declar-
ing that they would seize all the Mamluks they met but respect the inhabitants and
their property. The next evening the Mamluk beys abandoned the city. The citadel
was delivered to Mehmed Ali, who at once established public order and tranquil-
lity.¹²³ As a show of good will against the Porte, he released Hüsrev Pașa from
captivity, declaring him the governor of Egypt once again.
Hence the control of Cairo passed from the Mamluks back to the Ottoman
authorities. Lesseps was delighted. He reported to Talleyrand that ‘the tyrannical
and vexatious regime of the [Mamluk] beys came to an end’, and that the British,
‘our fiercest enemies’, were utterly disappointed by the downfall of their agents,
through whom they had hoped to obtain ‘a great preponderance in Egypt’.¹²⁴ For
his part, Missett complained that Osman Bey, against his repeated advice, con-
tinued his rapacity, which brought the demise of his rule in Cairo after a reign of
some eleven months.¹²⁵He did expect the beys to return, however, since they were
still in command of a considerable number of men.
Indeed, not long after, Osman and Ibrahim pitched their tents near Cairo,
cutting off its supplies from Upper Egypt and thus doubling grain prices.¹²⁶ They
had received intelligence that some of the Albanian soldiers were dissatisfied with
Mehmed Ali’s declaration of Hüsrev as governor, and insisted on the Ottoman
pașa’s leaving Cairo at an hour’s notice. In his stead, they invited Hurșid, the
¹¹⁹ Lesseps to Talleyrand, 5 Mar. 1804, LE, 179.
¹²⁰ Missett (Alexandria) to Hobart, 12 Mar. 1804, LPM vol. 2, 119.
¹²¹ Missett to Hobart, 29 Mar. 1804, LPM vol. 2, 143–4; Missett to Hobart, 13 May 1804, LPM vol. 2,
154–5.
¹²² Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-athār, vols 3–4, 435–40.
¹²³ Missett to Lord Hobart, 18 Mar. 1804, LPM vol. 2, 136–8; Lesseps to [MAE], 16 Mar. 1804, LE 189.
¹²⁴ Ibid. ¹²⁵ Missett to Lord Hobart, 18 Mar. 1804, LPM, vol. 2, 136–8.
¹²⁶ Missett to Straton, 4 Apr.1804, LPM vol. 2, 145; Lesseps to Talleyrand, 9 Apr. 1804, LE 198.
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kaymakam of Alexandria, to come and assume the reins of government in the
country. If Albanian differences turned into conflict, the Mamluks would attack.
Aware of this threat, Mehmed Ali did not oppose the demands of the Albanian
soldiers and asked Hüsrev to quit the capital. The latter duly proceeded to Rosetta,
where he awaited the orders of the Porte concerning him, hoping that he would be
restored to the governorship of Cairo through the mediation of Mehmed Ali.¹²⁷
He kept an active correspondence with the Albanian through the channel of his
interpreter, a Greek called Stephanaky (Boghorides) (1775–1859).¹²⁸
This curious turn of events in the spring of 1804 unexpectedly brought
Mehmed Ali and Hüsrev into the same camp once more, but again only for a
very short time. In mid-March, when the Porte announced its decision and
appointed Hurșid as the new governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali complied and left
Hüsrev completely out of the picture. The latter at first left off for Alexandria and
then went to Rhodes on 15 June 1804, still hoping to return to Cairo as gov-
ernor.¹²⁹ But, as we will see in Chapter 5, he would come back to Egypt only 21
years later, as the grand admiral or Kaptan-ı Deryâ of the imperial navy—an
appointment which would prompt renewed rivalry and war with Mehmed Ali as
well as a new episode of the Eastern Question.
*
With popular support behind him, Mehmed Ali became the de facto ruler of
Cairo. His influence on the Ottoman governor, Hurșid, was immense. The latter
had neither money nor troops, and thus found himself ‘in the hands of [Mehmed
Ali]’. Lesseps was content that the pașa was ‘virtually a prisoner’ of the Albanians,
who had further been tied to the French.¹³⁰ Hurșid was made ‘perfectly useful’ for
France’s interests.¹³¹
What altered the situation thence was the fact that, by the second half of 1804,
Mehmed Ali, once the swashbuckling nephew of the Çorbacı İbrahim Agha of
Kavala, was dreaming ever more earnestly of becoming the ruler of Egypt. As the
French consul Drovetti, one of his close associates at the time, reported, the
Albanian wished to reach his aim ‘without firing a shot . . . : all his households
feel [this] Machiavellian man, and begin to make me believe that he really has
more good meaning than the Turks have in general. He wants to seize authority by
the favour of the sheikhs and the people.’¹³² The French consul believed that ‘[the]
Albanian has more character and would probably be less sensitive to the advice
¹²⁷ Missett to Hobart, 29 Mar. 1804, LPM vol. 2, 143–4.
¹²⁸ Missett to Hobart, 16 June 1804, LPM vol. 2, 165. For his future political career, see Philliou,
Biography.
¹²⁹ Güler, ‘Mısır’ın Son Memluk Beyleri’, 253; Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-athār, vols 3–4, 440–41; Fahmy,
Mehmed Ali, 21–2; Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 65; Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 21.
¹³⁰ Lesseps to Brune, 25 Apr. 1804, LE 210.
¹³¹ Brune to Talleyrand, 10 Apr. 1804, AMAE CP Turquie 208/31.
¹³² Drovetti to Mengin, 16 May 1805, MAPC, 25.
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and the means of seduction of our enemies’. With Mehmed Ali’s seizure of power,
it would be possible for France to regulate the destiny of Egypt at the discretion of
the Republic.¹³³
In August 1804 Mehmed Ali sent his nephew to Istanbul with large sums of
money to raise troops and prevail on the ministers at the Porte to favour his uncle,
while he himself was confronting the Mamluks in the deserts around Cairo.¹³⁴
Even though, with Hurșid’s efforts, Mehmed Ali was at first appointed as the pașa
of Jeddah by Sultan Selim III, this order was rescinded soon afterwards and he was
named the new governor of Cairo on 9 July 1805, with the popular support of the
Cairene population who showered the Ottoman imperial agents with gifts for
months.¹³⁵ Caught in the middle of European wars, the sultan wanted order
established in Egypt as swiftly as possible. The rising Wahhabi threat in Hedjaz
was embarrassing the empire in the holy lands, and risking his reputation. It was
the task of the pașa of Egypt to counter this threat.¹³⁶
*
Even after Mehmed Ali’s rise to power, the conflict with the Mamluk beys did not
come to an end. The beys used their British connections to pressure the Porte to
replace Mehmed Ali with another pașa. And indeed, the Porte appointed him as
the governor of Salonika and Kavala in 1806, but the decision was rescinded once
again when the Cairene population, mainly the merchants and the ulema, again
stood behind Mehmed Ali.¹³⁷
Now the major obstacle to his full control over Egypt was posed only by
the Mamluks. ‘[S]o long as no suitable establishment is provided for the
Mamluks,’ Missett reported to London, ‘the political conclusions of Egypt will
never cease.’¹³⁸ This was why, in late 1806, when Osman Bey Bardissi passed
away, and Alfi Bey’s Mamluks felt deserted him due to his mistreatment of the
sheikhs under his command, the pașa took the opportunity to prepare a major
expedition, ‘the most formidable ever planned in Egypt since the days of the Great
[Bulutkaptan] Ali Bey’, to be led by himself, which prompted one last chase in the
desert.¹³⁹ In early February 1807, Alfi Bey also passed away, and the intra-elite
¹³³ Drovetti to Parandier, 22 May 1805, MAPC, 29; Lesseps to Talleyrand, 12 Oct. 1804, LE 243;
Missett to Hobart, 10 Aug. 1804, LPM vol. 2, 177–8.
¹³⁴ Lesseps to Talleyrand, 12 Oct. 1804, LE 243; Missett to Hobart, 10 Aug. 1804, LPM vol. 2,
177–8.
¹³⁵ Missett to Camden, 4 and 29 Apr. 1805, LPM vol. 2, 219, 221; Al-Jabarti, ‘Aja’ib al-athār, vols
3–4, 450; Cevdet Küçük, ‘Hurșid Ahmed Pașa’, IA, 395; Drovetti to Parandier, 15 May 1805,MAPC, 21;
Extrait de la correspondance de l’agent du Commissariat général au Caire, 23 Apr. 1805, MAPC, 15;
Drovetti to Parandier, 6 June 1805, MAPC, 41; Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 22; BOA HAT
39/1969.
¹³⁶ Küçük, ‘Hurșid Ahmed Pașa’, 395–6; Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 7; Parandier to
Talleyrand, 7 July 1805, AMAE CP Turquie 210/62; BOA HAT 36/1836.
¹³⁷ Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 8; BOA TS.MA.e 656/47, 25 Rajab 1221/26 Sept. 1806.
¹³⁸ Missett to Camden, 29 Aug. 1805, LPM vol. 2, 237–8.
¹³⁹ Missett to W. Windham, 27 Dec. 1806, LPM vol. 2, 324.
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struggles among his Mamluks further weakened them to the extent that they now
barely menaced the pașa’s rule.¹⁴⁰
One month later, Britain, now in war with the Ottoman Empire (See Ch. 2),
invaded Alexandria.¹⁴¹ According to Robert T. Harrison, their aim was to revive
the Mamluk influence to secure British interests.¹⁴² Parry, by contrast, argues that
the sole objective was to control Alexandria.¹⁴³ Regardless of the real British
intentions, the campaign culminated in a fiasco. Mehmed Ali had a streak of
luck. Just as he was about to flee to Syria to protect himself from a British
offensive, news broke that local forces had managed to stop the British forces in
Rosetta with an ambush, allowing Mehmed Ali to claim victory.¹⁴⁴
After this last major threat to Mehmed Ali’s rule, Mamluk influence over the
politics of Egypt was decisively purged in 1811, when the pașa employed a ruse
against the remaining 25 Mamluk leaders. Just when hostilities were calmed and
relative peace was obtained in the country, after an invitation to an official
ceremony in Cairo, a large number of the Mamluk beys were entrapped and
massacred at the Citadel at his orders.¹⁴⁵ Thus the age of the Mamluks was ended
by Mehmed Ali—a goal that several Ottoman pașas and French commanders,
including Bonaparte himself, had all failed to obtain. And thus the pașa’s 43-year
reign in Egypt began, in great adversity and terror, amidst inter-imperial rivalries
and wars, and with the antipathy of Istanbul.
*
The civil war in Egypt in the 1800s had several implications. Aside from the
economic, political, and moral suffering the local Egyptians had to endure, it
revealed how European imperial Powers looked to exercise influence in the Levant
by making use of the existing divides and conflicts among the Levantine inhab-
itants rather than by creating new ones. European involvement further compli-
cated the already very complex situation on the spot. The heightened turmoil in
Egypt left Mehmed Ali, the triumphant figure of all the unrest, with an almost
irrepressible sense of insecurity. The peculiar conditions through which he rose to
power made his reign a tremendously precarious one from the very beginning.
This is why, as early as 1806, he aspired to found his own independent empire
and even shared these aspirations with foreign agents.¹⁴⁶ There were clear signs,
the Egyptian historian Khaled Fahmy writes, that Mehmed Ali had made up his
¹⁴⁰ Missett to Arbuthnot, 3 Feb. 1807, LPM vol. 2, 333.
¹⁴¹ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 22–3. ¹⁴² Harrison, Britain, 33.
¹⁴³ Parry, Promised Lands, Ch. 2. ¹⁴⁴ Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 31.
¹⁴⁵ A. S. Norov, Puteshestvie po Egiptu i Nubii v 1834–1835 g. (St Petersburg: n.p., 1840), 107–8; Fred
Lawson, The Social Origins of Egyptian Expansionism during the Muhammad ‘Ali Period (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1992), 3.
¹⁴⁶ Ridley, Drovetti, 44; Missett to Lord Mulgrave, 1 Jan. 1806, LPM vol. 2, 251–4.
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mind about remaining in Egypt for good by that point.¹⁴⁷ He built a family tomb
in Cairo in 1808. The following year, he brought his spouse Emine Hanım and
entire harem from Kavala—a rare practice in the Ottoman Empire for temporary
governorship appointments. And eventually, he brought his extended family,
hired them in key positions, and created his own Turkish-speaking loyal elite in
Cairo that ensured his grip on administrative power.¹⁴⁸
When the pașa transformed the entire country into a formidable political,
economic and military power in the Ottoman Levant, Arabia and Sudan over
the next two decades, and when he turned against Sultan Mahmud II and Hüsrev
Pașa and thus instigated a civil war in the 1830s (see Chapter 5), he had in view the
maintenance of his rule and security of his family, more so than the interests of the
people of Egypt. Nor did he desire to ‘open their eyes’ or ensure their liberation
and independence from the ‘Ottoman yoke’, as is usually stated in Arab nationalist
literature.¹⁴⁹ His was an elitist rule that worked for the favour of a power coalition
he had formed with the local ulema and major Cairene merchants. The pașa
thence sought to achieve his goal of independence through a peculiar imperialism
from below, and by means of expansion within and around the Ottoman Empire.
His motivation prompted him to cultivate positive relations with the major
European Powers and especially Britain, rather than France. In 1808, he proposed
a secret treaty to the East India Company that would ensure British commerce in
the Levant and the Red Sea with reduced tariffs. In return, he asked for British
protection during wars between the European Powers and the Ottoman
Empire.¹⁵⁰ During the latter phase of the Napoleonic Wars, he became the
principal supplier of grain to the British garrisons in the Mediterranean during
their great need, paying for it in advance, and taking it away expeditiously.¹⁵¹
In 1811, when the pașa found among the property of the slaughtered Mamluk
beys some letters which led him to believe that Drovetti, not having found
Mehmed Ali sufficiently devoted to the cause of France, had entered into an
intrigue with his inveterate enemies for the purpose of deposing him, he
reproached the Frenchman for his perfidy. At about the same time, he told the
British agents in Cairo that the interests of Britain were equal to his own. The
Wahhabi sect was daily increasing in numbers and enthusiasm, and might soon
become dangerous to the British possessions in India: ‘If the King of England be
inclined to cultivate my friendship, he may rely upon me, more than upon a
Viceroy of his own, for me these people will obey, but a Christian never.’¹⁵²
At the most crucial hour of the Napoleonic Wars, as Bonaparte gathered his
Grande Armée, preparing for an offensive on Russia, the young Stratford Canning,
¹⁴⁷ Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 39. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid. ¹⁴⁹ Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 19–20.
¹⁵⁰ Ridley, Drovetti, 48, 51.
¹⁵¹ C. W. Thompson to Culling Charles Smith, 3 Aug. 1811, NLS MS 5626/67. ¹⁵² Ibid.
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the BritishMinister Plenipotentiary in Istanbul, advised ArthurWellesley (1769–1852),
the future Duke of Wellington, that Britain should make a firm bid for the support
of the pașa, since the latter was biased in favour of Britain. It could, he claimed,
be time for London to benefit from his ‘promising talents and friendly disposition,’
thus ‘establishing our interests [in Egypt] on some permanent basis.’¹⁵³
Wellesley favoured the idea of treating Mehmed Ali as an independent ruler,
‘offering him guarantees against French vengeance if he agreed to obstruct a
further Napoleonic thrust towards India.’ Britain would be able to finally form a
protective buffer for the security of her eastern commerce. Mehmed Ali was
pleased with such an offer. But, embroiled in war in Europe, almost no action
was taken after by London. When Canning was replaced by Robert Liston as the
ambassador to Istanbul in 1812, the British plan was dropped.¹⁵⁴
Mehmed Ali was then left to his own devices at the end of the Napoleonic wars.
He fully concentrated on establishing his full authority over Egypt, taking control
of the Bedouin Arabs, reconquering the holy place of Islamism (Hedjaz), laying
down to law for the Wahhabis, destroying the aspirations of the Janissaries to
assume a role in local trade and the ulemas to have greater political influence, and
putting an end to the embezzlement of the Coptic writers.¹⁵⁵
While his achievement in the Hedjaz was celebrated in Istanbul, the Porte’s
agents became increasingly alert to Mehmed Ali’s ambitions for independence
and the incorporation of Syria into his dominions.¹⁵⁶ A report (takrir) penned by
Halil Hamid Pașazade Arif Bey, the kadı of Egypt, on 22 December 1812, for
instance, warned the sultan against Mehmed Ali’s ulterior motives. According to
Arif Bey, despite being ‘a very shrewd man’, the pașa was at the same time very
‘rapacious and insatiable’ and, while serving the empire, he also wanted to acquire
Syria as a natural buffer against Istanbul and establish hereditary rule, which
would allow his sons Tosun and Ibrahim to succeed him.¹⁵⁷
This was why in the 1810s the pașa demanded the Porte confer the rule of
Syria upon him in order to facilitate the suppression of the Wahhabis. This was
also why he inquired as to whether Egypt could be accorded the semi-autonomous
status of Barbary Regency that Algiers and Tunis enjoyed. With these measures,
he would be able to manage his own foreign policy and keep Egypt neutral
from the potential wars the Ottoman Empire would be involved with the
¹⁵³ Stratford to Wellesley, 15 Mar. 1811, TNA FO 78/73; cf. Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 156.
¹⁵⁴ See Ch. 4.
¹⁵⁵ ‘Extrait d’un rapport á l’E. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères’, 10 July 1822, AMAE Papiers
Desages 60PAAP/39/158.
¹⁵⁶ Drovetti to MAE, 28 Nov. 1810, in Driault, Mohamed Ali et Napoleon, 93–4; Abū ‘Izz al-Dīn,
Ibrāhīm Bāsha, 32–4; Altundağ, Kavalalı, 30–31; Mansel, Levant, 75; Fahmy, ‘The Era of Muhammad
‘Ali Pasha’, 165.
¹⁵⁷ BOA TS.MA.E 381/7, n.d.
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Great Powers.¹⁵⁸ Fears of war and another Great Power invasion remained in
Mehmed Ali’s Egypt until at least 1815.¹⁵⁹
In the end, even though Egypt did not end up as a satellite of the Republic or a
part of the French informal empire, as had been envisaged by Talleyrand and
Bonaparte prior to the 1798 expedition, the Mamluk beys, whose actions had
undermined French trade, were eliminated for good by Mehmed Ali. The order
and stability in Egypt were sufficient enough for the security of the British Empire.
The Sublime Porte, for its part, was watchful, vigilantly observing the next move of
the pașa.
After the Napoleonic Wars, the economic, military and political relations
between Paris and Cairo grew ever stronger to the point of near dependency.
Two decades later, when a new episode of the Eastern Question unfolded with
Mehmed Ali at its epicentre, Franco-Egyptians connections weighed immensely
on inter-imperial diplomacy (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). But then again, by that
point, and especially after the Congress of Vienna, cards were redealt and a new
inter-imperial order was established in Europe with the utmost purpose of ensur-
ing continental peace and security and preventing a return to the horrors and
unbound chaos of the Napoleonic wars—the transimperial security culture in the
Levant gained new features then.
What were these new features? What implications did the new inter-imperial
order have for the rest of the world? How did it affect the nature of Great Power
interventions and their reception in the Levant? How did Mehmed Ali’s ambitions
affect this new order? And how did the Powers and the Porte tackle his ambitions
in the following decades? We will turn to these questions in the second part of
the book.
¹⁵⁸ Mehmed Ali to Necib Efendi (Istanbul), 25 Nov.1810, DWQ Abdin no. 54; Mehmed Ali to
Necib, 11 Jan. 1811, DWQ Bahr Barra no. 16; Unknown to Mehmed Ali, 6 Aug. 1815, DWQ Bahr
Barra, Files (4), no. 66.
¹⁵⁹ Liston to Castlereagh, 10 Jan. 1815, NLS MS 5629/1.
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PART II
THE INVENTION OF THE EASTERN
QUESTION
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A New Era?
The Vienna Order and the Ottoman World
One of the most recognizable images of Napoleon Bonaparte’s French empire was
Le Sacre de Napoléon (The Coronation of Napoleon). Completed in 1807, Jacques-
Louis David’s painting immortalized the induction and coronation of the
Corsican and his first wife Josephine as emperor and empress at Notre-Dame de
Paris on 2 December 1804. Since its first exhibition, the painting has been
considered ‘a transparently masterminded piece of modern propaganda’, where
many prominent French men and women, ranging from Napoleon’s mother,
Maria Letizia Ramolino, to Charles Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte, were
portrayed in the cathedral even when some of them did not actually attend the
ceremony. Le Sacre symbolized the unity and strength of France.¹
Of all figures that appear in the painting, one man markedly differs from the
others with his turban and dark beard. He fixes his curious gaze on the emperor,
standing at the very back of the throng. He was the Ottoman ambassador to Paris,
Mehmed Said Halet Efendi (1761–1822). Originally from the Crimea, Halet was in
the second year of his four-year Paris embassy when the coronation took place. As
a French correspondent once described him, he was a ‘very tall and very beautiful
figure’, and known to his Ottoman associates to be a proud and stubborn man.²
During his French sojourn that lasted until 1806, perplexed by the chaotic
international politics and fickle alliances of the time, Halet grew immensely
antipathetic to European ways of diplomacy, finding them ‘vulgar’ and ‘unwhole-
some’.³ His reports from Paris suggest that he found French politicians to be
sorely lacking in the courtesies of statesmanship. Yet he also harboured a degree of
gratitude to them, as they helped him cover the expenses of his embassy when the
Porte was unable to supply funds, having been preoccupied with the financially
draining New Order programme in the 1800s.⁴
¹ Todd B. Porterfield and Susan L. Siegfried, Staging Empire: Napoleon, Ingres, and David
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 4; see also Jean Tulard, Le Sacre de
l’empereur Napoléon: Histoire et légende (Paris: Fayard, 2004).
² George Grosjean, ‘La politique orientale de Napoléon. L’ambassade de France à Constantinople
(1803–1805) (I)’, La revue hebdomadaire. Romans, histoire, voyages 9(48) (27 Oct. 1900): 525–42,
at 526.
³ Karal, Halet, 33. ⁴ Ibid. 90. The New Order programme is discussed in Ch. 2.
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As we will see in the following pages, less than a decade after his return to
Istanbul, Halet emerged as the most formidable man in the Ottoman imperial
capital. He established a powerful network and patronage contacts with Janissary
aghas and Greek Phanariots as well as with regional leaders such as Mehmed Ali
of Egypt, Ali Pașa of Janina, and the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, who
provided him with funds, intelligence, and an immense political influence.⁵
Halet’s power sometimes surpassed even that of young Sultan Mahmud II. His
rapacious authority and harsh response to threats, his network and scheming ways
of preserving his power, and the tragic end of his life would lead historians to
consider him as a ‘statesman turned villain.’⁶
The career and political influence of Halet Efendi in the Ottoman world are of
great significance for our purposes here because during his heyday in the Topkapı
Palace, the 1810s, the ‘Eastern Question’ took on a new meaning in international
relations. Aiming to put a definitive end to the global Napoleonic Wars, while the
‘Western’ question of the future of Latin America and the ‘Northern’ question of
Scandinavia were deliberated by the self-defined Great Powers and the so-called
second-rank European polities during and after the Paris peace negotiations and
the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, the disputes over Poland and the European
dominions of the Ottoman Empire together constituted ‘the Eastern Question’.
The 1810s were a momentous period also because a new inter-imperial order
was forged in Europe then. First, at the Vienna apartment of the Austrian foreign
Figure 2. Jacques-Louis David’s Le Sacre de Napoléon
⁵ Philliou, Biography, 72–3. ⁶ Ibid. xxiii.
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minister Prince Klemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk von Metternich-Winneburg
(1773–1859), and then during the peace negotiations in Paris in March and May
1814, the leading empires—Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and later France—
came to officially style themselves as a separate category, ‘the Great Powers’, and
introduced new hierarchies into international politics on the continent. Nearly a
century before the formation of the League of Nations, the five claimed managerial
responsibilities to form an exclusive security system, the Congress or Vienna
system, which aimed at precluding a return to the horrors of the Napoleonic
Wars that had devastated Europe in the past three decades.
The Powers fostered an understanding of security as a public good that could be
obtained most effectively by means of cooperation among themselves. They
agreed to upholding a series of norms and principles ‘to serve as a code of conduct
. . . rules of behaviour to regulate the competition among them, and . . . a set of
procedures designed to maintain order’.⁷ Conference diplomacy, in place of inter-
imperial wars, became the means to deal with crises, and ambassadorial confer-
ences were organized with a previously unseen frequency in order to manage
Europe’s immediate issues.
The Allied Council Meetings in Paris (1815–18), and the congresses in Aix-la-
Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822), were all
convened with an arguably conservative yet explicitly anti-revolutionary spirit,
having in view the establishment of peace on the continent. The five Powers
espoused the idea of non-intervention in each other’s affairs, self-restraint in place
of encroachments and aggression, and consultation with each other instead of
unilateral action, constant assurances, and pacific intent in lieu of overt revision-
ism and violence. As of the mid-1820s the Vienna system was refashioned as an
international order, i.e. the Vienna Order, under supervision of the Concert of
Europe—the exclusive, elite club of the Great Powers.⁸
The question that concerns us here is the implications of this new episode
ensuring peace and security in Europe especially in the rest of the world. Did it
mean the beginning of a new era in the Levant also? As early as 1814, the issue of
where in the post-Napoleonic world the Ottoman Empire, and for that matter the
Levant, would be positioned occupied the minds of the statesmen that represented
the Great Powers and the Sublime Porte. The sultan’s empire had dangerously
strained relations with her Romanov neighbours on the eve of the Vienna
Congress, and both certain Ottoman ministers and Austrian and British diplo-
mats saw great value in involving the Porte’s differences with Russia in the
ongoing peace negotiations in Paris and Vienna.
⁷ Richardson, ‘The Concert of Europe’, 51; Mitzen, Power in Concert, 30; Cottrell, The Evolution,
68–9; Abbenhuis, Neutrals, 40–41; Jarrett, The Congress, 361–2; De Graaf, Fighting Terror,
Introduction.
⁸ Eckart Conze, ‘Historicising a Security Culture: Peace, Security and the Vienna System in History
and Politics, 1815- to Present’, in Securing Europe, 44–5.
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But, due to a variety of factors, largely originating from the diplomatic choices
made by Halet Efendi and his entourage, this plan never materialized. And then
the Ottoman Empire came into close contact with the Concert of Europe a decade
later, during the Navarino incident of 1827, when Russia, Britain, and France
intervened and destroyed an Egypto-Ottoman fleet so as to secure European
commercial interests and aid the Greeks in their war of independence. This
event has been considered as one of the earliest instances of humanitarian
interventions in history.⁹ It also proved to be an early moment of the Vienna
Order which signified that the changing dynamics of the relationship between the
Concert of Europe and the Ottoman Empire prevented neither Great Power
advances in the Levant, nor inter-imperial competition, nor diplomatic encroach-
ments or military/naval interventions.
The Eastern Question in the 1810s
Policies pursued by Russia with respect to the sultan’s empire and the Porte’s
responses to them became a major determinant in the sculpting of the Eastern
Question in the early decades of the Vienna Order. At the turn of the nineteenth
century, Catherine II’s ‘Greek Project’ had been replaced by an ‘Ottoman Project’
under Emperor Paul I.¹⁰ This was a victory of the moderates in the St Petersburg
court—moderates such as Victor P. Kochubei (1768–1834), a former ambassador
to Istanbul, and the diplomat Nikita P. Panin (1770–1837), over hardline states-
men such as Catherine II’s lover Pyotr V. Zavadovsky (1739–1812) and Foreign
Minister Fyodor V. Rostopchin (1763–1826) who favoured ‘direct territorial
conquests, the division of Ottoman possessions, support for separatists and
liberation movements’.¹¹
The moderates called for preserving the Ottoman Empire as a ‘weak neighbour’
under the orbit of Russian influence. Their strategy was considered to be more
beneficial for Russia than Empress Catherine II’s late eighteenth-century project
of total dismemberment.¹² After the palace coup and assassination of Emperor
Paul in March 1801, his son Alexander I adopted the same moderate policy,
considering the sultan’s empire as a barbarian state ‘whose weakness and bad rule
⁹ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 63–90. ¹⁰ Kobishanov, ‘Politika Rossii’, 4.
¹¹ Ibid. 4–5.
¹² On the weak neighbour policy, see Report of Dashkov, 4 Sept. 1829, VPR vol. 2/8, 292; Protocol of
the Extraordinary Committee, 4 Sept. 1829, ibid. 278; Bitis, Russia, 359–60; P. A. Iovskij, Poslednyaya
vojna s Turcieyu, zaklyuchayushhaya v sebe kampaniyu 1828 i 1829 godov v evropejskoj i aziatskoi
Turcii i na kavkaze, vol. 1 (St Petersburg: Tipografiya Depart. Narod. Prosveshch., 1830);
N. I. Ushakov, Istoriya voennyx dejstvij v aziatskoj Turcii v 1828 i 1829 godax, vol. 1 (St Petersburg:
Tipografiya Eduarda Pratsa, 1836); N. A. Lukyanovich, Opisanie tureckoj vojny 1828 1829 godov, vol. 1
(St Petersburg: Tipografiya Eduarda Pratsa, 1844).
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are a precious guarantee of [Russian] security’.¹³ His pursuit of this policy proved
to be volatile, however, due to continuous tensions between the courts of St
Petersburg and Istanbul.
One of the moments when Russo-Ottoman relations were heavily damaged was
the 1806–12 war that had begun (as we saw in Chapter 2) when Sultan Selim III
opted to throw in his lot with Napoleon Bonaparte, recognizing him as the
emperor of France and even appointing pro-French hospodars in the Balkans,
which immensely antagonized Tsar Alexander I. In 1807, at Tilsit, the tsar even
negotiated with Bonaparte the plans for the partition of the sultan’s empire.
The Russo-Ottoman fighting continued intermittently, and came to an end
only when Bonaparte recruited a massive Grande Armée of 600,000 men and
made alliances and agreements with Berlin and Vienna for military support and
the passage of his forces during his Russian campaign. The tsar was isolated,
racing in vain to make counter-alliances. Seeing that Prussia and Austria were not
standing in Napoleon’s way, Alexander I looked to end the war with the Ottoman
Empire. The peace was sealed with the Treaty of Bucharest in May 1812, which
was ratified in July, despite the new sultan Mahmud II’s belief that he could have
wrought more from the Russian anxieties.¹⁴
As I have detailed elsewhere, the Treaty of Bucharest secured for Russia the
mouths of the Danube and Bessarabia, setting the Pruth river as the border with
the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ In return, the tsar agreed to evacuate all areas in the
Balkans and the Caucasus that his army had occupied during the war. However,
the treaty was hastily prepared, and therefore laden with clumsy phrases and
open-ended articles. It left unaddressed at least two issues that became funda-
mental for Russo-Ottoman relations in the following years: first, Russia’s claim for
the protection of the Ottoman Serbians and her demands for autonomy for them,
and, second, despite the stipulations of the 1812 treaty, the fact that Russia left her
troops in the Phasis Valley in the Transcaucasia and wanted to legitimize this with
a secret article, which Mahmud II categorically rejected. When Russian forces
failed to abandon the Caucasus due to the region’s strategic importance against a
potential Persian or Ottoman attack, Mahmud II declared that ‘Russia must
evacuate the district in question otherwise there must be war’. When the tsar
refused to capitulate, the dispute took a turn for the worse.¹⁶
This was one of the most critical conundrums for European politics, because
the Russo-Ottoman war would handicap Russian success against Bonaparte by
diverting Russian resources, and would prolong the Napoleonic Wars. Since her
¹³ Kobishanov, ‘Politika Rossii’, 19–20.
¹⁴ F. Ismail, ‘The Making of the Treaty of Bucharest, 1811–12’, Middle Eastern Studies 15(2) (May
1979): 180–87; Liston to Castlereagh, 13 July 1812, NLS MS 5672, f. 9.
¹⁵ Ozavci, ‘A Priceless Grace?’
¹⁶ Liston to the Duke of Wellington, 25 Mar. 1815, TNA FO 139/26/40.
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immediate interests were at stake, Britain had supervised the Bucharest talks and
peace through her special envoy, Stratford Canning. As differences between
Istanbul and St Petersburg manifested themselves again in 1812, and when the
sultan accused Canning of making his plenipotentiary Mehmed Galib Efendi
(1763–1829) sign a treaty that was arguably unfavourable to the Porte, the
young British diplomat was called back. In his place the foreign secretary
appointed the seasoned Robert Liston, a shrewd diplomat who had left a positive
influence over the Ottoman ministers during his first Istanbul embassy in
1794–5.¹⁷
Liston’s mission was to secure the precarious peace between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire. The much-tarnished Anglo-Ottoman relations had been
mended by the 1809 Treaty of Dardanelles. British authorities now saw themselves
capable of affecting the diplomatic choices in Istanbul. In 1809, they had dictated
the closure of the Straits to foreign warships and obtained commercial privileges
(fixing customs tariffs on certain products) from the sultan in return for a
defensive alliance against France.¹⁸ Having obtained her goals in the ‘Orient’,
Britain would now lead a pacific policy in the Ottoman Empire, hoping to preserve
the status quo at almost every turn until the late nineteenth century.
Shortly after his arrival in Istanbul, it became Liston’s ‘fixed opinion’ on the
Russo-Ottoman dispute that the only means to produce a cordial understanding
between the two empires was ‘the renunciation on the part of the [Russian]
emperor of all projects of external acquisition or encroachment’.¹⁹ The British
diplomat closely followed the discontent of the sultan when the Porte made
several futile remonstrances concerning the evacuation of the Russian troops
from the Caucasus. Mahmud II was convinced that Alexander I was playing a
long game: the tsar was leaving the border disputes with the Porte unresolved with
the purpose of deploying them in the future as a pretext for a new Russian
offensive in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Yet the sultan was not entirely sure
as to the course of action he should take.
The advice his ministers offered him was mixed because they were divided on
the subject. One group, led by the moderate and Anglophile Reisülküttâb Mehmed
Galib Pașa, called for moderation and peace. The signatory of the Treaty of
Bucharest, Galib advised that the sultan should treat foreign courts, and particu-
larly Russia, with ‘perfect civility and attention’, and search for means to find
common and conciliatory ground instead of escalating tensions. In February 1814,
he asked Liston to bring the Russo-Ottoman dispute to the attention of the Allied
ministers during the peace talks to be held in Paris and Vienna. He suggested its
¹⁷ Ozavci, ‘A Priceless Grace?’
¹⁸ Sir Robert Adair, GCB, The Negotiations for the Peace of the Dardanelles in 1808–1809: With
Dispatches and Official Documents, vol. 1 (London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1845).
¹⁹ Liston to Castlereagh, 12 Nov. 1812, NLS MS 5627, f. 57.
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resolution be in favour of the Porte.²⁰ That is, the idea of involving the Ottoman
Empire in the Paris and Vienna peace settlements came initially from an Ottoman
statesman.
The former ambassador to Paris and now president of the imperial council,
Halet Efendi was the leader of the other group which leaned toward France. He
was willing ‘to foster the causes of the present and future quarrels with Russia’.²¹
This faction insisted that only with ‘a principled policy’ and ‘firm resolution and
an uninterrupted perseverance in the same system’ of making no concessions
against Russia could the ‘dignity and high destinies of the Ottoman Empire’ be
maintained.²²
In early May 1814, when the news of Bonaparte’s removal from power in Paris
arrived in Istanbul, the moderate Galib Pașa emerged as the sultan’s favourite due
to his anti-French tendencies and cautious diplomacy. But a cabinet crisis fol-
lowed and at a most unexpected moment Halet’s party managed to prevail in the
imperial administration.²³
Halet had realised that his political existence was at stake. He therefore master-
minded a scheme and hastened to pen a memorandum to the sultan (together
with Halil Efendi, the president of the conferences) that was calculated to gain
advantage from the temper of the sultan. In this memorandum, Halet accused
Galib of having signed the last, disadvantageous peace with Russia in Bucharest in
1812, providing the sultan with ‘treacherous information’ and imitating ‘the
manners of the Franks’, organizing ‘noisy entertainment with dancing and
music’, carrying ‘his imitation of Christian ministers so far as to appear at the
office until after the third hour of the day (11 o’clock), neglecting thus the
management of the most urgent business of the State’. Halet moreover stated
that the affairs of France were far from settled, and criticized Galib’s advice to the
sultan that the Porte needed prudence in its relations with Russia.²⁴ According to
Liston, as a consequence of these insinuations, and due to his ‘bigoted prejudices’,
the sultan dismissed Galib from his position and sent him into exile.
Thus Halet’s hardline, pro-French faction gained the upper hand in the
Ottoman cabinet just when the Napoleonic wars came to an end with
Bonaparte’s defeat (at least for the time being), and just when a new European
order was being forged under the guidance of the victorious major Powers,
particularly Britain and Russia. It was then that Halet preferred to follow a policy
diametrically opposite to Galib’s scheme of involving the sultan’s empire in the
²⁰ Liston to Castlereagh, 26 Feb. 1814, TNA FO 78/82/25.
²¹ Liston to Castlereagh, 27 Mar. 1813, NLS MS 5627, f. 99.
²² Liston to Castlereagh, 25 June 1814, NLS MS 5628, f. 30. On Halet, see also Süheyla Yenidünya
Gürgen, Devletin Kâhyası, Sultanın Efendisi. Mehmed Said Halet Efendi (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları,
2018).
²³ Liston to Castlereagh, 11 May 1814, TNA FO 78/82.
²⁴ On Halet’s influence in the Topkapı Palace, see Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 5, 2525–7; Liston to
Castlereagh, 10 June 1814, TNA FO 78/82.
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ongoing peace negotiations in Paris and Vienna, which resulted in the Ottoman
Empire’s exclusion from the Vienna order at her will.
*
As the historian Mark Jarrett tells us, in 1814, Britain and Austria had ‘achieved
their primary territorial objectives’ in Europe: Belgium was incorporated in the
new Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Britain wished, Austria had established
control over northern Italy, and the German Federation provided a stable
German core to central Europe. Now the two courts looked ‘to preserve the existing
balance (or more properly, distribution) of power on the Continent’. By contrast,
Prussia, Russia, and especially France emerged as ‘acquisitive powers’, looking to
extend or consolidate their territories and spheres of influence. The aspirations of
latter three put an increasing strain on the stability of the postwar order.²⁵
Among these aspirations was the Russian plan to extend control ‘across the flat
plains of Europe by taking the lion’s share of Poland in the west and by establish-
ing a sphere of influence over the part of the Ottoman Empire to the south’.²⁶ To
hold these objectives in check and contain Russian in the east, in July 1814, the
British foreign minister, Lord Castlereagh, and Prince Metternich drew up a plan.
They designed to invite the Ottoman cabinet to send a minister, ‘of respectable
rank and character’, to Vienna, perhaps ‘not to sit in the congress . . . but to be
within reach of the assembly to give explanations if required—to watch over the
interests of his country’.²⁷ The Russo-Ottoman disputes could naturally become
an object of discussion at Vienna. The Ottoman world’s tranquillity and inde-
pendence were ‘[closely] connected with a system of general and permanent
peace’ which would be the ultimate object of the congress. The existence of a
senior Ottoman minister at Vienna would lead the Powers to ‘pay sufficient
attention to this subject’ and the Porte to advocate its interests, where necessary.²⁸
As results, an official invitation was sent to the Porte via Liston. The Porte
responded only four months later, in November 1814, when the Congress of
Vienna had just begun. The response was negative. The sultan would not send a
senior minister to Vienna.
Historians usually argue that this stemmed from the Porte’s lack of interest in
European politics or from the absence of qualified men to represent its interests in
Vienna. But, in reality, the Porte’s decision was influenced by a number of factors.
First, Halet was of the belief that the peace in Europe was hardly settled, and that it
would not be wise to leave the fate of the empire in the hands of the European
Powers. Halet’s hardline faction associated European politics with amorality and
²⁵ Jarrett, Congress, 156. ²⁶ Ibid. 360.
²⁷ Ibid. For the Ottoman Turkish version of the document, see BOA TS.MA.e 243/16, 6 July 1814.
For the Austrian account, Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 6 Oct. 1814, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 10; cf.
Šedivý, Metternich, 39–40.
²⁸ Liston to Castlereagh, 25 July 1814, TNA FO 78/82/72.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
112  
deceit, and harboured an insatiable distrust of the Quadruple Alliance due to the
agonizing experiences of the recent past whereby their empire, they believed, had
repeatedly been a victim of European treachery. Moreover, the role accorded to
the Ottomans in the anticipated protocol at Vienna as an observant, and thus a
‘third-rank’ or even lower-placed country—in the Ottoman version of the docu-
ment, this was noted as karardadeye rızazade (the consenter to decisions)—was
virtually unacceptable, if not offensive, to the sultan, who considered his empire as
the last eternal state of the Islamic world and in no way inferior to her western
neighbours.²⁹ The four-month silence was in fact a cultural response that went
unnoticed by European diplomats.³⁰
Despite the Porte’s negative response, Metternich still promised the Ottoman
chargé d’affaires in Vienna, Yanko Mavroyeni, that ‘without waiting for a[nother]
formal invitation,’ he would do all he could during the congress for ‘the entire
satisfaction of the Porte’ in its dispute with Russia.³¹ He wanted to avoid giving
Tsar Alexander I a free hand in the Balkans, and therefore lost no time in keeping
his word. In early January 1815, he talked Castlereagh and Talleyrand into
guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the European dominions of the sultan’s
empire. In February, before his departure from Vienna, Castlereagh held conver-
sations with Tsar Alexander I to persuade him to offer security guarantees to the
Porte.
The British foreign secretary succeeded in his last mission at Vienna by
presenting a proposition to the tsar to ensure ‘the conservation and integrity of
the Turkish empire’ as an inducement to coax the Porte ‘to facilitate a more liberal
commercial intercourse for the nations of Europe in the Black Sea’.³² This was a
barter: security for freer trade. Alexander I saw in this an opportunity for both
gaining economic advantages after the draining wars and demonstrating his
commitment to the unfolding ‘Great Union’ in Europe. Accordingly, he agreed
to the proposal.³³
The proposition was delivered again by Liston. The British diplomat’s letter to
the Ottoman cabinet stated that a new system of union and peace was unfolding in
Europe, and that for it ‘to be complete, the general security would also have to
embrace the integrity of the Ottoman dominions’. The sovereigns of Europe,
including Tsar Alexander, the letter continued, were ready to give this extension
of the guarantee of the sultan’s empire, leaving the disputes with Russia to the
²⁹ BOA HAT 956/41003. ³⁰ Ozavci, ‘A Priceless Grace?’
³¹ Gentz to Caradja, 7 Nov. 1814, DI vol. 1, 119.
³² Castlereagh to Liston, 14 Feb. 1815, AVPRI f. 133, o. 468, d. 2303, l. 356.
³³ Gentz to Caradja, III, 24 Feb. 1815, DI vol. 1, 143; BOA HAT 961/41197; ‘Rapport du Chargé
d’affaires de la Porte à Vienne, sur son entretien avec le Prince de Metternich’, 17 Feb. 1815, AVPRI f.
133, o. 468, d. 2303, l. 295 Nesselrode to D’Italinsky, 26 Apr. 1815, VPR, vol. 2/8, 284–5; cf. Ozavci, ‘A
Priceless Grace?’ It is unclear, however, whether these were his actual motivations or whether he had
other ulterior motives.
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mediation of ‘the three friendly Powers, Austria, France and Britain’.³⁴ Liston also
added a clause demanding the liberalization of the commerce in all Ottoman
coasts, not only in the Black Sea.³⁵
Many European statesmen and diplomats—Castlereagh, Metternich,
Alexander I, Liston, and the Chevalier d’Italinsky, the Russian ambassador to
Istanbul—considered this proposal as an ‘invaluable favour’ or a ‘priceless grace’
(безценную милость) to the Ottoman Empire.³⁶ It would save the sultan from the
embarrassment of another military defeat at the hands of Russia by guaranteeing
the territorial integrity of the sultan’s European dominions.³⁷ But the Porte saw
the proposal in a different light.
After receiving the proposal, the Halet-led Ottoman cabinet—which included
Reisülküttâb Mehmed Seyid, the new Şeyhülislam Seyyid Mehmed Zeynelabiddin
Efendi, Halet’s butler Mustafa Efendi, and Hüsnü Bey, the defterdar Mehmed
Emin Rauf Bey, as well as the viziers of Zahire, Tophane, and Darbhane—held two
council meetings in March 1815.³⁸ On the 30th day of the month, they decided to
refuse the Powers’ proposal because of their suspicion concerning the goodwill of
the Powers, given the Porte’s deplorable experience with them in past decades
during the wars with Russia (1786–92, 1806–12), the French invasion of Egypt
(1798–1801), the slow British evacuation from Alexandria (1802–3), the British
blockade of Istanbul (1807), and the secret Franco-Russian talks at Tilsit (1807)
for the partition of the Well-Protected Domains. They feared that the proposal
could be a Russian ploy to prolong the border disputes until the affairs of Europe
was settled and thus maintain Russian troops in the Caucasus.³⁹ Moreover, the
fact that the proposal was bundled together with the issue of capitulatory/com-
mercial privileges was something that caught Sultan Mahmud II’s attention from
the outset, and led him to ask his men to be wary.⁴⁰
On the basis of these considerations, a majority of the Ottoman ministers at
first thought to respond with another prolonged ‘silence’. But then they agreed to
inform Liston that the dispute between the Porte and Russia could be resolved
only with the evacuation of Russian troops from the Caucasian borders and by
adherence to the 1812 Treaty.⁴¹ Their ‘civil rejection’, as Liston put it in his report
to Castlereagh, received almost no reaction from the leaders of the Powers because
just before the Porte’s response arrived in early April 1815, the news of Napoleon
Bonaparte’s escape from Elba had broken, shaking the entire continent and
dragging the European Powers back into war.
³⁴ BOAHAT 956/41005; ‘Raport Italinskogo ob audiencii Taleirana’, 15 Mar. 1815, AVPRI f. 133, o.
468, d. 2303, ll. 311–13.
³⁵ Ozavci, ‘A Priceless Grace?’
³⁶ D’Italinsky to St Petersburg, 25 Mar. 1815, AVPRI f. 133, o. 468, d. 2303, l. 356.
³⁷ Liston to Castlereagh, 10 Mar. 1815, TNA FO 178/84/60.
³⁸ BOA HAT 956/41003; ‘Küçük Hurșid Ahmed Pașa’, İA, 396. See also Liston to Castlereagh, 10
Apr. 1815, TNA FO 178/84/66.
³⁹ BOA HAT 956/41003. ⁴⁰ Ibid. BOA HAT 956/41006. ⁴¹ BOA HAT 956/41003.
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Liston poignantly wrote that the revival of war in Europe further strengthened
Ottoman ministers in their decision.⁴² Figures like Friedrich von Gentz, the
confidant of Prince Metternich and the secretary of the Congress of Vienna,
wrote that his hope was the involvement of the Ottoman Empire, as a ‘great
power’, in the Vienna system, if necessary ‘despite her own protests’, because it
was an object of ‘the highest importance for the general security, and for the
stability of the peace of Europe’. But his attempts to impress the European leaders
in Paris in November, during the talks after Bonaparte’s ultimate defeat and before
the second Treaty of Paris, remained fruitless.⁴³
No other substantial negotiation took place in 1815 on the subject of Ottoman
involvement in the Vienna Order. Sultan Mahmud II’s empire thus isolated itself
from the new international order purposefully—a resolution induced not simply
by irrationality and prejudice or lack of awareness of what was transpiring in
Europe, but arguably more by their distasteful experience with the major
European Powers in the recent past.
In the eyes of Ottoman ministers, and particularly Halet Efendi, both the
invitation to the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and the proposal in 1815 teemed
with problems and threats: being accorded a lower-rank status at the congress,
being a ‘consenter to decisions’, the bundling of the proposal with the issue of
commercial privileges, and their suspicion that it was part of a ploy, particularly
on the part of the Russians. To them, 1815 did not mark a new era in their
relations with their western and northern neighbours. Perhaps the inter-imperial
wars were over in Europe, perhaps peace and order were now definitively estab-
lished there. But the memory of wartime diplomacy associated with ‘trickery’ and
‘politicking’ was still fresh in Istanbul, and it continued to guide the isolationist
diplomacy of the sultan and Halet in the coming years.
A ‘Humanitarian’ Intervention: Navarino 1827
What effects did the non-involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the Vienna
Order have for the Levant? According to the British historian Edward Ingram,
even though the new order in Europe was based on respecting the international
treaties of Vienna and continued cooperation, it hinged on violence and violation
of law elsewhere in the world. He argues that the European Powers ‘did not fight
one another, [but] they fought everybody else—if only to show them that they had
not lost the knack’; ‘Only by accepting the narrow, exclusively Christian,
⁴² Liston to Wellington, 4 Apr. 1815, TNA FO 178/84/69.
⁴³ Gentz to Caradja, 1 Jan. 1816, DI vol. 1, 198–9. For a detailed and excellent analysis of the Allied
Council meetings in Paris, see Beatrice de Graaf, Tegen de terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werd na Napoleon
(Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2018).
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definition of Europe and the colonialist assumption that war with outsiders
([o]thers) is not war, may one treat the Vienna [Order] as a period of peace
between the European Powers.’ The relations of the Concert of Europe with the
Ottoman Empire were likewise characterized by violence, which manifested itself
in this specific case in five different ways: occupation, armed intervention between
the imperial authorities and the provinces, sponsorship of armed rebellion, nego-
tiation backed by threat, and partition.⁴⁴
True as these arguments may be in part, the situation was in fact much more
complex and nuanced. On the one hand, the Vienna Order helped prevent, albeit
with partial success, the major European Powers that formed the Concert of
Europe from engaging in single-handed interventions and occupations in the
Levant.⁴⁵ Their engagements there now required an audience to legitimize and
validate such practices, which bridled any unilateralism.⁴⁶ Ironically, the required
audience was often none other than the very same Powers—the political decision-
makers and, eventually, public opinion.
Yet, at the same time, the Vienna Order accommodated and even enabled
cross-border interventions, surrogate wars, asymmetrical, political interpretations
of international law, pacific blockades, and other arguably bellicose acts and
violence of the pre-1815 world—to the extent that these did not harm European
peace and order in toto but not to the extent that it prevented bellicose imperi-
alism elsewhere in the world. In other words, the major difference between the
pre- and post-1815 world remained limited to the Powers’ willingness not to
overtly step on each other’s toes. They eschewed another total war in Europe
during their quest for colonies and endeavours to open up new markets for free
trade elsewhere.
Moreover, their understanding of security as a public good obtained through
cooperation led to lasting efforts among the larger and smaller powers to facilitate
concerted action. Just as with Russo-Austrian relations in the ‘Eastern Question’
of the eighteenth century (see Chapter 1), convergence, or upgrading toward
political and military (naval) collaboration, stemmed from the divergence of the
Powers’ perception of threats and interests. As explained in the introduction of
this book, from this point onwards, Great Power cooperation in the nineteenth
century proved to be the logical completion and a vital requisite of competition
among them—not simply and not always its binary opposite.
*
An important and defining early example of the Janus-like nature of the Vienna
Order was the involvement of the Great Powers in the so-called ‘Greek crisis’ of
1821–32. From a Greek viewpoint, this was a revolutionary war of independence
⁴⁴ Ingram, ‘Bellicism’, 214. ⁴⁵ Ibid. 206, 211.
⁴⁶ Richardson, ‘The Concert of Europe’, 51.
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against the Ottoman sultan. To the Porte, it was a mischievous uprising (Rum
fesadı) supported by Russia. In the end, it sparked what was fashioned as the first
‘humanitarian’ intervention in the Ottoman Empire, and attested to the symbiotic
relationship at the time between imperial competition and cooperation.
An intellectual revival or self-awareness amongst Ottoman Greek subjects was
the major cause of what transpired in the 1820s. For several decades, prominent
writers and activists like Adamántios Koraïs (1748–1833) and Rigas Velestinlis
(1757–98) had acted to represent ideas and emotions for Greek emancipation
from Ottoman ‘barbarism and tyranny’—some of them suggesting the foundation
of a Greek-speaking democratic republic with a population composed of both
Christians and Muslims, and calling for peaceful coexistence under a more liberal
regime.⁴⁷
The aspirations of the Greek intelligentsia found a concrete political movement
in the Philiki Hetairia (the Friendly Society). Founded in Odessa in 1814, the
Hetairia carried the torch of the Greek independence struggle. It recruited mem-
bers from both Ottoman and Russian empires amongst prominent hospodars as
well as Russian Greek officers. During the Congress of Vienna in 1815, its
members made resolute attempts to place their cause before the Powers, as the
‘civilized Christians of Europe’ against the ‘barbaric Turks’. While these endeav-
ours constituted one of the earliest moments of the adoption of the Enlightenment
idea of civilization⁴⁸ in the Ottoman world, they yielded no results.
In 1821, the movement initiated a military campaign under the young Russian
Greek General Alexandros Ypsilantis (1792–1828), who marched with a regiment
past Russian borders into Moldova and Wallachia, making use of the fact that the
Ottoman forces were engaged in a conflict with Ali Pașa of Janina. The subsequent
Greek efforts at the Congresses of Laubach and Verona in 1821 and 1822
expanded the meaning of the Eastern Question with a new dimension besides
Russo-Ottoman differences regarding commerce in the Black Sea and the
Danubian Principalities.⁴⁹ But, in the opening years of the 1820s, Greek attempts
to obtain Great Power support remained again unheeded. European statesmen
regarded the revolutionary aspirations of the Hetairia in a similar light to those of
the Carbonari in Italy, i.e. as a threat to the monarchies.
To reiterate, the Vienna system and the ensuing Vienna Order were anti-
revolutionary from their inception, and in the eyes of Great Power leaders, there
was little to endorse and much to oppose in the ambitions of the Greek movement.
Prince Metternich, for instance, saw no difference between the revolution against
Ferdinand, the king of Naples, and a revolution against Sultan Mahmud II.⁵⁰ Tsar
⁴⁷ Frary, Russia, 28; George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, vol. 1 (London: William
Blackwood & Sons, 1861), 172–203; Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 290.
⁴⁸ For more on this notion, see Ch. 7. ⁴⁹ Gentz to Caradja, 6 Dec. 1822, DI vol. 2, 148–50.
⁵⁰ Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 195; Šedivý, Metternich, 83, 117–18.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
  ? 117
Alexander I and his foreign minister, Ionnes Antonios Capodistrias (1776–1831),
who would become the first leader of the autonomous Greece in 1828, publicly
denounced the Hetairia and allowed the sultan’s armies into the Danubian
Principalities to suppress Greek forces in 1821. The British ambassador to
Istanbul, Percy Clinton Smythe, 6th Viscount Strangford (1780–1855), commu-
nicated to the Porte that, at Verona, the ‘Greek affair’ was announced as an
Ottoman domestic affair.⁵¹ George Canning, who succeeded Lord Castlereagh as
foreign minister after the latter’s suicide in 1822, accepted that—as fighting spread
from Moldavia and Wallachia to the Morea, and 10,000–20,000 Muslim (and
some Jewish) civilians, including women and children, were killed and scores were
sold into slavery—Greek belligerence had become a ‘fact’.⁵² The Powers even
recognized ‘the Ottoman government’s right to repress the revolt using arbitrary,
indiscriminate and violent retaliation against innocent civilians who paid the price
of the actions committed elsewhere by other Ottoman Christians’.⁵³ All these
factors defined the initial stance of the Concert toward the ‘Greek crisis’—an
almost unblemished policy of non-interference and neutrality.
But this changed in a few years’ time, as we will see, especially when Russia
came to pursue a more active policy to bring the ‘Greek affair’ into the political
agenda of the Concert. The shift in Russian policy confirmed for the Porte that
what transpired from 1821 onwards was the sequel of a strategy, the continuation
of ‘the long game’ that Tsar Alexander I had been playing since the troubled
Treaty of Bucharest of 1812. In the estimation of Ottoman ministers, the Russo-
Ottoman disputes over the Caucasus and the Balkans had been put on hold in
1812–4 due to the Napoleonic wars. But once the European peace was definitively
settled, the Russian authorities would return back to an expansionist policy.
Mahmud II and his ministers were persuaded that Tsar Alexander I and
Capodistrias were the masterminds of the Greek ‘mischief ’ (fesad).⁵⁴ British
Ambassador Strangford implicitly confirmed this, insinuating that ‘a certain
friendly power’ was supplying ‘quite illegal assistance’ to the Greeks.⁵⁵
The Ottoman persuasion did not originate merely from strategic estimates. In
the late 1810s and 1820s, the Porte seized a large number of ‘secret documents’
from arrested Greek messengers. The information gathered pointed to Russia as
the whisperer behind the rising independence ambitions among the Greeks. In
April 1820, for instance, intelligence had discovered that a very numerous asso-
ciation had formed among the Christian subjects of the Porte in the Morea,
Albania, and the neighbouring provinces with a view to the liberation and
⁵¹ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 64–5; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 5, 2997.
⁵² On the Greek violence, see Heraclides and Dialla, Humanitarian, 108; Rodogno, Against
Massacre, 65; Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 56–7; Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence,
1821–33 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 59.
⁵³ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 67. ⁵⁴ Heraclides and Dialla, Humanitarian, 108.
⁵⁵ Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 309.
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independence of those countries. A great number of the inhabitants of the Ionian
Islands had joined the confederacy and demonstrated great zeal in support of it
since the visit to Corfu by Capodistrias, the Russian foreign minister. Several
informants, including British consuls and the conspirators themselves, had dis-
closed to the Ottoman cabinet that the overarching plan was to seize the Ottoman
fleet and then occupy Istanbul by means of an uprising of the city’s Orthodox
population.⁵⁶ These were in line with the declaration of Ypsilantis, who called for
the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire with ‘Constantinople’ as its capital.⁵⁷
According to these reports, the plan was countenanced and supported by Tsar
Alexander I.⁵⁸
The news of the Greek démarche therefore did not come entirely as a surprise
to the sultan.⁵⁹ Confronted with the severity of the threat, he reacted ferociously,
using religious language in order to mobilize the reluctant and undisciplined
Janissaries, and declared the Greek struggle to be a ‘war on Islam’.⁶⁰ Moreover,
since the Ottoman elites were persuaded that the revolt in the Balkans was part of
a wider conspiracy and that a revolution among the Istanbulite Christians was
likely to transpire, the Muslim populace was called to arms and provided with
pistols, while the armoury of the Greeks and Armenians was confiscated.⁶¹ Orders
were sent to detect the ‘riff-raff ’ Greeks and Armenians and send them away to
Anatolian provinces.⁶²
Still the most powerful man in Istanbul, Halet was coldly furious. He felt
betrayed when he realized that some of the Phanariotes with whom he worked
closely had links with the Hetairia.⁶³ In March and April 1821 more than 60 of
these were executed for acting as ‘terrorist conspirators’—and as a deterrent to the
Greek populace.⁶⁴Among them was Kostaki Muruzi, a close associate of Halet and
a dragoman of the Ottoman imperial council. Patriarch Gregorios was dismissed
from his position and replaced by the Bulgarian Archbishop Eugenios, and then
hanged (not as the patriarch but as a man who abused his previous post as
patriarch) together with several senior bishops who had been (arguably falsely)
suspected of endorsing the Greek movement.⁶⁵
In March 1822, the Ottoman imperial council was called to decide upon the
punishment of the Orthodox Christians involved in the ‘rebellion’. Despite
the divisions within the cabinet, at Halet’s demand, the new Şeyhülislam
⁵⁶ Dakin, Greek, 41–9; Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 200. ⁵⁷ BOA HAT 1317/51338.
⁵⁸ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 5, 2726–7; Liston to Castlereagh, 25 Apr. 1820, NLS MS 5636, f. 69.
⁵⁹ BOA/HAT 45685. For a study that asserts the opposite, see Şükrü Ilıcak, ‘The Revolt of Alexander
Ipsilantis and the Fate of the Fanariots in Ottoman Documents’, in The Greek Revolution of 1821:
A European Event, ed. Petros Piziniars (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2011), 225.
⁶⁰ BOA C.Dh. 3650; cf. Philliou, Biography, 85. ⁶¹ BOA HAT 1084/44138; 1294/50258.
⁶² BOA HAT 525/25687; 1316/51330. ⁶³ Yenidünya, Halet Efendi, 245.
⁶⁴ Philliou, Biography, 88.
⁶⁵ Heraclides and Dialla, Humanitarian, 108; Philliou, Biography, 89.
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Abdulvehhab Efendi issued a fatwa that announced that the residents of rebellious
Greek towns and villages that refused to submit had ‘forfeited their status as loyal
non-Muslim subjects under Islamic law, and were therefore liable to be killed or
sold into slavery’. Repressive measures were to be taken; in the interest of order
‘against a background of law of war under Islam’, the ‘rebellious’ (isyancı) Greeks
lost their zimmî status and became harbîs.⁶⁶
Within a space of a few weeks, the Ottoman Empire became an inferno for her
Greek subjects, while in the Morea, the killing of Ottoman Muslims and their
enslavement also continued, and diverse Greek forces turned against each other,
instigating a civil war within civil war. Şeyhülislam’s fatwa unleashed furious mobs
in the streets of the imperial capital and other towns with significant Greek
populations, such as İzmir (Smyrna) and Ayvalık (Kydonies), and the Aegean
islands, where several thousands were subject to gruesome violence, killings, or
slavery. Numerous Janissaries and opportunist soldiers procured immense gains
from pillage, plunder, and the slave trade, victimizing even the pardoned reaya
(non-Muslim) villages.
Seeing that the repression of the Greek ‘rebellion’ was out of control, the Porte
issued firmans and another fatwa. It denounced the misdeeds as a breach of Islam
and declared them illegal.⁶⁷ Divisions within the Ottoman cabinet then became
even sharper. As Strangford reported, Reisülküttâb Mehmed Sadik Efendi and
Canib Efendi, both from the moderate camp, were strongly inclined to show
mercy. They made ‘every effort to oppose the sanguinary counsels of Halet . . . ’⁶⁸
Yet, in mid-1822, ‘the barbarous system of terrorism which Halet Efendi pursues’
prevailed.⁶⁹
The Greek crisis had put Halet under immense pressure. The Phanariot
families, who had been acting as hospodars in Wallachia and Moldova and
providing Halet with funds to pay off the Janissaries, had now been dismissed
from their posts.⁷⁰ One of his major sources of income was thus denied.
Furthermore, in the past few years, the fact that he had had differences of opinion
with Mehmed Ali Pașa of Egypt with respect to the administration of Syria
prompted the latter to stop sending Halet gifts and funds to secure his post.⁷¹ In
1822, the Janissaries, who had their own professions in Istanbul as boatmen,
firemen, butchers, etc. (see Chapter 2), were recruited against their wishes and
sent to Greece to fight the ‘rebels’. When the news of Janissary losses was received
from Greece, causing great consternation among the populace, Halet emerged as a
⁶⁶ Ibid. 85–6; İsmail H. Danişmend, Osmanlı Devlet Erkani, Sadr-i-azamlar (vezir-i-a’zamlar), şeyh-
ül-islamlar, kapdan-ı-deryalar, baş-defterdarlar, reis-ül-kitablar (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1971),
152; Erdem, ‘Ottoman Responses’, 68–9.
⁶⁷ Ibid. 70–71.
⁶⁸ Strangford to Castlereagh, 25 May 1822, TNA FO 78/108; cf. Theophilus C. Prousis, ‘British
Embassy Reports on the Greek Uprising in 1821–22: War of Independence or War of Religion?’,
History Faculty Publications 21 (2011): 214.
⁶⁹ Ibid. ⁷⁰ Philliou, Biography, 73. ⁷¹ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 5, 2898.
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scapegoat. Now he could not pay off their aghas. Complaints against him became
rampant among the Janissaries, whose leaders submitted petitions to the sultan for
Halet’s removal.⁷²
This was an invaluable moment for Mahmud II to rid himself of Halet, who had
for a decade established a network in the empire that had undermined the
dynasty’s authority. Knowing that the latter’s power base (the Janissaries and
the Phanariotes) were no longer behind him, the sultan dismissed Halet from his
post in October 1822, and exiled him to Konya. On the day of his arrival there in
early November 1822, Halet was executed. When his corpse was returned to
Istanbul and exhibited in the court in December, a note attached to his nose
read that,
[b]ecause of the guile and machinations in which [he] took part . . . many people
have been ruined by him . . . [A] hypocrite in his words and actions, he behaved,
on the surface, like a faithful man, but, deep down, he sought nothing but to
advance his personal interests, and without . . . dissolving this perversity which
had become familiar to him, he dared to commit, against the supreme will, many
actions analogous to his character . . . ⁷³
Thus came the end of the Halet Efendi era in Istanbul—an era that saw the Porte’s
refusal to participate in the Vienna system, Ottoman isolationism in inter-
imperial relations, and the rise and brutal suppression of the Greeks.
*
Were the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul correct in believing that Russia had a
hand in the Greek ‘uprising’ all the while? Available sources and recent scholar-
ship have shown that Tsar Alexander I was opposed to any revolutionary move-
ment, and did not endorse the Greek démarche in the beginning. It was only
‘certain independently-minded front-line [Russian] commanders in the south’
who had personal links with the leaders of the Greek movement that were aware of
the revolution and possibly aided it.⁷⁴ Ypsilantis’s written appeals to the tsar and
Capodistrias for an aid in their démarche were received negatively. The Russian
Greek general was even dismissed from the imperial army.⁷⁵ In 1821, the tsar’s
agents expressed their ‘disinterestedness in the Greek affairs’ to the Porte; and in
1822, at the Congress of Verona, they would do the same before the other Powers’
plenipotentiaries.⁷⁶
⁷² ‘Affairs of Turkey’, The Times, 17 Dec. 1822.
⁷³ Memorandum 6 Dec. 1822, TNA FO 78/111; cf. Philliou, Biography, 92; Yenidünya, Halet
Efendi, 258.
⁷⁴ Bitis, Russia, 102. ⁷⁵ Frary, Russia, 30.
⁷⁶ ‘Note présentée par le Ministre du Russie (Stroganoff) a la Sublime Porte’, 6 July 1821, AMAE
MD Turquie 45/9; ‘Déclaration du Plenpt [sic] Russe à insérer au protocole des conférences qui avaient
été ouvertes a Vienna sur les affaires d’Orient’, Nov. 1822, AMAE MD Turquie 45/12.
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Yet a shift occurred in Alexander I’s attitude toward the crisis in conjunction
with the inimical Ottoman response. The tsar’s offence at the Sublime Porte’s
public accusations of him as the instigator of the ‘rebellion’, the deliberate
Ottoman disruptions over Russian trade in the Black Sea, and, most importantly,
the killing of a large number of Greek co-religionists by the Ottomans all led
the Russian ambassador, Baron Sergey Stroganoff (1794–1882), to protest to the
Porte and immediately leave Istanbul, breaking off the diplomatic relations
between the two courts in 1822.⁷⁷ Under the growing influence of the interven-
tionists in his entourage, such as Capodistrias, who insistently reminded the tsar
of Russia’s right—as acquired by the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca—as the
protector of the Orthodox subjects of the sultan, the tsar reviewed and reversed his
policy.⁷⁸
The fact that in the island of Chios alone tens of thousands of Christians had
been killed or enslaved in the spring of 1822 spurred great agitation amongst the
philhellenes in other European metropoles. In London and Paris, committees
were established to provide funding for the Greek movement, and public cam-
paigns were initiated. In the following years, several pro-Greek pamphlets were
written (31 in French, 37 in German, and 12 in English). ‘Foreign fighters’ left for
Greece from France, Prussia, Switzerland, Hungary, and the Netherlands for
religious and political reasons. Impressive artworks produced included Eugène
Delacroix’s Scènes des massacres de Scio, portraying the massacres of Greeks by
‘evil barbarians’. Lord Byron’s poems and the story of his eventual participation in
the Greek war himself, his unfortunate death in Missolonghi in 1824 from a fatal
illness, J. M. W. Turner’s watercolour study illustrating Byron’s The Giaour, as
well as daily newspaper reports, all led to the generation of a new influence, public
opinion, which propelled the Great Power governments in a more interventionist
direction.⁷⁹
In 1827, the Powers undertook their first joint armed ‘humanitarian’ (as they
called it at the time) intervention in the Levant partly as a consequence of these
pressures from the public. It is debatable, though, whether humanitarian con-
cerns, shared perceptions of threats, or their willingness to cooperate were the
main motivations behind the intervention. Another factor was the mounting
piracy in the Mediterranean during the crisis which obstructed European trade.
The Powers found in this a common threat and also a justificatory pretext for legal
intervention. But, in the end, multilateral intervention was more a consequence of
Great Power suspicions (of each other) and competition, and less a result of their
willingness to cooperate.
⁷⁷ ‘Halet Effendi’s Threat’, The Times, 20 Sept. 1822.
⁷⁸ Patricia K. Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of
Russian Diplomacy, 1801–1825 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 26; Grand Vizier to
Nesselrode, 27 June 1821, AMAE MD Turquie 45/7.
⁷⁹ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 75–8.
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In 1824, when Alexander I came up with the idea of the creation of three semi-
autonomous principalities in Greece under the sultan’s authority, yet also under
the protection of the Powers, he was vetoed by the other Powers, who feared that
Russia could use the scheme to establish a naval base in Greece.⁸⁰Metternich was
uneasy with intervention in favour of a revolutionary group. Consequently,
throughout the crisis he followed a consistent policy of non-intervention, remain-
ing loyal to the anti-revolutionary spirit of the Vienna Order. He called for respect
for the Ottoman sultan’s sovereignty (and the monarchy).⁸¹ Prussia faithfully
supported his cause. But Britain changed her position in 1825.
Rodogno has shown that London was left with an inconvenient choice between
allying with the Porte against Russia or joining St Petersburg in its plan for
intervention.⁸² The British opted for the latter under public pressure as well as
out of fear of a unilateral Russian action.⁸³ Especially after the sultan turned to the
aid of Mehmed Ali Pașa, the latter’s son Ibrahim launched a strong and conclusive
campaign,⁸⁴ and when the news of the two sieges of Missolonghi broke, religious
sentiments came to hold a stronger sway over the state of affairs in Britain.
In 1825, the tsar’s ambassador to London, Christopher Lieven, made a shrewd
move by revealing a document, the so-called ‘barbarization project’ of the sultan,
whereby the entire Christian population was allegedly to be swapped with
Egyptian Muslims. With this, he achieved his goal of heightening interest in the
Greek crisis in the British parliament.⁸⁵ This became the last straw determining
London’s gradual change of policy, and its agreement on cooperating with Russia
in the Greek crisis—a vivid example of how sentiments, be it religious or humani-
tarian, and commercial interests helped tip the scales when rational strategic
considerations caused hesitation.
Time and again, such religious and commercial sensitivities served as lubricant
for the sluggish Great Power and Ottoman diplomatic machinery to proceed with
respect to the Eastern Question in the nineteenth century. This being said, London
also had in mind a carefully designed plan. In fact, it was almost exactly the same
strategy as Austria had followed in the late eighteenth century when dealing with
the Eastern Question of the time. In the late eighteenth century, Austria had acted
together with St Petersburg to contain the Russian aggrandizement over the
sultan’s empire. Now, Britain was doing the same: she was cooperating with
Russia to hold the tsar’s designs in check.
What political scientist Korina Kagan argues is therefore true. Anglo-Russian
cooperation was more than ‘an occasion for high-level great power security
⁸⁰ ‘Mémoire sur la pacification de la Grèce’, 9 Jan. 1824, VPR vol. 2/5, 1982, 308–14.
⁸¹ Metternich’s policy is detailed in Šedivý, Metternich, 133–216.
⁸² Rodogno, Against Massacre, 78–81. ⁸³ Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 128. ⁸⁴ See Ch. 5.
⁸⁵ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 79.
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cooperation’.⁸⁶ Britain’s involvement in the Greek crisis resulted from a reckoning
of the influence of the philhellenes, the mounting piracy that haunted British
commerce, and, finally, due to the strategic, humanitarian, and religious stimuli.⁸⁷
For Russia, the Greek crisis tended to be more a pretext for exerting greater
influence in the politics of the Balkans and for finally putting to an end the
disputes with the Porte over the Caucasus. This we can deduce from several
instances.
For example, when Alexander I passed away in December 1825 and was
succeeded by his brother Nicholas I, the new tsar would at first falter on the
Greek crisis and even tell the duke of Wellington, who had been in St Petersburg
for his coronation, that ‘his quarrel with the Porte was not about the Greeks but
for his own just rights under treaties which the Porte had violated’, alluding to the
Treaty of Bucharest of 1812.⁸⁸ And in April 1826, when St Petersburg sent an
ultimatum to Istanbul demanding that the latter withdraw its troops from
Wallachia and dispatch plenipotentiaries to Akkerman to finalize the border
disputes pending since the Treaty of Bucharest, it did not mention the Greek
crisis once.⁸⁹
A new question follows from this: why then did Russia want to act together with
Britain (and later France) during the Greek crisis? One may argue that it was more
because of Tsar Nicholas I’s need to legitimize his plan to regain possession of the
disputed lands in the Caucasus and the Balkans. A unilateral action on the part of
Russia could isolate her and upset even European peace. But a joint intervention
could provide her with a leeway to solve disputes with the Porte in the tsar’s
favour. In short, he showed his commitment to the Vienna Order to obtain his
long-due imperial goals. The Greek crisis thus provided him with a heaven-sent
leverage over ongoing Russo-Ottoman disputes.
On 4 April 1826, when the tsar signed with Britain the Protocol of St Petersburg
in the name of ‘the principles of religion, justice and humanity’, the situation and
security of the Greeks were actually his lesser concern. True, with the protocol, an
offer was made to the Porte and the Greeks for the mediation of Britain and Russia
between them. The objective was framed as the pacification of the Levant, security
of European commerce, and the creation of an autonomous Greece under
Ottoman suzerainty.⁹⁰ Even France was eventually involved as a mediator, as
she looked to redefine her rank among the Great Powers (considering herself as
second-rank among the other four), anxious not to be left out and leave the future
⁸⁶ Korina Kagan, ‘The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great
Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821–41’, Security Studies 7(2) (1997): 1–57, at 25.
⁸⁷ On the Austrian policy in the 18th c., see Ch. 1. ⁸⁸ Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 129.
⁸⁹ Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 16 Feb. 1826, VPR vol. 2/6, 1985, 393–400.
⁹⁰ Šedivý, Metternich, 150; Bass, Freedom’s Battle, 130, 135.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
124  
of Greece to the dominant influence of either Russia or Britain.⁹¹ Yet all these were
also means for the tsar to gain the majority among the Concert of Europe—the
very audience before which he had to justify his acts.
Less noted in the literature is that the tripartite agreement immensely piled on the
pressure on the Porte. An unsigned document (possibly the Russian ultimatum)
written in Istanbul on 26 April 1826 suggests that the tsar was urging Istanbul to
begin negotiations over the disputed lands in the Balkans and the Caucasus by 17
May. The document read that ‘the system of alliance’ between the Great Powers
that had come into existence in 1815 (alluding to the Vienna System) had received
‘a double blow [in] the last five years’ and was ‘exposed as being shaken to its
foundations by the troubles which desolate a part of European Turkey and by
the [differences] between the Sublime Porte and the Imperial Court of Russia’. From
crisis to crisis, things had come to the point where ‘a fixed and precise state of
things must necessarily and immediately take the place of the uncertainties which
hitherto held in suspense the resolutions of the Allied Courts’. It was no longer a
question of ‘gaining time . . . of partial measures’. Now there was ‘no space for
bargaining because the resources of diplomacy were exhausted—the good
offices of the Allied Courts are useless . . . at Petersburg . . . for Russia has the right,
the will and the strength to deal with it alone . . . ’ If the Porte replied negatively to
Russia’s demands, ‘the Russian resolution is taken—she will do what dictates her
honour, rights and interests. The resolutions of the Allied Courts are also taken . . .
they will confine themselves to deploring the inefficiency of their efforts to save the
Ottoman Empire.’⁹²
To Sultan Mahmud II, the St Petersburg Protocol and the ensuing Russian
pressures were a huge source of humiliation. Against the imminent Russian threat,
he had only one alternative, war—one that would almost certainly culminate with
a devastating defeat for him given the military revolution under way in Istanbul.⁹³
Consequently, on 25 July 1826 he accepted the recommencement of negotiations
over the disputed lands in the Balkans and the Caucasus.⁹⁴
The talks began in Akkerman between Count Vorontsov and the Ottoman
plenipotentiaries Hadi and İffet Efendis. They broke off several times.⁹⁵ In the end,
Mahmud II conceded only when Vorontsov secretly promised Hadi and İffet that
should the sultan evacuate the Danubian Principalities entirely and settle the
dispute frontier in Transcaucasia, ‘the Greek question would simply die of neg-
lect’.⁹⁶ The Ottoman delegates were authorized to sign the Akkerman Convention
⁹¹ Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 16 Feb. 1826, VPR vol. 2/6, 393–400; Desages to Baron, 21 Aug. 1825,
AMAE Papiers Desages 60PAAP/6/128; Rodogno, Against Massacre, 81.
⁹² BOA HR.SYS 1676/2. ⁹³ See Ch. 5.
⁹⁴ Stats-Sekretar’ K.B. Nessel’rode poverennomu v delax v Konstantinopole M. Y. Minchaki.
Moskva, 15(27) Aug. 1826, VPR vol. 2/6, 576–9.
⁹⁵ Ibid. ⁹⁶ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 2998; Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 302.
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on 7 October 1826, surrendering the territories that the Porte had stubbornly
claimed since 1812.⁹⁷
*
After Akkerman, the Greek question did not die of neglect. This time the British
cabinet, facing continuous domestic pressure, remained dedicated to resolving the
affairs of Greece by means of Great Power mediation. British diplomats in
Istanbul, joined by the French and now less devoted Russian agents, continued
for another year to urge the Porte to agree on Greek suzerainty, much to the
frustration of the sultan. The ‘stern, relentless spirit of a fanatic despotism’ in
Istanbul would prevent the Porte from yielding, British ambassador Stratford
Canning complained. He did not seem to be aware that what was at stake for
Mahmud II was now a matter of not making any more concessions to the Russians
after the Akkerman Convention.⁹⁸ Moreover, thanks to the support of Mehmed
Ali Pașa, by mid-1827 Ottoman forces had largely contained the Greek revolu-
tionaries, and fights amongst the Greek factions had intensified, to the detriment
of their national movement.
This became the moment of intervention. With the initiative of the prime
minister, George Canning (1779–1827), on 6 July 1827, Britain, France, and
Russia held a series of ambassadorial meetings and then signed the Convention
of London ‘in the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity’ on the basis of
‘the invitation of [the Greeks] to the conflict’, ‘self-preservation based on the
threat to the stability of Europe and impediments to the maritime commerce
caused by . . . acts of piracy’, and ‘sentiments of humanity’. Despite the Porte’s
refusal, they agreed on the establishment of an autonomous Greece paying tribute
under Ottoman suzerainty.
The legal intervention was officially justified by framing it as an endeavour to
ensure the safety of British, Russian, and French imperial subjects by the supply of
‘commercial security’ in the Levant against ‘piracy and war’—though ‘to give to
the Greeks a more secure and definite existence under the Ottoman Porte’ was
also another major, albeit unofficial, objective.⁹⁹ France suggested an additional
arrangement for a general guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire, but, their eyes being fixated on the border disputes in the Balkans and the
Caucasus, the Russian plenipotentiaries rejected it.¹⁰⁰
⁹⁷ Selim Aslantaş, ‘Osmanlı-Rus İlişkilerinden Bir Kesit. 1826 Akkerman Andlaşması’nın
“Müzakereleri” ’, Uluslararası İlişkiler 9(36) (Winter 2013): 149–69, at 163–4.
⁹⁸ S. Canning toG. Canning, 24Apr. 1827 TNAFO78/153; cf. Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 304.
⁹⁹ Viktorija Jakimovksa, ‘Uneasy Neutrality: Britain and the Greek War of Independence
(1821–1832)’, in International Law in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Inge van Hulle and Randall
Lesaffer (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 65; the Earl of Dudley to the Prince of Lieven, 6 Mar. 1828, PRAG, 35–7.
¹⁰⁰ Dakin, Greek, 182.
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The Triple Alliance then presented to the Porte an overdetermined ultimatum
in August 1827. It asserted that ‘a new refusal, an evasive or insufficient answer, or
a complete silence on [the Porte’s] part would put the cabinets of the Allies in the
necessity of taking measures which they would judge to be most effectual’ to put
an end to the state of things that were incompatible with ‘the interests of the
Porte’, as well as ‘the security of commerce and the general and perfect tranquillity
of Europe’.¹⁰¹
ToMetternich, the ultimatum was a miserable violation of international law (he
would point to the double standard when the tsar rejected Great Power mediation
in the Polish question), and the Convention of London was nothing but ‘an act of
open hostility’.¹⁰² The Austrian chancellor was dismayed by the fact that ‘a treaty
arranged among the five Great Powers concerning the settlement of the internal
affairs of a sixth country, without a previous request and the cooperation of that
country . . . [w]as an irregular, dangerous and inadmissible form of proceeding’.¹⁰³
He further argued that after Akkerman, neither two, three, nor five Great Powers
would be able to convince Mahmud II.¹⁰⁴ He had a point, but there was almost
nothing he could do at this juncture. Britain, Russia, and now also France had
already dug their heels in. Canning deliberately neglected him.¹⁰⁵
If Metternich’s Prussian-backed opposition to intervention all along produced
any effect, it was the fact that, given the legal and political questions it would arise,
the three intervening Powers had to frame the ultimatum conscientiously. This is
why their note included the statement that, even though they might take military
measures in the interests of the security of their commerce and for European
peace, they would want to do so without ‘disturb[ing] their friendly relations’ with
the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Reisülküttâb Pertev Efendi was puzzled: ‘Hostility! Friendship!
What a confusion of terms in all this! Can you explain to me how water and
fire . . . can exist together? . . . If it is a declaration of war that you have to make to
us, say so.’¹⁰⁶ The Porte immediately rejected the ultimatum, maintaining that it
was not ‘afraid of [European] naval squadrons’. It was a violation of Law of
Nations.¹⁰⁷ For the Triple Alliance, this meant that all diplomatic resources
¹⁰¹ ‘Première Déclaration à la Porte Ottomane’, PRAG, 5; Stratford to Dudley, 19 Aug. 1827, TNA
FO 78/155, cf. Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol. 1, 309–10.
¹⁰² Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 20 June 1827, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 29; cf. Šedivý,Metternich,
179–80.
¹⁰³ Metternich to Zichy, Vienna, 31 Jan. 1827, HHStA, StK, Preussen 125; cf. Šedivý,
Metternich, 177.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 179. ¹⁰⁵ Dakin, Greek, 182.
¹⁰⁶ UK Government, Constantinople Protocols 1830 (n. 79), 126; TNA FO 352/15B, cf. Smiley, ‘War
Without War’, 61; also in Stratford to Dudley, 21 Aug. 1827, TNA FO 78/155.
¹⁰⁷ RGIA, f. 846, op. 16, e. 4479, l. 184; cf. J. V. Petrunina, Social’no-‘ekonomicheskoe i politicheskoe
razvitie Egipta v period pravleniyaMuhammeda Ali v rossijskoj obshhestvenno-politicheskoj mysli XIX v.
(Moscow: Prometej, 2008), 262; also in ‘Manifesto of the Sublime Porte’, PRAG, 1046; cf. Jakimovksa,
‘Uneasy Neutrality’, 67.
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had now been exhausted. In October 1827, the fleets of Russia, Britain, and
France were ordered to blockade the Otto-Egyptian fleet in Navarino Bay.¹⁰⁸
As Will Smiley has adeptly shown, the practice of ‘pacific blockade’ while at
peace—a term that was actually coined in hindsight in 1849—was a ‘new legal
form of force’ or a new type of (symbolic) violence, to add to Ingram’s aforemen-
tioned list, employed by the Powers in the nineteenth century. Navarino was one
of the earliest examples of this coercive instrument in the Levant.¹⁰⁹ With the
pacific blockade of Navarino in 1827, the Powers ‘prohibit[ed] the Sublime
[Ottoman] State from moving about in its own territory’ without actually declar-
ing war on the Porte.
Given this unacceptable offence for Sultan Mahmud II, after accidental shots
were purportedly fired from an Ottoman frigate, a general naval battle began
between 89 Ottoman-Egyptian and 24 allied ships on 20 October.¹¹⁰ The disparity
in the modes of military-technological power was so stark that in a few hours, ‘a
great many [of the Otto-Egyptian ships] have blown up and several have been
sunk’, the British Admiral Edward Codrington reported from the spot. The
Navarino harbour was ‘covered with wrecks’.¹¹¹ Thousands of Ottoman and a
dozen European sailors died.¹¹²
*
The Porte immediately announced a protest calling for the immediate cessation of
aggression and demanding indemnities for the damages inflicted on the Ottoman
navy.¹¹³ But the ambassadors of the three Powers in Istanbul responded negatively
and then left the Ottoman imperial capital—though not before the Porte had
given them a hard time in granting guarantees of safe passage. At the end of
November, the sultan declared the Akkerman Convention null, and on 20
December 1827, he gathered his assembly and ordered the arsenals to prepare
for the long-expected yet dreaded war against Russia. Orders were sent to all
provinces to call upon Muslims to defend their laws and religion.¹¹⁴ Russian
commerce in the Black Sea was deliberately fettered by Ottoman authorities.
As 6,000 French troops were dispatched to the Morea to protect the Greek
population and supervise the evacuation of the Ottoman-Egyptian forces, on 26
April 1828 Russia officially declared war on the Ottoman Empire on the grounds
¹⁰⁸ ‘Instructions to be addressed to the Admirals commanding the Squadrons of the three Powers in
the Mediterranean’, PRAG, 15.
¹⁰⁹ Smiley, ‘War Without War’, 56.
¹¹⁰ Ottoman sources claim that the first shot was not fired by the Ottoman fleet. Tarih-i Cevdet, vol.
6, 2999; BOA HAT 945/40700.
¹¹¹ Codrington to Stratford, 16 and 20 Oct. 1827 FO 78/157; Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman, vol.
1, 315.
¹¹² Rodogno, Against Massacre, 83.
¹¹³ M. le Général Guilleminot to M. le Baron de Damas, 11 Nov. 1827, PRAG, 18–19; also in
Jakjimovska, ‘Uneasy’, 61–2.
¹¹⁴ Le Moniteur, 3 Dec. 1827; The Times, 6 Dec. 1827.
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that the Porte did not fulfil the requirements of the Akkerman agreement and had
restricted Russian commerce. The Russo-Ottoman war at once alerted European
statesmen and diplomats, as Russia separated herself from the Concert and did
not consult the other Powers, taking an independent decision despite prior
cautions.¹¹⁵
The news of Russian victories that arrived after each battle in the Balkans and
the Caucasus led many to believe that the Ottoman Empire was falling. The British
prime minister, the duke of Wellington, observed that ‘the tranquillity of the
world’ was gone.¹¹⁶ He questioned whether a Greek empire could be established,
while the French prime minister and foreign minister, Jules August Armand
Marie de Polignac (1780–1847) drew up more concrete plans for the dismember-
ment of the sultan’s dominions and the establishment of a Christian state in
Constantinople with the Dutch king, William I, as its new ruler.¹¹⁷
Even though Russian strategists at first endorsed the French plan, when the
Russo-Ottoman war (which lasted more than a year) culminated with an embar-
rassing defeat for the sultan and the signing of the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople)
on 14 September 1829, they reviewed their position.¹¹⁸ Alexander I preferred to
return to the ‘weak neighbour’ policy. The peace treaty had ensured the Ottoman
payment of indemnities to Russia, the establishment of autonomous administra-
tive structures in Moldavia andWallachia, and free passage for commercial vessels
through the Straits. More importantly, it was agreed that the disputed frontiers in
the Balkans and the Caucasus should be conferred on the tsar, and Russian
commerce in the Black Sea would be ‘fully liberalized’.¹¹⁹ Russia had got all she
hoped for now, and was in a commercially advantageous position in the Levant.
In addition to these, Sultan Mahmud II reluctantly recognized Greece as a
tributary state, following the stipulations of the London Agreement of the Triple
Alliance dated 22 March 1829.¹²⁰ This paved the way for the full independence of
Greece in 1832, after long, delayed negotiations due largely to the differences of
opinions among Britain, France, and Russia over the regime and whom to appoint
as the leader of Greece.¹²¹
The Navarino intervention and the Great Power supervision of the foundation
of an independent Greek state signalled a hesitant turn away in European politics
from the anti-revolutionary proclivities of the Vienna Order. Britain, France, and
¹¹⁵ The Earl of Dudley to the Prince of Lieven, 6 Mar. 1828, PRAG, 53–5; see also Katalin Schrek,
‘The Effects of Russia’s Balkan Aspirations on the British Diplomacy in St Petersburg: The Treaty of
Adrianople and Its Consequences (1829–1832)’, in (Re)Discovering the Sources of Bulgarian and
Hungarian History, ed. Penka Peykovska and Gabor Demeter (Sofia: n.p., 2015), 22–37.
¹¹⁶ Dakin, Greek, 274; Macfie, Eastern Question, 12.
¹¹⁷ Puryear, France and the Levant, 77–9. ¹¹⁸ BOA TS.MA.e 709/66.
¹¹⁹ BOA HR.SYS 1187/2. Also in Şerafeddin Turan, ‘1829 Edirne Andlaşması’, Ankara Üniversitesi
Dil ve Tarih–Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi 9(1–2) (1951): 111–51, at 125.
¹²⁰ Frary, Russia, 43–5. ¹²¹ Ibid. 46–53.
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Russia all strove to manage their strategic differences, economic interests, and
public pressures (religious sentiments), as well as Ottoman/Greek differences. In
the end, even though neither the leaders of the Triple Alliance nor the Concert of
Europe as a whole had a unified position and policy with respect to the Eastern
Question at the time, and even though Austria and Prussia urged non-
intervention on the others, Russia, Britain, and France drove each other towards
an intervention, albeit reluctantly so.
With the countries following suit in an attempt to prevent one another from
establishing dominant control over the emerging Greek state, the legal and
strategic quagmire led the Triple Alliance into a rabbit hole. They did manage
to place the intervention on legal ground by highlighting that its ultimate object
was ‘commercial security’. But the subsequent Russo-Ottoman war, and the
territorial gains and commercial privileges St Petersburg consequently obtained
from the Porte, only hampered the solidity of the Concert of Europe serving as a
centrifugal dynamic.¹²²
In the end, the Greek revolutionaries emerged victorious, having obtained their
ultimate objectives—independence—even though they were given a lesser voice in
the selection of the regime and even the leader of their new independent polity.
The Ottoman Empire, for her part, remained on the receiving end of violence,
having lost her fleet. She was partitioned by the Powers and then by Russia, and
she unwillingly liberalized foreign trade in her dominions. Twelve years after the
Congress of Vienna, in a new encounter with the Concert of Europe, Sultan
Mahmud II and his ministers thus realized that the dynamics of Euro-Ottoman
relations were now different under the Vienna Order. In late 1828, they even made
an untimely attempt to get their empire ‘approved and recognized as an integral
part of the European political system’, though this was considered unfeasible due
to Russian opposition as well as the growing belief that the sultan’s empire was
disintegrating.¹²³ In the eyes of Ottoman ministers, a new era in inter-imperial
politics had begun—not in 1815, but in 1827.
Counterfactually speaking, can one argue that the Porte paid dearly for the
decisions it had taken during the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15? By refusing to
become a part of the Vienna System at the time under Halet Efendi’s sway, did it
jeopardize the territorial integrity of the sultan’s European dominions, which, as
of 1829, saw the emergence of new polities, (semi-)independent kingdoms, and
republics in Greece, Moldavia, Wallachia, and then Serbia?
The answer needs to be tentative: the Vienna Order formed in the 1810s barely
put an end to Great Power encroachments and the policy of supplying security in
the Levant in search of their own strategic, economic, and (to a lesser degree)
religious interests. True, the transimperial security culture woven around the
¹²² Ingram, ‘Bellicism as Boomerang’, 215; Frary, Russia, 39.
¹²³ Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Dec. 1828, HHStA, StA, Türkei, VI, 34; cf. Šedivý, Metternich, 44–5.
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Eastern Question did undergo a transformation in order to hold aggression in
check and foster cooperation among the Powers. And true, if the Porte accepted
the Powers’ proposal in February and March 1815, it could place the territorial
integrity of the sultan’s European dominions under the guarantee of international
public law. But, as was proved time and again in the course of the century, before
and after Vienna, international law tended to be applied unevenly when it came to
the Eastern Question or the periphery of Europe.
According to Ingram, the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the creation of
Greece illustrated ‘the reciprocal relationship between equilibrium in [Europe]
and bellicism in the [its] periphery’.’¹²⁴ The Ottoman Empire might have ‘paid the
price for the Concert of Europe’s stability’, as the Powers ‘recognized [her] rebel
subjects as belligerents, sank [her] fleet, invaded, annexed and partitioned [her]
territory’. And, with their bellicism, the Powers stored up problems for the future:
‘the states that savaged [the Ottoman Empire] would one day turn on one
another.’¹²⁵
Ingram calls this the boomerang effect of the bellicism of the Vienna order.
I argue instead that it was a paradox that formed the core of the transimperial
security culture that preceded this order. The imprudent European supply of
security in a foreign territory, whereby the more pressing interests of the Powers
were heeded above all, tended to engender fresh vulnerabilities in the Levant as
well as further demand for security in Europe. An infamous historical episode
provides us with an excellent example of this paradox: the war between Cairo and
Istanbul in the 1830s that followed the Navarino intervention and the independ-
ence of Greece, that almost ended the Ottoman Empire, and that engendered a
Great Power crisis, testing the Vienna Order to its foundations.
¹²⁴ Ingram, ‘Bellicism as Boomerang’, 215. ¹²⁵ Ibid.
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5
Old Enemies
Cairo, Istanbul, and the Civil War of 1832–1833
On 16 June 1804, when the Ottoman imperial frigate Zevi’l-’Ukûl (The Sagacious)
set sail from the port of Alexandria, on board was an anxious man. It was Hüsrev
Mehmed Pașa, the former governor of Cairo. As we saw in Chapter 3, he had had a
harrowing experience in Ottoman Egypt in the three years that preceded his
departure. He had been ousted from power by rebellious Albanian soldiers,
captured by the Mamluk beys, and then imprisoned in Cairo until days before
he left that bountiful country.¹ Yet, despite his many disappointments, because he
believed that he could still overcome the tragedies he had gone through, Hüsrev
harboured hopes of returning to settle in the citadel as the pașa of Cairo. He
therefore decided to go no further than Rhodes, and impatiently awaited news
from his correspondents—the interpreter Stephanaki (Boghorides) and lieutenant
Mehmed Ali. The two were in Egypt making contacts for Hüsrev’s restitution.² Or
so Hüsrev believed.
The news he expected never came. After waiting a few months in Rhodes, now
even more disillusioned and crestfallen, he gave up, and then left for the Balkans to
take up a new post. The next year, when he found out that Mehmed Ali had been
appointed the pașa of Cairo, he probably felt even more resentful. Yet all he could
do was swallow his pride and move on.
In the following decades, while Mehmed Ali was preoccupied with building his
imperium in imperio, Hüsrev became one of the most influential political figures
in Istanbul, responsible for the security of the imperial state, first as grand admiral
and then as serasker (the Ottoman equivalent of the ministry of war), and finally
as grand vizier. The pursuit in the Levantine deserts in which Mehmed Ali and
Hüsrev had been engaged in the 1800s was not the last time their paths crossed.
Their rivalry simmered in parallel with their budding influence in Ottoman
politics, and boiled over into an entrenched hostility.
As we have seen in the previous pages, intra-elite rivalries were among the
major relational dynamics of the Eastern Question in the nineteenth century. This
book considers many examples of such struggles—including those between the
French interventionists and anti-interventionists (Chapter 1), the pro-French,
¹ See Ch. 3. ² Missett to Hobart, 16 June 1804, LPM vol. 2, 165.
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pro-Russian, or Anglophile Ottoman ministers (Chapters 2 and 4), and the
proponents of the ‘Greek’ and ‘Ottoman’ projects in St Petersburg (Chapter 4).
In the following pages, we will see many other cases. Yet few of these rivalries
rested on personal acrimonies and grudges, and endured through time and
circumstances in the same manner as the rivalry between Mehmed Ali and
Hüsrev. Decades after their first encounter in Egypt in 1801, during the so-called
Greek and Eastern crises in the mid-1820s and then in 1832–41, the two men
became the central actors in the violence and civil wars that severely battered the
sultan’s empire, led to her partition, and jeopardized the Vienna Order, almost
causing it to crumble.
The present chapter concerns this rivalry. My aim here is to discuss the decisive
role emotions played in strategic decision-making processes in the Levant. By
accentuating the previously unrecorded nuances of the story of Mehmed Ali and
Hüsrev, I will also look to demonstrate the links between the crisis in Greece
(1821–32), the French invasion of Algiers (1830), and the empire-wide civil war
between Cairo and Istanbul that struck the Ottoman world (1831–41) and swiftly
became a transimperial crisis.
Hüsrev and Mehmed Ali
Hüsrev was originally from the Caucasus. Born in 1769 to an Abaza family, he was
brought to Istanbul in his childhood by slave traders. There he was sold for 2500
kuruș to Said Ağa, the çavușbașı (chief bailiff) of the imperial palace.³ He thus
entered the most revered and powerful household in the Ottoman world through
his new master, whose main duty was to assist the Reis Efendi and supervise
foreign visitors of the sultan. Said Ağa enrolled Hüsrev at an early age in the palace
school, Enderun-i Hümâyun. Like many others who were products of the
Ottoman gulam system, through which young slaves were trained for senior
military and bureaucratic positions, Hüsrev spent his adolescence within the
palace and acquired there the education, skills, and experience—as well as import-
ant connections—that helped him climb the ladder of imperial bureaucracy.
Unlike many, he managed to make it to the top.
Following his education, he became the chamberlain of Küçük Hüseyin Ağa
(1757–1803), who, as we have seen in Chapter 2, was the brother-in-law of Selim
III and an influential figure in the New Order movement. When Küçük Hüseyin
was appointed as the grand admiral in 1792, Hüsrev laboured with him to
renovate of the Ottoman navy. In this period he closely observed the training of
Selim III’s ‘New Order’ army. He accompanied the grand admiral to Egypt to fight
³ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 6–7.
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the French in 1801. And, he received the title of pașa the next year when he was
appointed governor of Cairo.⁴
After his departure from Alexandria in 1804, following his unrewarding wait in
Rhodes, Hüsrev served in Salonika and Bosnia as governor.⁵He fought against the
Russians during the 1806–12 war.⁶ And then, due to his successful achievements
and his connections in Istanbul, on 31 December 1811, he was promoted as the
kaptan-ı deryâ or the grand admiral of the Ottoman Empire.⁷ In Cairo, the news
of Hüsrev’s rise was unwelcome for Mehmed Ali, which indicates the degree of
dislike between the two men at this hour.⁸
Hüsrev spent the following seven years largely at sea, usually fighting against
Mediterranean pirates (izbanduts) but also in order to keep himself away from the
rein of the hardliner Halet.⁹ In 1818, before the Greek crisis arose, due to his
moderate leanings, Hüsrev was dismissed by Halet from his post as grand admiral
and sent to Trabzon and Erzurum to deal with the quarrels with Persia.¹⁰ He
returned back to Istanbul only four years later, after Halet’s fall. On 8 December
1822, the sultan appointed the Caucasian as grand admiral for the second time,
and entrusted him with the difficult task of quashing the Greek ‘rebellion’.¹¹ Just as
Halet had vanished from the picture, however, Hüsrev would find himself having
to deal with another, older rival during his Greek campaign: Mehmed Ali.
*
Since the mid-1800s, the life of Mehmed Ali Pașa of Egypt had proceeded in a
remarkably different direction from that of Hüsrev. While the latter steadily became
a major actor in the imperial palace, drawing closer and closer to Mahmud II,
Mehmed Ali grew politically distant from the sultan. From the early 1810s on, he
turned Cairo and its environs ‘into a centre of an expansive empire’’¹² Turning the
NapoleonicWars in his favour, and isolated from the frenzy of European fighting, he
sold grain to Austria, Britain, and Prussia, and reformed the Egyptian administra-
tion. He tightened central control, reduced corruption in the local bureaucracy,
conducted cadastral surveys to man his army and systematized his labour resource,
abolished the tax farming system (iltizam), and cancelled the immunities on agri-
cultural land belonging to mosques and pious foundations (awqaf).¹³
⁴ Ibid. 7–8. ⁵ Ibid. 68. ⁶ Ibid. 79–80.
⁷ BOA C.BH. 3236, 8118; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 91; İnalcık, ‘Hüsrev Pașa’, IA, 610.
⁸ Drovetti to MAE, Bulletin de février 1812, in Driault, Mohamed Ali et Napoléon, 168–9.
⁹ See Ch. 4. ¹⁰ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 5, 2628. ¹¹ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 192.
¹² Fahmy, ‘Muhammad ‘Ali’, 139; see also Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931); Guy Fargette, Méhémet Ali. Le Fondateur de
l’Égypte moderne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996).
¹³ Fahmy,All the Pasha’s Men, 9; Muhammed H. Kutluoğlu, The Egyptian Question, 1831–1841: The
Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Pașa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reaction of the Sublime Porte
(Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1998), 39–40; Marsot, Egypt, 142; Rivlin, 54–125; Reuven Aharoni, The
Pasha’s Bedouin: Tribes and State in the Egypt of Mehemed Ali, 1805–1848 (London: Routledge,
2007), 120.
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Most importantly, he established a coalition with rich local merchants,
incorporated their business into the government’s machinery, and, aside from
forced industrialization, introduced ‘a wide-ranging policy of monopolies
whereby staple goods as well as cash crops were to be sold only to government
warehouses and at prices fixed by [the pașa]’. The profits of Egypt rose from 8
million francs in 1805 to 50 million francs in 1821. Thanks to the booming trade,
the number of European trading houses increased from 12 in the 1800s to 66 in
the 1820s. While there had been barely 150 foreigners operating in Egypt before,
their number rose to over 15,000 in a few decades.¹⁴
The pașa’s financial strength procured him ready cash to undertake unique
infrastructural projects (such as the digging of the Rahmanieh and Mahmudiye
canals) and the establishment of several factories, schools, and hospitals that were
mainly in the service of his military.¹⁵ It also enabled the formation of a modern
conscription-based army and navy—Mehmed Ali’s own ‘New Order’.¹⁶
In 1819, Joseph-Anthelme Sève (1788–1860), a French colonel who had served
in the French army in Egypt and who converted to Islam and gave himself the
name Suleyman, was employed to train the pașa’s army in the French style.¹⁷
Meanwhile, Mehmed Ali began to purchase ammunition from the European
Powers, despite the disapproval of the Porte.¹⁸ Although his renovation experi-
ment did not prove effective immediately, the new army was put to a successful
test in Sudan, where he acquired new territories and slaves, including the gold-rich
regions of Sennar.¹⁹
Thus by the time the ‘Greek crisis’ broke, Mehmed Ali had placed Egypt fully
under his control, and aspired to expand his dominions with the army that had
become the most disciplined and efficient in the Ottoman world. He continued to
entertain the dream of founding his own independent empire. Yet to his inter-
locutors he usually appeared undecided about how to achieve this.
The news of the developments in the Morea, Danubian Principalities, and the
Greek islands in 1821 were therefore doubly intriguing to Mehmed Ali. At first, he
sympathized with the revolutionary Greeks, providing the runaways with shelter
and enrolling the sailors in his navy.²⁰ But then, he was moved by the reports of
¹⁴ ‘Mémoire sur l’état de l’Égypte sous la domination de Mohammed Ali’, Oct. 1824, AMAE Papiers
Desages, 60PAAP/4.
¹⁵ Ibid.; see also Mansel, Levant, 59; Dodwell, Muhammad Ali, 30–31; Z. Y. Hershlag, Introduction
to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 1964), 80; Fahmy, All the Pasha’s
Men, 10.
¹⁶ Ibid. 46; Puryear, France and the Levant, 43.
¹⁷ Aimé Vingtrinier, Soliman-Pacha. Colonel Sève, généralissime des armées égyptiennes ou Histoire
des guerres de l’Égypte de 1820 à 1860 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1886).
¹⁸ BOA HAT 678/33080, n.d.
¹⁹ Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 9. For more detail, see Edouard Driault, La Formation de
l’empire de Mohamed Aly de l’Arabie au Soudan (1814–1823) (Cairo: Société royale de géographie
d’Égypte, 1928).
²⁰ Sanktpeterburgskie vedomosti, 16 Aug. 1821, no. 65 and 1 Nov. 1821, no. 87.
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the massacres of the Muslims by Greek revolutionary militias. He changed his
position, and began to send military advice to Istanbul through his agent (Mısır
kapı kethüdası) Muhammad Necib Efendi (?–1851), who at the time also served
the sultan’s vizier responsible for the gunpowder factories.²¹
In May 1821, when the Porte asked his help to suppress the ‘disturbance’ in
Crete with Egypt’s fleet (as the sultan was unwilling to send the imperial navy to
the Mediterranean for fear of a possible major Orthodox uprising in Istanbul and
a Russian attack in the Black Sea), Mehmed Ali responded with reluctance.²² But
when the sultan promised him the administration of Crete and Cyprus, he
followed orders and sent 7,000 men to control the island swiftly.²³
The paths of Mehmed Ali and Hüsrev crossed one more time three years
later when the latter could have obtained little success in suppressing the Greek
‘rebels’ except on a few less important occasions in Kea, Syros, and Lesvos.²⁴ As
the Janissaries under Hüsrev’s command had once again proved inefficient,
Mahmud II set out to disband them and begin the training of new troops. His
plans were coming to fruition slowly and deliberately in the imperial capital. He
could not disturb the progress. This was why the sultan decided to ask for the
military assistance of Mehmed Ali. The latter’s more disciplined and advanced
troops had effectively accomplished difficult missions before, especially in Crete.
They could now help crush the ‘rebellion’ in the Morea.
But, again, Mehmed Ali was hesitant. A campaign to Greece would mean new
costs on top of those already incurred during the Crete campaign.²⁵Moreover, his
agents were reporting to him the public fury that the news from Greece was
creating in Europe.²⁶ When the sultan promised the pașa that he would ‘provide
him with all the tools of fighting and supplies and that he would receive all the
necessary powers to enable him to successfully complete the operation’, Mehmed
Ali agreed to send his son Ibrahim, together with the Egyptian fleet and some
17,000 men, to Greece.²⁷ He did not do so, however, without demanding the
governorship of the Morea for Ibrahim. Believing that he had enough leverage to
demand more, on 19 April 1824 he also asked for Ibrahim’s appointment as grand
admiral, in place of Hüsrev, for at least one year, so that all power would be
concentrated in one man. It would facilitate his campaign, allow the pașa to
²¹ BOA HAT 38237-A; 38018; see also Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 200.
²² Muhammed Necib Efendi to Mehmed Ali, 17 May 1821, DWQ Bahr Barra 7/100.
²³ Muhammed Necib Efendi to Mehmed Ali, 2 July 1822, DWQ Bahr Barra 8/48; Sanktpeterburgskie
vedomosti, 28 Apr. 1822, no. 40.
²⁴ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 193–203. For Sultan Mahmud II’s disappointment with Hüsrev’s mission and
Hüsrev’s apologetic response, see BOA HAT 37767.
²⁵ Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 157. ²⁶ Ibid.; Sanktpeterburgskie vedomosti, 25 Apr. 1824, no. 34.
²⁷ Jamāl ‘Ubayd, Qissat al-iḥtilāl Muḥammad ʿAlī li-l-yunān (Cairo: Al-Hay’at al- ‘āma al-ma:sriyya
li-l-kitāb, 1990), 611–12; Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, 128; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 12, 98; BOA HAT. 38781-C,
88781-B; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 199, 201, 203.
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distance an old rival, Hüsrev, from power, and put the Ottoman imperial navy and
military under Ibrahim’s command.²⁸
But granting the command of the imperial navy to a man the sultan hardly
trusted (he knew about Mehmed Ali’s aspirations)²⁹ was simply too large a risk to
take. Instead, Mahmud II kept Ibrahim as the governor of Morea, separated
Ibrahim and Hüsrev’s spheres of action, and ordered both not to interfere with
each other in their bicephalous mission.³⁰ And to keep Mehmed Ali in the
campaign, he made another pledge: control over Syria. This was an irresistible
offer for the pașa, who, as we will see below, desperately needed the riches of Syria
for his domestic and external security.
*
Mehmed Ali, his son Ibrahim, and Hüsrev began their joint campaign cautiously.
They were aware that their history could be a recipe for friction. They also knew
that they could not let it get on the way of their sensitive mission. After the initial
success in subduing the Greek units, when Hüsrev and Ibrahim met in September
1824 whilst sheltering from the storm in the port of Bodrum, the reports to
Istanbul heralded that the two pașas treated each other like ‘father and son’.³¹
Sultan Mahmud II was elated, wishfully thinking that this could be the beginning
of a union between the two.³²
The next year, Hüsrev was even ordered to go to Alexandria for the reparation
of his navy and to carry reinforcements for Ibrahim. He thus returned to Egypt on
7 August 1825, 21 years after he had left. His old nemesis, Mehmed Ali, was away
at sea when the grand admiral arrived, which was why he could see him only eight
days later.
Uncertain about how he would be received in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt, during
those eight days Hüsrev was nervous, and policed his sailors very strictly. He did
not wish to disembark before the return of the governor, and the same motive
prevented him from agreeing to receive the visits of consuls and other persons
who, in such circumstances, would present themselves to him. As soon as
Mehmed Ali arrived on the morning of 15 August, he accepted Hüsrev’s visit.
All onlookers were concerned about how their meeting would go. But, despite all
the odds, the grand admiral received a very warm welcome on the first day.
When his guest arrived, Mehmed Ali went down to the stairs in front of his
palace and hugged Hüsrev. The two ‘kissed each other affectionately’.³³ Mehmed
Ali gave way to his guest, and then they disappeared into his palace. After a long
²⁸ BOA HAT 39506; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 205; Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 2894. ²⁹ See Ch. 3.
³⁰ BOA C.DH. 83/4140; BOA C.AS. 1/40, n.d. For the firman of the sultan, see BOA TS.MA.e 721/36.
³¹ BOA HAT 900/39546; BOA TS.MA.e 721/8; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 214.
³² Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 2901–2.
³³ Drovetti to Baron de Damas, 20 Aug. 1825, in Édouard Driault, L’Expédition de Crète et de Morée
(1823–1828). Correspondance des consuls de France en Égypte et en Crète (Cairo: Institut français
d’archéologie orientale du Caire, 1930), 72.
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exchange of courtesies, they had a confidential talk for several hours in the
friendliest manner. During their conversation, Mehmed Ali called Hüsrev pașa
karındaşım (my pașa brother), told him that he owed everything he possessed to
the sultan, gave the grand admiral a generous amount of cash and valuable gifts,
and, immediately afterwards, wrote to the Porte to express his gratitude for having
seen Hüsrev Pașa again.³⁴
Hüsrev acted in kind, thanking Mehmed Ali for his services to the sultan. The
pașa of Egypt then ordered his men to supply the Ottoman fleet abundantly with
all the food and ammunition it required.³⁵ In an act of benevolence and courtesy,
Mehmed Ali also gave Hüsrev his own palace in which to spend the night, while he
established himself in that of his son, Ibrahim Pașa.³⁶ All these treatments led
observers to make an early conclusion that ‘these two most powerful men of the
Ottoman Empire’, ‘the old enemies’, had now made peace with one another.³⁷
However, their meetings in the following weeks proved to be less genial.
Mehmed Ali complained to Hüsrev about the ineptitude of the Ottoman navy—
of which the latter was in charge—in overwhelming the Greeks, due mainly to the
lack of courage shown by its commanders.³⁸He also expressed his discontent with
Hüsrev’s failure in shoring up Ibrahim’s efforts on the ground. Perhaps to soften
the blow, he promised the grand admiral that he would do everything in his power
to reinforce the Ottoman navy.
It is true that Hüsrev had more than once shied away from direct confrontation
with the ‘Greek rebels’ with the aim of protecting the fleet, which had occluded
Ibrahim’s efforts on the ground.³⁹ Embarrassed at having been scolded in front of
his own men in Alexandria, the grand admiral was nevertheless in no position to
provoke Mehmed Ali, for he knew that it could create an intra-imperial crisis just
when the sultan was in dire need of the Egyptian army. It would probably not be
wrong to assume that he left Egypt with bitter feelings for the second time, taking
with him some 12,000 jihadiyye infantry and cavalrymen that would fight under
the command of Ibrahim in the forthcoming Missolonghi mission.⁴⁰
Hüsrev’s relations with Ibrahim Pașa abruptly turned sour thereafter.⁴¹ The
treasurer of the Rumelian army, Hüsnü Bey, who had been secretly commissioned
by the sultan to ensure amicable relations between the grand admiral and Ibrahim
Pașa, reported that, even though the two pașas appeared to be on good terms, deep
³⁴ BOA HAT 38248; 38363, cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 224-5. ³⁵ Ibid.
³⁶ Drovetti to Baron de Damas, 20 Aug. 1825; cf. Driault, L’Expédition, 72–3.
³⁷ De Livron to Ministre des Finances et Président du Conseil, 12 Oct. 1825; cf.
Driault, L’Expédition, 91.
³⁸ BOA HAT 39953. Also in Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 226. ³⁹ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 2916–17.
⁴⁰ BOA HAT 639/31467; 857/38261.
⁴¹ Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 11; Drovetti to Collège Impérial à Saint Pétersbourg, 25 May
1826, in René Cattaui, Le Règne de Mohamed Ali d’après les archives russes en Égypte, vol. 1: Rapports
consulaires de 1819 a 1833 (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire, 1931), 66–67.
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down they hated each other and mediation between the two had now become
impossible.⁴²
As the preparations began for the decisive mission to Missolonghi, reports sent
to Istanbul contained hints of the degree of distrust, animosity, and hesitant
collaboration of the two.⁴³ The first Missolonghi siege by Ottoman forces failed
partly due to lack of coordination with Ibrahim’s men. When the latter seized this
unbreachable castle during the second siege in 1826, his soldiers’ macabre brutal-
ity towards the Greek inhabitants sprang partly from the belief that they would
not receive succour from Hüsrev’s forces.
The capture of Missolonghi was a momentous achievement on the part of
the Ottomans, nearly ensuring their complete control of the Greek ‘rebellion’. But
the differences between Ibrahim and Hüsrev became sharper afterwards. At the
celebrations in Istanbul, they explicitly accused each other of misconduct during
their campaign.⁴⁴
Mehmed Ali was peeved by the news, and instantly asked Mahmud II to
dismiss the grand admiral from his position, threatening to withdraw his troops
from Greece otherwise.⁴⁵ The sultan was focused on his secret plans to abolish the
Janissaries. Since he was heavily reliant on the strength of the Egyptian army in the
Greek campaign, he conceded to Mehmed Ali’s demands and, initially, called
Hüsrev back to Istanbul in June 1826. When Mehmed Ali sent another dispatch,
insisting on the dismissal of his nemesis in January 1827, Mahmud II relieved
Hüsrev of his position as grand admiral in early February.⁴⁶
The rancour between the two antagonists thus revived during the Greek
campaign. To Mehmed Ali, Hüsrev was not only an old rival whose presence in
the imperial capital hindered his interests. Their animosity was also an ostensible
instrument and sometimes a cover for justifying Mehmed Ali’s various political
manoeuvres and demands from Istanbul. Hüsrev, on his part, was the more
circumspect of the two. Unlike his nemesis, the latter had never been in possession
of a rich and semi-autonomous province.⁴⁷ He was instead charged with roles in
regions that were more directly controllable by the imperial centre. He had to act
with tenacity in order to survive and rise amidst the intrigues and rivalries that
characterized Ottoman bureaucracy. This demanded, above all, proximity to the
sultan and other strong men in the palace. His ability to manoeuvre in the long-
lasting political chess game he played with Mehmed Ali was therefore more limited.
He was far from being a mere pawn, though. For now, he was more like a
⁴² BOA HAT 37933; cf. Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 236–7.
⁴³ On the dispatch of food supplies and cavalry from Egypt, BOA HAT 621/30709; on the
differences of opinion between Ibrahim and Reșid about the siege of Missolonghi castle, see BOA
HAT 857/38261; Moskovskie vedomosti, 24 Feb. 1826, no. 16.
⁴⁴ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 6, 2918–22.
⁴⁵ Raif and Ahmed,Mısır Mes’elesi, 11; BOA TS.MA.e 721/36; Fahmy, ‘The Era of Muhammad ‘Ali’,
158; Mehmed Ali to Grand Vizier, 5 Ramazan 1241; cf. Dodwell, The Founder, 85.
⁴⁶ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 235–49. ⁴⁷ This is mentioned also in Fahmy, Mehmed Ali.
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knight: calculating, underhand, andmore difficult to foresee. This was why he avoided
overt conflicts and often presented himself as the underdog or the downtrodden.⁴⁸
It paid off. As Mehmed Ali rose as a major threat to the authority of the sultan
in the early 1830s, Hüsrev, with the help of his cautious attitude, emerged in the
imperial capital as ‘a symbol of anxiety and outrage against the governor of Egypt’,
as a mouthpiece of the Sublime Porte, and as one of the masterminds of imperial
security.⁴⁹ But, even when he eventually became a highly influential figure in the
Ottoman world, he often refrained from the political limelight. Instead, he pre-
ferred to pull the strings from behind the curtains.
*
When Hüsrev was recalled to the imperial capital and relieved of his post of grand
admiral at Mehmed Ali’s insistence in 1826–7, a military and social revolution was
under way in Istanbul.⁵⁰ Since the elimination of Halet Efendi, Sultan Mahmud II
had initiated the training of a new and modern army, the eşkinci troops, in the
same spirit as that of the New Order troops of Selim III. The sultan suspected and
anticipated that this could prompt the jealousy of the Janissary aghas, whom the
Ottoman leadership viewed at the time as ‘the enemies of the state’ and ‘the infidel
traitors, parading in the disguise of Muslims’.⁵¹
In point of fact, on 12 June 1826, the first drill of the eşkinci troops with their
blue, European-style uniforms in Istanbul agitated the Janissary leaders. Feeling
compromised, two days later the latter staged a revolt. The streets of Istanbul
witnessed bloody fighting similar to 1807 when Selim III had been dethroned. But
his nephew Mahmud II was prepared. With his artilleries he arranged the bom-
bardment of the Janissary barracks, and by 16 June 1826, he managed to disband
the Janissary units for good, which went down in history as the ‘Auspicious Event’
(Vâkâ-yî Hayriye).⁵²
The Janissary network was so widespread that thousands were investigated,
banished, or arrested thereafter. Those who declared themselves loyal to the sultan
were pardoned and incorporated into the new troops. Some went underground,
only to reappear again in a few years’ time during the uprisings in Bosnia.⁵³
Considered by the proponents and sympathizers of the ‘New Order’ as a
harmful cudgel in the ‘circle of justice’ and among most ardent defenders of
⁴⁸ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 249. ⁴⁹ Ibid.; İnalcık, ‘Hüsrev Pașa’.
⁵⁰ Virginia Aksan, ‘Ottoman Military and Social Transformations, 1826–28: Engagement and
Resistance in a Moment of Global Imperialism’, in Empires and Autonomy: Moments in the History
of Globalization, ed. Stephen Streeter, John Weaver, and William D. Coleman (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2010), 61–78, at 61.
⁵¹ Howard Reed, ‘The Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June 1826’ (PhD dissertation,
Princeton University, 1951), 245.
⁵² Aksan, ‘Ottoman Military’, 61.
⁵³ Stratford Canning to George Canning, 12 Aug. 1826, TNA FO 78/144; cf. Cunningham, Anglo-
Ottoman, vol. 1, 293.
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economic protectionism, the Janissaries were at last eliminated. Sultan Mahmud II
could finally establish his absolute authority, which almost nobody could dare
oppose, except for an amorphous body of women, mostly wives and daughters of
the crushed Janissaries, who in August 1826 protested in the streets of Istanbul
against the terror that had gripped the imperial capital.⁵⁴
The Auspicious Event was one of the milestones of the transformation of
Ottoman security culture, as the backbone of the circle of justice underwent a
radical change. Mahmud II continued his military reform programme by estab-
lishing the Âsâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (The Victorious Army of
Muhammad), a new modern army of the empire. He even asked Mehmed Ali to
send his French instructors to Istanbul to help him train his new army. But the
pașa of Egypt astutely chose not to cooperate, suspecting that the new imperial
order might check the power of his own military.⁵⁵ In dire need of men who would
help him in running this most important of imperial projects, Mahmud II found
in Hüsrev an old and reliable associate who had acquired first-hand observations
of the roll call, drill, firearm practices, and training of European armies during the
campaign against the French in 1801.
Hüsrev saw in this an invaluable opportunity. When he heard the news of the
abolition of the Janissaries, he immediately formed a fruitful collaboration with a
French former sergeant named Gaillard (first name unknown) in practising an
advanced European drill method with select men in the navy near İzmir (Smyrna).
He then told the sultan of his method and secured an invitation in 1827 to
introduce the so-called ‘drill of Hüsrev’ (tâlim-i Hüsrev) to the infantry of
Âsâkir-i Mansure in Istanbul.⁵⁶ The same year, aged 58, he was appointed as the
serasker of Anatolia (commander in chief of the imperial army or a near equiva-
lent of the minister of war), a post in which he remained for nine years.⁵⁷
During the catastrophic war with Russia in 1828–9, which Hüsrev had been
adamantly opposed to in the first place, the new, yet raw, infantry (many of whom
were in their early teens) that he had trained displayed an encouraging level of
discipline. This added to his credibility in the imperial capital. Due to the sultan’s
reliance on the army under Hüsrev’s control, the serasker became such an
influential figure at the end of the 1820s that the prominent Turkish historian
Halil İnalcık claims that he could get grand viziers replaced one after the other in
quick succession.⁵⁸ In more than one account, European observers described him
as the second most influential figure in Istanbul after the sultan.⁵⁹
⁵⁴ Ibid. 294.
⁵⁵ Gültekin Yıldız, ‘Üniformalı Padişah: II. Mahmud’, in II. Mahmud. Yeniden Yapılanma Sürecinde
İstanbul, ed. Coşkun Yılmaz (Istanbul: Avrupa Kültür Başkenti, 2010), 105–6; Aksan, ‘Military and
Social’, 71; Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 266.
⁵⁶ Yıldız, ‘Üniformalı’, 106, 108; Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 271.
⁵⁷ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 71. ⁵⁸ İnalcik, ‘Hüsrev Pașa’, 43.
⁵⁹ Murav’ev-Karskii, Turciya, vol. 1, 13–14; Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke’nin Türkiye Mektupları,
trans. Hayrullah Örs (Istanbul: Remiz Kitabevi, 1995), 32; Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 334.
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Indeed, bar a short break in 1836-37, Sultan Mahmud II trusted Hüsrev’s skills,
character, network, and influence until the last hours of his life.⁶⁰ In turn, Hüsrev
remained loyal to him all along. When important political decisions were made in
Istanbul, Hüsrev, as ‘the man who knew everything that was going on in the
imperial capital’, sat at the sultan’s council, gave him advice and looked to guide
him—mostly with success.⁶¹
In the first years of his tenure as the serasker, he played a pioneering role in
reorganizing the security mechanisms of the imperial state, convening censuses
(1827, 1830, 1831), redesigning military costumes, opening medical schools and
new hospitals, rearranging the finances of the military, introducing universal
conscription and the reserve system (national militia), and building new networks
with provincial power brokers which re-empowered notable local families—all of
which marked, after the Sened-i İttifak of 1808, a new episode in Ottoman military
history.⁶²
In rebuilding and controlling the security apparatus of the empire, Hüsrev paid
particular attention to installing his own men in key positions in the military as
well as in the civilian bureaucracy.⁶³ The serasker was nothing if not a diligent
educator and trainer. As a contemporary resident in Istanbul in the 1830s wrote,
he had been ‘for thirty years . . . constantly engaged in buying children in Georgia
and Circassia, to educate them for different offices’.⁶⁴ Indeed, Hüsrev created a
private school in his mansion in Bahçekapı, where he provided his own slaves,
more than 100 of them, with education through private tutors in parallel to that
supplied at the Palace School.⁶⁵ Since he had no biological children himself, he saw
his slaves as his own children, calling them ‘oğullarım’ (my sons).⁶⁶ He sent some
of them to Paris to supplement their education and acquire a perfect command of
French. He then procured ‘his sons’ positions in the palace, the Porte, and the
military, thus laying the basis of the creation of a numerous and hitherto unseen
network that provided him with a power base and allowed his protégés to rise over
time to the most senior ranks: Reșid Mehmed became grand vizier in 1829.
⁶⁰ See Ch. 7. ⁶¹ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 15.
⁶² Military historians can trace these reforms through Hüsrev’s personal library, today preserved at
the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul and filled with books that helped shape the Ottoman grand
strategy and the most detailed accounts of military thinking and plans of his period. See Veysel
Şimşek, ‘The Grand Strategy of the Ottoman Empire, 1826–1841’ (PhD thesis, McMaster University,
2015), 13, 108, 135, 137, 158, 175, 179, 237; Gültekin Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok. Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş
Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti’ne Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826–1839) (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009),
254–7.
⁶³ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 14; Carl V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 73–104.
⁶⁴ Robert Walsh, A Residence at Constantinople During a Period Including the Commencement,
Progress and Termination of the Greek and Turkish Revolutions, vol. 2 (London: Wesley & Davis, 1836),
523 (appendix 7); cf. Philliou, Biography, 98.
⁶⁵ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 415. ⁶⁶ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 14.
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Akif (1787–1845) was appointed as Reis Efendi (foreign minister), and Halil Rifat
(1795–1856) as grand admiral.⁶⁷
*
The rise of Hüsrev in Istanbul was a major threat to Mehmed Ali and his
aspirations in Cairo. The dangerous spark between these most powerful men in
the Ottoman Empire eventually blazed into a civil war as Greece gained first her
autonomy and then independence from the Porte. In fact, the rivalry between the
two men was hardly the sole cause of the ensuing violence. Their emotions served
only as accelerators of the political commotion that resulted from a series of
developments and irreversibly tarnished relations between Cairo and Istanbul: the
efforts of the agents of the intervening Triple Alliance to separate Mehmed Ali
from the sultan during the ‘Greek crisis’, the Navarino incident, and the planned
participation of Mehmed Ali in a French-led occupation campaign in North
Africa despite the Porte’s disapprobation. Ties were cut loose one by one after
each of these developments.
As early as 1826, the agents of the Triple Alliance, particularly those of Britain
and France, were instilling the pașa of Egypt with the idea of withdrawing his
troops from Greece to end the ‘Greek crisis’ in hopes of preventing a unilateral
Russian intervention at the time. Mehmed Ali’s dream of an independent empire
was known to British and French agents. In the 1810s, he had talked of it with
them and even received endorsement, although this eventually faded (see
Chapter 3). In November 1826, when he received the new British consul, John
Barker (1771–1849) at his palace, he would tell him in a half-hour monologue, as
he did with many other foreign visitors, the story of his childhood and his rise
from ‘humble origins’, ‘step-by-step’, to the post of Egyptian governor: his suc-
cesses, his suppression of the Wahhabis, his conquest of Sudan, and his worth to
the sultan. ‘[N]ow here I am,’ he would conclude, ‘I never had a master.’⁶⁸ Barker
was hardly baffled. He knew that this was an opportunity for Britain to separate
Mehmed Ali from the sultan during the fight in Greece, and to gain greater
influence in Cairo. The British consul took it.
In point of fact, the French agents in Egypt had been working towards the very
same ends at the time, and if anything, this sparked a hidden competition between
the two empires. Since the early 1820s, thanks to the energetic policies of the
French consul Drovetti, France had followed an active policy of strengthening of
Egypt ‘within well-defined limits’. Drovetti had envisaged that close connections
between France and Egypt could allow France to use the Egyptian navy ‘in the
future to balance more nearly her naval inferiority to Great Britain in the
⁶⁷ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 417–27.
⁶⁸ Barker to Joseph Planta, 25 Nov. 1826, in John Barker, Syria and Egypt Under the Last Five Sultans
of Turkey, vol. 2 (London: Samuel Tinsley, 1876), 46–8; also in Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, xix.
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Near East’.⁶⁹ Moreover, the commercial relations between the two countries, the
volume of which had grown from 2 million francs in 1816 to 12 million in 1827,
had inspired French agents to look for options for the ‘expansion of the French
influence in Egypt’ again.⁷⁰
France accordingly provided assistance in educational, health, agricultural, and
industrial reform in Egypt. Egyptian students were dispatched to Paris, silk factories
were opened by mostly French entrepreneurs. French officers were sent to Cairo for
the formation, organization, and instruction of the pașa’s officer corps.⁷¹ In 1823
and 1824 a group of French middle-rank officers and two generals, Pierre François-
Xavier Boyer (1772–1851) and Pierre Gaston Henri de Livron (1770–1831), were
placed in Mehmed Ali’s service for this reason.⁷² The pașa received rifles and other
ammunition from France, as well as financial support.⁷³
Mehmed Ali knew that a military force on which he could always rely was the
only way to keep the Egyptian fellahin in submission and realize his ambitions in
the future. The French officers led the pașa’s new projects with their expert
knowledge of the art and mechanics of war.⁷⁴ In 1825, Jules Planat opened a
staff college, which was followed by the establishment of a cavalry school by Noel
Varin. To accompany the cavalry education, a veterinary school and hospital were
also established at Rosetta under Pierre Harmont.⁷⁵
French influence was so paramount in the mid-1820s that, in his private
conversations with General Boyer, Mehmed Ali could express to him his future
plans of independence in the hope of obtaining French support. In 1826, he
presciently indicated that Tsar Nicholas I would declare war on the Porte, after
which the pașa himself would move into Syria and occupy Damascus and Acre,
and not stop until he had reached the Tigris and Euphrates.⁷⁶ Then he unam-
biguously professed that he wanted to found his own empire because he con-
sidered the Ottoman Empire a ‘phantom’. He had sent his agents ‘everywhere to
prepare the way for his new démarche’.⁷⁷
⁶⁹ Puryear, France and the Levant, 42.
⁷⁰ Damas to M. le Barre, 9 Oct. 1824, AMAE Papiers Desages 60PAAP/3/161; La Ferroyans to
Mimaut, 28 Feb. 1828, AMAE Alexandrie 23; cf. Puryear, France and the Levant, 53.
⁷¹ Drovetti to Pierre Balthalon, 16 Apr. and 16 June 1822, 4 Apr. 1823, in Lettres de Bernardino
Drovetti, consul de France à Alexandrie (1803–1830), prepared by Sylvie Guichard (Paris: Maisonneuve
& Larose, 2003), 406, 413, 442; Georges Douin, Une mission militaire française auprès de Mohamed Aly.
Correspondance des Généraux Belliard et Boyer (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire,
1923), xx–xxi; Fahmy, ‘The Era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha’, 154; Puryear, France and the Levant, 43. For
one of the best accounts of reform inMehmed Ali’s Egypt in the 1820s, see Ridley,Drovetti, 208–47.
⁷² Boyer to Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 1 Nov. 1824, AM Papiers Boyer Pierre François Xavier,
GDI 7 YD 630; Douin, Une mission, xxi; Puryear, France and the Levant, 43; Ridley, Drovetti, 236–7.
⁷³ ‘Mémoire sur l’état de l’Egypte sous la domination de Mohammed Ali’, Oct. 1824, AMAE Papiers
Desages, 60PAAP/4.
⁷⁴ Jules Planat, Histoire de la régénération de l’Égypte (Paris: J. Barbezat, 1830), 25.
⁷⁵ For details, see Pierre Harmont, L’Égypte sous Méhémet-Ali (Paris: Leautey & Lecointe, 1845), 27;
Fahmy, ‘The Era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha’, 160.
⁷⁶ Douin, Une mission, 79–80; also in Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 38.
⁷⁷ Puryear, France and the Levant, 47–8.
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The French response to the pașa was ambivalent. General Auguste Daniel
Belliard (1769–1832), a member of the Chamber of Peers who had served in
Egypt during the 1798–1801 expedition and had suggested the dispatch of Boyer
in the first place, asked the latter to treat this ‘question of highest interest . . .
verbally and with the greatest circumspection’.⁷⁸ The available archival sources
suggest that the French government declined to take part in Mehmed Ali’s project
at an official level, while leaving the officers on the ground free in their conduct.
Drovetti was strictly instructed to pay extreme attention to avoiding rumours that
the officers were sent to aid the pașa’s declaration of independence from the
Porte.⁷⁹
This and what followed reveal that French involvement in Mehmed Ali’s plans
was minimal in the beginning. We can deduct this also from the fact that, in the
second half of 1826, the pașa’s relations with the French officers in Egypt were
seriously tarnished due to quarrels among the French officers caught by personal
animosities. While France was engaged in talks for a potential Great Power
intervention in Greece, Boyer’s opponents such as General Gaudin started
rumours of a potential French invasion of Egypt orchestrated by General Boyer,
a self-described philhellene. As soon as these rumours reached Mehmed Ali, the
pașa decided to sack the French officers, and even requested new ones from
Britain. Boyer consequently left Egypt in September 1826.⁸⁰
The pașa then looked to obtain the support of Britain in the realization of his
goals, as had been the case in the early 1810s. He believed that the British succour
would thwart a major threat to his planned expansion toward the Persian Gulf. It
would secure protection for Egypt when he defected from the Ottoman Empire.
But the Navarino incident in October 1827 pushed the pașa’s back against the
wall, because, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the very Powers that he looked to
collaborate with against the sultan annihilated his navy in Greece.
The news was shocking to Mehmed Ali. And this was not simply because of his
material loss or because the Powers had destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian navies
without declaring war on the sultan. Despite his calls to proceed with a ‘lighter’
diplomacy against the Triple Alliance, Mahmud II had remained stubborn against
the Powers’ demands, and even after Navarino, the sultan ordered Ibrahim Pașa
not to abandon his mission.⁸¹ What had transpired since 1826—the Triple
Alliance’s involvement in the Greek crisis, and their demands for autonomy for
Greece in the interests of ‘commercial security’ and with ‘humanitarian senti-
ments’—were all unprecedented and puzzling to Mehmed Ali. The pașa also
realized that a new international order was unfolding. He concluded that there
⁷⁸ Ibid. 44. ⁷⁹ MAE to Drovetti, 8 Nov. 1825, in Douin, Une mission, 6.
⁸⁰ Ridley, Drovetti, 241–2.
⁸¹ DWQ Bahr Barra 12/18, 10 Nov. 1827; cf. Fahmy, ‘The Era of Mohammad ‘Ali Pasha’, 159.
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was no good reason—and would be no beneficial result—for him to confront the
Powers.
Unlike the sultan, he signed a convention with the Triple Alliance (9 August
1828) without the approval of the Porte, and ensured the secure withdrawal of his
son.⁸² To him, this was the end of the ‘Greek crisis’. He did not evacuate Crete,
keeping control until 1841. He asked the sultan to grant him Syria as a reward for
his success and also indemnity for his loss. But Mahmud II rebuffed his request.
Hence came the moment of truth and the point of no return for the pașa.
Appalled by the sultan’s response, Mehmed Ali considered his experience in
Greece, Mahmud II’s refusal to leave Syria to his control, and the rise of Hüsrev
in Istanbul as valid excuses for expanding his power base and dominions within
the Ottoman Empire in the following years. From the end of the 1820s on, he
looked to seize every opportunity for expansion and independence that presented
itself.
‘The Civil War of Islamism’
For Mehmed Ali, an opportunity for expansion towards the sultan’s north African
suzerainties—Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers—manifested itself unexpectedly, when
the French approached him in 1829–30 with a plan that he was more than ready to
agree upon. Since 1827, King Charles X’s navy had been blockading Algiers. The
dey Hüseyin (1765–1838) and the French consul Pierre Derval (1758–1830) had
come to loggerheads over the arrears in repayment of the loans contracted by French
merchants (Bacri and Busnach) and the alleged piratical acts of the Barbary corsairs
and privateering against the European maritime Powers. In a heated moment, when
the dey infamously hit Derval with his flywhisk, the differences had turned into a
diplomatic crisis and engendered the naval mission.⁸³
Even though, the French prime minister and foreign minister Jules de Polignac
had toyed with grandiose designs for the total dismemberment of the sultan’s
empire and redrawing the map of Europe during the Russo-Ottoman war of
1828–9, after the war, he reviewed his designs and set to pursue a more forceful
diplomacy in Algiers.⁸⁴ At about the same moment, the consul of France in Cairo,
Bernardino Drovetti, proposed to him an occupation project, which Polignac
immediately upheld.
⁸² Mehmed Ali to Sheikh Efendi, 11 Dec. 1827, DWQ Dafatir Mu’ayya Turki 31/61; Petrunina,
Social’no, 268–9.
⁸³ Georges Douin, Mohamed Aly et l’expédition d’Alger (1829–1830) (Cairo: Société royale de
géographie d’Égypte, 1930), i–ii. For an insightful and nuanced account, see de Lange, ‘Menacing
Tides’, ch. 4.
⁸⁴ See Ch. 4.
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The so-called Drovetti plan pertained to the conquest of Algiers (as well as
Tripoli and Tunis), not by King Charles X, but by the French-backed armies of
Mehmed Ali. Just like Talleyrand and Bonaparte in 1798, Drovetti saw in his plan
several rewards for France. Aside from regaining the prestige of the monarchy, it
would help repair Franco-Egyptian relations, which had been deeply tainted after
the Boyer–Gaudin dispute (1826) and the Navarino incident (1827). It could put a
conclusive end to the alleged piratical acts of the Barbary corsairs and win back
prominence and influence for France both in Europe, for thwarting the common
piracy threat, and in the Mediterranean, by means of reforging an alliance with the
most powerful actor on southern shores. France would gain strategically crucial
outposts.⁸⁵ The plan would also avoid antagonizing the local Muslims, as the
occupation would be directed by a subject of the sultan, his co-religionist, the pașa
of Egypt. It would justify the act before the eyes of both the Sublime Porte and the
Concert of Europe by purportedly preserving Ottoman territorial integrity.
Finally, it would be less expensive for France and provoke less jealousy on the
part of Britain, the other major European Power in the Mediterranean.
Drovetti persuaded Mehmed Ali without much effort. The latter even signed a
bill with France.⁸⁶ But then, in the spirit of collective action and multilateralism in
the European inter-imperial diplomacy of the time, Polignac presented the plan to
the other European Powers whose commerce was hampered by piracy in the
Mediterranean. While he received the endorsement of Russia and Prussia, Austria
and Britain remained hesitant, arguing that the plan lacked legitimacy.⁸⁷
Even though the sultan’s rule over the Barbary states was merely nominal, they
were still under his jurisdiction. This was why the French had to obtain his
consent before launching their campaign. Drovetti believed that the plan could
be touted to the Porte by either carrots or sticks, i.e. by means offering the Porte
‘an annual tribute of four million francs, [which would] duplicat[e] the amount
paid by Egypt’, or, in case of the Porte’s censure, by threatening the Ottoman
cabinet that, otherwise, ‘France would [still] conquer Algeria and Egypt would
take Syria’.⁸⁸ In the end, Drovetti gauged, Istanbul could be made to believe that it
would attain more benefits from the proposed campaign than from the status quo.
As had been the case with Talleyrand and Bonaparte in 1798, Drovetti and
Polignac made exactly the same hefty miscalculation by considering or framing
their plan as a favour to the sultan. When the French ambassador to Istanbul,
⁸⁵ ‘Aperçu de la situation politique de l’Égypte en 1828 et 1829 par Mr de Coehorn, attaché aux
Ministaire des affaires étrangères’, [n.d.], CADLC, 17MD/19, fp. 107–120; cf. de Lange, ‘Menacing
Tides’, 224.
⁸⁶ See also Ercüment Kuran, Cezayir’in Fransızlar Tarafından İşgali Karşısında Osmanlı Siyaseti
(1827–1847) (Istanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1957), 21; Jean Serres, La Politique turque en Afrique du Nord
sous la Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Geuthner, 1925), 82–3.
⁸⁷ Kuran, Cezayir, 21–3; Mimaut to Prince de Polignac, 26 June 1830, AMAE CP Égypte II, f. 46–51;
cf. Gaultier-Kurhan, Méhémet Ali, 150.
⁸⁸ Puryear, France and the Levant, 112–13, 115.
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Armand Charles Guilleminot (1774–1840), officially informed the Ottoman
Reisülküttâb Pertev Efendi of his government’s proposal on 1 December 1829,
he was met with a categorical rejection.⁸⁹ Under the counsels of Serasker Hüsrev
Pașa, the Porte had previously decided upon not directly interfering in the
differences between the dey and the French agents.⁹⁰ But, in their view, the
French plan was ludicrous. It had crossed the line, especially for the sultan and
Hüsrev, to whom approving the expansion of Mehmed Ali in the Maghreb was
nothing short of impossible.
The sultan’s hümâyuns and the Porte’s dispatches to the pașa of Egypt in the
following days reveal the reasoning of Ottoman officialdom. In the eyes of the
Ottoman agents, Franco-Algerian animosity had grown out of ‘trivial issues’. Even
though Garp Ocakları (the western hearths), as the Maghreb provinces were called
in Ottoman parlance, were semi-autonomous entities that had been running their
own foreign diplomacy with other states for decades, Algiers was still under the
jurisdiction of the sultan; and, even though France and the Porte were friendly
powers, French aggression in Ottoman territories could not be ignored.⁹¹
Hüsrev found the plan unrealistic: in his view, the dispatch of 40,000 Egyptian
troops all the way to Algiers in summer was impossible to realize.⁹² He instead
suggested dispatching an Ottoman official (the sultan nominated Çengeloğlu
Tahir Pașa, a sailor of Algerian origin) for the friendly mediation of the problems
between France and the dey. But when Tahir was duly dispatched, he was
prevented from entering Algiers by the admirals of the French fleet who had
blockaded the town.
After failing to obtain the consent of the Porte, Polignac turned to his European
audience. Adhering to the transimperial security culture of the time, he made a
last-ditch effort to convene a multilateral conference for intervention in Algiers to
obtain the sanction of the Concert of Europe. As had happened during the Greek
crisis, a joint, majority decision within the Concert could help overcome the
opposition of the Porte. Russia and Prussia once again supported him. But the
French minister was met by the demands of Lord Aberdeen for a written assur-
ance that Charles X’s armies would evacuate Algiers immediately after the defini-
tive destruction of piracy and the absolute abolition of Christian slavery.⁹³
Polignac did not capitulate to these demands.⁹⁴ He had already obtained the
support of the majority within the Concert. Moreover, he was still counting on
Mehmed Ali. For this reason, he made the pașa another offer, according to which
the latter would occupy Tripoli and Tunis, while the French army would invade
Algiers. But he refrained from promising Mehmed Ali protection from any
⁸⁹ BOA i.DUIT 139/3, 23 Feb. 1830. See also Kuran, Cezayir, 18–19. ⁹⁰ Ibid. 16.
⁹¹ BOA A.VKN 1/9, 21 June 1830; BOA i.DUIT 138/76 28 June 1829. ⁹² BOA A.VKN 1/9.
⁹³ For selected British and French correspondence on the subject, see Testa, Recueil, vol. 1, 445–67.
⁹⁴ Edgard Le Marchand, L’Europe et La Conquête d’Alger (Paris: Perrin, 1913), 184.
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potential British assault during the course of the campaign. The pașa then refused
this second offer, unwilling to throw the caution to the wind. In the end, having
Russo-Prussian support behind her, and, despite British and Ottoman protests,
France invaded Algiers by herself in June 1830.
Since the Congress of Vienna of 1814–5, this was the second major Great Power
intervention in the dominions of Sultan Mahmud II allegedly undertaken in his
favour. It soon turned into a lasting occupation. The diplomatic efforts of the
Porte’s agents in the following months did not suffice to drive the French out of
Algiers. Especially after the fall of King Charles X and the establishment of the July
Monarchy in Paris, and when liberals entered office in London, the cordial
relations between the two European courts undermined the Porte’s hand, and
exposed its diplomatic (as well as military and naval) weakness.
Austria and Britain did not consider the French invasion of Algiers as a
pressing enough reason to risk a war between the Great Powers.⁹⁵ Even after the
Porte declared its commitment to eliminating the piracy of the Barbary corsairs
and facilitating European commerce in the Mediterranean in return for the
restitution of Algiers under its authority (13 May 1831), the Franco-Ottoman
negotiations bore no results.⁹⁶ Instead, as we will see, they provided France with
an edge in the talks over the ‘Eastern’ crisis that would soon break.
The Drovetti plan never materialized, but Mehmed Ali’s commitment to it
disclosed both to Istanbul and the Powers that he was ready to cut ties with the
Porte already in 1829–30. As France invaded Algiers, the pașa prepared to launch
his campaign on Syria. He knew now that he had to pursue a far-sighted diplomacy,
attract at least one of the Powers to his side, and avoid any infamy if he ever wanted
to realize his dream of expansion and independence. As for Sultan Mahmud II and
Hüsrev, the Drovetti plan, especially Mehmed Ali’s involvement in the French
designs without their sanction, proved a source of immense vexation.⁹⁷
*
Mehmed Ali’s desire to expand, and his eager involvement in the Drovetti plan,
did not originate purely from personal ambition. Although he had placed Egypt,
Crete, Hejaz, most of Yemen, Eastern Arabia, and part of the Sudan under his rule
by 1830, his authority had been under strain. His experiment with building a new
empire through the monopoly system, heavy taxation, and corvée labour had
foisted huge burdens onto the shoulders of the underprivileged classes, namely,
the producers and the fellahin.
Toward the end of the 1820s, the limitations imposed by this militarist rule on
the impoverished agricultural producers—such as keeping them from selling their
goods in local markets or from exchanging them for staples—and the increase in
⁹⁵ Šedivý, Metternich, 426–7. ⁹⁶ Kuran, Cezayir, 33.
⁹⁷ See BOA i.DUIT 138/76; 138/76; 139/1–11; BOA TS.MA.e 730/9; BOA HAT 1322/51647A.
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the number of agricultural workers made them prey to grave economic miseries
and gave rise to conditions of rural disorder. Poverty and discontent became
dangerously widespread and—especially in times of poor harvests—family flights,
small-scale revolts and rebellions (whereby the pașa’s silos were burnt), and
brigandage and piracy over the Nile were sporadically witnessed.⁹⁸
To address these problems, Mehmed Ali had established asylums for the poor,
village jails, and state-sponsored mosques. But these were not enough. He believed
that a more efficient way of relieving the mounting tensions was to acquire
adjacent territories with rich resources that would buttress production and pre-
serve foodstuff in the countryside, instead of selling these goods in foreign
markets.⁹⁹When the French approached him in 1829, he had immediately turned
his eyes to North Africa for this reason. But when that scheme failed, he returned
to his original plan.
Bilâd al-Sham, or Syria, was always situated at the apex of his territorial
ambitions.¹⁰⁰ The pașa believed that the natural borders of Egypt were not in
Suez but in the Taurus mountains, which sharply divided Asia Minor from the
shores of the eastern Mediterranean. Syria, as a buffer between Istanbul and Cairo,
was crucial for the security of Egypt and consequently for Mehmed Ali’s reign.¹⁰¹
The pașa held that the invasion could offer a respite from domestic problems
through Syria’s rich resources in grain, wood, coal, iron ore, horses, silk, labour,
and more luxurious manufactured goods such as woollen and silk clothes.¹⁰² By
controlling Syria, he would be able to patrol the major commercial routes of the
Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, which were often subject to Bedouin
attacks. The catastrophic Greek campaign persuaded him that it was his right to
control Syria. In the end, the sultan had pledged this to him in return for his
services in the Morea.
Circumstances for making a move on Syria came together in Mehmed Ali’s
favour in 1831 perhaps more conveniently than he could have possibly imagined.
The Powers were embroiled in problems both domestic (revolution) and diplo-
matic (in Portugal, Belgium, etc.). The Porte was busy quelling the ‘disturbances’
in Bosnia. And a domestic dispute arose between him and Abdullah, the pașa of
Sidon (Acre), which Mehmed Ali used as a ruse to start his campaign.¹⁰³
When 6,000 Egyptian peasants fled to Syria to escape taxes and corvée labour
under Mehmed Ali’s rule, Abdullah had refused to send them back on the grounds
that they were free to move between two provinces of the empire. According to
⁹⁸ Boyer (Cairo) to Belliard, 10 May 1826, in Georges Douin, Une mission militaire française auprès
de Mohamed Aly. Correspondance des Généraux Belliard et Boyer (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie
orientale du Caire, 1923), 119; Lawson, Egyptian Expansionism, 119–23.
⁹⁹ Ibid. 123. ¹⁰⁰ Puryear, France and the Levant, 147; Altundağ, Kavalalı, 36.
¹⁰¹ Lawson, Egyptian Expansionism, 1.
¹⁰² Ibid. 138–40; Altundağ, Kavalalı, 36–7; Fahmy, ‘The Era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha’, 166.
¹⁰³ BOA HAT 357/19977 D, 24 Dec. 1831.
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Mehmed Ali, the pașa of Sidon also had unpaid dues to Cairo, and was suspending
the sale of silkworm eggs to Egypt in 1831 even though this was important for
Mehmed Ali’s silk production plans.¹⁰⁴ He found in—and wrought from—these
unresolved issues ample reasons to direct his forces onto Acre.
The Porte was aware of Mehmed Ali’s plans over Syria. But even then, it
regarded the dispute only as a temporary regional problem at first. It therefore
sent an agent, Mustafa Nazif Efendi, to Cairo to persuade Mehmed Ali to end his
hostility toward Abdullah Pașa. It pledged to Mehmed Ali that Abdullah would no
longer disturb his stronghold in Egypt and also warned that a potential conflict in
the region would upset the pilgrimage routes.¹⁰⁵
Moreover, to contain the pașa’s aggression, Mahmud II addressed a signed letter
to him. In vaguely lenient but foreboding words, the sultan told Mehmed Ali:
There is no need to express the marvelling [feelings] [I have harboured] for you
[for a long time], and your past services have not been forgotten . . . Perhaps it
cannot be denied that at this moment there are several things that have been
forgiven or turned a blind eye to by my [Sublime Empire], [and] if one is fair, one
has to be thankful [for this] . . . [O]bserving odd conduct on your part baffles me.
The sultan then asked Mehmed Ali to listen to his message with ‘[an] open heart
and justice’. As long as the pașa remained loyal to him, ‘there is no possibility that
I will regard you with [doubtful eyes]. Now you know what you need [to do] . . . ’¹⁰⁶
Despite all these attempts at pacification, Mehmed Ali continued preparations
for the démarche, replying to Mahmud II that he was doing homage to the empire
by confronting Abdullah. The pașa gave assurances also to the agents of Britain
and France, asserting that he had liberal ideas and that the Great Powers would
find in his plan ‘a happy application of the principle of non-intervention’.¹⁰⁷ He
argued that his control over Syria would ensure the security of the Persian Gulf,
and therefore the interests of Britain. He also guaranteed the status of Christians
and foreign nationals, justifying his plan as a move that would reinforce the hand
of the sultan against Russia (with whom the sultan had fought as recently as
1828–9) with a strong army of 120,000 men in his service.¹⁰⁸
*
The Egyptian army had already been mobilized for months due to the previously
concocted Algiers campaign. It began its march to the north on 2 November
1831, under the command of Mehmed Ali’s son Ibrahim Pașa and his French
¹⁰⁴ Altundağ, Kavalalı, 37; Pierre Crabitès, Ibrahim of Egypt (London: George Routledge & Son,
1935), 136.
¹⁰⁵ Altundağ, Kavalalı, 57. ¹⁰⁶ BOA TS.MA.E 861/15/1.
¹⁰⁷ Mimaut to Sebastiani, 19 May 1831, AMAE Egypte 2; cf. Puryear, France and the Levant, 150–51.
¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
  151
aides-de-camp.¹⁰⁹ Days later Jaffa was captured.¹¹⁰ The next month Ibrahim
besieged Sidon (Acre) but was confronted with stiff resistance.¹¹¹ The siege lasted
six months. Only on 27 May 1832, when Abdullah had only 400 (out of 6,000)
soldiers left, did Ibrahim manage to seize the castle that Bonaparte had failed to
occupy in 1799. Abdullah was captured and sent to Egypt.
The Egyptian armies then went on to control other Syrian towns, which required
much less effort—indeed, in some cases, almost none at all.¹¹² This was thanks to
the fact that Mehmed Ali had sent his agents before the campaign to propagate the
notion that the objective of his occupation was to free them from the economic
difficulties that had reigned in the country and from the suppression of Abdullah.¹¹³
Ibrahim immediately enforced Egyptian rule in the controlled territories by intro-
ducing (as had been promised to the agents of the Powers) further rights to non-
Muslims and exempting the pilgrims to Jerusalem from taxes, with the aim of
gaining the sympathy of both locals and international actors.¹¹⁴ Mehmed Ali,
Ibrahim, and the French officers under their command styled their campaign as
one of ‘liberating’ the Syrians from Abdullah, and they were indeed celebrated by a
majority of the Syrians as ‘saviours’ in several of the places that they captured.
But after a series of meetings in Istanbul held with the sultan and his council at
Hüsrev’s house in Emirgan, Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim were declared asi (rebels)
and hain (traitors) by an imperial fatwa, and their official positions as the
governors of Egypt, Jeddah, and Crete were indefinitely deferred on 3 March
1832.¹¹⁵ Mahmud II dithered as to what other action to take against the pașa. It
was Hüsrev’s decisiveness that dictated the Porte’s next moves.
As we have seen, since his departure from Alexandria in 1804, Hüsrev had
harboured antipathy towards Mehmed Ali. In 1824, the pașa of Egypt had tried to
depose him from his post as grand admiral. In 1826, Mehmed Ali had humiliated
him before his men. And in 1827, he was sacked from his post as grand admiral
following the Albanian pașa’s demands. Having worked on the renovation of the
Ottoman imperial army over the past years, Hüsrev felt that this could be the time
for him to twist Mehmed Ali’s arm and, with a military stroke, eliminate his old
enemy from imperial politics for good. This was why Hüsrev would clamour for
war during the council meetings in Istanbul.¹¹⁶
¹⁰⁹ Altundağ, Kavalalı, 37–8, 53; Fahmy. ‘The Era of Muhammad ‘Ali’, 166; Raif and Ahmed, Mısır
Mes’elesi, 11–12.
¹¹⁰ ‘Narrative of the Events of the Turco-Egyptian War in the years 1831, 1832 and 1833’, 4 Mar.
1834, TNA FO 78/472/1.
¹¹¹ Dukakinzâde Feridun, ‘Türk Ordusunun Eski Seferlerinden Nezip 1831–1840 Seferleri’, Askeri
Mecmua 83 (1931): 1–50, at 14.
¹¹² BOA HAT. 356/19977-D, 24 Dec. 1831.
¹¹³ Abū ‘Izz al-Dīn, Ibrāhīm Bāsha, 116, 57–8; Altundağ, Kavalalı, 38.
¹¹⁴ Kutluoğlu, The Egyptian Question, 71.
¹¹⁵ Raif and Ahmed, Mısır Mes’elesi, 12; BOA HAT, 356/19977-D, 24 Dec. 1831.
¹¹⁶ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 333, 341.
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This was also why, when Mehmed Ali sent to Istanbul proposals for an
accommodation with the sultan for his restitution to Egypt as well as for obtaining
the rule of the provinces of Tripoli, Sidon and Damascus, he was denied. Imperial
armies commenced their preparations and the Şeyhülislam issued a fatwa endors-
ing war against Mehmed Ali Pașa and his son Ibrahim.¹¹⁷ This act was intended to
win over Muslim public opinion in Syria, as well as elsewhere in the empire, and to
rally support for the cause of the sultan.
Mehmed Ali retaliated by way of obtaining a declaration from the local clergy
in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina announcing their support for the pașa’s
campaign. Egyptian agents had been sent all around the Arabic and Turkish-
speaking domains of the empire, circulating vitriolic accusations that the sultan
and his men had submitted to the mercy of the Russians in 1829, and that
Mehmed Ali was the voice and representative of true Muslims. Moreover,
Ibrahim declared the re-establishment of the Janissary hearths in Syria against
the sultan. Before their armies clashed on the battlefield, a propaganda war had
begun. Contemporary French commentators such as MM. De Cadalvène et
E. Barrault consequently described the contest as the ‘civil war of Islamism’.¹¹⁸
In the interim, the Ottoman imperial fleet was sent out to observe Egyptian
movements, while Mehmed Pașa, the governor of Aleppo, and Aga Hüseyin Pașa,
the governor of Adrianople, were dispatched to Syria to halt the Egyptian army.¹¹⁹
But Ibrahim routed the troops of the sultan in Homs and Aleppo on 8 and 29 July
1832 respectively.¹²⁰
Having thus conquered Syria and shown his military superiority over the
Ottoman imperial armies, Mehmed Ali sent another peace proposal to the Porte
in August.¹²¹ But it was again turned down, with a declaration that a compact
could not subsist between a rebel and his legitimate sovereign.¹²² The pașa then
announced that there was nothing left for him but to advance to Istanbul.¹²³ In a
short time, Ibrahim captured Antakya, Adana, and Tarsus, and defeated Ottoman
forces at the gateway of Belen.¹²⁴ He thus crossed the Taurus mountains and
¹¹⁷ BOA C.AS. 56/2610, 944/40987; BOA HAT 360/20081.
¹¹⁸ MM. De Cadalvène et E. Barrault,Histoire de la guerre de Mehemed-Ali contre la Porte Ottomane
en Syrie et en Asie Mineure (1831–1833). Ouvrage enrichi de cartes, de plans et de documents officiels
(Paris: Arthur Bertrand, 1837), 1–2.
¹¹⁹ BOA C.AS 393/16233; BOA AE.SMHD.II 16 May 1832.
¹²⁰ BOA C.AS 56/2610; BOA C.AS 944/40987; BOA C.DH 1/3, n.d.; BOA HAT 355/19957, n.d.;
Altundağ, Kavalalı, 61, 62.
¹²¹ Réné Cattaui, Le Règne de Mohamed Ali d’après les archives russes en Égypte (Cairo: Imprimerie.
de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire, pour la Société royale de géographie d’Égypte,
1931), 553.
¹²² Dispatch from Barker, 13 Oct. 1832, TNA FO 78/472, f. 7.
¹²³ Dispatch from Barker, 20 Sept. 1832, TNA FO 78/472, f. 7.
¹²⁴ BOA HAT 362/20117C; HAT 362/20117D; BOA HH. 19812; cf. Salih Kış, ‘KavalalıMehmet Ali
Paşa’nın Anadolu Harekâtı ve Konya Muharebesi’, Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 23
(2010): 145–158, at 148.
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arrived in Konya, in the heart of Anatolia, on 27 November.¹²⁵ There, on 21
December, his army of about 30,000 men and 36 artilleries was to confront the
Ottoman imperial army of 65,000 men. The latter was under the command of
Grand Vizier Reșid Mehmed Pașa (1780–1836), one of Hüsrev’s sons.
*
Reșid Mehmed had suppressed a major ‘uprising’ under the leadership of Mustafa
Pașa Busatli (backed by Mehmed Ali) in Bosnia as recently as the end of 1831.¹²⁶
En route to Istanbul, he wrote a soothing letter to the sultan in which he argued
that the Ottoman navy was capable of overpowering that of Egypt but nonetheless,
through an alliance with Britain, whose fleet could cut the supply lines of Ibrahim,
security in the seas could be improved. Furthermore, with the participation of the
Map 3. Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor
¹²⁵ BOA HAT 347/19733.
¹²⁶ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 1, 11, 123. For a detailed analysis of the uprising, see Fatma Sel
Turhan, The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising: Janissaries, Modernisation and Rebellion in the
Nineteenth Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).
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Albanian and Bosnian contingents that he had secured, the army of Ibrahim Pașa
could well be dragged down.¹²⁷
This was why, in April 1832, Ottoman officialdom made an unprecedented
move, seeking an alliance with a foreign power against one of the sultan’s vassals.
The former British ambassador to Istanbul, Stratford Canning, had just returned
to Istanbul to conclude negotiations over issues concerning the new Greek
kingdom. During the talks, first Reis Efendi Akif Pașa and then the sultan himself
directly proposed an alliance between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, while
Serasker Hüsrev pleaded for assistance, ‘naval not military, since the army was
strong enough while the fleet was not to be trusted’.¹²⁸
Mahmud II and Hüsrev had chosen Britain because they were aware of France’s
special relations with Egypt and the Algiers crisis was still looming. They did not
trust Russia. They knew that Austria was logistically unable to offer such aid, and
Prussia was more or less completely indifferent to Eastern affairs. They found in
Britain an actor keen to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire
as well as one with the naval strength that they needed.
Without making any commitments, Canning promised to communicate the
proposal to London.¹²⁹ As the news of the defeat of the Ottoman armies of
Hüseyin and Mehmed broke in early August 1832, in order to hasten the process
of securing an alliance, the anxious sultan sent his agents Yanko Mavroyeni
and Namık Pașa to London.¹³⁰ But there was no time to wait for the British.
Mahmud II and Hüsrev therefore decided to become masters of their own destiny.
The serasker mustered an army in Karahisar, appointed the optimistic Grand
Vizier Reșid as the serdar-ı ekrem (commander-in-chief) of the imperial army,
and dispatched him to confront Ibrahim in Konya.¹³¹
Reșid Pașa’s army arrived on the plains of Akşehir, only eight hours away from
Konya, on 18 December 1832.¹³² The fighting began the next morning in bewil-
dering fog on a hilly battlefield. Due to the inclement weather, the visibility range
dropped at times to only about 50 metres. At night, it became almost impossible to
distinguish Reșid’s regiments from those of Ibrahim.
Since the Ottoman imperial army outnumbered their opponents, it was initially
able to push the Egyptians back and obtain a slight advantage on the flanks by the
time the fighting ended at midnight. There were around 700 casualties in total
¹²⁷ BOA TS.MA.E 457/13. ¹²⁸ Webster, Palmerston, 280.
¹²⁹ Canning to Palmerston, 9 Aug. 1832, TNA FO 78/211/285. See also Palmerston to Mandeville,
5 Dec. 1832, TNA FO 78/212; cf. Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 83.
¹³⁰ A. Nuri Sinapli, Mehmet Namık Pașa (Istanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1987), 24; cf. Kutluoğlu,
‘Egypt’, 85; Webster, Palmerston, 282.
¹³¹ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 2, 118; Mustafa Nuri Pașa, Netayicül Vukuat, vol. 4, 90; Kış,
‘Konya Muharebesi’, 151.
¹³² Ahmet Lûtfî Efendi, Vakanüvis Ahmet Lûtfî Efendi Tarihi, vols 4 and 5 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi
Yayınları, 1999), 736; BOA HAT 20376-B.
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(500 Ottomans and 200 Egyptians).¹³³ Both armies then pulled back, to continue
the battle the next day. But the course of the war changed before dawn broke.
The night of 21 December was one of panic and chaos on the Ottoman front.
The news was disquieting. As it happened, earlier in the evening, before the
fighting was over, Grand Vizier Reșid Mehmed Pașa had noticed that the left
wing of his army was losing ground. He had then ridden towards them to put his
men in order but, in the fog, he had mistaken an Egyptian cavalry unit for an
Ottoman corps and gone among them. He had then fallen into the hands of the
Bedouins.¹³⁴
When tongues began to wag later at night and the rumour spread, the Albanian
and Bosnian mercenaries that Reșid Mehmed had brought from the Balkans
immediately fled from the line of defence.¹³⁵ The attacks of the dispirited and
demoralized Ottoman army the next days only further scattered it. This was a total
victory for Ibrahim Pașa. He wrote to his father: ‘We can [now] advance as far as
[Istanbul] and depose the Sultan quickly and without difficulty.’¹³⁶ Indeed, the
road to the imperial capital was wide open to him, and the grand vizier was in his
hands.
The future of the empire was uncertain when Ibrahim Pașa began his march
toward Istanbul on 20 January 1833.¹³⁷ The sultan was all ears, waiting for news
from London. In fact, King William IV (1765-1837), Prime Minister Charles Grey
(1764–1845), Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston
(1784–1865), and Stratford Canning were all in favour of sending naval succour to
the Porte. Canning even insisted, with a memorandum dated 19 December, that
Britain should support the Porte, ‘either alone or in concert with any of her allies,
not leaving the sultan’s independence to chance’. He presciently warned that ‘to
leave the Turkish Empire to itself was to leave it to its enemies; the sultan faced the
alternative of abandoning his throne entirely or of turning Egypt, Syria and the
regions of the Persian frontier over to Mehme[d] Ali.’¹³⁸
But the Tories in general, and the duke of Wellington in particular, were of the
belief that even though preserving the Ottoman Empire was of immense signifi-
cance for European peace and security, it had to be ensured by a collective act of
European Powers. The Tories’ fierce opposition to the Grey cabinet with regards
to the crises in Portugal and Holland led the government to follow a policy of
delay with respect to the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁹ London was disinclined
¹³³ Kış, ‘Konya’, 152–3; Kutluoğlu, ‘Egypt’, 82.
¹³⁴ BOA HH 20076 A, 14 Jan. 1833; 19747, 18 Jan. 1833; cf. Kutluoğlu, ‘Egypt’, 81.
¹³⁵ BOA HH, no. 20036-E, 25 Dec. 1832; cf. Kış, ‘Konya’, 154.
¹³⁶ Ibrahim to Mehmed Ali, 28 Dec. 1832, DWQ Abdin; cf. Crabitès, Ibrahim, 160.
¹³⁷ BOA HAT 351/19824A.
¹³⁸ Webster, Palmerston, 282; S. Canning, ‘Memorandum on the Turco-Egyptian Question’, 19 Dec.
1832, TNA FO 78/211, f. 337.
¹³⁹ Webster, Palmerston, 282–3.
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to commit to a single-handed intervention in the Ottoman world, so as not to
upset the Concert of Europe or arouse the hostility of France.
The Powers were so preoccupied with domestic and more immediate diplo-
matic issues that the Concert appeared to be in no position to mobilize for a joint
action. When French observers called the Ottoman crisis ‘the civil war of
Islamism’, the term possibly also implied the European distance and indifference
to the fight between two Ottoman, Muslim centres of the empire, Cairo and
Istanbul, that, unlike Greece, did not require any such intervention since
European interests were not directly jeopardized. Not yet.
The British cabinet replied accordingly that, ‘embarking in naval operations in
the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland’ while ‘under the necessity of keeping
up another naval force on the coast of Portugal’ meant that the Ottoman request
for naval assistance could not be fulfilled by London at the time. The Grey cabinet
instead offered mediation with Mehmed Ali, made its final assessment on 27
January 1833, and officially communicated it to the Porte on 7 March.¹⁴⁰
Seven years later, Palmerston would express deep regret for this decision:
no British Cabinet at any period of the history of England ever made so great a
mistake in regard to foreign affairs as did the Cabinet of Lord Grey [ . . . ] Our
refusal at that time has been the cause of more danger to the peace of Europe, to
the balance of power and to the interest of England than perhaps any one
determination ever before produced.¹⁴¹
This was because the moment the news arrived from London, as Ibrahim’s armies
were approaching Istanbul, to the aid of the sultan and Hüsrev came the least
likely of all European Powers: Russia. The civil war in the Ottoman world
immediately gained a transimperial character, and prompted a Europe-wide crisis,
bringing the Powers to the brink of war more than once. In all this, as we will see,
Hüsrev Pașa, his animosity toward Mehmed Ali, and his fear of falling into the
hands of Ibrahim played a pivotal role.
¹⁴⁰ Kutluoğlu, ‘Egypt’, 86; Webster, Palmerston, 283. ¹⁴¹ Ibid. 284.
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The Russian Peace in the Levant
Britain’s decision not to supply naval support to the Sublime Porte against
Mehmed Ali in January 1833 created a golden opportunity for Russia. Since
1829, St Petersburg had set its Ottoman policy straight. As the 1828–9 Russo-
Ottoman war was nearing an end, Russian strategists saw greater benefit in placing
the sultan’s dominions under their orbit of influence than in dismembering his
empire in toto. To this end, an offer of alliance had been made to the Porte in June
1829 before the war officially ended, whereby Russian agents had argued that ‘for
the Sultan’s long-term security it was more beneficial to be in a firm and constant
alliance with Russia’.¹ But the Porte’s plenipotentiary, Serasker Hüsrev Pașa, had
rebuffed the offer at the time, considering Russia the cause of the catastrophes the
sultan had lately suffered from.²
Days before the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) was signed on 14 September,
Tsar Nicholas I assembled an extraordinary committee to decide upon the Russian
strategy. The members of the committee included Kochubei, one of the architects
of the ‘weak neighbour policy’, Count Nesselrode, and D. V. Dashkov, Russia’s
most prominent expert on ‘Turkey’.³ They agreed to continue the ‘Ottoman
project’ of the 1800s with the belief that the advantages of maintaining the sultan’s
dominions in Europe were greater than the inconveniences it presented.⁴ Their
underlying understanding was that a weak neighbour like the Ottoman Empire
would never pose an existential threat to Russia and, if Russia could not control
the Straits by annexing them, which could prompt a Great Power war, she could
ensure her security by ascertaining the closure of the Straits to foreign warships by
establishing dominant influence over the sultan.
The tsar signed the 1829 Treaty in part to lay the ground for such influence in
the near future.⁵ As the Russian historian Alexander Bitis writes, ‘through its
strategic annexations and extension of Russia’s commercial and political rights[,]
the treaty . . . served to weaken the Ottoman Empire while preserving its existence’
¹ Krasovskii to Diebitsch, 1 Aug. 1829, RGVIA, f. VUA, d. 4722, ll. 87–8; cf. Bitis, Russia, 350.
² Nesselrode to I. I. Dibichu, 6 Nov. 1829, VPR vol. 2/8, 397–8; General-Lieutant A. F. Orloff to
I. I. Dibichu, 2 Feb. 1830, VPR vol. 2/8, 451.
³ Bitis, Russia, 358.
⁴ Report of Dashkov, 4 Sept. 1829, VPR vol. 2/8 (1995), 292; ‘Protocol of the Extraordinary
Committee’, 4 Sept. 1829, VPR vol. 2/8, 278. Also in Bitis, Russia, 359–60; Robert J. Kerner, ‘Russia’s
New Policy in the Near East and After the Treaty of Adrianople’, Cambridge Historical Journal 5(3)
(1937): 280–90.
⁵ Nesselrode to Butenev, 12 Dec. 1830, VPR vol. 17, 175–88.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security, and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798–1864. Ozan Ozavci, Oxford University Press.
© Ozan Ozavci 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852964.003.0007
and making Ottoman authorities believe that it was a generous agreement, as
Nicholas I could have actually obtained more territories than he did.⁶ The same
policy guided the Russian strategists to endorse the French occupation of Algiers
in 1830 the following year.⁷ By the same token, when the British prime minister,
the duke of Wellington, made repeated offers ‘for a collective guarantee of the
Ottoman Empire’ during the ‘Greek negotiations’ in 1830–32, Russia, despite
being committed to her preservation, would not agree with the principle of
conserving her territorial integrity entirely.⁸
By 1832, it had become St Petersburg’s ultimate goal in the Levant to maintain
its privileged hold over the Porte rather than agreeing to the collective European
guarantees and to barter away those cherished bits of the ‘eastern’ empire, such as
the Straits and the Caucasus, that served its own interests. This posed a threat to
the solidity of the Concert of Europe and the continuation of peace in the
continent. But it did not lead to an immediate inter-imperial crisis, since
Russian diplomatic rhetoric continued to endorse concerted action while the
other Powers were preoccupied with the rising tide of revolutions at home or
more immediate diplomatic problems that manifested themselves in Belgium,
Portugal, and Algiers, among others.
Only in February 1833, as Ibrahim’s armies were marching on Istanbul, when
the Porte accepted the Russian offer of military aid and the first Russian squadrons
arrived in the Bosphorus, and especially when a defensive alliance treaty was
signed between Tsar Nicholas I and Sultan Mahmud II in July, did Russian
ambitions in the Levant prompt a major furore in Europe. Distress that the
European balance of power could be upset brought the Powers to the brink of
war in the summer of 1833 for the first time since the Napoleonic Wars. What
follows is a discussion of this new episode of the Eastern Question, when the war
between Cairo and Istanbul and the rivalry between Mehmed Ali and Hüsrev
turned into a transimperial quandary.
The Russian Intervention: ‘We Have Been Sick,
You the Medicines’
One month before the Ottoman imperial army was defeated by Ibrahim Pașa in
the plains of Konya in December 1832, Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode
announced that Russia would be willing to offer military aid to the Sublime Porte
if needed.⁹ Russian strategists were concerned that Mehmed Ali’s Islamist propa-
ganda campaign in Asia Minor could spark revolts in the Caucasian towns under
their control that were predominantly populated by Muslims ready to defy their
⁶ Bitis, Russia, 361. ⁷ See Ch. 5. ⁸ Bitis, Russia, 466.
⁹ Anderson, Eastern Question, 80–81; Bitis, Russia, 467–8.
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new, ‘infidel’ Russian overlords. They also looked to avert a potential Egyptian
campaign in the Caucasus. In the end, a weaker Ottoman Empire was preferable
for the security of Russia than a stronger and better organized empire under
Mehmed Ali as their southern neighbours.¹⁰
Accordingly, Tsar Nicholas I instructed his agents to inform the Ottoman
ministers that Russian naval and military assistance would be supplied only
upon the request of Sultan Mahmud II.¹¹ The Russian ambassador to Istanbul,
Apollinarii P. Butenev, made an official proposal on the day of the sultan’s defeat
at Konya (21 December 1832) while a mission was sent to Istanbul to explain the
importance the tsar attached to the crisis. Presided over by Lieutenant General
Nicolai N. Murav’ev-Karskii (1794–1866), a Russian commander and traveller,
who had participated in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828–9 and who became one
of the first chronologists of the crisis, the Russian agents re-articulated their plan:
Tsar Nicholas I would demand that Mehmed Ali return his army to Egypt
immediately, and send the message that in the case of refusal, the pașa would
find in Russia ‘an enemy of the revolt’ and she would launch military operations
against him.¹²
On the receiving end of this proposal were Serasker Hüsrev Pașa and
Reisülküttâb Akif Efendi (Hüsrev’s protégé). The two men had negotiated with
the Russians the peace settlement following the 1828–9 war, and had at the time
given the impression to Count Nesselrode that they were ‘the bitter enemies of
Russia’. Since then, Russian agents had been actively looking to break the anti-
Russian sentiment in Istanbul and make personal acquaintance with ‘the most
influential people’ around the sultan, ‘in particular, with Serasker Hüsrev [Pașa]’.¹³
Without overestimating the significance of the ‘confidential relations’ with key
Ottoman ministers, they strove ‘to . . . control and from time to time direct the
actions of [the Ottoman imperial council through them.]’¹⁴
In November 1832, Serasker Hüsrev Pașa was opposed to accepting the Russian
proposal. As an observer reported, at one imperial council meeting he had so
insistently pleaded with the sultan that he had thrown himself at the feet of
Mahmud II and, ‘in the name of the whole Divan [imperial council]’, striven to
show him the perils of welcoming to Istanbul their hereditary enemies.¹⁵ But,
according to Murav’ev, by 18 December 1832 the serasker had altered his position
¹⁰ Bitis, Russia, 468. ¹¹ Altundağ, Kavalalı, 96.
¹² ‘Mémorandum confidentiel’, 18 Dec. 1832, BOA HR.SYS 1847/1/1; Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya,
vol. 3, 390; Severnaya pchela, 23 Jan. 1833; cf. Petrunina, Social’no, 304; F. S. Rodkey, The Turco-
Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russia, 1832–41 (Urbana: University of
Illinois-Urbana, 1925), 15–16.
¹³ Nesselrode to I. I. Dibichu, 6 Nov. 1829, VPR vol. 2/8, 398.
¹⁴ K. V. Nesselrode to A. P. Butenev, 12 Dec. 1830, VPR vol. 17, 185–8.
¹⁵ George Douin, La Mission de Baron de Boislecomte. L’Égypte et la Syrie en 1833 (Cairo: Institut
français d’archéologie orientale du Caire, 1927), xvi; Pierre Crabitès, Ibrahim of Egypt (London: George
Routledge & Sons, 1935), 164.
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diametrically, and became eager to reach a settlement against his old rival
Mehmed Ali. ‘The [serasker] could not contain his happiness’ upon hearing the
tsar’s official offer of aid, the Russian lieutenant general reported. After the news
of defeat at Konya, Hüsrev became more trustful of the ‘honest intentions of
Russia’ and listened to Murav’ev’s plans with greater interest, even discussing the
number of artillery units needed.¹⁶ He wanted Murav’ev to explain the Russian
plans to the sultan as soon as possible.¹⁷ When the sultan dithered about Russian
aid, the serasker sought to allay his fears, secretly despising Mahmud II’s ‘timidness
and indecisiveness’. After the sultan decided first to wait for news from Britain in
early January, he asked Murav’ev not to ‘delay [his] trip to Alexandria’ and to pass
Mehmed Ali Russia’s message.¹⁸
Murav’ev’s mission to Egypt began and ended with hostile remarks and threats.
After his arrival on 13 January, the Russian lieutenant general made known to
Mehmed Ali that Russia would not permit the dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire, and demanded that the pașa of Egypt ‘cease the hostilities and recognise
the supreme power of the Sultan’. ‘Well,’ Mehmed Ali replied,
I will have one thousand very good troops to oppose the [Russians], the entire
Muslim population [in Asia Minor] will become my reserve; I have a fleet that is
not at all afraid of the Russians, and with the first news of the Russian involve-
ment a terrible uprising in Constantinople will destroy the Sultan and the
dynasty.
But when Murav’ev did not hold back, instead responding in kind, Mehmed Ali
dithered. At their second meeting on 16 January, the pașa promised that Ibrahim
would not march on Istanbul and would refrain from dismembering the sultan’s
empire.¹⁹
In the meantime, the sultan was trying obtain a settlement with Mehmed Ali,
and sent Halil Rifat Pașa (1795–1856), another protégé of Hüsrev, and the young
amedci (receiver) Mustafa Reșid Bey (1800–58) to Alexandria at the end of
January 1833. These intra-imperial endeavours and negotiations proved to be
no less hostile. The Ottoman delegation handed Mehmed Ali the sultan’s message
that ‘he had no grounds to complain about [his] lack of security’, that the pașa’s
provincial governorship of Egypt, Crete, and Jeddah as well as Sidon and Tripoli
would be reinstated, but that he would not be granted the whole of Syria nor the
timber rich regions on the outskirts of the Taurus mountains.²⁰ For all these
¹⁶ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 3, 49, 53, 56. ¹⁷ Ibid. 26 ¹⁸ Ibid. 26, 192.
¹⁹ BOA TS.MA.e 547/1; Petrunina, Social’no, 304–5; T. V. Eremeeva, ‘Zaklyuchitel’nyj etap egipets-
kogo krizisa 1831–1833 gg. i velikie derzhavy’, Uchenye zapiski po novoj i novejshej istorii 2 (1956): 515.
²⁰ Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 96–7.
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proposals to take effect, the pașa had to release Grand Vizier Reșid Mehmed Pașa
from captivity.²¹
Mehmed Ali listened to these demands with unease. Having emerged victorious
in three battles against Ottoman imperial armies, he believed that he was entitled
to more. He replied that, unless the Porte granted him the whole of Syria and
Adana as well as Mersin and the ports of Silifke and Alaiye, his men would march
first toward Bursa and then Istanbul, so that he could obtain his goals by force.²²
The sultan’s delegates were overwhelmed by this shocking answer, but could do
nothing except write back to Istanbul for further instructions. Halil Rifat was
asked to stay in Alexandria to continue the negotiations, while Mustafa Reșid was
called back to the imperial capital, where, as we will see in the following pages, he
would become a key figure in resolving the crisis.²³
In the meantime, Ibrahim’s army was still closing in on Istanbul.²⁴ On
2 February, he arrived in Kütahya, now only 200 miles away from the imperial
capital. ²⁵ He sent to his father asking permission to advance toward Istanbul to
acquire further concessions from the sultan:
as long as Sultan Mahmud, that evil genius, remains on the throne no permanent
peace or definite arrangement of our conflict is possible . . . It is imperative that
we return to our original intention and dethrone that pernicious man and replace
him with the Crown Prince . . . [W]e should act so promptly that Europe will be
unable to forestall our designs . . . ²⁶
But on 3 February Ibrahim received orders from his father to halt the army
wherever he stationed next.²⁷ Mehmed Ali kept his word to Murav’ev out of
fear of Russian intervention.
In Istanbul, unaware what the pașa’s next move might be, the sultan’s anxieties
had also grown and then turned into panic on 2 February—the very day the news
of Ibrahim’s arrival in Kütahya overlapped with the news from London that
Britain would not come to his aid. Mahmud II was on tenterhooks. Despite his
continual hesitation, he listened to Hüsrev’s advice, and then expeditiously asked
Reisülküttâb Akif Pașa to formally apply to Russia for eight warships and
30,000 men.²⁸ Russian Ambassador Butenev accepted the Ottoman request
instantly.²⁹
²¹ BOA HAT 369/20364-A; Barker to Mandeville, 17 Jan. 1833, TNA FO 78/221; Kutluoğlu,
Egyptian, 88.
²² Ali Fuad, ‘Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Pașa’, Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası 19(96) (1928): 85–7.
²³ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit Pașa, 52–3. ²⁴ Douin, Boislecomte, xxvii.
²⁵ BOA 351/19824 A; Fatih Gencer, ‘Hünkar İskelesi Antlaşması’nı Hazırlayan Koşullar’, Tarih
Okulu Dergisi 8(22) (2015): 135–60, at 140.
²⁶ Ibrahim to Mehmed Ali, 20 Jan. 1833; cf. Crabitès, Ibrahim, 152. ²⁷ BOA TS.MA.e 547/1
²⁸ Bitis, Russia, 470.
²⁹ Nicolai N. Murav’ev-Karskij, Russkie na Bosfore v 1833 godu (Moscow: 1869), 20.
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Hence the sultan agreed to the intervention of his age-old Romanov rival in his
fight against one of his vassals. This was a huge relief for Serasker Hüsrev Pașa. He
had now found the means to protect himself from the threat of Mehmed Ali. By
early February 1833, he started to convene hospitable and friendly dinners at his
mansion for the Russian mission, giving them valuable gifts to express his
gratitude to them.³⁰ He would even entertain the idea of commanding Russian
troops.³¹ He was actively involved with the decision of where to camp them,
which, Murav’ev writes, was mainly because ‘it would stroke his ego, not because
of lack of trust’.³² In the coffee-houses of Istanbul, informants were exchanging
‘gossip that Hüsrev Pașa . . . had proposed turning Istanbul over’ to Russia so that
he and others in the government would be able to ‘rest easy’.³³
*
The cause of Hüsrev’s relief swiftly became a source of international anxieties.
British and French statesmen were uncertain about the tsar’s real intentions. Was
he trying to capture Istanbul while pretending to aid the sultan, or was he only
looking to turn the Ottoman Empire into a Russian vassal? As soon as the news of
the Russo-Ottoman agreement broke in Paris, French officialdom looked to
capitalize their influence over Egypt, not Istanbul, due to the Franco-Ottoman
disputes over Algiers. The French chargé d’affaires in Istanbul, baron de Varennes,
sent to Ibrahim demanding he halt his march beyond Kütahya. But Ibrahim
refused, writing that he could act only according to the orders of his father.
France then made another move and appointed a new ambassador, Admiral
Albin-Rein Roussin (1781–1854), to Istanbul to mediate peace between Istanbul
and Cairo. At his arrival in the imperial capital (17 February), the admiral imme-
diately requested a meeting with Reis Efendi Akif, believing that he and Hüsrev
would be ready to solicit French help. The two Ottomanministers secretly conveyed
to Roussin that they would agree to renounce Russian assistance on condition that
the French agents could guarantee a peace with Mehmed Ali on the sultan’s terms.³⁴
But, the next morning, Roussin woke up to a dreadful sight. In the Bosphorus,
under his window at the Palais de France, were four vaisseaux de ligne and four
frigates. The first Russian squadron had already arrived. ‘Jamais,’ the French
ambassador wrote that evening, ‘jamais sensation plus pénible n’assaillit mon
cœur et mon esprit.’³⁵ He knew that he had to rally support among the represen-
tatives of the four Powers in Istanbul to find ways to expel the Russian warships.
However, as he wrote later, there was not much hope:
³⁰ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 3, 177; Campbell to Palmerston, 31 Mar. 1833, TNA FO 78/122.
³¹ Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 3, 181. Hüsrev to Murav’ev, 3 May 1833, in Appendix, Murav’ev-
Karskij, Turciya, vol. 3, 272.
³² Murav’ev-Karskij, Turciya, vol. 3, 184. ³³ BOA C.Dh. 12037; cf. Philliou, Biography, 107.
³⁴ Douin, Boislecomte, xxii; Crabitès, Ibrahim, 169. ³⁵ Douin, Boislecomte, xxiii.
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I cast my eyes around me. I saw in the envoy of Britain a feeling similar to stupor,
but nonetheless the will to associate himself with all that could prevent the
Russian intervention. In all the other legations, absolute reserve, and in some,
particularly the Austrian and Prussian, obvious malevolence towards us.³⁶
As I will explain below, ideological and strategic differences had by this point
divided the Powers into camps, making concerted action among them hardly
possible. Roussin then acted on his own, requesting Reis Efendi to contact the
Russian ambassador Butenev so that Russian naval and military assistance would
be withdrawn. Reis Efendi duly approached Butenev and received a tentatively
positive response from the Russian agent. At once, the French diplomat threat-
ened Mehmed Ali (22 February) that this situation gravely compromised the
general peace, Europe’s principal need, that Ibrahim must retire from Kütahya,
and that Mehmed Ali must accept the conditions of the sultan. Otherwise France
would withdraw all her officers in Egypt.³⁷ But Mehmed Ali rebuffed him, stating
that he ‘preferred a glorious death to ignominy’.³⁸
For his part, after finding out that Roussin was behind the Porte’s demand for the
withdrawal of Russian troops, Butenev, despite initial approval, changed the Russian
response to Reis Efendi, arguing that until Mehmed Ali retreated beyond the Taurus
mountains, the tsar’s squadrons would not leave Istanbul.³⁹ In order to allay Anglo-
French fears, the Russian agents communicated to ‘the principal courts of Europe’ an
explanation that they had adopted determinations in the interests of the sultan ‘at the
request of the Sublime Porte’, and then inserted in the newspapers of St Petersburg
an official article in which they gave ‘the Powers of Europe a pledge of the loyalty of
[the tsar’s] policy by frankly manifesting [their] resolution as a contribution to the
preservation of the Ottoman Empire’. The tsar reassured the other powers that
Russian troops would turn back as soon as the threat to the sultan disappeared.
This, the tsar considered, was a testimony of ‘his sincere solicitude’ and a response to
those who questioned ‘the disinterestedness of [the Russian] cabinet’.⁴⁰
*
All these developments only pushed the Porte further into the arms of Russia, and
filled Mehmed Ali’s sails with wind. The pașa of Egypt tried to influence the course
of inter-imperial diplomacy by manipulating the presence of the Russian squad-
rons in Istanbul to his advantage. He told the representatives of Britain and France
in Alexandria how he was aware—through his agents in the Ottoman imperial
council who daily reported him the developments from Istanbul—that Hüsrev
³⁶ Ibid. ³⁷ Ibid. xxiv–xxv; Crabitès, Ibrahim, 170. ³⁸ Ibid. 172.
³⁹ Matthew Rendall, ‘Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,
and the Vienna System, 1832–41’, International History Review 24(1) (Mar. 2002): 40.
⁴⁰ ‘Extrait d’une dépêche confidentielle de M. le comte Nesselrode à M. de Boutenieff en date du 21
février 1833’, BOA HR.SYS 1847/1/6.
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and his entourage had been bought off by the Russians. By inviting their fleet into
the Bosphorus, he claimed, Hüsrev, his ‘great enemy’, had ‘shamefully deceived
him’, and gained time through Halil Rifat, who was keeping him busy with a peace
proposal in Egypt.
Mehmed Ali suggested that London and Paris should support him against the
alliance between Hüsrev and the Russians, for in so doing they would be giving
‘the best support to the Ottoman Empire [against Russia] which no person could
be more anxious to uphold than himself ’. The pașa further stated that he had
never had the idea of throwing off the sultan, and independence had ‘never
entered into his mind’. His only aim was ‘to give the sultan support . . . to realize
the desire of the whole [Muslim community] who call on him to free the
government and the nation from the shameful servitude imposed on them by
their natural enemies, the Russians’.⁴¹ He was bluffing. But the cabinets in Paris
and London, as well as Vienna, all refused an alliance with Mehmed Ali against
Russia and Hüsrev, seeing no reason to jeopardize European peace over Egypt.
Thereupon Mehmed Ali sent an ultimatum to Istanbul to accept his demands
within ten days, while granting his son Ibrahim full authority to sign the peace
under his terms.⁴² And he told the European agents in Egypt that a forward
movement by Ibrahim could cause the Turkish fleet and what was left of the army,
as well as the populace of the capital, to depose the sultan and to place his son on
the throne, and ‘above all [achieve] the exclusion of his enemy [Hüsrev]’.⁴³
On 11 March, Hüsrev retaliated by asking Murav’ev whether Russia could send
25,000–30,000 troops to the capital to counter the armies of Ibrahim, before
Ibrahim arrived in Istanbul.⁴⁴ Although the Russians were willing to send their
troops and preparations had long begun, it was impossible for all the Russian
forces to arrive before Ibrahim could do so. The Porte was conscious of the risk of
panic that the news of Ibrahim’s march could generate in the imperial capital.
Since it did not want the negotiations to be coloured by an Egyptian advance,
amedciMustafa Reșid Bey was sent to Kütahya to start and complete negotiations
with Ibrahim immediately. He was ordered to make a settlement, giving up
Damascus and Aleppo if necessary, but saving Adana at the least.⁴⁵
On 4 April, the day a small Russian regiment set foot in Istanbul, Reșid Bey
arrived in Kütahya to start talks with Ibrahim. When he realized that Ibrahim
insisted on keeping the whole of Syria as well as Adana and Mersin, and fearing
that the commander could, on a whim, decide to march on Istanbul in the event of
an obstinate disagreement, he agreed on 17 April to give up Adana to Egypt in
⁴¹ Campbell to Palmerston, 31 Mar. 1833, TNA FO 78/122.
⁴² Bitis, Russia, 472; Douin, Boislecomte, xxxvi.
⁴³ Campbell to Palmerston, 1 Apr. 1833, TNA FO 78/122, f. 33.
⁴⁴ N. N. Murav’ev to Chernyshev, 12 Mar. 1833, RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 5304, f. 31–5; cf. Bitis,
Russia, 473.
⁴⁵ BOA HH 20345, n.d.; cf. Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 98.
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return for keeping Mersin and Silifke. But the sultan was outraged by Reșid’s
unauthorized action. He adamantly opposed conferring the timber-rich town of
Adana upon Mehmed Ali, for he knew that the pașa wanted this in order to build
battleships. The deal collapsed.⁴⁶
Thence began a new round of Anglo-French pressure on the Porte and the pașa
to make an agreement each on the terms of the other. The two powers hoped to
get this done immediately, for they wanted to countermand the landing of Russian
soldiers in the Ottoman capital, the second group (4,500 soldiers) of which was
scheduled to arrive on 23 April.⁴⁷ Colonel Campbell and Charles-Joseph-Edmond
Baron de Boislecomte, the British and French agents in Egypt, received identical
instructions from their ambassadors in Istanbul to convince the pașa.
Mehmed Ali did not waver, determined to protect his reign, his family, and thus
his burgeoning imperium. He argued that the security of all he had was dependent
upon obtaining that natural defence line of Egypt, the Taurus mountains, and the
timber-rich province of Adana.⁴⁸ He told Boislecomte on 12 May that he would
desist from his demand for Adana only under one condition: the European
powers ‘should confirm by their guarantee a peace’ in his terms and ensure the
security of his reign.⁴⁹
The French agent replied that it was impossible to suggest an explicit guarantee
to a subject against his sovereign.⁵⁰When the pașa reminded him of the guarantees
granted to the Greeks and the Belgians, Boislecomte responded that the case was
different: ‘[T]he peace that these two peoples concluded with their former rulers
declare them independent.’ Their negotiations took place between two equal
parties. The pașa then asked, ‘Why am I not independent?’ and replied himself,
You know, it is out of deference to the Powers. Do you believe that without the
due respect I had for the intentions of the Powers, I would still be in the condition
of a subject? Well, that respect I had for your advice the Greeks did not have,
neither did the Belgians, and you rewarded them by guaranteeing their inde-
pendence and you punish me by refusing to guarantee my security.⁵¹
Mehmed Ali considered his position no different from that of the Greeks and the
Belgians. But in the eyes of the powers, his was a revolutionary movement that was
upsetting European stability by threatening the existence of the Ottoman Empire
as a whole, and, unlike the case of Greece of the 1820s, there were neither
humanitarian, nor religious, nor strategic or commercial security issues at stake
⁴⁶ Boislecomte to MAE, 11, 12, 14 May 1833; Douin, Boislecomte, 32–4.
⁴⁷ Petrunina, Social’no, 309–10.
⁴⁸ Boislecomte to MAE, 5 May 1833, in Douin, Boislecomte, 8–9.
⁴⁹ Boislecomte to MAE, 12 May 1833, in Douin, Boislecomte, 40; see also Campbell to Palmerston,
13 May 1833, TNA FO 78/227; cf. Kutluoğlu, Egyptian,104.
⁵⁰ Boislecomte to MAE, 12 May 1833, in Douin, Boislecomte, 40. ⁵¹ Ibid.
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for the Powers to intervene on his behalf. By contrast, Britain’s transportation and
communication routes to India were now at risk of falling under the indirect
domination of Russia and France.
The pașa was accordingly strong-armed. The British foreign secretary, Lord
Palmerston, ordered the British navy to blockade Alexandria and cut Ibrahim’s
communication with Egypt. France buttressed this move by sending her own ships
to the Levant. Upon hearing these orders, the pașa gave in. He agreed to abandon
Adana and sent his orders to Ibrahim to withdraw his men on 8 May.⁵² But he was
fortunate to avoid a formal commitment, because Mahmud II had also caved and
agreed further concessions just before the pașa’s orders arrived in Kütahya. The
sultan could no longer have tolerated the risk of an Egyptian attack on Istanbul.
Having observed that he had to make a choice between abandoning Adana or
starting military preparations against the Egyptian army, Mahmud II decided that
the former was the lesser of two dangers. Russia, he thought, was hardly to be
trusted and France often changed her position.⁵³ He therefore accepted the
abandonment of Adana and declared with a firman an amnesty for Ibrahim
only two days before Mehmed Ali made his decision.
Sultan Mahmud II never found out about the pașa’s almost simultaneous
surrender. As Palmerston wrote to his agents, the question was finally settled,
and no one would want to disturb it.⁵⁴ On 6 May, Ibrahim was appointed as
the muhassıl of Adana and restored as the pașa of Jeddah and Habesh, while the
provinces of Egypt, Crete, Damascus, Tripoli, Sayda, and Aleppo as well as the
sancaks of Jerusalem and Nablus were conferred upon Mehmed Ali.⁵⁵ The civil
war in the Ottoman world was thus halted with the naval and diplomatic
interference of the Powers.
*
The ‘convention’ of Kütahya was only a verbal truce, with no written assurances,
signatures, or ratifications on the part of either party.⁵⁶ An ephemeral solution for
the sultan’s distress, it left the Powers and the Porte with a question still unre-
solved. What would now happen to the Russian warships and soldiers that had
been stationed in Istanbul? The answer Palmerston came up with was to curb the
self-centred actions of Russia, and invigorate the Concert of Europe against this
perilous episode of the Eastern Question.
In fact, this was precisely when the term ‘Eastern Question’ became prevalent in
both European and Ottoman parlance. Following the pattern laid out by the
Vienna Order, at the end of May 1833 the British foreign secretary proposed a
⁵² Campbell to Palmerston, 9 May 1833, TNA FO 78/227; cf. Kutluoğlu, Egyptian,103.
⁵³ BOA HH 20346, n.d.; cf. Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 102–3.
⁵⁴ Palmerston to Campbell, 1 June 1833, TNA FO 78/226/27.
⁵⁵ BOA HAT 362/20211B; BOA TS.MA.e 712/19.
⁵⁶ Muhammed H. Kutluoğlu, ‘1833 Kütahya Antlaşmasının Yeni Bir Değerlendirmesi’, Osmanlı
Araştırmaları 17 (1997): 265–87, at 285.
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convention among the powers where they would pledge themselves to the support
of the sultan. However, the Austrian and Russian agents in London, Philip von
Neumann (1781–1851) and Christopher Lieven (1774–1839), were not given
authorization by their governments to enter into such an arrangement.⁵⁷
The Concert was in dissonance. Russian policy had undermined the commit-
ment to multilateral action—even though the Russian agents would have phrased
it differently. The diplomacy pursued by the Ottoman elites—Hüsrev and his
men—in the spring of 1833 was one of the chief causes of Russian unilateralism.
Before the verbal truce at Kütahya, Hüsrev had become more and more eager to
make concessions in return for Russian guarantees, and had approached Butenev
for the signing of an offensive and defensive alliance.⁵⁸ St Petersburg instantly
seized the opportunity once again.
Count Aleksey F. Orlov (1786–1861), whom Nesselrode had dispatched to
Istanbul in late April as an extraordinary envoy to discuss with the Porte the
future of Russian troops, received the news of the Ottoman proposal of alliance on
his way. His mission gained a new quality then. Orlov was ordered to begin and
conclude the negotiations immediately after his arrival (6 May).⁵⁹
Russia was disinclined to give away her dominant position in Istanbul, the
centrepiece of her ‘weak neighbour’ policy. This was why Orlov was instructed to
oppose any suggestion for collective intervention.⁶⁰ Tsar Nicholas I and
Nesselrode saw in the Ottoman offer of alliance an invaluable opportunity to
secure the Black Sea and the south of Russia, especially in view of the fact that
British and French squadrons were cruising the Mediterranean, alarmed by the
Russo-Ottoman rapprochement.
During the negotiations, Orlov made sure that the Ottoman representatives,
Hüsrev and Akif, kept the contents and existence of negotiations secret from
foreign ambassadors, and promised that Tsar Nicholas I would forgo half of his
pecuniary claims from the sultan arising from the 1829 war, and would evacuate
Silistria. Moreover, learning from Hüsrev that Mahmud II was reluctant concern-
ing an alliance with Russia, the tsar himself wrote a private letter to the sultan,
stating that ‘it was reserved for his genius to see in Russia a true friend and a
serviceable and faithful ally’.
In return, during the talks in early May, the Porte’s plenipotentiaries, Akif Pașa
and Hekimbaşı (chief of medicine) Mustafa Behçet Efendi (1774–1834), would
express the Porte’s willingness to enter into an alliance, stating that:
We feel some relief when we see that our disasters have served to expose, to the face
of the world, the high benevolence of the [Russian Emperor] . . .We have been the
⁵⁷ Sir F. Lamb (Vienna) to Ponsonby, 30 May 1833, BLM MS 60474, f. 14.
⁵⁸ Altundağ, Kavalalı, 150–51.
⁵⁹ BOA TS.MA.e 547/2–3; C. de Freycinet, La Question d’Égypte (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1905), 27.
⁶⁰ Rendall, ‘Restraint’, 41.
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sick, you the medicines . . . [S]o that the cure becomes complete, we [ensure that]
justice and good order reign at our home . . . [We] tell you with great frankness
[that] the Representatives of His Imperial Majesty can henceforth be considered as
the ministers, the sincere advisers of the S[ublime] Porte herself . . . ⁶¹
This was probably the first time the impression of the Ottoman Empire as ‘a sick
man’ was uttered, not by Russian but Ottoman agents themselves, possibly by
Behçet Efendi. It also attested how Ottoman officialdom called in Russia in the
management of a threat (Egypt) within their empire, though it is true that in
demanding an alliance treaty they also had in view the immediate evacuation of
Russian troops from Istanbul.
At the end of June, the plenipotentiaries of the two empires reached agreement
over the details of the alliance. Russia promised to evacuate Istanbul once the
treaty was signed, and only the wording of the document remained to be com-
pleted. Orlov and Hüsrev added the final touches, and on 8 July 1833 the two put
their signatures on the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty at Hüsrev’s mansion. This was a
defensive mutual assistance treaty for eight years, with a renewal option. Its object
was the security of the two empires ‘against every species of attack’. Russia and the
Ottoman Empire would engage to arrange all matters, without exception, which
could affect their tranquillity and security, and for that purpose afford each other
effective succour and assistance. Most importantly, a secret clause stipulated the
closure of the Dardanelles to all foreign battleships in times of war in return for
relieving the sultan of the obligation to supply military aid.⁶²
Although historians have previously suggested otherwise, the Porte did not
resist the treaty with Russia, and was not in fact coerced into signing it.⁶³ It is true
that Orlov used the presence of Russian troops in Istanbul to his advantage,
having only to point his finger at the squadrons in the Bosphorus to obtain
leverage.⁶⁴ But, despite the sultan’s reluctance, it was through Hüsrev’s initiative,
eagerness, and desire for revenge, that the Porte wished to enter into an alliance,
both offensive and defensive, with the tsar. The Ottoman serasker had to contend
with a defensive agreement alone, since Nicholas I considered it more advanta-
geous and useful for Russia, ‘given France’s and England’s present alliance’.
It would help him ‘tie Austria more tightly than ever to [his] interests’, by
guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵ And it would
procure Russia a unique advantage for intervention in the Levant in the future,
⁶¹ ‘Résumé d’une conférence de M. l’envoyé Bouténeff avec le Reis Effendi et l’Hekim Bachi,
médecin en chef et ministre des conférences, Bestchef Effendi, tenue dans la maison de ce dernier à
Bebeck le 13/23 mai 1833’, AVPRI f. 181/2, l. 5.
⁶² ‘Traduction de l’acte de ratification du Traite patent’, BOA HR.SYS 1847/1/18; ‘Traduction de
l’acte de ratification de l’article séparé et secret’, BOA HR.SYS 1847/1/18; British and Foreign State
Papers, vol. 10 (London: James Ridgway & Sons, 1836), 1176; Bitis, Russia, 475.
⁶³ Rendall, ‘Restraint’, 43. ⁶⁴ Orlov to Kiselev, 27 June/9 July 1833; cf. Rendall, ‘Restraint’, 43.
⁶⁵ Ibid. 46.
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‘the first and strongest . . . whether considering the preservation of the Ottoman
Empire possible, or at last recognizing its dissolution inevitable’.⁶⁶
Hence the fears, ambitions, and policies of the sultan, Hüsrev Pașa, and the tsar
coalesced, and guaranteed a Russian peace in the Levant. Ibrahim’s troops had
already begun evacuating Asia Minor in early May, and retreated back to Urfa.
Russian troops left Istanbul days after the signing of the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty in
July. But the Russian peace in the Levant immediately jeopardized order and
security in Europe, prompting a diplomatic crisis and the threat of war. It also
emphasized the cracks within the Concert of Europe, testing both its functionality
and durability.
Preaching to the Winds: The Disconcert of Europe and
the Diplomatic Impasse
Only days after the signing of the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, its secret clause was
leaked to the British and French agents by anti-Russian Ottoman ministers
(possibly by the Anglophile Pertev Efendi). In London and Paris, the secret clause
was considered sensational and controversial.⁶⁷ British and French statesmen
believed that Russia had trapped the Porte into signing the treaty, and thus placed
the sultan’s empire under her protectorate. The secret clause had given the tsar a
strategic advantage with a geographical and natural defence system, as he now had
control over the Dardanelles, which were very difficult for naval ships to sail
through from the Aegean Sea thanks to the strong northerly winds.⁶⁸ As a result,
preventing the ratification of the treaty became a matter of preserving the balance
of power in Europe. Seeing that their attempts could lead to aggression, Tsar
Nicholas I started drawing up plans for war.⁶⁹
The risk of war was now indeed very high. Palmerston looked to avert it first
by persuading the Porte. To this end, he instructed Lord John Ponsonby
(1770–1855), his new ambassador to Istanbul, to remind the Ottoman ministers
that, when ‘a sovereign trusted for his security to the military support of a
neighbouring Power stronger than himself ’, it would be obvious that he acquired
such protection ‘at the price of his independence’’ Furthermore, ‘[s]uch a state of
things’ would destroy the respect of the foreign powers for the sovereign, ‘weakens
the affection of his subjects, exposing him thereby to danger from their insurrec-
tion and tends to the loss of his crown as the consequence of the sacrifice of his
⁶⁶ Nesselrode to Orlov, 8/20 May 1833, cf. Rendall, ‘Restraint’, 46.
⁶⁷ Lamb to Ponsonby, 15 Aug. 1833, BLM Beauvale Papers, Add. MS 60474/20.
⁶⁸ William R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on
the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 194.
⁶⁹ Palmerston to Bligh, 9 Aug. 1833, BLM Add. MS 41285, f. 79; ibid. f. 60, Palmerston to Bligh,
19 July 1833; see also Bitis, Russia, 475, 478
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independence’. Hence, in forming alliances and developing policies, any sovereign
had to follow a careful and well-calculated triple policy of preserving its inde-
pendence while acknowledging the sentiments of its citizens and the reactions of
other major global actors. This was why, Palmerston concluded, the Porte had to
pay attention to the fact that the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty was produced for Russian
and not for Ottoman goals. The Porte was advised not to ratify it. If it ratified the
treaty, Russia would become ‘the umpire between the sultan and his subjects,
would exercise a species of Protectorate over Turkey, and the [s]ultan would be
bound to adopt the quarrels of Russia’.⁷⁰
Palmerston was not aware that this was what the Ottoman ministers, Hüsrev
and Akif Pașas, wanted, at least in part, in the spring of 1833. Before the foreign
secretary’s instructions reached Lord Ponsonby, Ottoman Reis Efendi Akif, now
known as a Russophile, announced the ratification of the treaty on 26 August. The
Porte’s decision was met with immediate protests. Ponsonby even threatened that
‘if the stipulations of that treaty should hereafter lead to the armed interference of
Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, the British government [would] hold itself
at liberty to act upon such an occasion’.⁷¹ But Reis Efendi sent a negative and
detailed response, declaring that the Porte would not enter into any discussion
with respect to such protests because it would be ‘without object, and must be
without result’. The Ottoman court sought only the tranquillity of the sultan’s
dominions, and as an independent power, it had the right to enter into alliance
with any other state, especially when such an alliance was not directed against any
power—the alliance was made through the mutual desire of both parties.⁷²
When the tsar ratified the treaty on 29 October, similar protests, denouncing the
action, were delivered to his court.⁷³ Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode
responded that the treaty did not impair the interests of any powers whatever, and
asked: ‘How can the other Powers declare they do not recognize its validity unless
they aim at the destruction of [the Ottoman Empire] the preservation of which is
the aim of the treaty?’ The treaty was concluded in a ‘pacific and conservative
spirit’, and ‘has indeed introduced a change in the relations of union and confi-
dence in which the Porte will find a guarantee for her stability and if need be means
of defence’.⁷⁴
The Russian disavowal of the Anglo-French protests engendered deep antag-
onism among the powers. Palmerston ordered his ambassador in St Petersburg,
⁷⁰ Palmerston to Ponsonby, 7 Aug. 1833, TNA FO 78/472/42.
⁷¹ Ponsonby to [the Porte], 26 Aug. 1833, BOA HAT 1166/4123; also in BOA TS.MA.e 578/34.
⁷² Dispatches by Ponsonby (Istanbul), 15 and 24 Sept. 1833, in ‘Proceedings in Turco-Egyptian
Question’, TNA FO 78/472, f. 46, 48.
⁷³ Dispatch by Bligh (St Petersburg), 2 Nov. 1833, in ‘Proceedings in Turco-Egyptian Question’,
TNA FO 78/472, f. 49.
⁷⁴ Dispatch by Bligh (St Petersburg), 4 Nov. 1833, in ‘Proceedings in Turco-Egyptian Question’,
TNA FO 78/472, f. 50.
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John Duncan Bligh (1798–1872), to stress to tsarist authorities that the ‘real
independence’ of the Ottoman Empire had to be regarded as ‘an indispensable
condition’.⁷⁵ And, from that point on, it became his object and a centrepiece of his
eastern policy to prevent Russia from ‘pushing her advantages farther’, and
depriving her ‘of what she has gained’ in the Levant.⁷⁶ Under the ministries of
Maréchal Étienne Maurice Gérard (1773–1852) and Jean-de-Dieu Soult
(1769–1851), France consistently supported the British policy, though they also
hoped to accommodate Sultan Mahmud II in a new understanding, which would
procure for the pașa of Egypt hereditary rights in the provinces he ruled.⁷⁷
Britain and France thus positioned themselves sternly against the 1833 treaty
and Russia. But, against the two, St Petersburg made new diplomatic moves that
bolstered her position. One of these was to assure Austria of her peaceful inten-
tions. Its success is affirmed by Metternich’s note to his agents in the summer of
1833 that where Ottoman affairs were concerned, the courts of Vienna and
St Petersburg ‘want the same thing, and they want it in the same way’.⁷⁸ The
Austrian chancellor was of the belief that the 1833 treaty’s real object was the
protection of Odessa, and to that end, not to open the Bosphorus to Russian ships
of war, but to close the Dardanelles against British warships.⁷⁹
On 18 September, Metternich agreed to adopt a ‘principle of union’ with
Russia in his eastern policy. This resulted in the famous 1833 pact in
Munchengratz in the presence of King Francis I and Tsar Nicholas I. A month
later Prussia joined the conservative Holy Alliance, which positioned her against
the revolutionary aspirations of Mehmed Ali as the three powers agreed to
support the sultan against the pașa, and to act together should the sultan’s empire
disintegrate.⁸⁰
With the support of the conservative Austria and Prussia, the liberal camp of
Britain and France would not be able to diplomatically twist the arm of the tsar
into annulling the treaty and giving up his advantages in the Levant. A diplomatic
impasse ensued. The powers were grouped into camps, each seeking to weaken
the other, and toying with the idea of war. A Great Power intervention in the
Levant—this time a unilateral one—thus generated division in Europe and
prompted fears of war. As Lord Beauvale, the British ambassador to Vienna,
⁷⁵ Dispatch to Bligh, 6 Dec. 1833, in ‘Proceedings in Turco-Egyptian Question’, TNA FO 78/472, f. 52.
⁷⁶ Palmerston to Ponsonby, 6 Dec. 1833, in ‘Proceedings in Turco-Egyptian Question’, TNA FO 78/
472, f. 58.
⁷⁷ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 13.
⁷⁸ Metternich to Ficquelmont, 10 July 1833; cf. Šedivý, Metternich, 538.
⁷⁹ Lamb to Ponsonby, 2 Sept. 1833, Beauvale Papers, BL, Add. MS 60474, f. 22; also in Šedivý,
Metternich, 537–8.
⁸⁰ For the details of this union, see esp. Miroslav Šedivý, ‘From Adrianople to Munchengratz:
Metternich, Russia, and the Eastern Question 1829–33’, International History Review 33(2) (2011):
205–33.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
172  
poignantly wrote, the circumstances could ‘set . . . Europe on fire’ again at any
minute.⁸¹
*
None of the individual Great Powers, or their liberal and conservative camps for
that matter, could dare to make any other one-sided move now. They dreaded the
destabilizing effect of aggression on the sensitive ‘Eastern Question’. They knew
well that neither Sultan Mahmud II himself nor Mehmed Ali was entirely satisfied
with the terms of the Kütahya truce to which the two had reluctantly agreed. True,
Egyptian armies had withdrawn and the imminent danger of the fall of the sultan’s
empire had passed for the time being. But what was obtained in Kütahya was
merely a verbal agreement and the status of Mehmed Ali could be revoked by the
sultan whenever he pleased.⁸²
As a result, the pașa of Egypt kept making military preparations, building ships,
and fortifying the defiles in the Taurus mountains. In fact, he did not give up his
ultimate ambition to build his own, independent empire or at least obtain
hereditary possession of his territories to ensure the security of his family, though
he was reminded by the Russian agents not to entertain such dreams time and
again.⁸³
Tensions between Cairo and Istanbul became critical when the sultan
demanded from the pașa a sum of 50 million piastres for arrears of tribute
clearing the war indemnities along with the payment of annual tributes starting
from the Mohammedan year 1250 (May 1834). Mehmed Ali refused to pay arrears
for a battle he had actually won. He deferred the payment of the tributes, fearing
that the sum would be used against him and for military investment. He moreover
demanded from the sultan the dismissal of Hüsrev, his arch-enemy, from the post
of serasker as a condition for the recommencement of the payments. He even sent
a letter to Valide Sultan, the mother of Mahmud II, to try and effect this, but to no
avail. The stubborn pașa then ordered his regiments to remain in Urfa, and
continued his effective occupation much to the irritation of the sultan. Finally,
the sourness and caprice of Mahmud II was aggravated when the pașa did not
follow the tradition of deputing a member of his own family to be present at the
wedding of the sultan’s daughter, as a sign of respect.⁸⁴
For the hot-headed Sultan Mahmud II, the Kütahya truce was only a temporary
measure to save the day. After the military and diplomatic defeats in 1832 and
1833, the Porte had begun summoning a new army. Serasker Hüsrev Pașa’s plan
was to bring in European officers to train and discipline the soldiers until the
imperial army matched the might of Egyptian forces. In the meantime, the eastern
⁸¹ Lamb to Ponsonby, 30 Sept. 1833, Beauvale Papers, BL, Add. MS 60474, f. 23.
⁸² Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 109.
⁸³ Vice Chancelier to M. Duhamel, 31 Dec. 1834, BOA HR.SYS 1847/1/7.
⁸⁴ BOA HAT 351/19816A.
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army of the empire would oversee an insurrection that broke out in Syria in May
1834 against the authority of Mehmed Ali as a consequence of heavy taxation and
unwelcome conscription.⁸⁵ The Ottoman imperial council resolved to supply
military support to the dissenting Syrians and send the imperial fleet to the eastern
Mediterranean to cooperate in the prospective attack upon Mehmed Ali.⁸⁶
The Porte hoped that Russia would assist it in the operation, and immediately
enquired about it. The sultan’s ministers had good reason for this belief because,
since the Russian intervention in the crisis with Egypt in April 1833 and especially
after the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty, relations between Istanbul and St Petersburg had
improved remarkably. The tsar had specifically ordered his agents in Istanbul to
keep the sultan content by all means possible.⁸⁷ In December 1833, he signed a
convention with the Porte in St Petersburg, in which, as he promised before the
July 1833 treaty, he made concessions with regard to the indemnities of the
1828–9 war in favour of the sultan, and agreed on the evacuation of Russian
forces from Silistra and the semi-autonomous provinces of Wallachia and
Moldavia.⁸⁸ He thus looked to tie the Porte even more tightly to his plan, and to
strengthen the hand of pro-Russian Ottoman ministers in Istanbul.
However, in July 1834, Butenev responded unfavourably to the Ottoman
inquiry regarding potential Russian assistance in the sultan’s offensive against
Mehmed Ali. The Russian ambassador told the Reisülküttâb that if the Porte
attacked Mehmed Ali, it would be the aggressor. The Hünkar İskelesi Treaty
concerned purely defensive engagements, and would therefore not bind Russia
to assist the Ottoman Empire on this occasion. It was true that the Russo-Ottoman
alliance was merely of a defensive nature, according to the 1833 treaty. Yet Russian
policy was also founded on the understanding that the existence of Mehmed Ali as
a threat would lead the Porte to ‘look more and more for rapprochement with
Russia and only further strengthen our legitimate influence in the East’.⁸⁹
The sultan did not take the Russian response well, wondering ever more
strongly now whether his alliance with Russia was a mistake. But he did not
know how to free his rule from Russian influence while the threat of Mehmed Ali
was still imminent. To find an answer to this dilemma, he secretly approached the
British ambassador, Ponsonby, through an agent (Stephanaky Boghorides, prince
of Samos), and expressed his anxiety that ‘the rivalry existing in the Ottoman
Empire serves the purposes of Russia by disorganising [his] government . . . wast-
ing its resources and exciting [his] fears which make him look to Russia for
⁸⁵ Dispatch by Ponsonby, 16 Aug. 1834, in ‘Proceedings in Turco-Egyptian Question’, TNA FO 78/
472, f. 95. See Ch. 9 for more on the uprisings in Syria.
⁸⁶ BOA HAT 9674. ⁸⁷ Nesselrode to Boutenieff, 20 July 1833, BOA HR.SYS 1847/1/27.
⁸⁸ Dispatch by Bligh, 24 Feb. 1834 TNA FO 78/472, f. 81; also see Hayreddin Pınar, ‘Ahmed Fevzi
Paşa’nın Petersburg Seyahati ve Petersburg Anlaşması’, Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Dergisi 29 (2003): 179–89.
⁸⁹ A. O. Duhamel, Avtobiografiya Aleksandra Osipovicha Dyugamelya (Moscow: Univ. Tip., 1885),
71; Dispatch by Ponsonby, 20 Aug. 1834, TNA FO 78/472, f. 99.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
174  
protection’.⁹⁰ He then inquired whether Britain would side with him in a planned
attempt at ‘compelling [Mehmed Ali] to retire within proper bounds and thus
liberate the [s]ultan from the alarms which have been the cause of his alliance with
Russia’.⁹¹
Although the British ambassador was pleased with Mahmud II’s approach, he
replied that Britain would not attack Mehmed Ali without special cause of offence.
The London cabinet was of course willing to see the Porte freed from Russian
domination as swiftly as possible, but since France was opposed to a recurrence of
war between the Porte and the pașa, and because the Russian attitude in such a
scenario was unpredictable, Britain would avoid any ‘action against the clock’.⁹²
To Foreign Secretary Palmerston, it was ‘of utmost importance to the interests of
[Britain], and to the preservation of the balance of power [and peace] in Europe,
that the Turkish Empire should be maintained in its integrity and independence’,
but risking a war with Russia initiated by Britain for this purpose would be at best
a counterproductive move.⁹³
Palmerston was still looking to reinvigorate the Concert of Europe. Reading the
reports of Lord Beauvale from Vienna, he was encouraged. Beauvale described the
Austrian court’s reservations about the tsar’s real intentions, and concluded that
Metternich now suspected that the policy of Russia towards the Porte was ‘to
weaken and to degrade the [s]ultan, and to avail herself of every opportunity of
aggrandizement by progressive acquisitions of portions of the Turkish territory’.
The Austrian chancellor would be ready to send auxiliary troops if a danger
similar to the 1832–3 crisis menaced the Ottoman Empire, for he deplored the
thought of a return of Russian troops to Istanbul and would do everything in his
power to prevent it.
Even though, by the end of 1834, Metternich still had some trust in St
Petersburg, he was likewise of the belief that the best way to handle the ‘Eastern
Question’ of the time was to return to the Vienna system of 1815–22 and to
undertake a concerted action at least by a majority of the powers. The intra-
European disagreements and divergences, the powers’ polarization, and the pri-
oritization of their own interests were only perpetuating, if not exacerbating, the
problems of the Ottoman Empire. ‘The political rivalry of the Powers’, he told
Lord Beauvale, ‘exercised . . . a fatal influence on the position of the sultan by
exposing him to a variety of influences . . . [T]he security which [the powers’]
rivalry afforded against schemes of partition was but negative, whereas the
union of the Three Powers against one . . . would be positive.’⁹⁴
⁹⁰ Dispatch by Ponsonby, 15 Sept. 1834, TNA FO 78/472, f. 105. ⁹¹ Ibid.
⁹² ‘Instructions pour M. Lapierre, premier drogman de l’ambassade de France’, 2 Sept. 1834;
‘Rapport à Son Excellence Reis Effendi’, 4 Sept. 1834; Ponsonby to Reis Efendi, 23 Nov. 1834;
Roussin (Therapia) to Reis Effendi, 20 Nov. 1834, in BOA HR.SYS 933/1, f. 42, 48, 53, 56.
⁹³ Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 111. ⁹⁴ Dispatch by Lamb, 2 Nov. 1834, TNA FO 78/472, f. 126.
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At the end of 1834, the powers were still in a diplomatic logjam. The hardline
unilateralist camp in St Petersburg, or the so-called ruskaaia partiaa (Russian
faction), was still strong and fixated on the possibility of war. But Metternich and
Palmerston saw a solution elsewhere. As had been the case in 1815, Austria and
Britain conceived of a joint Great Power action regarding the Ottoman Empire in
line with the transimperial security culture of the time.⁹⁵ In 1815, their object had
been to prevent a Russo-Ottoman war by warranting the sultan’s European
dominions under European public law. In 1834, the ‘Eastern Question’ pertained
to preserving Ottoman territorial integrity against domestic threats such as
Mehmed Ali’s aspirations and containing the advantageous, dominant position
Russia had acquired for herself.
Only concerted action could put an end to the Russian tutelage over the Porte
and the embarrassment of the sultan, whose sovereignty and authority had now
been jeopardized both externally (St Petersburg) and from within (Cairo). It was
perhaps militarily impossible or too dangerous to push Russia out of Istanbul by
way of force. But it could be possible to pull St Petersburg back into the security
system in Europe and thus prevent the renewal of the 1833 Hünkar İskelesi Treaty
that would expire in 1841. The question remained: how could Palmerston and
Metternich persuade the tsar to give up his privileged position in the Levant now?
⁹⁵ See Ch. 4.
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7
An Unusual Quest for Revenge
Civilization, Commerce, and Reform
The literature on the latter phase of the Eastern crisis in the 1830s usually
concentrates on the policy of one or more of the leaders of the European Great
Powers—including Lord Palmerston, Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, and
Adolphe Thiers. Many fascinating studies have detailed the efforts of these ‘great
men’ to ensure order in Europe and the Levant, how they piloted bureaucratic and
military reforms in Istanbul and then brought an end to the crisis by means of
their shrewd diplomacy, commitment, or opposition to the Concert of Europe.¹
In this chapter I will place the emphasis elsewhere, with a prosopographical
approach to the experience of the Ottoman statesman and diplomat Mustafa
Reșid (1800–1858). He was possibly the first non-European figure to place an
almost unwavering trust in the Vienna Order, or at least the late 1830s version of
it. Unlike the young Mahmud II and Halet Efendi (see Chapter 4), Reșid espoused
the collective intervention of the Powers in Ottoman domestic affairs. It was under
his influence, even if not through his sole agency, that the idea of ‘civilization’ was
adopted in Ottoman official lexicology, Ottoman markets were further opened to
the global capitalist economy, and the Gülhane Edict of 1839, which pledged to
guarantee the life, security, and property of all Ottoman subjects, was promul-
gated. And it was during his heyday in Istanbul that the future territorial integrity
of the sultan’s empire was subsumed under the guarantee of the Concert of
Europe, and the policy of Russia with respect to the sultan’s empire was
overturned.
All these overlapped with a moment when the Eastern Question was repur-
posed as a question of civilization as much as a constellation of strategic, legal,
commercial, and religious concerns. The ideology and diplomacy of Mustafa
Reșid and his intra-elite struggle against Russophile ministers in Istanbul became
a feature of this transformation as decisive and determinative as the ideologies and
diplomacy of the aforementioned European statesmen and Mehmed Ali Pașa.
Of course, one ought not to overemphasize the role of a single political figure in
the policy-making processes of an empire and the European Great Powers. Yet the
story of Mustafa Reșid tells us much about those processes themselves, and how
¹ Webster, Palmerston; Šedivý, Metternich; Caquet, The Orient; François Charles-Roux, Thiers et
Méhémet-Ali (Paris: Plon, 1951).
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Ottoman statesmen, especially those who lived and worked in Europe, usually
found themselves torn between two worlds—one (Europe) that would appear to
them as the champion of values such as ‘humanity’ and ‘civilization’ and thus
initially mesmerize their ‘riental’ observers, before prioritizing its immediate
interests at every critical turn, usually at the expense of these values; the other
(Ottoman) bogged down in fatal interpersonal rivalries and struggles for office in
the Sublime Porte, and thus suffering the absence of coherent, consistent, and
stable policies and individual security. Along with his like-minded European and
Ottoman associates, Mustafa Reșid became a connector between these two worlds
hoping to remedy the issues that existentially threatened the sultan’s empire and
brought the European Great Powers to the brink of war in the 1830s and later
in 1840.
Civilization
Mustafa Reșid was a man with relatively humble origins. Born in Istanbul in 1800,
he was the son of a bookkeeper of the revenue records of Sultan Bayezid’s imperial
mosque. He received his early education partly from his father and intermittently
at neighbourhood schools in Davudpașa. When his father passed away in 1810, his
education was temporarily halted, which restricted his knowledge of Arabic and
Persian, the benchmarks of Ottoman high culture. Thereupon he was taken under
the protection of his sister’s husband, Seyyid Ali Pașa of Isparta, a prominent
military statesman in the Ottoman world.
When Seyyid Ali became grand vizier in 1820–21, Reșid worked as his
mühürdar (sealer). He thus started his career in the Sublime Porte in the highest
office at the age of 20. He was eventually employed at Divan Kalemi and wrote all
the official letters of the grand viziers. In this capacity he served in the army with
the new Grand Vizier Selim Pașa, who commanded Ottoman forces at the
beginning of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828–9. Reșid also acted as the chief
clerk in the peace negotiations with the Russians in Edirne in 1829.²
His writings from the front to Istanbul, and his plain yet powerful language,
attracted the attention of Sultan Mahmud II. On his return, the sultan specifically
asked to have Reșid in his audience, and commended his work before advising
him to learn French so that he could involve him in his diplomatic corps.³ The
young man was then placed at âmedi kalemi, which was one of the most important
offices in the Sublime Porte because it was there that the official reports of the
government to the sultan were produced. There, thanks to his progressive ideas,
Reșid came into close contact with Pertev Efendi (1785–1837), kâhya bey or the
² BOA HAT 676/33010.
³ Cavit Baysun, Mustafa Reșit Pașa (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 3.
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minister for civil (internal) affairs, and a disciple of the Anglophile Galib Pașa,
who had advocated a moderate and conciliatory policy toward the Great Powers
in the 1810s. Pertev showed particular interest in Mustafa Reșid’s career.⁴ In 1830,
he took him as his second scribe to Egypt in a mission to Cairo. And until his
tragic death in 1837, in parallel with his own growing influence in the Topkapı
Palace, he played a considerable role in Reșid’s rise as one of the most prominent
statesmen of his time.
During the 1830 visit to Egypt, Reșid’s potential was noticed by Mehmed Ali
Pașa also. The latter asked for him to stay in Cairo and join his staff. But Reșid
refused this offer. As mentioned in the previous chapter, three years later, in
January 1833, Reșid was again sent to Egypt—this time to make an arrangement
with Mehmed Ali during the 1832–3 crisis. During these unfriendly negotiations,
he reportedly became a bitter enemy of the pașa. As Ottoman chronicler Mehmed
Selahaddin narrates, during the talks at Mehmed Ali’s palace in Cairo, Reșid was
so shocked and shaken by the pașa’s adamant refusal of the demands of the sultan
that at the most heated moment of one of the meetings, he would ask to be
excused, leave the room, and cry in anger, disappointment, and an intense desire
for revenge that came to fill his heart from then on.⁵
Not that his entire career was devoted solely to this quest for revenge. But along
the way his cause changed his world-view and the trajectory of his life, and
arguably the course and culture of Ottoman politics and security, as he ascended
to the highest offices. He went through unique learning experiences during his
years of diplomatic missions in Paris and London, where he perhaps too uncrit-
ically observed the state of politics in Europe and adopted some of the ideas and
ideals of European international political and economic thought, for better and
worse.
Mustafa Reșid wanted the Porte to move past the petty issues in which it was
caught up, which every now and then threatened both his career and his life. For
example, when, in April 1833, as the negotiator of the sultan at Kütahya, Mustafa
Reșid agreed to give up Adana to Mehmed Ali without informing the sultan, the
furious Mahmud II ordered his execution.⁶ It was only by the efforts of inter-
mediaries that the sultan’s rage was tamed and his order rescinded.⁷
Such were the conditions under which Ottoman bureaucrats and statesmen led
their lives and performed their duties. Gaining the favour of the sultan could at
once allow them to swiftly climb the ladder of the bureaucracy and obtain
immense affluence and invaluable mansions by the Bosphorus. Losing his favour
⁴ Bayram Kodaman, Les Ambassades de Moustapha Rechid Pacha à Paris (Ankara: Société turque
d’histoire, 1991), 26.
⁵ Mehmet Selahattin, Bir Türk Diplomatın Evrâk-ı Siyasiyesi (Istanbul: Alem Matbaası, 1306
[1888]), 15; Reșat Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit Pașa ve Tanzimat (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954), 52.
⁶ Baysun, Mustafa Reșit, 4.
⁷ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 21.
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or angering him might well result in immediate poverty, if not death. Six years
later, the Gülhane Edict, which Mustafa Reșid would himself read out and which
arguably heralded the Tanzimat (reordering) era in the Ottoman Empire, looked
to put an end to this vicious system, guaranteeing the property, life, and security of
all Ottoman subjects, and particularly the sultan’s ministers—introducing a ver-
sion of the rule of law (shari’a), albeit imperfectly.
After evading death in 1833, Mustafa Reșid remained jobless for a while. He
stayed in Istanbul, observed the functioning of the state apparatus, investigated the
weakness of Ottoman institutions, and studied Great Power politics. And then, in
June 1834, possibly through Pertev’s influence, he was sent to Paris as the new
chargé d’affaires of the Ottoman Empire. Reșid formed the core of the Ottoman
diplomatic corps in Europe in the 1830s together with a certain Nuri Efendi, who
was concurrently dispatched to London. The public announcement made at the
time suggests that the two diplomats’ task was to mend tarnished relations with
France and Britain. In fact, their main objective was to obtain compensation for
the Hünkar İskelesi Treaty.⁸ At the same time, Ottoman agents were ordered to
gather intelligence on the Eastern crisis and the aforementioned diplomatic
deadlock in which the major Powers, the Porte, and Mehmed Ali were embroiled.
*
‘Small in size, yet big enough without being obese’, a contemporary French writer
wrote, Mustafa Reșid Efendi was a ‘quite lively, even active’man with a ‘clever feel’.
His moustache was cut in a brush, and his thick eyebrows slightly hid eyes ‘endowed
with a great depth’.⁹ European statesmen and diplomats who met Mustafa Reșid in
person usually became fond of him. According to Metternich, the Ottoman diplo-
mat was ‘extraordinarily intelligent, incorruptible and devoted to his native country
with a sincere wish to regenerate it’.¹⁰ Ponsonby would introduce him to Palmerston
as ‘a statesman of high calibre’.¹¹ An 1839 French memorandum would describe
Reșid as a patriotic man, ‘fine, circumspect and prudent’.¹²
For his part, Mustafa Reșid’s perception of European politics and statesmen was
mixed, at least at first. In the summer of 1834, when he set for Paris, he was
discovering a new world that he had previously observed from afar or through his
correspondence with diplomats in Istanbul. In the next few years, he saw and
talked with all key European political figures, along with whom he would play a
pioneering role in resolving the inter-imperial deadlock over the Eastern Crisis.
⁸ ‘L’envoi de Rechid-Bey en France’, Moniteur Turc, 8 July 1834; Roussin to [MAE, Paris], 9 June
1834, AMAE CP Turquie 268/304; Roussin to Le Comte, 8 July 1834, AMAE CP Turquie 268/345.
⁹ M. Destrilhes (pseud.), Confidences sur la Turquie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1855), 37.
¹⁰ Šedivý, Metternich. 927.
¹¹ Ponsonby to Palmerston, 19 Dec. 1933, TNA FO 75/125; cf. Bailey, Reform, 181.
¹² ‘Renseignements sur les hommes et les choses en Turquie’, 27 July 1839, AMAE CP Turquie
38/191.
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The first major European statesman that Reșid met was Metternich. He saw the
Austrian chancellor en route to Paris, and received from him the latest updates on
the abovementioned ideological divergence among the Powers as well as Austria’s
support toward the Porte. Metternich informed the young Ottoman diplomat of
the conservative principles upon which Austria’s policy was based. ‘Egyptian
affairs’, he told Reșid, were ‘only a revolt’ of Mehmed Ali against his legitimate
sovereign. ‘[W]hatever may be [the] causes [of this revolt] . . . it is the Viceroy that
is in the wrong’, and Austria was ‘ready to defend the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire’, while Britain and France were not to be trusted.¹³
Pleased to hear of Austrian support but also perplexed at the chancellor’s
insinuations against the liberal camp, Reșid arrived in Paris in the morning of
14 September 1834, and installed himself at the Hôtel d’Artois in Rue Lafitte. Eight
days later he made his first appearance before the French king, Louis Philippe, to
whom he presented a letter of cordiality from Sultan Mahmud II. Reșid could not
speak French well at the time.¹⁴ During his short conversation with the king, the
queen, and their sons, he expressed his desire, through his interpreter M. Cor, to
be able to converse with them in French soon.¹⁵
During his first Paris sojourn, he immediately began to learn the lingua franca
of the time from a certain Mademoiselle N., an opera singer in Paris, and mastered
it in less than five years. Concurrently, he studied European culture and inter-
national politics in depth.¹⁶ For now, his plan was to cautiously dip his foot into
the vast waters of European diplomacy, research French statesmen and politicians,
understand the intentions of the French government on the issues of Algiers and
Egypt, and examine French public opinion, before deciding on his next steps. His
dispatches to Istanbul from Paris show the young Ottoman diplomat coming to
recognize the importance of the European equilibrium and the Concert for the
interest of the sultan’s empire in these early months of his Paris mission. And it
was then that he came to adopt the idea of ‘civilization’ that was gaining traction in
French political thought.¹⁷ It would be this idea that eventually formed the nucleus
of his international political thought, guided Ottoman diplomacy, and even
shaped imperial security culture in the following decades.
*
The notion of ‘civilization’, in the abstract, metaphysical sense, was not a
European invention per se. From ancient Chinese, Greek, Mexican, or Islamic
¹³ Cavit Baysun, ‘Mustafa Reşit Paşa’nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasî Yazıları’,
Tarih Vesikaları 1(1) (1941): 33–4; Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 55, 109.
¹⁴ BOA HAT 714/34088A.
¹⁵ ‘Traduction du discours que doit tenir Moustapha Rechid Bey Effendi à l’audience du Roi’, 22
Sept. 1834, AMAE CP 269/170.
¹⁶ BOA HAT 714/34101.
¹⁷ Tuncer Baykara, ‘Mustafa Reșid Paşa’nın Medeniyet Anlayışı’, in Mustafa Reșid Pașa ve Dönemi
Semineri Bildiriler (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985), 49.
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societies to the nineteenth-century global overseas empires, the belief that the
world was inhabited by both civilized and barbaric peoples had pervaded history.
Yet the term itself was coined and systematically invoked in international political
thought after the French and Scottish Enlightenments in the second half of the
eighteenth century.
Previously used as a term of jurisprudence, in his 1757 work L’Ami des hommes,
the French author Victor Riquetti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715–89), came to
infuse it with new and diverse connotations such as ‘the softening of manners,
the education of spirits, the development of politeness, the culture of arts and
sciences, the rise of trade and industry, [and] the acquisition of material amenities
and luxury’.¹⁸ A decade later, in 1767, the Scottish writer Adam Ferguson
employed the word ‘civilization’ in the English language for the first time.¹⁹
The idea took hold as a systematic political instrument only after the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, and more precisely in the 1830s, in the context of a new wave of
colonial competition worldwide. In fact, in the course of the nineteenth century
there was hardly any agreement over what the word actually meant. Such terms
gained new meanings at the hands of statesmen and later historians, sociologists,
and anthropologists, who interpreted them across a large spectrum. As Duncan
Bell tells us, in the case of ‘civilization’, this spectrum involved
dominant understandings of religion found in a society, levels of technological
sophistication, ascribed racial properties, economic dynamism, the structure of
legal and political institutions, posited gender roles and perceptions of individual
moral and intellectual capacity, or some combination of these.²⁰
Yet, despite its manifold uses, the notion of ‘civilization’ gradually became a
political tool to underpin the justification of empire and the acquisition of new
colonies before other global Powers, in order to avoid inter-imperial aggression.
Moreover, it legitimized the idea of aiding ‘the “immature” people of the world
reach maturity’ through such methods as colonization, the establishment of
protectorates, and cross-border ‘humanitarian’ interventions.²¹
Especially against the backdrop of colonial competition among the European
Powers, ‘civilization’ was conceived as a process—a civilizing process—that
¹⁸ Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilisation: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2009), 26–7; Michel Bruneau, ‘Civilisation(s). Pertinence ou résilience d’un terme ou
d’un concept en géographie?’, Annales de géographie 674(4) (2010): 615–37, at 619; Krishan Kumar,
‘The Return of Civilization—and of Arnold Toynbee?’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 56
(4) (Oct. 2014): 815–43, 820.
¹⁹ Bowden, The Empire of Civilisation, 31.
²⁰ Duncan Bell, ‘Empire and Imperialism’, in The Cambridge History of Nineteenth Century Political
Thought, ed. Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 867.
²¹ Ibid.
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societies worldwide were to go through in different stages, following in the
footprints of European societies to reach the level of enlightenment (the term
was eventually replaced with the words ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’) in place of
barbarism and savagery. In the new age of imperial expansion, European states-
men, international lawyers, and military and naval commanders all employed the
concept for their respective ends. Empire and imperialism came to be seen as a
moral right, duty, and objective, and as a code of intelligibility and conduct to
universalize international law, which grew out of legal positivism.²² Normatively
speaking, civilization became one of the master themes of the century, and the
‘dominant ideological and mental framework for interpreting, [transforming] and
ordering international relations’.²³
The idea of civilization has usually been studied in the English-language
literature of international and imperial history to discern how ‘European’ and
then Western Powers justified their empire and violence in imperial (colonial)
contact zones.²⁴ Considerably less attention has been paid to the fact that the so-
called non-Western ruling elites also utilized the idea it to underpin their empires.
While Suzuki has explained Japan’s attempts to securitize the imperial civilized
identity to legitimize her expansion into Taiwan and China in the late nineteenth
century, Makdisi and Deringil have recently shown that the bifurcation of the
‘civilized’ and the ‘savage’ also played a considerable role in Ottoman imperialism
and Orientalism.²⁵
Deringil aptly explains the entry of the term into the Ottoman context as a
‘survival tactic’, while the Kosovan historian Isa Blumi demonstrates that
Ottoman official elites embraced an orientalist attitude toward their periphery
to influence at least ‘two very distinctive sets of rhetorical battles’ that were fought
between the competing voices within Great Powers that advocated for or against
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, as well as between expansionist
imperialist discourses, both Ottoman and European, overseas.²⁶
Both Deringil and Blumi consider these ‘tactics’ and ‘rhetorical battles’ with
special reference to the late nineteenth-century history of imperialism. In a similar
²² Anghie, International Law, 4; Bell, ‘Empire’, 867.
²³ Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Approaches to Global History and the Question of the “Civilizing
Mission” ’, Global History and Maritime Asia Working and Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper
no. 3, http://www.geocities.jp/akitashigeru/PDF/DiscussionPaper2006_01_14Osterhammel.pdf (last
accessed 12 Sept. 2017), 16–17.
²⁴ Bowden, The Empire of Civilisation.
²⁵ Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International
Society (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Makdisi, ‘Ottoman Orientalism’; ‘Rethinking Ottoman
Imperialism: Modernity, Violence and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform’, in The Empire in the
City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, ed. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and
StefanWeber (Wurzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 29–48; Selim Deringil, ‘ “They Live in a State of
Nomadism and Savagery”: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate’, Comparative
Studies in Society and History 45(2) (Apr. 2003): 311–42.
²⁶ Isa Blumi, ‘Reorientating European Imperialism: How Ottomanism Went Global’, Die Welt des
Islams 56 (2016): 316.
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vein to Türesay’s recent article, I will extend the chronology further and contend
that the Ottoman idea of civilization and, as a derivative of this, orientalism can in
fact be traced at least as far back as the 1830s.²⁷ Yet I will argue that, here, Mustafa
Reșid’s experience was pivotal.
As far as has been established, even though previously the Greek revolutionar-
ies had used the term in international diplomacy in the 1810s, the vocabulary of
civilization (medeniyet) was naturalized in Ottoman Turkish political lexicology,
first in an editorial of the official newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi (The Chronicle of
Events), and then with Reșid’s letters from Paris to Istanbul in the 1830s about the
same time the notion became rampant in French political thought. By the 1850s,
medeniyetçilik (civilizationism) emerged as a semi-official ideology of the
Ottoman Empire. The ruling elites in Istanbul, mostly protégés of Mustafa
Reșid, then came to believe that avoiding being on the receiving end of foreign
intervention and European encroachment required classifying their empire as one
of ‘the civilized’ societies of the world, or at least pretending that it was so (see
Chapter 11).²⁸ In the beginning, however, the adoption of the nineteenth-century
idea of civilization in Ottoman political thought did not result simply from the
desire to fend off European encroachments into domestic politics. The historical
reality was quite the contrary.
While living in Paris in 1834, Mustafa Reșid found himself in an intellectual
and political milieu where the idea of ‘civilization’ was widely absorbed into
French liberal and positivist thought, especially since the publication of François
Guizot’s 1828–9 lectures at Sorbonne on the history of European civilization.²⁹
Guizot argued for the existence of a universal civilization progressing across a
unilinear timeline, a civilization of those who led and those who followed, and of
the global role European empires ought to play, civilizing others as the spearhead
of progress. An unmistakable position of superiority was thus attributed to
Europe, while Asia, which was usually considered to be the ‘cradle of civilisation’,
was associated with decadence and barbarity. It was excluded from the field of
civilization ‘by identifying it with a glorious past, but dead’.³⁰
The one exception to this stark split between the ‘civilized’ West and the
‘barbaric’ East manifested itself in French liberal and Saint-Simonian thought of
the 1830s in the heroic achievements of Mehmed Ali. I must note that the politics
²⁷ Özgür Türesay, ‘The Ottoman Empire Seen Through the Lens of Postcolonial Studies: Recent
Historiographical Turn’, Revue d’histoire modern et contemporaine 60(3) (2013): 127–45.
²⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, ‘Kalemiye’den Mülkiye’ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti’, in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal
Düşünce 1. Tanziatın Birikimi ve Meşrutiyet, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim
Yayınları, 2004), 55–6; Fuat Andıç and Süphan Andıç, The Last of the Ottoman Grandees: The Life and
the Political Testament of Âli Paşa (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1996), 35.
²⁹ Franck Laurent, ‘Penser l’Europe avec l’histoire. La notion de civilisation européenne sous la
Restauration et la Monarchie de Juillet’, Romantisme 104 (1999): 53–68, at 53.
³⁰ Ibid.
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of the July Monarchy, which had been formed after the 1830 revolution, encour-
aged the romantic admiration of the Napoleonic legend, even though, before 1848,
the legend ‘did not channel into Bonapartism’.³¹ This is important to remember
because, although there had been for many years a growing political and economic
interest in Egypt, during the first decade of the July Monarchy, Mehmed Ali came
to be identified in France with Bonaparte and what he stood for.
As Caquet writes, this was partially because the pașa’s ‘personal trajectory was
marvellously suited to the Romantic age . . . Like Bonaparte, the Pa[ș]a had first
been a soldier; like Bonaparte, he was a charismatic figure; like Bonaparte, he was
identified with a new regime’which he had established in Egypt, ‘tearing it from its
centuries-old bandages’.³² Like Bonaparte, he attempted to conquer Syria.
Bonaparte had failed to capture the castle of St Jean d’Acre from Jazzar Pașa in
1799, whereas Mehmed Ali would control this unattainable castle (see Chapter 5),
which attracted admiration and sympathy in France and revived memories of the
Napoleonic campaign.³³
What mattered also was the role French agents played in the modernization of
the Egyptian army and the valiant accounts of French commanders such as
Colonel Sèves, once a junior officer in the Grande Armée and now the second-
in-command of the Egyptian army in Syria.³⁴ All subsequent news of Mehmed
Ali’s glorious victories over the sultan, who in French eyes represented the ancien
régime, were thus greeted by many in France with enthusiasm.
Mehmed Ali played his part in honing French sentiments. In Alexandria,
banquets and parties were given to celebrate the July Monarchy.³⁵While awaiting
the Ottoman imperial army in Konya in December 1832, his son Ibrahim played
La Marseillaise to increase the morale of his army. Moreover, the pașa subsidized
French journals to propagandize on behalf of his campaign, portraying him as an
eastern counterpart of Bonaparte. He would boast of having been born in the same
year as Bonaparte (though, according to his biographer, he was actually born in
1770–71, not 1769).³⁶ And he dispatched the three obelisks to New York, London,
and Paris to paint Egypt as a distinct entity from the rest of the Ottoman and
wider Islamic world—as a unique civilization, that of the pharaohs, that needed to
be considered differently. Here was the extension of the propaganda war that he
had waged against Istanbul in the 1830s. And it worked. Mehmed Ali was
perceived, at least in French thought, as an exceptional figure, beyond the unciv-
ilized peoples of the East.
³¹ Stanley Mellon, ‘The July Monarchy and the Napoleonic Myth’, Yale French Studies 26 (1960):
70–78, at 71.
³² Lucien Davéziés, ‘Mohammed-Ali-Pacha’, La Revue des deux mondes (Sept. 1835): 443; cf.
P. E. Caquet, The Orient, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41 (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 52. See also Gaultier-Kurhan, Méhémet Ali, 39–40.
³³ Cadalvène and Barrault, Histoire, 1–2. ³⁴ Caquet, The Orient, 53.
³⁵ Jerome Louis, La Question d’Orient sous Louis-Philippe (Paris: SPM Lettrage, 2015), 39.
³⁶ Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 2.
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For Mustafa Reșid, observing in Paris the ‘Egyptian extravaganza’ that revolved
around the persona of Mehmed Ali, and encountering there the idea of ‘civilisa-
tion’ was at once a source of immense frustration and inspiration. He was appalled
to witness the association of Egypt with advancement in France while the
Ottoman Empire at large was scorned. Consequently, he settled on a less cautious
and more dynamic policy, fighting his own narrative battle to unravel the ‘mis-
perceptions’ of Mehmed Ali and Egypt in Paris. He repeatedly maintained to his
French interlocutors, such as the prime minister, Maréchal Étienne Maurice
Gérard (1773–1852), General Armand Charles Guilleminot (1774–1840), the
former ambassador to Istanbul, and Émile Desages (1793–1850), the French
président du conseil, that Sultan Mahmud II and the Porte were the real, unique
mediums of ‘civilization’ in the east. As he once put it, unlike Cairo, Istanbul had
remained unwaveringly loyal to ‘civilization’, which Mustafa Reșid defined in a
dispatch in the moral and political sense as ‘the principles of the cultivation of
people and the execution of order’. Espousing a unilinear conception of time in a
similar vein to Guizot, he argued that progress in Istanbul was perhaps slow but
stable, and that it was the real guarantee of the unity of the Islamic world.³⁷
According to Reșid, the sultan desired to undertake new reforms with the purpose
of ensuring the prosperity of the Ottoman population, regardless of their religion
and race.³⁸
In November 1834, the Ottoman diplomat wrote to the French foreign ministry
about the intended ‘improvements and reform in the administration of the
[Ottoman] Empire’, which had been ‘tirelessly’ under way with the purpose of
the development of ‘des principes feronds de la civilisation*’,³⁹ and which would
take further effect by means of the establishment of post offices, roads, and a
straight line of railway between ‘Scutari to Nicomedia, over eighteen leagues in
length, with post houses’. The ‘imperial will’ was to render all these advantages
‘common to the other parts of the Empire’.⁴⁰
In this new narrative, Mustafa Reșid despised Mehmed Ali and his Egypt as the
‘other’. He knew that Mehmed Ali was playing the field to make use of the
differences among the Powers, and possibly attract France and Britain to his
cause against the Russian-backed sultan.⁴¹ Stunned and distressed, Reșid wrote
back to Istanbul, perhaps too bluntly, that he found the plans of Mehmed Ali
‘inappropriate’ even for ‘an ignoble old man’, and that he took these as a sign of
the fact that the pașa had now become ‘senile’ and ‘doddered’. In his interviews
³⁷ Cavit Baysun, ‘Mustafa Reşit Paşa’nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasî Yazıları’,
Tarih Vesikaları 1(4) (1941): 283–296, at 291; Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 69.
³⁸ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 115–16. ³⁹ The asterisk is in the original text.
⁴⁰ ‘Mémorandum adressé au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par l’Envoyé Ottoman le 25 novembre
1834 après son entrevue avec M. Desages, le 24 du même mois’, AMAE CP 269/270.
⁴¹ Mavroyeni to [Istanbul], 28 Oct. 1834, BOA HR SYS 1910/47; Ponsonby to Reis Efendi, 23 Nov.
1834, BOA HR.SYS 933/1/53.
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with French statesmen and bureaucrats, the Ottoman chargé d’affaires maintained
that after Mehmed Ali ‘pegged out’ (geberdikten sonra), the troubled situation of
his rule (referring to the ongoing anti-Egyptian revolts in Syria) would worsen
under the leadership of his son Ibrahim Pașa, who was ‘morally weak’ and
incapable.⁴²
Mustafa Reșid’s rhetorical bifurcation here between the allegedly unsteady and
untrustworthy politics of Mehmed Ali and his son Ibrahim, on the one hand, and
the unwavering but slow progress of the Porte, on the other, was possibly the
earliest case of the notion of ‘civilization’ being adopted as a distinct line of
demarcation between Istanbul and its periphery. Even though the idea of ‘exter-
iority’ had already been used to distinguish the imperial capital and the provinces,
with the introduction of the notion of the civilization into the political lexicon, this
idea was incorporated into a new formula.⁴³
This was a milestone in the history of Ottoman orientalism.⁴⁴ Mustafa Reșid’s
rhetorical turn, which has up to now remained unexplored in literature on
Ottoman orientalism, was a hybrid product of the propaganda battle between
Cairo and Istanbul and his encounter with the French (Guizotian) idea of civil-
ization in Paris.
This situation displays remarkable parallels to the fact that, in the late 1790s
and the 1800s, at the request of Sultan Selim III, Ottoman statesmen had written
several pamphlets on the military strength of their empire in the French language
and to a European audience, in order to ensure their empire’s (ontological)
security by positioning it among the powerful actors of the global order.⁴⁵ As of
the mid-1830s, the notion of civilization was adopted, and became a major
rhetorical frame for Ottoman statesmen, by and large with the same purpose.
The resolve was to situate Istanbul among the civilized imperial Powers, not
simply by way of highlighting its military strength, and not as yet to fend off
foreign encroachments, but instead, in this particular moment, to obtain Great
Power support, or at least to sever French endorsement of Mehmed Ali. While at
the turn of the century the Ottoman statesmen had sought to influence European
policy-makers, in the 1830s they also had to address European public opinion.⁴⁶
*
By the end of 1834, Reșid’s one and only political achievement in Paris was
directly linked to this objective. He managed to gain for the Ottoman cause
⁴² Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 69.
⁴³ On the notion of exteriority, see Marc Aymes, ‘Provincialiser l’empire. Chypre et la Méditerranée
ottomane au XIXe siècle’, Annales. Histoire, sciences sociales 6 (2007): 1313–44, at 1317.
⁴⁴ Makdisi, ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, 769. ⁴⁵ See Ch. 2.
⁴⁶ On the semantic history of the notion of ‘civilization’ (medeniyet) in the Ottoman world, see
Tuncer Baykara, Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı (Istanbul: IQ Yayıncılık, 2007).
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writers like Jean-Marie Jouannin and Serge Evans, who published articles attempt-
ing to unravel the pro-Mehmed Ali propaganda in the French press.⁴⁷ And when
the Ottoman chargé d’affaires felt persuaded that his presence in France was no
longer necessary, he requested of the Porte on 9 November 1834 that he might
return to Istanbul.⁴⁸ He left Paris in early 1835, having met Austrian and French
statesmen, studied the European international system, and familiarized himself
with the idea of ‘civilization’.
Upon his arrival in the imperial capital in April 1835, Mustafa Reșid was granted
an audience with the sultan and his son Abdülmecid, to whom he detailed the
situation of politics in France as well as international relations in Europe more
widely. Even though Mustafa Reșid’s mission to Paris was hardly a diplomatic
success, Mahmud II was fascinated by the knowledge his young diplomat amassed.
He thereupon ordered the latter’s reappointment to Paris at the rank of ambassa-
dor.⁴⁹ The sultan furthermore asked Mustafa Reșid to write a mazbata (report)
about possible measures to be taken to deal with the issues of Algiers and Egypt.
The whereabouts of this report is today unknown, as is the details of its content.
But we do know from a hümâyun that the sultan was pleased with Mustafa Reșid’s
suggestions, as he praised his new ambassador for his diligence and devotion.⁵⁰
It is usually assumed that the report called for a series of new reforms aimed at
strengthening the empire internally, as a means to present the Ottoman Empire as
among the ‘civilized’ nations of the world and obtain international support against
Mehmed Ali.⁵¹ This is because, less than half a year later, a new period of bureau-
cratic reforms began in the Ottoman Empire, first with the reorganization of the
ministries along European lines—the Reisülküttâb became the foreign minister
(hariciye nazırı), for instance—and later the various defterdars (provincial treas-
urers) were gathered under the ministry of finance (maliye nezareti).⁵² All these
were in effect the beginning of a new Tanzimat (reordering) era in the Ottoman
Empire, even though the official declaration would have to wait another four years.
While the new reforms were under way in Istanbul, Mustafa Reșid set off for his
first Paris embassy in October 1835; the next year he was swapped with Nuri
Efendi, the ambassador to London, due to the latter’s health problems in the
British climate. But Reșid could obtain almost no diplomatic success in either of
the two capitals except perhaps improving relations with Britain that had been
tarnished due to the infamous ‘Churchill affair’ in 1836.⁵³ He was disappointed by
⁴⁷ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 77–9; Mavroyeni to [the Porte], 14 Apr. 1835, BOA HR. SYS 1911/8.
⁴⁸ BOA HAT 832/37550; also in Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 66–7; Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 111.
⁴⁹ BOA HR.SFR.3 1/1. ⁵⁰ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 72.
⁵¹ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 69.
⁵² Ali Akyıldız, Tanzimat Dönemi OsmanlıMerkez Teşkilatında Reform (1836–1856) (Istanbul: Eren
Yayıncılık, 1993), 26.
⁵³ Baysun, Tanzimat, 728, 730; Kaynar,Mustafa Reșit, 80, 83. The Churchill crisis emerged out of an
accident, when a British subject, William Churchill, accidentally killed an Ottoman subject during a
hunting party and the Ottoman authorities arrested him. Lord Ponsonby’s insistent demand for the
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Palmerston’s unwillingness to help the Porte’s cause on the Algiers issue for fear of
upsetting London’s French allies. Reșid reminded him, and was at pains to report
back to Istanbul, that the Powers had formed an alliance during the ‘Greek
mischief ’ (Yunan fesadı) in the 1820s to prevent bloodshed in the name of
humanity. Now in Algiers, while blood was being shed for unjust reasons (refer-
ring to the French invasion of Algiers and the anti-colonial war the Algerian
inhabitants had waged against France), they were doing nothing: ‘the European
states are not caring about the sins committed in Algiers, . . . [is it] because they do
not see [the Muslims] as humans?’⁵⁴
This was precisely the confusion that most Ottoman statesmen, less prejudiced
against the liberal European Powers and more eager to develop cordial relations
with them, grappled with. Yet they almost never had any other choice but turn for
aid to the same Powers they suspected. The prospects of obtaining Great Power
support for the sultan’s designs against Mehmed Ali were grim in Europe.
Dominated by Russophiles, the political situation in Istanbul was even more
dangerous for Reșid.
*
The intra-elite struggles at home took a new turn while he was in London. First,
Serasker Hüsrev was dismissed from his post in November 1836 due, allegedly, to
his old age but in fact because of his quarrels with his former protégé Akif and Said
Pașa, who had become the sultan’s sons-in-law.⁵⁵ Hüsrev’s dismissal meant a
schism in the Russophile camp among the Ottoman ministers. Russian represen-
tatives in Istanbul considered Hüsrev to be the most trustworthy figure, but now
the signatory of the Hünkar Iskelesi Treaty of 1833 was no longer at the centre of
power.⁵⁶
Making use of the weakening of the Russophiles, when Pertev managed to have
his protégé, Mustafa Reșid, appointed as the new foreign minister on 13 June
1837, the Russian ambassador to Istanbul, Butenev, interpreted the news as a sign
of the sultan’s desire to break free from the tsar’s influence. In Russian eyes, during
his embassies in Paris and London, Reșid had become the ‘main vehicle’ for pro-
British policies. The reforms initiated at his suggestion in 1835–6 were clear
indicators of this new orientation.⁵⁷
release of Churchill resulted in Ottoman foreign minister Akif Pașa’s resignation. But the Russophile
camp in Istanbul, as well as the sultan, resented the British attitude at the time, which fanned hostilities
between pro-British and pro-Russian Ottoman ministers.
⁵⁴ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 83.
⁵⁵ Pisani to Ponsonby, 2 Nov. 1836, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E483/4F/1; Pisani to Ponsonby, 15
Nov. 1836, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E483/4F/9.
⁵⁶ Maria N. Todorova, Angliya, Rossiya i Tanzimat (Moscow: Nauka i Izkustvo, 1983), 130; Carter
V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.
⁵⁷ Butenev to Nesselrode, 18 Nov. 1835, AVPRI, f. Kantselyariya, d. 47, ll. 253–7; cf. Todorova,
Rossiya, 130–31.
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The hidden rivalry between the arguably pro-British and pro-Russian factions,
one led by Pertev and the other by Akif and Said Pașas, thereupon broke open and
turned into a ruthless struggle and intrigue.⁵⁸ It resulted in Pertev’s dismissal from
the cabinet for purportedly having been involved in an attempt to assassinate the
sultan, which was in fact a ploy of Akif Pașa, who then seized his post as the
interior minister. Listening to Akif ’s insinuations, Mahmud II eventually had
Pertev and his associates executed in Edirne without mercy in November 1837.⁵⁹
Just about the time his patron Pertev’s life was taken, Reșid was approaching
the Balkans on his way to Istanbul to take up his new post. He was devastated by
the news.⁶⁰ His mentor was no more, and in Istanbul there awaited a powerful
network of Russian agents and pro-Russian ministers, Akif and Said Pașas,
amongst others. Reșid’s life, not to mention his entire political career, was
now in danger. He was not sure how the sultan would receive him, as his
European mission had not procured his empire any gains and, above all, Pertev
was his patron.
But not long after his arrival Mustafa Reșid was relieved to realize that, despite
the execution of Pertev, Mahmud II still had little sympathy for Russia and for that
matter, pro-Russian policies, and he was still fond of the new foreign minister. As
a matter of fact, despite all opposition, Reșid was elevated to the rank of pașa in
January 1838. He then formed in Istanbul a most unlikely inter-elite alliance
against the Russophiles Said, Akif, and Halil Rifat. One such ally was the latter
two’s ‘father’, Hüsrev, whom they had sidelined in 1836.⁶¹ Rıza Efendi, another
figure favoured by the sultan and his mother, Valide Sultan, also joined
Reșid’s camp.
With the momentum of his return and new alliances, Mustafa Reșid secretly
communicated with the sultan, almost on a daily basis, all his concerns about the
imperial state through an agent called Mustafa Kani Bey, who had been specific-
ally appointed by Mahmud II for this purpose.⁶² The shift in his position of power
can be discerned also in the dispatches of foreign diplomats such as Lord
Ponsonby, who, at the beginning, found Mustafa Reșid to be a man ‘timid and
afraid of Russia’. But, shortly after, he changed his tone: ‘There is no other man
[than Reșid] capable of conducting at all to the taste of the Sultan a large part of
the affairs of the Government.’⁶³
By the spring of 1838, Mustafa Reșid’s sway in the Sublime Porte was supreme.
The sultan promised him new measures that would ensure the security of the life,
liberty, and property of Ottoman subjects, which would allow, first and above all,
relatively more freedom for Ottoman statesmen to perform their duties. And then
⁵⁸ ‘Note by Ponsonby’, 12 June 1837, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E631/49.
⁵⁹ Findley, Ottoman, 76; ‘Pertev Mehmed Said Pașa’, IA, 235. ⁶⁰ Selahaddin, Evrak, 19.
⁶¹ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 336–43. ⁶² Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 100.
⁶³ Webster, Palmerston, 536.
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he led the passage of a series of reforms including the establishment of new
bureaucratic bodies such as Meclis-i Vâlâ’yi Ahkâm-i Adliye (the Supreme
Council of Judicial Ordinances) and Dar-i Şurâ-yi Bâb-i Âli (the Consultative
Assembly of the Sublime Porte) in March 1838. Hüsrev was named the head of the
Meclis-i Vâlâ. It consisted of five members who were tasked with preparing the
laws and regulations that would enable the reforms which the sultan then called
‘tanzimat-i hayriyye’ (auspicious reforms), as well as editing the mandates drafted
by Dar-i Şurâ-yi Bâb-i Âli, which, at Mustafa Reșid’s request, were gathered twice
a week in the presence of the grand vizier, serasker, grand admiral, and the foreign
minister himself.⁶⁴ Moreover, a motion was passed for the preparation of a penal
code. After obtaining a fatwa from the şeyhülislam, a new system for quarantines
(an international sanitary council) and passports was introduced in order to
bolster imperial security (maslahatı kavileştirmek için) and health provision in a
time of cholera epidemics.⁶⁵ These were accompanied by a commission that was
established to oversee all political economic matters as well as issues linked to
agriculture, commerce, and industry such as the causes of the empire’s trade
deficit.⁶⁶
It is true that Mustafa Reșid was one of the masterminds of these reforms, and
his ideas were shaped in large measure by the European example: their state
mechanisms, permanent embassies, the handling of the interior and external
affairs of the empire in different state departments, or the importance of the
non-arbitrary appointment or dismissal of the members of the imperial councils.⁶⁷
At the same time, the Ottoman reform movement of the late 1830s was in many
senses the resurgence of the hybrid temperament of the New Order of Selim III,
which had been an amalgam of European-inspired ideals and the teachings of the
Sunni–Orthodox Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi school.⁶⁸ Figures like Hüsrev, Pertev,
and the future Valide Sultan Bezm-i Alem were all linked to the Naqshbandi
school, or at least to the proponents of the New Order, such as Küçük Hüseyin
Pașa (Selim III’s right hand and the prominent grand admiral), and his wife, Esma
Sultan (Selim III’s sister).⁶⁹ Moreover, figures like Sadık Rifat Pașa, the sultan’s
ambassador to Vienna, supported the movement by sending reports on European
institutions and advising on the means of reform.⁷⁰
The Russian-backed adversaries of this hybrid camp such as Halil Rifat and
Akif Pașas, for their part, were not opponents of reform. Their disagreement was
⁶⁴ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 102.
⁶⁵ Ahmet Dönmez, Osmanlı Modernleşmesinde İngiliz Etkisi: Diplomasi ve Reform (1833–1841)
(Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2014), 220.
⁶⁶ ‘Memorandum on the Commission to Lord Ponsonby’, n.d., DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E631/88.
⁶⁷ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 104, 107. ⁶⁸ See Ch. 2.
⁶⁹ Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript’, Die Welt des Islams 34(2)
(Nov. 1994): 184–7.
⁷⁰ Seyit B. Uğurlu and Mehmet Demirtaş, ‘Mehmet Sadık Rifat Paşa ve Tanzimat’, History Studies
2(1) (2010): 44–64.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
     191
instead mainly over the means and content of the programme. As the Russian agents
in Istanbul observed, they preferred more independent and indigenous reforms in
the Ottoman Empire, instead of the replication of ideas and institutions from
Europe, which could prove hazardous and inefficient in the sultan’s dominions.⁷¹
Mahmud II listened to the demands of both groups. He endorsed Mustafa
Reșid’s vision. But he did not grant the foreign minister unlimited liberty in his
scheme. For instance, since Reșid aimed to recruit to the Ottoman cause the
support of European public opinion and of Ottoman subjects, both Muslim and
non-Muslim, in 1838 he requested the announcement of an edict to herald the
new reforms. A pilot region was even chosen, in the environs of Bursa, for the
implementation of new institutional and political reforms. But, due in part to
Russophile ministers’ insinuations that such an edict would lead to the curbing of
his absolute power, and in part because he felt uncertain whether he was making
too many concessions to Reșid, the sultan decided against the plan.⁷² The prom-
ulgation of the edict would have to wait for another year.
Commerce and Security: A Capo d’Opera?
All these bureaucratic changes overlapped with Anglo-Ottoman negotiations over
the opening up of the sultan’s dominions to free trade. As noted previously, a
major relational dynamic of the Eastern Question was the intersection between
the economic, financial, legal, strategic, and religious calculations of the various
agents. The expansion of global capitalism was one of the major determinants of
European diplomatic and military interventions in the Levant.
In 1815, Sultan Mahmud II had rejected the Great Powers’ guarantees over his
European dominions partially because commercial issues (liberalizing commerce
in the Ottoman shores) had been tied to the Powers’ proposal, which had baffled
and intimidated him. In the mid-1830s, the security-for-liberal-commerce
dilemma would again be brought to the attention of his ministers. By then, free
trade had become a more pressing concern for western European empires, espe-
cially for Britain and France, who needed to find new markets for their manufac-
tured goods in the age of the industrial revolution. Central European economies
were protected by high customs tariffs. This would lead British merchants to search
for new markets in Asia, particularly in the Ottoman and Chinese empires.
*
Under normal circumstances the age-old capitulatory agreements with the
Ottoman Empire would allow British merchants to sell their goods in the sultan’s
dominions with a degree of liberty. Import and export tariffs had been fixed at
⁷¹ Todorova, Rossiya, 129, 130, 131, 134. ⁷² Dönmez, İngiliz Etkisi, 221.
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3 per cent by the agreements of 1800, 1805, 1809 and 1820. But the customs duties
British merchants paid in reality were 12 per cent or higher, as was the case with
oil (35 per cent), opium (48 per cent), or silk (35 per cent).⁷³
This was why British merchants complained that these were irregularly applied,
as in each case a merchant could be asked by the Ottoman authorities for different
sums for the same product, while the same rule applied to states differently. They
believed that there was great ambiguity due to variable charges made for permis-
sions to trade in the interior too.⁷⁴
Another problem was the fact that international trade in the Ottoman Empire
had previously been limited to ports because of religious prejudices as well as
logistical difficulties. The existing capitulatory agreements had been designed in
accordance with these customs. The growing tendency towards foreign commerce
with the interior of the empire had led the Porte’s authorities to levy extra duties,
and to exercise prohibitions as well as monopolies that were granted for the
producers to sell at fanciful prices of the sole manufacturers as venders.⁷⁵ This
was why, as early as 1833, Palmerston had asked Ponsonby to remind the sultan
that monopolies were ‘injurious to the Industry of both Nations, and in the end
detrimental to the financial interests of the Porte’.⁷⁶
Moreover, British merchants were in a disadvantageous position in comparison
to Russian traders in the Levant after the 1829 Treaty of Edirne. Palmerston and
his agents believed that it was legitimate to ask for the same (i.e. establishing ‘a
general system of certainty . . . to the foreign trade’), as well as a European union
entitled to enjoy special privileges such as those accorded to Russia, whose
merchants paid fixed duties by treaties. This new system would be introduced in
place of a ‘perpetual and secret struggle to obtain such privileges amongst the
European nations’.⁷⁷
Finally, there was the issue of unequal customs duties levied by British author-
ities: ‘for every £100 of English goods sold in Turkey, the Porte exacted but £3 in
custom duties, whereas English duties on Turkish products of equal value amount
to £60.’⁷⁸ This was why the Porte was also willing to review the customs tariffs on
certain products; it was actually the sultan’s agents that had taken the initiative,
not Britain, in the commencement of negotiations over the tariffs in 1834, as the
previous agreements were now expiring.⁷⁹
⁷³ Henry L. Bulwer to Henry U. Addington, 26 May 1843, NRO Henry Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/18/
1–20, 561X9. See also Bailey, British Policy, 120–21.
⁷⁴ Henry L. Bulwer to Henry U. Addington, 26 May 1843, NRO Henry Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/18/
1–20, 561X9.
⁷⁵ Ibid.
⁷⁶ Palmerston to Ponsonby, 6 Dec. 1833, TNA FO 78/220/22; cf. Bailey, British Policy, 121.
⁷⁷ Henry L. Bulwer to Henry U. Addington, 26 May 1843, NRO Henry Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/18.
⁷⁸ David Urquhart, ‘Turkey and its Resources’, 92; cf. Bailey, 119–20.
⁷⁹ Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri (1580–1838) (Ankara: Türk
Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1974), 92.
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At first, the talks proceeded at a rather slow pace. This was due to the stark
differences of interest as well as the urgency of the Porte’s ‘Egyptian crisis’. In
1835, Palmerston hinted to Nuri Efendi in London that these commercial and
political issues could well be connected. With the abolition of the monopolies in
the Ottoman Empire, ‘[a]n increase of the commercial intercourse between the
subjects of the two states must tend necessarily to strengthen the political union
between the two governments’.⁸⁰ But his hint did not prompt any concrete results.
In October 1836, the British agents prepared a draft agreement for the consid-
eration of the Porte. Ponsonby had little hope; in his view, the Porte would reject
‘with extraordinary perseverance’ the abolition of monopolies, especially given
that, amidst the crisis with Egypt, it was in a state of emergency and mobilization,
and expensive military reform had for some time been under way, while war with
Mehmed Ali was only a matter of time.⁸¹ All these, together with the desire to
make up the losses arising from the depreciated Ottoman currency, added up to
an urgent need for funds.⁸² It was no time to make commercial concessions that
could adversely affect the Ottoman treasury.⁸³
In May and July 1837, Ponsonby again dolefully wrote, ‘the Porte feels the
shackles imposed upon it by the [commercial] conventions that exist’, referring to
the 1829 agreement with Russia. Obtaining the consent of Istanbul was ‘almost
impossible’.⁸⁴ Additionally, Russophile ministers were concomitantly pressuring
the sultan against an Anglo-Ottoman agreement, still exercising a profound
influence over the cabinet. Russia would not want the Porte to enter into an
agreement with Britain which would upset the Russian merchants’ advantageous
position in the Levant.
*
What eased the gridlocked Anglo-Ottoman negotiations was a bold political move
on the part of Mehmed Ali of Egypt. Spurred by his preoccupation with Druze
revolts and distress caused by the existence of an Ottoman imperial army of
50,000 men in his borders, the pașa’s military preparations were continuing at
full speed.⁸⁵ Yet they were draining Egypt’s sources and prompting domestic
discontent, embroiling the pașa’s country in a vicious cycle.
⁸⁰ Palmerston to Nuri, 23 Oct. 1835, TNA FO 195/122; cf. Bailey, British Policy, 127.
⁸¹ Frederick Pisani to Ponsonby, 14 Oct. 1836, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/E483/45.
⁸² Bailey, British Policy, 122. In 1828, the British sterling was quoted in Istanbul at 60 piastres, while
in 1832 it rose to 100. Charles Issawi, ‘Notes on the Negotiations Leading to the Anglo-Turkish
Commercial Convention of 1838’, in Mémorial Ömer Lutfi Barkan (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1980),
119–134, at 119–20.
⁸³ See also ‘Objections which Pisani believed the Porte would make to certain clauses in the
commercial treaty proposed by Britain’, 26 Dec. 1836, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E483.
⁸⁴ Ponsonby to Palmerston, 9 May 1837; cf. Bailey, British Policy, 122; Denise LeMarchant [Office of
Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Whitehall] to Bulwer, 20 July 1837, NROHenry Bulwer Papers,
BUL 1/17.
⁸⁵ See Ch. 9.
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In early 1838, encouraged by a number of French and British merchants and
travellers such as Thomas Waghorn and John Bowring, who, during a visit to
Egypt, made Mehmed Ali believe that Britain would not object to his independ-
ence, the pașa looked to break this cycle by voicing once more the idea of
separation from the sultan.⁸⁶ In March, he hinted confidentially at his idea to
the French consul-general, Adrien-Louis Cochelet (1788–1858)—a sign of his
trust in France; then, in May 1838, he publicly announced his intention to gain
independence to the representatives of all four Powers (Austria, Britain, France,
and Russia), stating that ‘he was now an old man’, and could never ‘consent that
all that which he has been toiling for, and all [his] useful and costly establishments
founded . . . at an enormous expense [would] revert to the Porte and to be lost at
his death . . . I have worked fifty-two years to achieve what I am today.’⁸⁷ He had a
family as well as ‘a thousand adopted children’ for whom he took the place of
father, and he felt that all his labours would merely have been for the Porte, while
his own children and family would be exposed to want and perhaps even to be put
to death: ‘I cannot quit this life without securing their future.’⁸⁸
In this kairotic moment, just as Mehmed Ali declared his intention to win
independence, Ponsonby used the anxieties in Istanbul to his advantage, arguing
that an Anglo-Ottoman commercial agreement could be ‘a means . . . to destroy
the power of [Mehmed Ali] by destroying monopolies’ upon which the latter’s
economic system was founded.⁸⁹ In addition, the British ambassador gave reason
for Mustafa Reșid to believe that the commercial agreement could be followed by a
political alliance.⁹⁰
After these remarks, and only then, was the Ottoman foreign minister cajoled.
He naively believed, and suggested to the sultan, that the abolition of the mon-
opolies would not only draw Britain closer to the Porte and upset Mehmed Ali’s
economic system but would also win the support of the sultan’s non-Muslim
subjects who were usually occupied with commerce, revitalize Ottoman agricul-
ture, and thus in the long run procure greater financial benefits despite the
expected immediate losses to the imperial treasury.⁹¹ Its benefits would be greater
than what the sultan feared he might lose.
The British agents, Lord Ponsonby and the chief negotiator, Henry Bulwer,
were aware of the potentially detrimental effects the planned agreements would
cause for the Ottoman economy. They therefore suggested that the Porte ought
not to be left in complete ‘financial embarrassment’. They did not resist the
⁸⁶ Dodwell, Egypt, 170; Webster, Palmerston, vol. 2, 607; Kutluoğlu, Egyptian, 124–5.
⁸⁷ Campbell to Palmerston, 25 May 1838, TNA FO 78/342-II; cf. Kutluoğlu, Egyptian Question, 126.
⁸⁸ Comte Medem to Nesselrode, 17 July 1838, BOA HR SYS 933/1/185.
⁸⁹ Notes by Ponsonby, 11 Apr. 1838, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/E631/75; Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-
İngiliz, 100–101.
⁹⁰ Ponsonby to Cor, 8 Nov. 1838, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E149/9.
⁹¹ BOA HAT 51905-B, 46365; cf. Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz, 103.
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proposal of the Ottoman plenipotentiaries Nuri Efendi and Mustafa Kani Bey to
raise export duties for certain goods from 3 per cent to 12 per cent, and import
duties from 3 per cent to 5 per cent.⁹²
Despite the last-ditch attempts of Halil Rifat and Akif Pașas, who, according to
Ponsonby, were ‘indoctrinated by the Russians’, to prevent the signing of the
agreement, after further last-minute negotiations and British assurances to the
sultan, Mahmud II was persuaded to sign the treaty.⁹³ When the news reached
London, Palmerston was delighted. He wrote to Bulwer that the 1838 convention
was a ‘capo d’opera’ and would be ratified without reserve.⁹⁴ British merchants
were equally content with the efforts made and the final agreement, which opened
up new markets.⁹⁵ A Prussian observer wrote to Palmerston that it might ‘very
likely prove the most important feature of European policy since 1815’.⁹⁶ The
treaty was ratified by Queen Victoria on 8 October 1838 and by the reluctant
sultan in early November.⁹⁷
The Baltalimanı Convention of 1838 was arguably the fourth major step toward
the liberalization of the Ottoman economy in the nineteenth century. The first had
been the new capitulatory treaties that had been revised every seven years since the
1800s; the second the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826, ‘of the urban
guildsmen on the military payroll that were the strongest advocates of protection-
ism’; and the third, the Treaty of Edirne (1829) when (as already noted) Russia
had obtained from the Porte specific rights for her merchants.⁹⁸ Now, in 1838,
most local monopolies were also abolished and extraordinary duties on exports in
the Ottoman Empire—which had, until the 1830s, supplied invaluable fiscal
revenue for the sultan’s treasury in times of crisis—were eliminated. In the
following years, commercial conventions on similar terms were signed with
other European Powers, including France (6 April 1839), Spain (2 March 1840),
the Netherlands (14 March 1840), Prussia (22 October 1840), Denmark (1 May
⁹² Britain accepted these, however, in lieu of internal transit fees (the extra levies charged on British
merchants) from which the foreign merchants were now exempted, thus gaining an advantage over
domestic competition; Ponsonby to Palmerston, 25 July 1838, NRO Henry Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/17;
Fred van Hartesveldt, ‘Henry Bulwer and the Convention of Balta Liman’, Proceedings and Papers of the
Georgia Association of Historians 6 (1985): 56–63, at 60.
⁹³ ‘Note on Halil Pasha’s attempt to influence the Sultan against Reschid Pasha and the Commercial
Convention’, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/E631/84, n.d.; Bulwer to Addington, 26 May 1843, NRO
Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/18.
⁹⁴ Palmerston to Bulwer, 13 Sept. 1838; NRO Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/17.
⁹⁵ ‘Address to Ponsonby signed by thirteen merchants in Constantinople expressing appreciation of
the recent Commercial Convention’, 9 Oct. 1838, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E631/79.
⁹⁶ ‘Memorandum by Augustus Jochmus for Palmerston on the situation in the east following the
commercial treaty with Turkey and seeking employment in the areas especially in a military capacity’,
20 Nov. 1838, GRE/E346.
⁹⁷ Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz, 109; The Times, 19 Dec. 1838; BOA TS.MA.e 597/29.
⁹⁸ Şevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Ottoman De-Industrialization 1800–1913: Assessing
the Shock, Its Impact and the Response’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no.
14763 (2009), 4.
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1841), and Portugal (20 March 1843).⁹⁹ The Ottoman government’s authority to
impose unilateral tariffs in service of the goal of a higher and more protective
structure was thus curbed until the First World War.¹⁰⁰
The short-term consequences of the opening up of the Ottoman economy were
arguably negligible, as the treaties were not implemented by the Porte immediately,
though over time it did procure an advantage to the European merchants over
domestic competition and caused frustration for Mehmed Ali, while local industries
under protection were dissolved one by one.¹⁰¹ But, in the end, with the 1838 treaty,
the Porte did give London what it had hoped for its merchants and commerce. The
question was whether London would act in kind and provide the sultan with
military support against Mehmed Ali through a political alliance without offending
Russia. This was precisely the question to which Mustafa Reșid hoped to find the
answer when he left for London the day after the convention was signed.¹⁰²
‘We Are Still Called Barbarians!’
The Ottoman foreign minister’s talks with Palmerston in London did result in the
draft of an agreement. But Britain would not want to participate in an offensive
alliance with the Porte so as not to tarnish the ‘constitutional alliance’ with France
nor to offend Russia. Palmerston was still committed to the Vienna order and
would not wish to bind himself to a long bilateral alliance treaty with Istanbul
which, he believed, went against the principles of the Concert of Europe.¹⁰³
Instead, the British foreign secretary proposed tacit assistance—support for the
rejuvenation of the sultan’s empire against Mehmed Ali by the sending of military
and naval advisers that would help renovate the Ottoman forces. He believed it
was in the interests of Britain that the sultan should be strong, and it was evident
that he would be stronger with Syria and Egypt than without them.
Palmerston looked to justify his support of the sultan by arguing that the
Ottoman Empire was not ‘crumbling to pieces’. He was possibly the first
European statesman to oppose the idea of ‘Ottoman decline’:
I must question that there is any process of decay going on in the Turkish
Empire. [T]hose who say that the Turkish Empire is rapidly going from bad to
worse ought rather to say that the other countries of Europe are year by year
⁹⁹ Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İngiliz, 114–17.
¹⁰⁰ Reşat Kasaba, ‘Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and China in
the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of World History 4(2) (1993): 218.
¹⁰¹ Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment
and Production (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20; Pamuk andWilliamson, ‘Ottoman
De-industrialization’, 4.
¹⁰² BOA HAT 950/40829C. ¹⁰³ Baysun, Mustafa Reșid, 10; Bailey, British Policy, 176.
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becoming better acquainted with the manifest and manifold defects of the
organisation of Turkey . . .
Still, Palmerston kept his options open, writing later: ‘on the principle of “That
I can do when all I have is gone” we can think of a confederation when unity [of
the Ottoman Empire] shall have been proved to be impossible.’¹⁰⁴
A defensive alliance was the most the British foreign secretary could offer
Mustafa Reșid. But the latter needed more from Palmerston. He knew that it
would not satisfy the sultan in Istanbul, especially after the concessions made with
the 1838 commercial treaty.¹⁰⁵ Russian pressure on the Ottoman imperial capital
was mounting daily, and Mustafa Reșid’s mission had already caused anxiety in
St Petersburg. Nesselrode had instructed Butenev to point out to the sultan the
serious inconveniences triggered by the actions of Mustafa Reșid. St Petersburg
was particularly riled by the information received from Austria that the Ottoman
foreign minister had told British and French agents that after his return to
Istanbul, the Porte would not extend the Hünkar Iskelesi Treaty.¹⁰⁶
*
It is unknown whether this was true. But, even if not, Reșid’s policy proved
inadequate to the sultan. Mahmud II was anxious. The state of uncertainty had
for years exhausted his resources and health. On 6 April 1839, he decided against
the signature of a defensive alliance with Britain.¹⁰⁷ The foreign minister was
ordered to return back to Istanbul. With or without foreign assistance, it was the
hour for battle, not fruitless negotiations. As a major conflict in Kurdistan had
finally been suppressed and as the military had been mobilized and disciplined
under Hafız Pașa and his able advisers, such as the Prussian field marshal
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800–1891), the conviction (introduced again
by Hüsrev) arose that Mehmed Ali’s forces stationed in Urfa could this time be
defeated and pushed back to Egypt.¹⁰⁸
Mahmud II subsequently ordered Hafız Pașa to commence hostilities on
17 April. The imperial army of 150,000 men crossed the Euphrates, invaded
northern Syria, and met the outposts of the Egyptian army of Ibrahim Pașa near
Nizib. The fighting took place on the 29 June. The first discharge of the Egyptian
artillery, when more than 1,000 Ottoman soldiers were cut down, caused such
panic that the sultan’s army almost immediately took to its heels. His units having
been scattered, Hafız Pașa pulled back, accepting defeat.¹⁰⁹
¹⁰⁴ Palmerston to Bulwer, 22 Sept. 1838, NRO Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/17.
¹⁰⁵ BOA HAT 829/37498E. ¹⁰⁶ Todorova, Rossiya, 132, nn. 161, 162.
¹⁰⁷ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 128.
¹⁰⁸ Ponsonby to Cor, 8 Nov. 1838, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/E149.
¹⁰⁹ A. Pisani to Bulwer, 9 July 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/17.
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It was the fourth time that Mahmud II’s imperial armies had been overwhelmed
by Egyptian forces in seven years. But the sultan never heard the news. Before the
two armies clashed, he had fallen very ill. His tuberculosis was in its second stage.
Very lately, perhaps under the strain of recent developments, the threatening
nature of his disease had been made manifest. His physicians had declared that if
the fever ‘which came on every severing was not subdued, he could not live much
above a month’. On 21 June, he was seen in public for the last time, on horseback
on his way to a mosque close by his residence at Çamlıca (where he had been sent
for respite), but he was ‘quite méconnaissable, so emaciated, so pale, so weak that
he could hardly keep his seat’.¹¹⁰ From then onwards he had not been able to leave
his room, and his symptoms were alarming. On the morning of 1 July 1839, just
before the news of the battle reached Istanbul, Mahmud II passed away, having
spent the greatest part of his last night conversing with his 16-year-old son,
Abdülmecid, who was to succeed him, and with Hüsrev, whom he recommended
the young şehzade consider as ‘his father and adviser’.¹¹¹
After Mahmud’s death, however, Hüsrev claimed more than this.¹¹² The next
day, during Abdülmecid’s ascendance to the throne, in possibly the single most
inopportune moment in late Ottoman bureaucratic history, he seized the seal of
the grand vizierate from the hands of Rauf Pașa (the present grand vizier) and
appointed himself the most powerful man in the empire after the sultan. His
opponents, including his former protégés-turned-enemies, and particularly Grand
Admiral Ahmed Fevzi, were all alarmed by this hitherto unheard-of action by the
70-year-old. Fearing the loss of his post and life under Hüsrev’s rule, the grand
admiral immediately fled with the imperial fleet to Rhodes, and thence to
Alexandria, seeking shelter with Mehmed Ali.¹¹³ Thus the Porte lost a battle, its
sultan, and the imperial fleet—all within one week.
*
What would the young Sultan Abdülmecid and his cabinet do now? Authority had
now passed back to the hands of old Hüsrev, and Mustafa Reșid was still in
Europe. The new grand vizier’s first action was to invite the representatives of the
five Great Powers to a conference on 3 July and to communicate to them that the
new sultan wanted to maintain peace.¹¹⁴ At the same time, a letter—signed by
Hüsrev but written on behalf of the sultan—was sent to Mehmed Ali that
promised the pardon of the pașa and guaranteed him the hereditary rule of
¹¹⁰ A. Pisani to Bulwer, 25 June 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/17.
¹¹¹ A. Pisani to Bulwer, 9 July 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/17.
¹¹² Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 354–5. ¹¹³ BOA HR.SYS 933/7; BOA HAT 1239/48178.
¹¹⁴ Palmerston to Bligh, 3 July 1839, BLM Beauvale Papers MS 60475/16.
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Egypt, if he returned Syria, and ‘under the condition of fulfilling entirely the duties
of submission and obedience’.¹¹⁵
Two weeks later, however, Mehmed Ali, despite recognizing Abdülmecid as
sultan and caliph, refused to return Syria to the Porte and demanded de facto
hereditary rights over all provinces he ruled.¹¹⁶ He also strongly demanded the
dismissal of Hüsrev from the post of grand vizier, since he was ‘detested by the
whole nation and for whom all means are admissible for achieving his objective,
including a knife and poison’.¹¹⁷ As soon as Hüsrev was dismissed, Mehmed Ali
would make peace, send the Ottoman fleet back to Istanbul, and he would even go
himself on a steamship to pay homage to the sultan.¹¹⁸
This was what had transpired in early 1833 all over again. The road to Istanbul
was once again open for Ibrahim’s army. Mehmed Ali was again asking for the
dismissal of Hüsrev. The Ottoman sultan, albeit a different one, was again
disinclined to accept this request. And the Porte again found itself having to
turn to the aid of the Powers against a vassal.
What was different this time was that the five Great Powers could finally act in
concert—at least in the beginning. On the day Mehmed Ali’s response reached the
palace, despite all their other differences, the representatives of the five Powers in
Istanbul jointly signed a note to the sultan urging him to suspend any definitive
action without their agreement.¹¹⁹ Six days later, on 27 July, they signed another
note declaring their commitment to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire.¹²⁰
This was the first time since the Congress of Vienna of 1815 that the Powers
had taken a common stance with respect to the Eastern Question. How had the
impasse between them been overcome? What happened to the ideological divides,
Russia’s ‘weak neighbour’ policy, and the distrust among the Powers? Before
answering these questions at some length in the next chapter, I should like to
highlight the agency of Mustafa Reșid as one of the enablers of the multilateral
intervention of the Great Powers that took effect not only by means of inter-
imperial diplomacy but also through domestic reform and, eventually, the insti-
gation of an uprising in Syria.
*
Mustafa Reșid was in London when Sultan Mahmud II died and the Battle of
Nizib was fought. He found out the news on 17 July 1839 after returning to Paris
¹¹⁵ ‘Traduction de la copie d’une lettre écrite par le Grand Vizier to Méhémet Ali Pacha’, 8 July 1839,
AMAE Papiers Desages, 60PAAP/37.
¹¹⁶ (Ambassadeur, Therapia) to M. le Maréchal, 22 July 1839, AMAE Papiers Desages, 60PAAP/37,
f. 46.
¹¹⁷ Laurien to Stürmer, 16 July 1839, HHStA, Türkei VI, 69; cf. Šedivý, Metternich, 743.
¹¹⁸ Roussin to Desages, 26 July 1839, AMAE Papiers Desages, 60PAAP/37, f. 47.
¹¹⁹ Collective Note, 21 July 1839, AMAE Papiers Desages, 60PAAP/37, f. 49.
¹²⁰ Collective Note, 28 July 1839, AMAE Papiers Desages, 60PAAP/37, f. 48.
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and settling into his residence at 1 Rue des Champs-Élysées.¹²¹ In fact the news did
not upset him at all. Instead, he believed that now was the opportunity to put an
end to the crisis, as we can deduce from an informal memorandum to the French
foreign ministry which he drafted in his native language (its date is unknown, but
it appears to have been written after he found out about the death of Mahmud,
and was translated by P. Desgranges on 22 July). In it he underscored his ‘great
hopes’ and desire for European involvement in the crisis in the Ottoman Empire,
and explained how this should take place.¹²²
The memorandum began with a forthright and self-critical portrayal of the
wider ills of Ottoman governance. Mustafa Reșid wrote that the Janissaries had
been a major cause of the maladministration of Ottoman public affairs, and that
since their abolition in 1826, opportunities to introduce new reforms had been
wasted by the ‘intolerable tyranny’ of Mahmud II, as well as by domestic and
external intrigues that prevented the higher levels of administration from under-
taking any measures for the good of the empire. The discontent of the Ottoman
people was not, as was believed in Europe, ‘a result of their lack of disposition to
civilisation’, nor from any other cause arising from fanaticism.
According to Mustafa Reșid, ‘the Egyptian question’ was an accidental product
of the wider ills of the Ottoman imperial system. It had in the past decade further
weakened the empire by exhausting her resources. However, it had resulted
merely from the personal hostility between Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali, and
since the former was now gone and the latter ready to give up the grudges of the
past, it should now be very easy for Istanbul and Cairo to be reconciled, he
maintained. Amidst all these domestic and international hurdles, progress had
been almost impossible. Now was the time for comprehensive reforms that would
prevent the Porte from suffering similar miseries. If new institutions could be formed
and governed ‘with wisdom and discernment’, each would bring ‘the real advantages
of an immutably established system’. Tyranny would diminish and the subjects’
affection for the imperial government would increase: ‘the populations [would] rally
with all the strength of their heart to useful and beneficent innovations.’
For Mustafa Reșid, Mahmud II’s death was an opportunity to effect a break
from this vicious past. But he was concerned that the sultan’s young successor was
still surrounded by those men of the ancient system—domestic (Russophile) and
¹²¹ Jouanin to MAE, 17 July 1839, AMAE CP Turquie 38/128.
¹²² ‘Traduction d’un mémorandum par Moustapha Reschid Pacha’, in ‘Notes sur l’état de la Turquie
traduites par M. Desgranges’, 22 July 1839, AMAE CP Turquie 38/133; also in AMAEMD Turquie 45/
40; Desgranges to Desages, 19 July 1839, AMAE CP Turquie 38/129. Turgut Subaşı has recently
published an article about the memorandum, including in its appendix the full text (in French), in
which he rightly points out that it has been almost entirely overlooked in the literature of the Eastern
Question. However, he asserts that the memorandum was written to Palmerston in August. Turgut
Subaşı, ‘Anglo-Ottoman Relations in the Nineteenth Century: Mustafa Reșid Pașa’s Memorandum to
Palmerston, 11 August 1839’, International Journal of Human Sciences 8(1) (2011): 1731–46.
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foreign (Russian) individuals who were ready to stage any intrigue to sustain their
interests, and who would thus keep alive the ancient system of tyranny which had
arbitrarily claimed the lives of people like his mentor, Pertev Pașa.
This was why the intervention and tutelage of the European Powers was
needed. The foreign minister knew that external interventions would be ‘contrary
to the respective rights of nations’, and ‘the blind submission of Muslims to the
laws of the Qur’an and their recognised fanaticism’ would not fail to make them
‘repel all proposals dictated by the European Powers’. Yet at the same time he
believed that these could be ‘countered by guaranteeing that the intervention and
thus infringement of the respective rights of nations would have as its object no
action harmful to the strength and prosperity of the Ottoman subjects, and that
such interventions would not exceed administrative suggestions’.
Therefore, the proposals ought to be made to the Porte ‘not by a single nation,
but an alliance of all the Great Powers’. It would warrant, by adherence to the
principle of European equilibrium, that such an intervention would not act as ‘an
antecedent to unilateral interventions in the future’. Finally, Mustafa Reșid sug-
gested that the Powers should pay great attention to two things when making
proposals for intervention to the Porte: first, they should not violate the teachings
of the Qur’an, so that the conservative and reactionary powers would not cat-
egorically oppose them; second, proposals for reform of the Ottoman councils
should be made not in the name of ‘liberty’ but in the name of ‘the security of life
and fortune’, so that the agents of those Powers with absolute governments would
not strive to hinder them.¹²³
With these words, one of the sultan’s ministers was for the first time explicitly
calling for the Powers to intervene collectively, defining the nature and limits of
their intervention, and observing the benefits of joint intervention for both Europe
and the Ottoman Empire. His was also a call not to leave the destinies of the
empire to the will of Russia again, and for support for the reforms which he
wanted to undertake.
We will possibly never know whether Mustafa Reșid wrote this memorandum
by himself or received any aid from his European correspondents, such as
Canning or Guilleminot. Either way, the most important point for our purposes
is the role he attached to security as a driving force. He made it clear that the
support of the Great Powers should be framed very carefully—‘security’ had to be
the keyword, not ‘liberty’. His memorandum and subsequent actions would
irreversibly merge local discursive practices in the Levant with a culture of
transimperial security in the following months.
*
¹²³ Ibid.
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About ten days later, on 27 July, the Ottoman foreign minister wrote from Paris to
Grand Vizier Hüsrev, asking him not to hurry in taking any action against
Mehmed Ali. He explained that the Powers not only wanted an arrangement
between the Porte and Egypt, but also stronger measures which would in future
secure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire: ‘so we must do
nothing . . . but wait for the Concert of their combined wills. Waiting brings no
danger.’ Mehmed Ali would not be able to do more than the Powers permitted
him. ‘All that I see in Europe proves to me that all the governments . . . have the
will to support the equilibrium of Europe by the maintenance of the Ottoman
Empire.’ Therefore, ‘[l]et us not act on our own, let the field of negotiations be
entirely free, and let us give up to the Powers, for they are better than us.’
According to Mustafa Reșid, what the Porte had to do for now was ‘not to
shock [Mehmed Ali]’, but ‘to be nice for the form . . . nothing for the substance,
and to refer to the European arbitration’.¹²⁴
The Ottoman foreign minister had realized that the European notes of July
1839 stemmed from their immediate urge to prevent the fall of the empire rather
than the resolution of their ideological and strategic differences. But he was then
left puzzled after his conversations with King Louis Philippe and the prime
minister and foreign minister, Admiral Soult, in late July 1839. The French had
endorsed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But at the same time,
their policy toward Algiers had switched from temporary occupation to coloniza-
tion. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, sympathy for Mehmed Ali in France
was still steering the course of French policy—in fact, the French government
asked the Porte to grant Mehmed Ali the hereditary rights of the provinces that
were currently under his rule.
As a result, after spending three weeks in Paris, Mustafa Reșid did not proceed
to Istanbul as he had initially planned. Instead, he decided to go to London first to
ensure British support. There, on 11 August, he presented his July memorandum
to Palmerston also. Mustafa Reșid believed that the key to the solution of the
‘Egyptian crisis’ lay in London, and in the resolution of its differences with Russia.
But, despite his advice to Hüsrev, he did not just wait to see if the Powers would
resolve their differences in 1839. He was worried that a shift was unfolding in
French policy: ‘A powerful party of [French] philanthropy and liberals’, he
penitently wrote to Hüsrev before leaving Paris, ‘pronounces against us despite
all our reforms.’ Despite all administrative reorganization, all pledges delivered,
and all commercial concessions made in the past decade or so, ‘[w]e are still called
Barbarians [by the French public]’.¹²⁵
¹²⁴ Mustafa Reșid Pașa to Grand Vizier, 27 July 1839, AMAE CP Turquie 38/212, cited also in
Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 130–31.
¹²⁵ Mustafa Reșid Pașa to Grand Vizier, 27 July 1839, AMAE CP Turkey 38/212.
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In September 1839, immediately after he returned to Istanbul, the Ottoman
foreign minister invited young Sultan Abdülmecid, together with the grand vizier,
to consider the promulgation of an edict. The edict would herald a set of new
empire-wide reforms, and help prove the Porte’s civility to the French in particu-
lar. That is, Mustafa Reșid and his network in Istanbul set out to take their own
steps—no longer militarily, nor by provoking Mehmed Ali—but by way of
reforms and regeneration, an idea often attributed to Palmerston, though a
party of Ottoman ministers themselves had upheld it since the late eighteenth
century.
To reiterate, Mustafa Reșid thought that the promulgation of a new series of
reforms would seal the Porte’s commitment to ‘civilization’ in the eyes of the
European Powers and particularly those of French liberal public opinion. At the
same time, it would buttress the sentimental attachment of Ottoman subjects to
the sultan against Mehmed Ali’s power and popularity. Of particular importance
were places like Syria, which had been the focal point of the differences between
Istanbul and Cairo for some time and where uprisings against Egypt had been
taking place intermittently since 1834.
After weeks of confidential negotiations at the imperial councils, the script of
the edict had finally been drafted and agreed upon in early November. Mustafa
Reșid was nervous about how it would be received by the wider public and the
ulema, knowing that its content was ‘far beyond anyone’s expectation’.¹²⁶ On the
evening of 2 November, just hours before he would read out the edict, he told his
steward Salih Bey, ‘Tomorrow I will be in great danger and I have little hope that
I will be alive [by the end of the day].’¹²⁷
On 3 November, Reșid went to the kiosk of the Gülhane Park in Istanbul where
the proclamation was to be delivered. At 11 o’clock in the morning the protocol
began. He received the red ceremonial book from Grand Vizier Hüsrev. He then
ascended a pulpit, standing under a gold awning. Before him were numerous
bureaucrats, European and Ottoman diplomatic corps, and the Istanbul popula-
tion. The sultan was watching behind a curtain at his stand. The foreign minister
waited five minutes for the signal of the court astrologer, and then read out the
script in an audible, expressive tone: ‘All the world knows that . . . countries not
governed by the laws of the shari’a cannot survive,’ he began.¹²⁸
But in the last one hundred and fifty years . . . the sacred shari’a was not obeyed
nor were the beneficent regulations followed [by the Ottoman state]; conse-
quently, [its] former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and
poverty . . . [W]e deem it necessary and important . . . to introduce new legislation
¹²⁶ Pisani to Bulwer, 17 Nov. 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers BUL 1/17.
¹²⁷ Baysun, Mustafa Reșit, 12.
¹²⁸ Caquet, The Orient, 93. For the English translation of the script, Bailey, British Policy, 277.
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to achieve effective administration of the Ottoman Government and Provinces.
Thus, the principles of the requisite legislation are three: (i) the guarantees
promising to our subjects perfect security [emniyet-i kâmile] for life, honour
and property; (ii) a regular system of assessing taxation; (iii) an equally regular
system for the conscription of requisite troops and the duration of their
service.¹²⁹
The edict had great textual similarities to his July memorandum. Often labelled as
the Ottoman social contract, it spoke to an Ottoman as well as European audience.
It accentuated the security of Ottoman subjects and pledged a guarantee allowing
Ottoman statesmen to perform their duties partially emancipated from the
unchecked acts of the sultan.¹³⁰ It was a declaration of the rule of law in the
sultan’s empire.¹³¹
A British agent in Istanbul wrote that ‘the announcement of this great measure . . .
has been received with the greatest exultation by all classes and sects in the
several provinces of all [the] Turkish empire in which it has been promul-
gated’.¹³² This was partly because, as the historian Butrus Abu-Manneh accurately
claims, the edict could not be attributed exclusively to the European-oriented
ideas of Mustafa Reșid or ‘to his initiative’.¹³³ In fact, it was the product of a
coalition formed by Hüsrev Pașa, Sultan Abdülmecid, his mother, Valide Sultan
Bezm-i Alem, the Şeyhülislam Mustafa Ashim Efendi, and their Naqshbandi-
Mujadidi network. This is comparable to the New Order movement of the 1790s
and 1800s and its ideals. A resident of Istanbul for decades, the dragoman Pisani
rightly noted, ‘the ulema had prepared something of this kind for the adoption
of Selim III but the [1807] revolution took place before the plan could be carried
into effect.’¹³⁴
Abu-Manneh traces the wording of the edict to an irade issued by Sultan
Abdülmecid on 17 July 1839 that had already set out, in different language, the
security of the ‘property, soul, dwelling and place’ of Ottoman subjects. Although
this observation certainly has merit, it is questionable whether Hüsrev and other
proponents of the ‘New Order’, who in 1838 had urged Mahmud II for similar
reforms guaranteeing the security of life, property, and honour, could have
¹²⁹ J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary
Record, 1535–1914, vol. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 268–70.
¹³⁰ Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State (Leiden:
Brill, 2004), 41–3.
¹³¹ Selim Deringil, Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 33–4.
¹³² Pisani to Bulwer, 17 Nov. 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers BUL 1/17.
¹³³ Abu-Manneh, ‘The Islamic Roots’, 193. This is discussed also in Caroline Finkel, Osman’s
Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923 (London: John Murray, 2005), 449.
¹³⁴ Pisani to Bulwer, 6 Nov. 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers BUL 1/17.
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influenced the young Abdülmecid—a significant point that remains unaddressed
in Abu-Manneh’s account.
Moreover, Abu-Manneh seeks the ideological origins of the rescript in the
medieval writings of the Islamic scholar Ghazali, who writes of the relationship
between justice, security, and prosperity.¹³⁵ Yet when one examines the continuity
of Ottoman political discourses and the more immediate political-ideological
context from the late 1790s to 1839, it is possibly more persuasive to argue that
the Gülhane Edict was a late 1830s adaptation of the ‘circle of justice’ and the
philosophy of security-with-prosperity that had been upheld by the ‘New Order’
coalition. It was an understanding of governance that predates Ghazali.¹³⁶
The 1839 edict reads:
[i]f there is an absence of security as to one’s property, everyone remains
insensible to the voice of the Prince and the country; no one interests himself
in the progress of the public good . . . If, on the contrary, the citizen keeps
possession in all confidence of all his goods . . . he feels daily growing and
doubling in his heart not only his love for the Prince and country, but also his
devotion to his native land. These feelings become in him the source of the most
praiseworthy actions.¹³⁷
This cyclical understanding of just governance, which formed the underlying
philosophy of Ottoman security culture, and which created an undeviating link
between peasants, merchants, soldiers, bureaucrats, diplomats, and the sultan, was
bolstered by the Gülhane Edict.¹³⁸ Among its major objectives was the reform of
the entire taxation system of the empire, while ensuring security by means of
introducing rights and liberties and regular conscription.
Yet the edict delivered more than this. As Abu-Manneh claims, it went further,
requiring the sultan and the ulema to pledge to take an oath not to act contrary to
its stipulations–something that went beyond the irade of the sultan and the
petitions of previous imperial councils. With this unprecedented aspect, the
edict checked the arbitrary political decisions of the sovereign and the ulema. It
was possibly what frightened Mustafa Reșid the most, because it threatened the
authority of the sultan as well as the influence of the ulema. Even though the edict
was by no means a constitution, nor a bill of rights, it aimed, as Reșid later wrote
elsewhere, to put an end to the fatal state of affairs the Porte was in, but not ‘to
restrict the sovereign authority of the Sultan’. It had in view the improvement of
the imperial conditions ‘by sound reason and even by the precepts of Islamism’.¹³⁹
¹³⁵ Abu-Manneh, ‘The Islamic Roots’, 190, 196. ¹³⁶ See Ch. 2.
¹³⁷ Hurewitz, Diplomacy, 114. ¹³⁸ Darling, Social Justice, 161–2.
¹³⁹ ‘Traduction d’un mémoire sur la situation actuelle de l’Empire Ottoman’, attached to Stürmer to
Metternich, Constantinople, 10 Mar. (N472E), HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 80; cf. Miroslav Šedivý,
‘Metternich and Mustafa Reshid Pasha’s Fall in 1841’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39(2)
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Finally, the Gülhane Edict spoke to a European audience by invoking the idea of
civilization. One can discern this in the explicit emphasis on equality between ‘the
Muslim and non-Muslims subjects’ who would enjoy, ‘without exception’, imper-
ial concessions, and in the pledge that everyone participating in the imperial
council would ‘express his ideas and give his advice freely’. Reșid associated
‘civilization’ with granting non-Muslims the same liberties and rights enjoyed
by Muslim subjects of the sultan.¹⁴⁰ A major difference between his July memo-
randum and the edict was that ‘liberty’ and ‘security’ were considered synergistic
concepts, not as two opposite ends of the arc of a pendulum between which
Ottoman governance should oscillate.¹⁴¹
As will be clearer in the following pages, the idea of ‘civilization’ was implanted
with this edict as one of the building blocks which bridged European and Ottoman
quests for security, and signified the transimperial quality of the civil war in the
sultan’s domains.¹⁴² Two days after reading out the edict, relieved of his fears for
his life, Mustafa Reșid wrote to Palmerston, expressing his hope that ‘the friendly
Powers will appreciate the good that must result from these institutions in the
interests of humanity and the Ottoman Empire, and that they will see in them a
new motive for strengthening the bonds which will unite them with Turkey’.¹⁴³
Amongst the statesmen of the Great Powers and the public, there was a mixed
reception. To Palmerston, the edict was ‘a grand Stroke of Policy, & it is producing
great effect on public feeling both here & in France. I have never despaired of seeing
Turkey rear her head again as a substantial element in the Balance of Power.’¹⁴⁴
Russian Ambassador Butenev’s first report on the ceremony hastily depicted it as a
‘theatrical act’. It was ‘unexpected for people as well as diplomats . . . ’ He could not
fathom ‘the secrecy and mystery of the ceremony as well as the total lack of prior
knowledge of the diplomats about it’. But he was the first to underline the links
between the edict and the reforms of Mahmud II, showing how in some respects
one was the continuation of the other. Butenev presciently noted that it would
herald a new era in Ottoman history.¹⁴⁵
The French press bestowed praise upon the edict and the ceremony, though the
liberal, pro-Mehmed Ali Le Siècle also raised suspicions about its potential
(2012): 259–82, at 282. On the religious origins of the edict, also see Frederick F. Anscombe, ‘Islam and
the Age of Ottoman Reform’, Past and Present 211 (2010): 160–89.
¹⁴⁰ ‘Exposé fait par Rechid Pacha à M. Desgranges’, 21 Sept. 1841, AMAE MD Turquie, 44; cf.
Kodaman, ‘Paris Sefirlikleri’, 73.
¹⁴¹ For an article that argues otherwise, see Ersel Aydınlı, ‘The Turkish Pendulum between
Globalization and Security: From the Late Ottoman Era to the 1930s’, Middle Eastern Studies 40(3)
(2004): 102–33.
¹⁴² Hurewitz, Diplomacy, 114.
¹⁴³ Reshid Pacha to M. Le Vicomte, 5 Nov. 1839, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E506.
¹⁴⁴ Palmerston to Ponsonby, 2 Dec. 1839; cf. Caquet, The Orient, 113.
¹⁴⁵ Butenev to Nesselrode, 5 Nov. 1839, AVPRI f. Kantselyariya, d. 47, ll. 302–15; cf. Todorova,
Rossiya, 132–3.
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effectiveness in an ‘oriental empire’.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, French intelligence
correctly identified the edict’s general objectives as being to rally the people’s
support against Mehmed Ali and to attract the attention of European public
opinion, and noted that Mustafa Reșid’s immediate goal, as he once told to
M. Desgranges, was to make it clear that the true trajectory of ‘civilization did
not point to Egypt but Constantinople’.¹⁴⁷
The edict did fulfil its immediate purposes. ‘It is a fact’, one British agent wrote,
‘that the first intelligence of it which reached [Mehmed Ali] upset him more than
anything we did.’¹⁴⁸ As we will see, it was also used as a wildcard in pressuring
France to change her policy with respect to Mehmed Ali in the coming months. It
was presented as a main point of reference in rallying the Syrian population
against Egypt a year later.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, it paved the way for the joint
European intervention that Mustafa Reșid had long hoped would take place.
With the edict, the Ottoman foreign minister and his associates—Valide Sultan,
Hüsrev, Rıza, Sadık Rifat, et al.—managed to weave together legal reform, security,
and liberty in order to obtain the support of the Powers. The Porte’s key agents
would no longer oversimplify by framing their empire as the ‘patient’ in need of
European ‘medicine’, but would instead depict it as an active figure in the game of
civilization. This was why, only days after the edict’s proclamation, Mustafa Reșid
made a bid to involve the Porte in ‘the European confederation’ by means of
Baron Stürmer, the Austrian internuncio to Istanbul.¹⁵⁰
*
The effects of the Gülhane proclamation on Mehmed Ali’s ambitions can be
discerned in his immediate response to it—an unexpected move. In early 1840,
he sent a letter to his old enemy Hüsrev, now the grand vizier, through his
handmaiden Zehra Hanım. He announced that he had given up his claims over
Hüsrev’s dismissal. But on everything else he made no concessions: the Porte
would always have in him and his sons ‘faithful and devoted servants’ together
with ‘a considerable force in Arabia’ which was always ready to cooperate in
support of the state and religion, provided that the Taurus mountains were left to
him. His only objective was ‘to acquire a good name in future history’. The pașa
underlined that the imperial fleet still belonged to the sultan and would be
returned to him. Yet the persistent refusal to leave the Taurus mountains to
Egypt prevented him from doing so. He added that the Porte was ‘playing the
game of those Powers’ in seeking refuge at their hands, while the very same
¹⁴⁶ Caquet, The Orient, 117.
¹⁴⁷ ‘Lettre de M. Desgranges sur l’état de la Turquie’, 17 Nov. 1839, AMAE MD Turquie 45/43.
¹⁴⁸ Pisani to Bulwer, 27 Dec. 1839, NRO Bulwer Papers BUL 1/17. ¹⁴⁹ See Ch. 8.
¹⁵⁰ Stürmer to Metternich, 6 Nov. 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 71; cf. Šedivý, Metternich, 45.
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Powers were in fact aiming to weaken it ‘to facilitate in due season the project so
long entertained by them: [the partition of the Ottoman Empire]’.
If this be so, rather than fall in five years with shame and ignoring, how much
preferable is it to fall at once, while the name and religious enthusiasm of Islam
yet exists. To this I have made up my mind, and cease not night and day in
pushing on my warlike preparations.¹⁵¹
The pașa hoped for the resolution of the crisis by an agreement between Istanbul
and Cairo, but not with inter-imperial meddling.
Hüsrev rejected Mehmed Ali’s proposal. With the support of the four Powers
behind him, despite the defeat at Nizib, he believed he now had the upper hand
against his rival. He therefore wrote in his response to Mehmed Ali that the
sultan’s only desire was to forgive his enemies and restore peace, and establish
concord among all his subjects. The Taurus mountains offered an important
natural fortress for Istanbul as much as they did for Cairo. They were essential
for imperial security. And it had become impossible for the Porte to follow a
different path from that which ‘we have feared so far’—seeking refuge in the
intervention of the Powers. ‘What were we supposed to do in this situation? Could
we reasonably refuse the support we have been so generously offered by the
Christian Powers?’ the Grand Vizier wrote in the draft letter, before crossing
out these sentences. Instead, he wrote, ‘[W]e are waiting with perfect security’ for
the events that the future would bring, and the preparations for war that Mehmed
Ali spoke of did not frighten him.¹⁵²
This was the last (written) dialogue on the subject between the two men.
Despite Hüsrev’s reliance on the support of the Powers, there was in fact still no
prospect of a Great Power intervention at this hour. The risk of an invasion of
Istanbul by Ibrahim was still imminent. And until the spring of 1840, no action
was taken by the Powers. Only then did Reșid and then the Austrian ambassador
to London, Baron Neuman, take the initiative. Together with Nuri Efendi, the
Ottoman ambassador, Neuman penned a letter addressed to the representatives of
the Powers. The two reminded of the July 1839 note and criticized the Concert of
Europe for its lack of action.¹⁵³
Seeing that the dangerous relations between Hüsrev and Mehmed Ali con-
tinued unabated even after their secret correspondence (leaked to Mustafa Reșid
¹⁵¹ Mehmed Ali to Hüsrev, 23 Feb. 1840, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/320.
¹⁵² Grand Vizier to Mehmet Ali, Moharrem 1256 [Mar. 1840], BOA HR.SYS 933/1/249.
¹⁵³ Rechid to Nuri Efendi, 27 Feb. 1840, DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E444/25; Nuri Efendi to
Palmerston, 7 Apr. 1840, BOA HR.SYS 934/1; Nouri Efendi to Palmerston, 18 May 1840, DUR
Ponsonby Papers GRE/E444; Webster, Palmerston, 678–9; ‘Extrait des nouvelles confidentielles par
M. Chevalier Cordoba (Spanish chargé d’Affaires at Constantinople)’, Jan. 1840, DUR Ponsonby
Papers, GRE/E150.
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by Ponsonby, who then got it published in European press), and in the absence of
Great Power action, the Ottoman foreign minister, for his part, looked to prevent
any forward move on the part of the pașa. He took the reins into his hands and got
Hüsrev dismissed from his position on 8 June, lest Mehmed Ali should use his
personal enmity as a pretext for aggression again.¹⁵⁴ When Hüsrev struggled to
force his way back into office, he was linked to a bribery scandal and then sent into
exile in Tekirdağ.¹⁵⁵
Malicious as it may seem, Reșid’s plan did the trick. Mehmed Ali was elated by
the news of Hüsrev’s dismissal. He saw a new chance for a bilateral settlement with
the Porte and sent his first secretary, Sami Bey, with an official proposal for an
arrangement. Even though the continuation of the talks produced no settlement, it
gained Mustafa Reșid time. He himself was preparing a new proposal in mid-July
1840, agreeing to confer Egypt on Mehmed Ali with hereditary possession, and
southern Syria with partial hereditary rights.¹⁵⁶ But before his proposal was
communicated, the long-expected news came from London. The four Powers—
Austria, Britain, Prussia, and even Russia—and the Porte’s representative, Șekib
Efendi, had finally agreed on an intervention plan.
Mustafa Reșid immediately dropped his scheme. His unusual quest to over-
whelm Mehmed Ali’s ambitions by means of painting the Ottoman centre as the
civilized face of the East, making commercial concessions to wring an alliance
from Britain, penning memoranda to legitimize and enable the multilateral
intervention of the Concert of Europe, and helping to initiate bureaucratic and
administrative reforms, was finally producing concrete results. For the Ottoman
foreign minister, this was the hour of revenge.
¹⁵⁴ BOA HR.SYS 933/2; Roussin to Desages, 8 June 1840, AMAE 50MD/45/70.
¹⁵⁵ Çelik, Şeyhü’l-Vüzerâ, 375–85.
¹⁵⁶ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 135; Šedivý, Metternich, 796–7, n. 121.
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8
Return of the Ashes
The Concert of Europe and the 1840 Intervention
Le retour des cendres, or the repatriation of the ashes of Napoleon Bonaparte from
Saint Helen to Paris, was a masterpiece of myth-making.¹ Amidst lavish cere-
monials in every city, the late emperor’s coffin passed through in the autumn of
1840. The event attracted enormous local interest and filled the hearts of many
onlookers with what Bonapartists claimed Napoleon stood for: pride and the glory
of France. In Normandy alone, during the six days his coffin was exhibited at the
frigate La Belle Poule, more than 60,000 people came to accord respect to the
memory of the late emperor. An abundance of patriotic artistic works—paintings,
songs, poems, and lithographs—exposed the emotional intensity of the day,
while endless newsprints recurrently portrayed Napoleon as a prince, or even
the Christ.²
This patriotic pageant was as much about renewing the prestige of the July
Monarchy as about paying respect to Bonaparte. France was embroiled in dan-
gerously strained relations with Britain and her allies. War over their conflicting
interests in the Levant, or the Eastern Question, was once again at the door.
Orders had been given for the mass conscription of the army and an expensive
fortification of Paris was under way. Public sentiment had to be whetted.
Only seven years had passed since France and Britain had revived their
‘constitutional alliance’ against Russia. As we saw in Chapter 6, after the signing
of the Russo-Ottoman Hünkar İskelesi Treaty in July 1833, St Petersburg had won
a dominant influence over the Levant, which went against the interests of both
London and Paris. In the previous year, in July 1839, when the so-called ‘Second
Eastern Crisis’ had just broken loose with the renewal of hostilities between
Sultan Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali Pașa of Egypt, the two liberal powers had
again taken a common stance regarding the territorial integrity and independence
of the Ottoman Empire. But a few months later, France chose to pursue a non-
interventionist policy tacitly supporting Mehmed Ali, while the other four
¹ See e.g. Jean-Marcel Humbert,Napoléon aux Invalides. 1840, le retour des Cendres (Paris: Musée de
l’Armée, 1990); Henri Gaubert, Le Tombeau de l’empereur. Son tombeau, vol. 2 (Paris: Acad. Napoléon,
1951).
² See Avner Ben-Amos, Funeral, Politics and Memory in Modern France, 1789–1996 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 73, and Michael Paul Driskel, As Befits Legend: Building the Tomb of
Napoleon, 1840–1861 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993).
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security, and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798–1864. Ozan Ozavci, Oxford University Press.
© Ozan Ozavci 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852964.003.0009
Powers—Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia—and the Porte strove to keep the
pașa at bay, forcing him to evacuate Syria.
This was how the allies, London and Paris, became foes; and the foes, Britain
and Russia, became allies within a space of a few months. And this was why it took
nearly a year for the Concert of Europe to intervene in the civil war in the
Ottoman world. Diplomatically isolated by the other Great Powers, the French
officialdom would use the return of Bonaparte’s ashes as an inspiring moment for
national esteem and social mobilization. Yet it was also then that many French
writers and statesmen came to cast doubt on both the policy in the Levant and the
implications of the Eastern Question for France. Could there be an alternative,
more peaceful way of appraising the Eastern Question that would still enable
European dominance over the Ottoman Empire but bring serenity and calm at
home, instead of war?
The Quadruple Alliance and France
In late 1838, it was highly unlikely for Britain and Russia to form a common front
with respect to the Eastern Question. Anglo-Russian relations had been danger-
ously strained since the Hünkar Iskelesi Treaty of 1833. Policy-makers in London
and St Petersburg had become increasingly persuaded that the European empire
which held sway over the Levant would prevail in Asia and Europe.³ The ‘lion’ and
the ‘bear’ had come to loggerheads in Asia, while the Vixen affair—the capture of a
British schooner by the Russians in the eastern Black Sea—threatened to turn this
confrontation into an inter-imperial war.⁴
In June 1838, Tsar Nicholas I was determined to pursue a unilateral policy
toward the Ottoman Empire, maintaining that, due to his empire’s geographical
proximity and direct interests, the Eastern Question was his private affair and not
to be interfered with by the other Powers.⁵ For Russia, collective action by the
Powers was acceptable only insofar as the Powers collaborated in supplying
assistance to the Porte with the purpose of upholding the status quo that was in
Russia’s favour both strategically and commercially.⁶
Yet at the same time it was a ghastly prospect for Nesselrode to see Russia
isolated by the other four Powers in the Levant. For this reason, in late 1838, when
Palmerston and Metternich came up with the idea of convening an ambassadorial
conference in Vienna specifically on the Eastern Question, fearing that the
meeting would materialize the alignment of the four Powers against Russia, he
³ Harold N. Ingle, Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836–1844 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976), 95.
⁴ Ibid. 63–95. ⁵ Šedivý, Metternich, 752. ⁶ Ingle, Nesselrode, 103.
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declined to participate.⁷He was fortunate that the contest betweenMetternich and
Palmerston over leadership of the conference, the scepticism harboured by the
other Powers when Britain unilaterally signed the commercial convention with
the Porte (August 1838), and finally Palmerston’s desire to link the ‘Egyptian
crisis’ with the subject of the Straits, would lead France and Austria to lose
sympathy with the idea of a conference.
The collective note of the Powers in July 1839 (see Chapter 7) was a decentral-
ized act undertaken at the initiative of the European ministers in Istanbul without
orders from their capitals. It was acceptable for Russia not as ‘a move toward a
conference’, but only as an offer of the ‘good offices’ of the Powers ‘to mediate a
direct settlement, not to resolve’ the crisis between Istanbul and Cairo.⁸
After August 1839, however, the policy of St Petersburg unmistakably changed
due to a number of factors. The risk of Russia’s isolation by the other four Powers
remained. The reign of Mustafa Reșid and the pro-British camp in Istanbul
deemed the renewal of the Otto-Russian defensive alliance much less likely.
Furthermore, Russia had lost her privileged commercial position in the Levant
after the commercial treaties signed between the Porte and several European
Powers. Instead of standing alone for a cause that seemed unlikely to materialize,
Nesselrode recommended Tsar Nicholas I change policy and take the lead in
collective action. With this, Russia could feed two birds with one seed: accentuate
the differences between the French and British cabinets with respect to Egypt, thus
isolating France instead, and ensure an agreement among the Powers for the
closure of the Straits which would warrant her security.⁹
The tsar agreed to this plan and, as Ingle tells us, demonstrated his adherence
to the new policy by dismissing the members of the patriotic ruskaaia
partiaa (Russian party), including the commander-in-chief, General Rosen,
and N. N. Murav’ev, a lead actor of his unilateralist diplomacy in 1832–3
(see Chapter 6). He then sent Baron Ernest Philipp Brunnow (1797–1875)—a
member of the nemetskaia partiaa (German party), which had a pro-European
orientation—to London. The new Russian policy was bent on building on the joint
note of July 1839 and obtaining a settlement among the Powers, and particularly
with Britain, over the ‘Eastern Crisis’.
Brunnow was the right person for this mission. He was known to be fond of the
‘European family’, and strongly opposed to the nationalist policies of the ruskaaia
partiaa. Having sat at the Congresses of Laibach and Verona, he was one of the
few remaining figures of ‘the Vienna system generation’. He shared the beliefs and
understanding of the men of 1815–22 that ‘the interests of the whole represented a
“higher order” of national unity that was threatened by war and revolution’.¹⁰ He
poignantly admitted that ‘the entire European political system was completely
⁷ Ibid. 104, 108. ⁸ Ibid. 112. ⁹ Rendall, ‘Restraint’, 53.
¹⁰ Ingle, Nesselrode, 122–3.
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upset,’ and ‘Europe was divided into two camps’ when the Whig ministers
‘submitted to the public opinion that was opposed to the true interests of the
community’ and allied with the French government so as to remain in office.¹¹ But
now, as he set off for the British capital, he had high hopes for the renewal of the
Vienna Order and the Concert of Europe.
In London, Brunnow found what he had hoped for.¹² Despite all his scepticism
over Russia, Palmerston welcomed the Russian diplomat’s unexpected offers.
Russia would allow the Hünkar Iskelesi Treaty to expire in 1841 if Britain agreed
to guarantee the closure of the Straits and ‘the existence and repose’ of the
Ottoman Empire. In other words, St Petersburg would be ‘pleased to exchange
[the 1833 Treaty] for a concerted guarantee’.¹³ To Russian agents, Britain was
squared. For his part, Palmerston considered his policy toward Russia a success at
last, and from the end of 1839 onward, together with the Austrian and Prussian
ambassadors, he held several conferences in London to decide on the policy of the
Concert towards the Levant.
The ‘Eastern Question’ thenceforward no longer meant ending (or preserving)
Russian dominance over the Porte but aimed to address the differences between
Cairo and Istanbul. However, the shift in French policy in autumn 1839 as to how
to tackle these differences complicated matters. A new crisis among the Powers
had arisen.
*
As we saw in the previous chapter, after the Battle of Nizib (June 1839), France
had declared her commitment to the territorial integrity of the Porte despite her
ongoing occupation of Algiers. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Admiral
Soult even agreed with London to give instructions to their combined squadrons
in the Mediterranean to use coercive measures with Mehmed Ali, prevent his
army from marching onto Istanbul, and cease hostilities. But this was the most
French ministers wished to adhere to. In lieu of any further intervention on the
part of the Powers, they called for a speedy arrangement between ‘the Turk and
the Turk’, alluding to the sultan and the Turkish-speaking Mehmed Ali.¹⁴ If the
French representative attended the ambassadorial meetings, the ministers in Paris
feared, the other four Powers could corner them into accepting the pro-sultan and
anti-Mehmed Ali decisions taken by the majority.
As observed by the French président du conseil, Emile Desages, who acted like a
spider at the centre of his country’s diplomatic web of correspondence, the French
were more Egyptian in their orientation than any other Power. This was in part
thanks to Mehmed Ali’s active propaganda campaign in the French press which,
as mentioned earlier, depicted him as the Napoleon of the East, in part because the
¹¹ Ibid. 123–4. ¹² BOA HR.SYS 1947/43. ¹³ Ingle, Nesselrode, 124.
¹⁴ Desages to Cochelet, 27 Sept. 1839; cf. Charles-Roux, Thiers, 26.
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pașa was seen, from an ideological point of view, as a revolutionary civilizer in
opposition to the ancient system represented by Istanbul, and in part (though to a
lesser extent) because of the economic links between France and Egypt.¹⁵ If a
settlement could be obtained without the involvement of the Powers, Mehmed Ali
could attain a better deal. The collective note of 27 July 1839 therefore became a
source of resentment in Paris as soon as news of it broke. It was criticized
particularly by such figures as Adolphe Thiers, the ex-président du conseil, as an
act of ‘inconsiderate precipitation’.¹⁶
From the autumn of 1839, France’s policy was geared towards overt support of
Mehmed Ali, as evidenced from the fact that the Soult government asked the
Porte to allow Mehmed Ali to at least keep Syria in return for giving up his
demands for Hüsrev’s dismissal, for Crete, and for provinces other than Egypt.
But this move outraged both Ottoman and British authorities. ‘The conduct of
the French is disgusting,’ Lord Ponsonby wrote from Istanbul to Lord Beauvale
in October. ‘It is hard to say what is her most characteristic feature; falsehood,
vanity, insolence or folly.’¹⁷
Just as Russian strategists had hoped, the relations in the Anglo-French liberal
camp then took a critical turn, which delayed the Powers in taking joint action.
After Adolphe Thiers’s rise to power as prime minister and foreign minister on 1
March 1840, French diplomacy began to challenge the Great Power intervention
in the Eastern Crisis more firmly.¹⁸
Before coming to office, in January 1840, Thiers had boldly declared in a
parliamentary speech, ‘The cause of Mehmet Ali in Syria is the cause of
France.’¹⁹ As prime minister and foreign minister, his line of action developed
in parallel to this statement, and consisted, first, of excluding France ‘from waging
war for the cause of Mehmed Ali, or to risk, for this cause, a general war . . . but
[he] did not publicly lay a limit to the support’. Then, he meant ‘to endeavour to
postpone and, if possible, prevent the agreement of the other Powers without
France by trying to obtain from them a lowering of their demands. Then, he
intended to nibble at Mehmed Ali’s claims and reduce them to proportions that
could be admitted by the Powers. And finally, to ask the pașa to leave the crisis to
France.’²⁰With these aims in view, in London, the recently appointed ambassador
François Guizot was ordered to obtain the support of Francophile ministers and
deputies, while in Istanbul, ambassador Charles Édouard Pontois (1792–1871)
would look to persuade Mustafa Reșid to accept a settlement with Mehmed Ali,
and the pașa of Egypt would be pressured to make concessions.²¹
¹⁵ Ibid. 22. ¹⁶ Ibid. 21.
¹⁷ Ponsonby to Beauvale, 9 Oct. 1839, BLM Lord Beauvale Papers MS 60475/54.
¹⁸ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 31; BOA HR.SYS 965/8.
¹⁹ Alphonse de Lamartine, La Question d’Orient. Discours et articles politiques (1834–1861) (Paris:
André Versaille, 2011), 77.
²⁰ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 53. ²¹ Ibid.
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As a result of Thiers’ policy, Palmerston found himself in a fierce struggle
against Francophile politicians like Lord Calderon and Lord Holland in the
Melbourne cabinet.²² Their liberal cabinet had been formed, in the first place,
thanks to a promise of good relations with France. The Francophiles were ill-
disposed to give the entente with France for the Levant. Their opposition had
paralysed Palmerston’s initiative to spearhead a joint intervention.
Only with news of violence in Syria did the foreign secretary find a way to break
the diplomatic resistance of France and strong-arm his Francophile opponents in
London. As will be detailed in the following chapters, the Druze and Maronites
of Mount Lebanon had risen against Mehmed Ali’s rule in May 1840. Since the
Battle of Nizib, the permanent state of emergency and mobilization and the
resulting enforced conscription and heavy taxation had united the peoples of
Lebanon, both Christian and Muslim, Maronite and Druze, against Mehmed
Ali.²³ To Palmerston, this was a priceless opportunity.
The devil in the detail here is the fact that the French were the historical
protectors of the Maronites, the Catholic Christians of Lebanon, who had now
risen against the French-backed Mehmed Ali. The pașa of Egypt’s brutal suppres-
sion of the Maronites left France in a quandary, and tarnished Mehmed Ali’s
‘civilized’ image in Paris. The news of violence, or, ‘horrors committed by the
[Egyptian] soldiers’, that arrived in Paris would lead Thiers, despite all his support
of Mehmed Ali, to question ‘if it was worthwhile to agitate the world for a
Barbarian’, as he put it.²⁴
On the other side of the Channel, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby: ‘I will fairly
own that till this insurrection broke out I did not clearly see my way as to the
means by which we could drive Mehemet [Ali] out of Syria.’²⁵ In early July, he
managed to break the opposition of Clarendon, Holland, and Melbourne, after
threatening the prime minister that he would resign from his post. As the news
from Syria garnered public support to Palmerston’s cause and fearing that the
foreign secretary’s resignation would dissolve the cabinet, Melbourne caved.²⁶
Palmerston made one final effort to rein in France, by reminding Thiers of
his false cause and arguing that Mehmed Ali was ‘nothing but an ignorant
barbarian’, and that he was ‘look[ing] upon his boasted civilisation as the arrantest
humbug.’²⁷ As it became clear that all doors for an Anglo-French settlement were
closed, a week later, on 15 July, leaving French Ambassador Guizot in the dark, the
British foreign secretary led the meetings in London that resulted in the signing of
the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant by the representatives of the four
Powers and the Ottoman plenipotentiary Șekib Efendi.
²² Webster, Palmerston, 689. ²³ See Ch. 10 for the details.
²⁴ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 123. ²⁵ Webster, Palmerston, 689. ²⁶ Ibid. 690.
²⁷ Temperley, Near East, 89; Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 303.
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With the convention, the four Powers and the Porte agreed that Mehmed Ali
would be given hereditary rule in Egypt as well as the fortress of Acre (Sidon),
provided that he accepted this proposal within ten days. Otherwise, the offer
of Acre would be withdrawn by the sultan. If he refused the second offer, then
the future of Egypt would be decided by the sultan and the signatories of the
convention. To ensure Mehmed Ali’s submission to the sultan, a secret protocol
was signed to assume the right to coerce the pașa by force if necessary. Moreover,
the signatories agreed that, in times of peace, the Straits were to be closed in
accordance with the ancient rights of the sultan, thus ending one dispute, for the
time being, that had been central to the Eastern Question since at least the French
invasion of Egypt in 1798.²⁸ Thus were laid the ground rules for the first joint
Great Power intervention in the Levant with the consent and active participation
of the Porte.
The 1840 Intervention
When the news of the London convention reached Cairo on 20 July, Mehmed Ali
was enraged, ‘very vocal, not at all downcast’. He anxiously declared that he
was going to order Ibrahim to invade Asia Minor. The French consul, Adrien-
Louis Cochelet (1788–1858), tried to calm him, telling him that such an offensive
measure would be catastrophic for Egypt. France would then have to side with the
other Powers in subduing him, which would result in the pașa’s ultimate defeat.²⁹
Ironically, the news of the convention was not received any more calmly in
Paris. King Louis Philippe was just as incensed.³⁰ He directed his anger at the
Austrians and the Prussians, believing that they were the weakest links of the
chain: ‘You want war: you will have it, and if necessary, I will muzzle the tiger [of
revolution]. It knows me, and I know how to play with it. We shall see if it respects
you as it respects me.’³¹
The French king used one of the shared fears of the European monarchs—
revolution—against another—total war in Europe—to turn the Quadruple
Alliance from taking offensive action without consulting France, thus fuelling a
new crisis in the Rhine. Liberal and revolutionary French journals instantly began
to call for war, one writing that ‘if the government is arming, it is right to do so’,³²
and the other forewarning: ‘we are on the verge of war.’³³
Adolphe Thiers was likewise indignant at the news, calling the convention ‘an
injurious procedure’ against France, because it was isolated on an issue on which it
²⁸ Sergey Goryanof, Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi (Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat,
2006), 110, 112–13.
²⁹ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 92–3. ³⁰ BOA TS.MA.e 419/6; Caquet, The Orient, 212.
³¹ Ibid. ³² Journal des Débats, 31 July 1840; cf. Caquet, The Orient, 213.
³³ Le National, 28 July 1840; cf. Caquet, The Orient, 213.
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should have been the first to be consulted, as the ‘first power in the Mediterranean
basin’.³⁴ But he had utterly misread—or at least wrongly framed—the situation. It
was precisely because of the fearful prospect of the French becoming the first
power in the Mediterranean after the occupation of Algiers, and the establishment
of dominant influence over Tunis, Egypt, and now Syria up to the Taurus
mountains, that the other four Powers, particularly Britain, were looking to take
a more independent course of action from Paris.
From the moment Thiers heard of the convention, he endeavoured to frustrate
it. He believed that its ‘failure of coercive action’would drive the four Powers ‘back
to France to solve the Eastern Question’.³⁵ He strove to end the uprising in Syria
first, as it would deprive the Quadruple Alliance and the Porte of vital clout, and
save France and Mehmed Ali from great embarrassment. Even though Ibrahim
Pașa had put down the uprising by July 1840, in August it bubbled up again in
different parts of Mount Lebanon.
*
The renewal of the Lebanese uprising was to a considerable degree the work of the
British dragoman Richard Wood (1806–1900), who had been dispatched from
Istanbul to Beirut by Mustafa Reșid and Ponsonby in early July 1840. They
invested Wood in an official capacity with the responsibility for ‘the regulation
and settlement of the actual affairs of Mount Lebanon’.³⁶ Having lived in Syria on
and off since 1832, and since he could speak the native languages (both Turkish
and Arabic), Wood was familiar with local realities and sensitivities in the Levant.
He was confident that the Lebanese would be well disposed to receive his aid.³⁷ In
fact, they had already collectively reached out to the British authorities ‘to rescue
them from the destruction with which Mehmet Ali threaten[s] them now’.³⁸
At first, Wood kept a low profile and made contact with key figures in the
mountain. Then, after the London Convention, he orchestrated the Lebanese
movement, along with Ottoman agents such as Tahir Bey, as well as the Russian
consul in Beirut, Konstantin Mikhailovich Bazili (1809–84).³⁹ They circulated
several proclamations which promised the Lebanese the restitution of their
ancient privileges as well as the introduction of new rights—equality between
³⁴ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 98. ³⁵ Ibid. 104–9.
³⁶ Ramazan Ata, ‘Osmanlı Kaynaklarına Göre 1839–1841 arası Osmanlı Mısır İlişkileri ve Düvel-i
Muazzama’ (PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2011), 178; RWEC, 7, 20; G. H. Bolsover, ‘Lord Ponsonby
and the Eastern Question, 1833–39’, Slavonic and East European Review 13(37) (July 1934): 98–118, at
104; ‘Richard Wood Statement of Services’, 8 Aug. 1846, SAMECO Richard Wood Papers, Box 7.
³⁷ Ponsonby to Wood, 28 June 1840; Wood to Ponsonby, 3 July 1840, RWEC, 146–7.
³⁸ ‘English translation of letter from the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to Ponsonby asking for
British aid against Mehemet Ali’, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/E606.
³⁹ K. М. Bazili, Siriya i Palestina pod tureckim pravitel’stvom v istoricheskom i politicheskom
otnosheniyax (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi lit-ry, 1962), 177. On the transfer of the Russian consulate
from Jaffa to Beirut, Butenev to Nesselrode, 13 Nov. 1839, AVPRI f. 149, o. 502/1, d. 397, ll. 1–3, 20–29.
See also ‘Copie d’un rapport du Consul Basili à M. l’Envoyé de Bouténef en date de Yaffa le 8/20
Septembre 1839’, AVPRI f. 149, o. 502/1, d. 397, ll. 20–29.
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Muslims and non-Muslims, as heralded by the Gülhane Edict of 1839—if they
directed their obedience to the sultan. They announced that the British fleet was
ordered to help the Syrians, and the Porte’s arms and ammunition supplies were
on their way.⁴⁰Wood himself helped distribute 84,000 muskets to the inhabitants.
A new insurrection duly erupted.
Yet it did not break Mehmed Ali’s resistance. At the end of July 1840, when
Mustafa Reșid officially communicated to the pașa the 15 July Convention, the
latter refused to accept its conditions.⁴¹ In his calculation, the likelihood of a Great
Power intervention in Syria was very small because it would be an invitation for a
general war in Europe—France being on the one side, and the remaining four
Powers on the other—a risk the Powers would not take for the East. However,
when the pașa received intelligence of Anglo-Austrian fleet movements toward
the eastern Mediterranean, he sent an agent to Istanbul hoping for bilateral
conciliation within the Ottoman Empire, declaring that he would agree to aban-
don Acre. This time Mustafa Reșid refused to settle, believing that he had the
unconditional support of the Powers behind him now, and that he could eliminate
Mehmed Ali for good.
In early September 1840, after an imperial council meeting, the Ottoman
foreign minister did what he had determined to do and got Mehmed Ali removed
as governor of Egypt. In his place, İzzet Mehmed Pașa was nominated as the
governor of Acre and Egypt.⁴² Shortly after, Mustafa Reșid sent an announcement
to the representatives of the Powers, declaring that since Mehmed Ali did not
consent to the pacific proposals of the signatories of the July 1840 Convention, it
had become necessary to withdraw him from Egypt and, as a prelude to coercive
measures, to proceed to a rigorous blockade of all the ports of Egypt and Syria by
means of the Ottoman and Allied squadrons.⁴³
From mid-August onward, the military support pledged to the Lebanese began
to arrive. The Syrian coasts were blockaded by 19 British, 7 Ottoman, and 4
Austrian ships.⁴⁴ Around 5,380 Ottoman soldiers landed, along with 232 cannons,
under the command of the serasker and interim governor İzzet Mehmed Pașa,
while the Prussian co-commander of the expedition, General Augustus Giacomo
Jochmus (1808–81) marched with 22,000 men (some of them British, under the
command of Colonel Hugh Rose).⁴⁵
⁴⁰ ‘Richard Wood Statement of Services’, 8 Aug. 1846, SAMECO Richard Wood Papers, Box 7.
⁴¹ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 142. ⁴² Ibid. 143.
⁴³ Moustapha Reschid, ‘Traduction d’une note officielle concernant le bloc de l’Égypte et de la Syrie’,
16 Sept. 1840, AMAE Papiers Desages 60PAAP/37/87.
⁴⁴ Mansel, Levant, 95. On 16 Sept. Egypt was also blockaded, and the consuls of the four Powers left
Alexandria. ‘Secret Memorandum by Lieutenant-General Augustus Jochmus on the war in Syria’, 12
May 1841, DUR Ponsonby Papers, GRE/E346.
⁴⁵ Defter II, 67-b. Richard Wood, Statement of Services, 8 Aug. 1846, SAMECO, Richard Wood
Papers, Box 7.
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Thiers tried to impede the intervention by dispatching to Mount Lebanon the
Lazarist abbot Étienne, who had considerable influence over the local Lebanese
Christians, in order to ‘calm angry hearts’ and convey ‘promises of guarantees and
concessions’ on the part of Mehmed Ali. Thiers moreover sent the young Count
Alexandre Colonna Walewski (1810–68) to Cairo and Istanbul to arrange for a
bilateral settlement. The latter suggested that the pașa give the inhabitants of
Lebanon certain guarantees, ‘under the superior guarantee of France’, perhaps
through a Gülhane Edict of his own, to counter the influence of the agents of the
other Powers on the spot.⁴⁶ The pașa of Egypt followed this suggestion, and
promised the Lebanese the return of their ancient privileges and the introduction
of new liberties.⁴⁷ But it was too little, too late.
The bombardment of Beirut by the Quadruple Alliance and the Ottoman ships
began on 6 September. In Paris, the news reverberated through ‘every French
heart’.⁴⁸ The country having been ‘seriously armed’, and the fortification of
Paris intensified, newspapers considered that ‘[t]he answer to the question “Are
we to have peace or war?” was more doubtful than ever’.⁴⁹ The Courrier de Roven
was the most daring: ‘war, immediate war, is the only means of conserving our
honour.’⁵⁰
In mid-September, the republican poet Edgar Quinet (1803–75) wrote that
‘[a] coalition similar to that of 1815 was formed against France in 1840’, just as the
ashes of Napoleon had set for Paris and just when France was once again about to
confront a Quadruple Alliance. ‘[The ashes] are approaching; they are going to
enter the port. The earth quivers. Who do you think will, in the name of all, receive
the first and greet these spoils?’⁵¹
Despite all the emotional intensity of the time, Thiers knew that France was not
ready for war: ‘Our navy is excellent but not large enough; she would win the first
battle and lose the last.’⁵² Nonetheless, he did not withdraw his support for
Mehmed Ali’s cause. Principled as his policy might have been, it cost him his
ministry in the end.
*
The disagreement between France and the four Powers (and the Porte) terminated
only when the moderates who were against war prevailed in Paris. Amidst the
chauvinistic ceremonials, private intimidation, public displays of military power,
and heedless war songs, one such moderate was the conservative French writer,
poet, and parliamentarian Alphonse de Lamartine (1790–1869). He had travelled
in the Levant, in Egypt and Syria in 1832–3, and had some knowledge of the
⁴⁶ Charles-Roux, Thiers, 108–9. ⁴⁷ Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 303.
⁴⁸ Cunningham, RWEC, 20.
⁴⁹ ‘Paris’, Journal des débats, 13 Sept. 1840; see also ‘Eastern Affairs’, The Times, 14 Sept. 1840.
⁵⁰ Caquet, The Orient, 213. ⁵¹ Edgar Quinet, 1815 et 1840 (Paris: Paulin, 1840), 6–8.
⁵² Charles-Roux, Thiers, 231.
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region. Like most Saint-Simonians and liberals in France, he too thought highly of
Mehmed Ali, at least in July 1839, as ‘the missionary of civilisation in the east’ who
resuscitated Arabia.⁵³ Yet in 1840, amid the heated warmongering, he adopted a
calmer voice, and called his countryman to serenity, peace, and reason.
Aside from his parliamentary speeches, in four articles titled ‘La Question
d’Orient, la guerre, le ministère’, written in late August, Lamartine severely
criticized Thiers and his line of action. He rejected the idea that the cause of
Mehmed Ali was the cause of France, reminding his audience that the Syrians,
and ‘most importantly the Maronites, a healthy, vigorous, Catholic population’,
viewed the rule of Mehmed Ali ‘with horror’, and were fighting for freedom from
his ‘despotism, the upsurge in barbarism’.⁵⁴ Lamartine argued that Mehmed Ali’s
cause did not constitute ‘a very holy cause to be served, a very vital interest to be
defended, a very immense result to be obtained’ for France, whose entry into
war against the Quadruple Alliance and the sultan would be ‘monstrous’ and
‘treason’.⁵⁵ He invited Thiers to resign, and suggested the formation of ‘a more
consistent and more cautious cabinet [for] the very difficult task of rectifying the
situation and putting France back in her place’, among the ranks of the Concert of
Europe from which she had been excluded.⁵⁶
What distinguished Lamartine from many other moderates was his remarks on
the Eastern Question (la question d’Orient). This question had been interpreted
erroneously, he argued. It should have been seen, not as a source of conflict, but as
an opportunity for profitable political and economic gains for Europe. It could
furnish France with an excuse for peace and the establishment of lasting alliances,
thus guaranteeing her future in the European balance system. Each of the three
Powers—Britain, Russia, and Austria—had vital interests in the Eastern Question.
Russia had a desire to expand toward Istanbul. Britain’s interests rested on
communication with India. Finally, Austria strove to preserve her interests on
the Danube. ‘France’, Lamartine argued, ‘had only an interest in the balance and
freedom of the seas.’⁵⁷
The French writer further maintained that, instead of antagonizing Britain and
Russia, France could follow a more conciliatory and cooperative policy and seek
the establishment of ‘a general protectorate of the West over the East’.⁵⁸ This
protectorate would respect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but it
would be:
⁵³ Lamartine, La Question, 151. ⁵⁴ Ibid. 189. ⁵⁵ Ibid. 188. ⁵⁶ Ibid. 186.
⁵⁷ Lamartine, Vues, discours et articles sur la question d’Orient (Paris: Charles Gosselin, 1840), 19.
Also cited in Andrew Arsan, ‘ “There Is, in the Heart of Asia, . . . an Entirely French Population”: France,
Mount Lebanon and the Workings of Affective Empire in the Mediterranean, 1839–1920’, in French
Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 76–100.
⁵⁸ Lamartine, Vues, 71.
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[a] special protectorate of each of the four Great Powers over the four great
divisions of the [Ottoman] empire which interest them most immediately. The
Black Sea and its mouth to the Russian protectorate; the shores of the Adriatic to
the Austrian protectorate; the centre of Asia Minor, Rhodes, Cyprus, Syria and
the Euphrates to the protectorate of France; finally, Egypt and the passage of Suez
to the protectorate of England.
Lamartine called this ‘negative patriotism’, and argued that it ought to prevail over
‘malicious and jealous contests’ among the Powers. A general peace and broad and
lasting equilibrium in Europe ought to be built on the equitable and loyal
distribution of interests to the satisfaction of all. It entailed ‘the union of the
East and the West’, joined together by the knot of politics and commerce in a free
Mediterranean which would guarantee the peace of the world, linking Europe to
Asia—a dream, Lamartine added, that he shared with Talleyrand and Napoleon,
‘those two dreamers!’⁵⁹ France’s global position could be bolstered by this ‘new
European political system’.
Lamartine’s account of the Eastern Question and call for peace signified a key
aspect of the ongoing crisis for at least two reasons. On the one hand, more
generally speaking, he invited the French and the other Great Powers to extend to
other parts of the world the system of balance and equilibrium they had estab-
lished in Europe—in this specific case the Ottoman Empire. This would preserve
the territorial integrity of the sultan’s domains and thus eliminate a major threat
to European peace, while at the same time peacefully securing the interests of
European Powers. In other words, he sought to reconcile what might at first
sight seem to be two opposites: the expansionist motives of Napoleon with the
pacific nature of the Vienna Order. He invited the Powers to repurpose the
Eastern Question as an instrument of condominium, not dangerous competition,
still an enabler of Great Power intervention in the east, but not a trigger of war
among them.
The other paramount implication of Lamartine’s account was more urgent. He,
and those statesmen and writers who thought alike, helped stop the emotional
slide to war. All the sabre-rattling proved in the end to be intolerable for Louis-
Philippe I. He could no longer risk international war, nor allow revolutionary
propaganda that might spawn unrest in the country. He listened to the moderates:
‘Nothing in the world will force me into [war],’ he declared, swallowing his earlier
words on releasing ‘the tiger of the revolution’. The reversal of his policy meant
vetoing Adolphe Thiers’s conduct and forcing the prime minister and foreign
minister to announce his resignation on 22 October.⁶⁰ One week later, he
⁵⁹ Ibid.
⁶⁰ M. [François] Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de mon temps, vol. 5 (Paris: Michel Lévy
Frères, 1862), 404.
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appointed in Thiers’s place another moderate, conservative, and Anglophile
figure, François Guizot, the very man who had popularized the idea of civilization
in France. Guizot was of the belief that ‘the question of Syria was not a legitimate
war case,’ and guided Paris to a more pacific policy thereafter.⁶¹
On hearing the news, the agents of the Quadruple Alliance and the Porte were
elated. The Ottoman chargé d’affaires Yanko Mavroyeni communicated the news
from Paris to Foreign Minister Mustafa Reșid: ‘the demission of Thiers, who has
confused matters both in France and abroad with his revolutionary principles, will
be favourable for the maintenance of peace.’⁶² This signified the complete diplo-
matic isolation of Mehmed Ali, and meant only one thing—the ultimate, diplo-
matic victory belonged to the sultan. Palmerston and Metternich became the men
of the hour in Europe. Now they could mediate between Cairo and Istanbul for an
almost unhindered settlement. But, in the Ottoman Empire, a different fate
awaited Mustafa Reșid.
*
When the castle of Acre, one of the Egyptian strongholds, was unexpectedly
surrendered to the Allied forces on 3 November, Mehmed Ali ordered Ibrahim
Pașa to evacuate Syria.⁶³ The Egyptian armed resistance was now broken on the
ground. The diplomatic resistance persisted. The talks between the signatories of
the July 1840 Convention and Mehmed Ali over the terms of the settlement with
the sultan continued for five months. All the while, Mehmed Ali continued to
ask for hereditary rights at the least, and played all his trump cards, seeking,
on the one hand, to overthrow the victorious cabinet in Istanbul and, on the
other, looking to use Druze chiefs as an instrument to suppress the uprisings
in Syria.⁶⁴
Mustafa Reșid was stubbornly opposed to Mehmed Ali’s restoration as the pașa
of Egypt. But by early March 1841, he had lost his popularity and credibility in the
eyes of the sultan. When the fiscal results of the new tax system under the
Tanzimat had proven to be disastrous, a group allegedly linked to Mehmed Ali,
his steward Necib Pașa, as well as Valide Sultan and her agent, Rıza, found ample
opportunity to oppose Mustafa Reșid and the Gülhane Edict even though the
latter two had endorsed it at first. The Ottoman foreign minister was declared
the culprit. It was he who had spearheaded the tax reforms and the signing of the
recent commercial treaties with the European Powers, which were considered
the main causes of the treasury’s woes.
Cornered by this newly formed camp, Mustafa Reșid wrote a secret memoir to
Metternich in a frantic effort to ask for the Powers’ aid. Things had changed since
⁶¹ Ibid. 390; Alfred Schlicht, ‘La France et le Liban dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Influences
occidentales dans l’histoire orientale’, Francia 11 (1984): 459–507, at 499.
⁶² Mavroyeni to Reșid Pașa, 3 Nov. 1840, BOA HR.SYS 965/35.
⁶³ Wood to Ponsonby, 4 Nov. 1840, RWEC, 180–81. ⁶⁴ See Ch. 10.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
    223
1839, Reșid complained, due to the cessation of the critical position adopted by the
young Sultan Abdülmecid against the ancient order, as well as the sultan’s
proclivity ‘little by little to do anything that comes to his mind without reflection
and without consulting anyone’. The new institutions of the Tanzimat were not
thriving, and there was a tendency to return to the old regime. Mustafa Reșid was
concerned that his post and life were at stake. He warned that the return to the old
system might lead to the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, whose eventual
disintegration could result in a European war. Therefore, in the last days of
his ministry, he called for the Powers to actively intervene in the domestic politics
of the Porte, if necessary by anchoring warships in the Bosphorus against the
ulema and the fanatical statesmen ‘for a decade or so’ until the new system
consolidated.⁶⁵
But no such aid came from the agents of the Powers, who possibly had difficulty
fathoming the foreign minister’s unexpected call. On 29 March 1841, Mustafa
Reșid was dismissed by the sultan, while the negotiations with Mehmed Ali
were still under way. A British agent reported that this happened after an imperial
council meeting at which Reșid told the müftü (the chief ulema) to keep
the preaching of the șer-i șerif (holy justice according to the prescriptions of the
Qur’an) out of the code of commerce. Blasphemy was committed, and the
extraordinary disturbance in the assembly led, first, to the müftü and the kazasker
resigning—a course from which they were then dissuaded with great difficulty by
Rıza and Said Pașas. The same evening Grand Vizier Rauf spoke to the sultan in
the name of the ministers against the conduct of Reșid. Infuriated by the news
and long alarmed by the foreign minister’s popularity, Abdülmecid I made up
his mind.⁶⁶
Mustafa Reșid was thereupon appointed as ambassador to Paris. His dismissal
from office eliminated the last major obstacle to an Ottoman–Egyptian agreement
with the mediation of the Powers. After a series of ambassadorial meetings, a deal
was finally made in London in May 1841.⁶⁷Mehmed Ali’s gain was limited: he was
granted hereditary rights, and the sultan appointed Necib, Mehmed Ali’s agent in
Istanbul, as the pașa of Damascus. But the agreement restrained Mehmed Ali’s
military to 20,000 men, and fixed a tribute to be paid by the pașa to the sultan
annually.⁶⁸ If Mehmed Ali or any of his descendants were to break the conditions,
the hereditary government from Egypt would be subject to revocation.⁶⁹
Moreover, Mehmed Ali agreed to recognize, ‘without reservation, that all the
treaties and all the laws of the Empire will have to apply to Egypt as to any other
⁶⁵ ‘Traduction d’un mémoire sur la situation actuelle de l’Empire Ottoman’, attached to Stürmer
to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 Mar. (N472E), HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 80; cf. Šedivý, ‘Mustafa
Reshid’, 282.
⁶⁶ ‘Note on the fall of Reschid’, n.d., DUR Ponsonby Papers GRE/E506. See also Šedivý, ‘Mustafa
Reshid Pasha’s Fall’.
⁶⁷ BOA HR.SYS 936/1. ⁶⁸ BOA HR.SYS 936/2. ⁶⁹ Ibid.
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province of this empire’, which secured for Britain and other European Powers
the privileges of the commercial agreements signed with the Porte since 1838. The
pașa would comply with the orders addressed to him by the Porte to regulate the
system of the levy and the construction of warships in Egypt. He would also place
his land and naval forces under the rule of the sultan. That is, he would entirely
submit to the authority of Istanbul, while at the same time giving up the Taurus
mountains, Crete, and Syria.⁷⁰
The aspirations of the pașa of Egypt, despite the French support he received
until October 1840, were thus quelled by the Quadruple Alliance and the Porte. It
was neither Hüsrev nor Mustafa Reșid alone that haunted the pașa’s dreams, but a
fluid coalition that the two initiated though they were both excluded from this
coalition eventually. Mustafa Reșid played an Eastern version of the ‘civilization’
game with Mehmed Ali to enlist the intervention of the Powers on behalf of the
sultan, not to fend off their encroachments. Yet it was Sultan Abdülmecid I who
made the final deal with Mehmed Ali for the stability of his empire.
All these events overlapped with a moment when the idea of civilization was
being used more explicitly and vocally in European international thought to
justify interventions, wars, and colonization in the East. While Britain fought
China by herself in 1839–41 and together with France in 1856–60 in the two
Opium Wars, or when the French looked to suppress the resistance of the
Algerians from the late 1830s onwards, the term ‘civilization’ frequently appeared
in diplomatic correspondence, parliamentary speeches, and public writings as a
way to underpin empire and imperial violence.⁷¹
In the Levant, too, in 1840–41, during the intervention of the Powers and the
Porte in Syria, it served as an instrument to silence France, end her support of
‘the barbarism’ of Mehmed Ali, and endorse the cause of the sultan. After the
Navarino intervention of 1827, a new discursive practice thus fully fed into
the transimperial culture of security, owing to the fact that the Eastern
Question came to be seen as a question of whether to establish a joint, ‘peaceful’
protectorate of the West over the East. Then began a new history of concerted, co-
interventionism in the East, whereby the Powers considered intervention a ‘right’
and a ‘duty’, not an ‘untoward event’. From then on, the weight of the Concert’s
influence over the politics of the Levant dramatically increased.
With the end of the so-called second ‘Eastern crisis’ and the 1840–1 interven-
tion, peace was perhaps settled in the wider Ottoman world, the dynasty of Osman
and the family of Mehmed Ali were protected by inter-imperial agreements, and
the threats to the Vienna Order were finally thwarted. The pașa of Egypt would tell
⁷⁰ Ibid.
⁷¹ Andrew Phillips, ‘Saving Civilization from Empire: Belligerency, Pacificism and the Two Faces
of Civilization during the Second Opium War’, European Journal of International Relations 18(5)
(Oct. 2011): 5–27.
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his European correspondents in Alexandria that the Eastern Question was now
‘radically terminated’.⁷² But in Syria, and particularly Mount Lebanon, which was
the centre of the hostilities in the first place, violence erupted immediately after the
British, Prussian, and Ottoman expeditionary forces left the country. The
European Great Powers intervened once again in the name of ‘civilization’ and
‘humanity’, and in order to address the never-ending Eastern Question. The
Levant descended into a new cycle of inter-imperialized civil wars.
⁷² BOA HR.SYS 936/1/118.
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Beginnings
Mount Lebanon before 1840
Syrians!
Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia in conjunction with the
Sultan have decided that the Rule of Mehemet Ali shall cease in Syria
and I have been sent here with an advanced squadron to assist you in
throwing off the yoke of the Pashas of Egypt.
Syrians!
You know that a Hatt-i Scheriff has been issued by the Sultan securing
the life and property of his subjects which is in full operation through-
out the Turkish territories in addition to which the Allied Powers have
engaged to recommend to the sultan to make an arrangement to
render your condition happy and prosperous . . .
Inhabitants of Lebanon!
I call upon you to rise and throw off the oppressive yoke under which
you are groaning. Troops, arms and ammunition are daily expected
from Constantinople . . . ¹
In August 1840, when the British squadron the Powerful anchored off Beirut, its
seasoned captain, Commodore Charles Napier, circulated this proclamation to
incite a rebellion against French-backed Egypt.² As we saw in the previous
chapter, the Lebanese, particularly the Maronite peasantry, responded to these
calls positively, and gave their sweat and blood to fight against Mehmed Ali’s
armies. Their struggle helped break the diplomatic resistance of Paris and Cairo
against the Quadruple Alliance and the Porte, leaving no manoeuvring space for
France except war or compliance with the demands of the allies. Their efforts
immensely contributed to ending the diplomatic deadlock of the time. They
enabled the 1840 intervention, helping to suppress Mehmed Ali’s imperialist
ambitions and to restore Syria to the sultan’s authority in the hope of a better
future for themselves.
¹ Copy of Proclamation, 14 Aug. 1840, BLM Napier Papers, Add MS 40036/46.
² Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., The War in Syria, vol. 1 (London: John W. Parker, 1842),
15–18; Ponsonby to Wood, 28 June 1840; Wood to Ponsonby, 3 July 1840, RWEC, 146–7.
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In the third and final part of the book, we will discuss their experience:
the implications and effects of the 1840 intervention on the ground, what it
meant for the Lebanese, how it was received, and what role it played in the
outbreak of a new cycle of civil wars in 1841, 1842, 1845 and finally—and most
tragically—in 1860.
It is true that much has already been published on the civil wars in Mount
Lebanon, their complex origins, theatres, and repercussions.³ Fascinating as these
studies are, they have usually built their narratives and employed analytical grids
within the framework of an abstract—and sometimes ambiguous—notion of
modernity that gradually threatened the existing modes of (feudal) politics and
the economy in Lebanon, and produced sectarianism as a cultural response to
uncertainties about future. With a few exceptions (e.g. Caesar Farah’s incredibly
detailed Politics of Interventionism), these studies have rarely kept in view the
transformative role of persistent vectors, such as the Eastern Question, which
made violence in Lebanon more complex and enduring, and more difficult to
contain. In these studies, the Eastern Question has usually been considered as an
‘age-old’, intangible, and static component, a European, inter-imperial quandary
only. Its inter-sectoral qualities, and the responses of the Porte and the Lebanese
themselves to it, have received much less attention.
Here, I will consider Great Power interventions, the quest for security, and
civil wars in Lebanon through a micro-spatial lens, by historicizing the Eastern
Question as a constellation of factors. I will try to explain how the Eastern
Question reached Mount Lebanon, extending into the manors of the feudal
lords, or the so-called muqatadjis, that had for centuries formed the nucleus of
the Lebanese society in Greater Syria. And I will seek to elaborate how it was
played out by diplomatic (strategic), legal, religious, and economic agents—how
³ Aside from the aforementioned works of Fawaz, Farah, and Makdisi, the studies published on the
wars include (in chronological order), Henry Churchill, Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years’ Residence from
1842 to 1852, Describing the Manners, Customs and Religion of its Inhabitants with a Full & Correct
Account of the Druse Religion and Containing Historical Records of the Mountain Tribes from Personal
Intercourse with Their Chiefs and Other Authentic Sources, 2 vols (London: Saunders & Otley, 1853);
Tayyib M. Gökbilgin, ‘1840’tan 1861’e kadar Cebel-i Lübnan Meselesi ve Dürziler’, Belleten 10 (1951):
641–703; Abdul al Razzaq al Bitār, Haliyyāt al-bashār fī tārīkh al-qarn al-thālith ashar, 3 vols
(Damascus: 1961, 1963); Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1965); Haluk Ülman, 1860–1861 Suriye Buhranı. Osmanlı Diplomasisinden Bir Örnek Olay
(Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966); Ilya F. Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon,
1711–1845 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Dominique Chevallier, La Société du
Mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1971); Michel
Chebli, Une histoire du Liban à l’époque des émirs (1635–1841) (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1984);
Mikhayil Mishaqa,Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and
19th Centuries (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988); Karam Rizk, Le Mont-Liban au
XIXe siècle de l’émirat au Mutasarrifiya. Tenants et aboutissants du Grand-Liban (Kaslik-Liban:
Bibliothèque de l’Université Saint-Esprit, 1994); Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon:
A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press,
2002); Yann Bouyrat, La France et les Maronites du Mont-Liban. Naissance d’une relation privilégiée
(1831–1861) (Paris: Geuthner, 2013); Dima de Clerck, Carla Edde, Naila Kaidbey, and Souad Slim
(eds), 1860. Histoires et mémoires d’un conflit (Beirut: Presses de l’Ifpo, 2015).
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resources, men, ammunition, funds, plans, and ideals were daily mobilized from
imperial hubs into the mountain, not only from Istanbul or Cairo but, from
around 1840, also from the capitals of the five Great Powers and other
European states.
Using fresh archival and secondary sources, I will show that transimperial
security culture thrived in Lebanon through the already existing sectarian and
class divides and tensions that had been brought about in part by new streams of
egalitarian and capitalist ideas and aspirations, the rise of new classes and class
consciousness, as well as quest for political power in the mountain. I will thus
differ from the revisionist scholarship on the history of Lebanon which considers
sectarian disaggregation as a post-1840 phenomenon and a product of imperial
interventionism—a ‘storm’ created by European and Ottoman imperial agents.
Since fleshing out these points requires an understanding of the nuances of
politics and society in Mount Lebanon in the decades preceding the 1840 inter-
vention, it is important to first discuss the pre-1840 history of Lebanon and the
beginnings of class conflict and sectarianism there. I will do so by following the
story of a leading feudal family, the Druze Jumblatts, which will enable us to make
better sense of the composite Lebanese experience of change before and after 1840.
The story of the Jumblatts is useful not only because the family lived through
war and peace, violence and security in Syria for centuries, nor because their
history furnishes us with a more intelligible and economical narrative amidst all
the complexity and diverse factors that fanned violence and civil wars. The
Jumblatts were also one of the richest (if not the richest) and most influential
families in the country, in whose lands the Maronites and Druze had lived side by
side in harmony for decades. It was in these very lands, and in a few others, that
internecine and inter-imperialized violence erupted in the nineteenth century.
The Land of the Muqatadjis
In Bilâd al-Sham or Greater Syria, there had been almost no direct Ottoman
political control since Sultan Selim II had conquered the country in 1516. This
situation lasted until the mid-nineteenth century. The decentralized administra-
tion permitted hereditary rule by politically and economically powerful families as
long as they submitted to the authority of the imperial centre.⁴ In return for
enjoying relative autonomy, these families were made responsible for taxation and
security and for keeping the region within the Ottoman fold, which required them
to attune themselves to the incessant demands of the imperial centre while
⁴ ‘Abd-al Qādir al-Azm (ed.), Al-Usra al-’Azmiya (Damascus: Matba’at al-Inshā, 1960), 25ff.; cf.
Hanioğlu, Late Ottoman, 15.
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responding to the requests of local elites and the population. The one major
imprint of the Ottoman sultans on this system of vernacular politics was to divide
Syria into three vilayets (provinces): Tripoli, Aleppo, and Damascus.⁵ Later, in
1660, a fourth vilayet in Sidon was established in order to exercise nezaret or
superintendence over the others, mainly to check the activities of potentially
dissenting Lebanese gentry.
The main duty of the Ottoman valis (governors) of the four vilayets was to
ensure submission to the imperial capital and the sending of revenues. Yet, just
like Bulutkaptan Ali and Mehmed Ali of Egypt,⁶ they occasionally aspired to
greater autonomy, or even independence. Each time local notables accumulated
sufficient power to pose a threat to the central authority of the Porte, the sultans
would turn either to nearby governors or to rival notables and reward them with
greater authority to create a power balance in the region—or, if this failed, an
imperial army would be dispatched to restore Ottoman rule. In a similar vein, each
time the local gentry rose against their Ottoman overlords (valis) as a result of
heavy taxation, the irregularities of the tax system, or excessive demands for
military aid, the governors would appeal to the same method of pitting these
gentries against one another to subjugate the local elites under imperial authority,
as was the case in Ottoman Egypt.⁷
The Jumblatts were one of the notable families in Syria, with their leaders
holding the post of the pașa (vali) of Aleppo at the start of the seventeenth century.
Of Kurdish (Ayyubi) descent and, after conversion from Sunni Islam, followers of
the Druze doctrine,⁸ in the first decade of the seventeenth century, the relations
between the Jumblatt pașas and their Ottoman overlords became strained when
Hüseyin Jumblatt Pașa refused to send reinforcements to the sultan’s Persian
campaign. Following his execution, his nephew Ali Pașa aspired to found an
independent state in Aleppo and Adana. In 1607, the sultan’s military inflicted a
heavy blow on the army of Ali Pașa. Some members of the family, scattered and
much reduced both in number and in property, sought refugee in Mount
Lebanon. The Lebanese grand emir at the time, Fakr’eddin II (1572–1635) of
the Druze Ma’n family, warmly welcomed the Jumblatts, most notably Jumblatt b.
Said and his son Rabah.⁹ The Jumblatts were then settled in the Shuf region, and a
new episode began in the history of the family.
*
⁵ Salibi, Lebanon, 16. ⁶ See Chs 3 and 5. ⁷ See Ch. 4.
⁸ An Islamic sect that sprang from Isma’ili beliefs in the 11th c., the Druze adhere to a gnostic and
esoteric version of Shiism that combines Islamic teachings with Hellenistic, Iranian, and other Eastern
pre-Islamic religious traditions. Kais M. Firro, A History of the Druzes (New York: E .J. Brill, 1992); Nejla
N. Abu ‘Izz al-Din, The Druzes: A New Study of their History, Faith and Society (Boston: E. J. Brill, 1993).
⁹ Abu ‘Izz al-din, The Druzes, 209. Hazran tells us that Ali Pașa likewise sought refuge at first in
Beirut. He then went to Istanbul, and was pardoned by the sultan and appointed as beylerbeyi in
Hungary. He was either executed by local authorities in 1610 or died of natural causes in 1611, while his
family is said to have been killed or enslaved. Yusri Hazran, ‘How Elites Can Maintain their Power in
the Middle East: The Junblat Family as a Case Study’, Middle Eastern Studies 51(3) (2015): 346.
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Mount Lebanon was a semi-autonomous region in Syria with its own unique
structure of order, which lasted until 1842.¹⁰ Under Ottoman rule, it was admin-
istered by the local grand emirs, of the Ma’n family until 1697 and, from then on,
of the Sunni Muslim Shihabs, whose main duty was to mediate the interests of
local inhabitants and those of the Ottoman overlords to whom they paid a yearly
tribute.¹¹ With the exception of Ahmed Pașa al-Jazzar (1722–1804), the pașa of
Sidon who reigned between 1775 and 1804, Ottoman valis intervened in the
internal affairs of the mountain only when the grand emir became too aspir-
ational, when the taxes were not remitted, or when the local gentry became
troublesome in official eyes.¹²
The inhabitants of Mount Lebanon lived in a patriarchal system of social
hierarchy, with emirs at the top of the pyramid and hakims and sheikhs of various
ranks below them. This hereditary feudal order was based on kinship and prestige,
wherein the principal values held by society honoured the traditions of the
ancestors.¹³ In this system, after the family of the great emirs (the Druze
Yemenites and Arslans, and the ‘Abu l’Lamas who eventually converted to the
Maronite religion), and the second-rank emirs (the Shi’ite sheikhs of the Himadah
house and the Muzhir house), came the Jumblatts, along with the eight grand
sheikh families of the special class (al-mashayikh al-kibar), the ‘sheikh of the
sheikhs’. The latter were granted muqatas—lands of various sizes leased to them
by the sultan—in 1711, and were therefore known as muqatadjis or fief-holders.
Five of these great sheikhs were Druze (the Jumblatts, the Imads [Yazbakis],
Abu Nakads, Talhuqs, and Abd al-Maliks) located in the south of the country,
and three were Maronites (the Khazins, Hubayshes, and Dahdahs) that resided in
the north.
Like most other Lebanese chiefs, the Jumblatts were mainly occupied with the
cultivation of silk, mulberries, olive trees, and vines in their ‘muqatas. They were
responsible for the productivity, justice, and security of these lands, collecting and
remitting taxes, policing, presenting a yearly tribute to the grand emir, and
contributing armed men for his purposes.¹⁴ They enjoyed the privilege of partial
exemption from taxes, keeping a percentage of the tax that they collected as a fee.
And they cohabited with other gentry which had no ascribed status, such as clergy
and small landowners, as well as with peasants, commoners (‘ammiyyah) in rural
areas, and artisans in urban centres.¹⁵
¹⁰ Farah, Politics, xviii; Schlicht, ‘La France’, 496.
¹¹ Chebli, Une histoire, 59; Fawaz, An Occasion, 16. ¹² Makdisi, Culture, 37.
¹³ Harik, Politics, 71.
¹⁴ John Bowring, Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria, Great Britain, Presented to both
Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1840), 102; Khalaf,
Civil and Uncivil Violence, 65; Harik, Politics, 41.
¹⁵ Caesar Farah, ‘The Road to Intervention’, Papers on Lebanon 13 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese
Studies, 1992), 10.
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In Tarih-i Cevdet, the Ottoman chronicler Ahmet Cevdet Pașa writes that at the
turn of the nineteenth century the population of Mount Lebanon was 217,000, the
majority of which (121,000) consisted of Catholic Maronites. Other sects that
lived in the mountain were the Greek Orthodox and Catholics (47,000), Druze
(30,000), Shi’ite Metuwalis (11,500), Sunni Muslims (6,500), and Jews (1,000).¹⁶
Even though the Maronite majority was concentrated in the north of the
mountain, some peasants eventually moved to the south to work in the Druze
and Greek Orthodox muqatas at the invitation of the muqatadjis, including the
Jumblatts, who needed their labour power. In rare cases Druze peasants also
worked under Maronite muqatadjis. The ethno-religious diversity and the limi-
tations imposed on the Christians, such as dress codes and the heavy poll
tax (haraç) due to their exemption from military service, did not disturb social
accord. In this system, legitimacy relied on personal allegiance: it was ‘more a
function of . . . loyalty between protector and protégé than an attribute of coercion
and impersonal authority’.¹⁷Mutually dependent, the Christian peasants and their
Druze or Muslim chiefs usually lived in harmony. This situation gradually
changed, however, after the turn of the nineteenth century.
*
During their early days in Mount Lebanon, the Jumblatts wielded almost no
political influence and possessed very few estates. A turning point in their story
came in 1711, when Jumblatt b. Said’s nephew Ali b. Rabah married a daughter of
Sheikh Qablan Tanukh, the leader of one of the most established feudal families.
After the sheikh passed away in 1712 with no male descendants, all his property
was inherited by Ali b. Rabah. Thereafter the Jumblatts became one of the richest
families in the mountain, and stepped into the limelight of Lebanese politics.¹⁸
In the eighteenth century, the family featured in the archetypical feud between
themuqatadjis, rallying behind them several families (Druze and some Maronite),
against their rivals, the ‘Imad family and their Yazbaki faction. The differences
between the two factions, over having their Shihab candidate nominated as the
grand emir, turned into more serious hostilities and occasional skirmishes.¹⁹ In
the end, with the support of the pașa of Sidon, the Jumblatts managed to get
Bashir II Shihab, the son of a Maronite convert, proclaimed as the new grand emir.
This was another crucial turning point in the family history. Dubbed the ‘Red
Emir’ because of his red beard and his shrill and brutal methods of oppressing his
opponents, Bashir II eliminated the Jumblatts’ rivals one by one. He reduced
dynastic and inter-factional quarrels to a minimum, using great force and thus
bringing into subservience the major muqatadjis who he believed menaced tran-
quillity in the country. These were mostly Druze: the Arslans, Talhuqs, ‘Imads,
¹⁶ Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 1, 275. ¹⁷ Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 65.
¹⁸ Salibi, Lebanon, 9–10. Harik, Politics, 50.
¹⁹ BOA C.ML. 40/1802, h. 29.1.1174; Salibi, Lebanon, 11–12; Harik, Politics, 46–7.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
234  
‘Abd al-Maliks, and Nakads. These families belonged to the Yazbaki faction.
Especially the Nakads were among the major protagonists of the civil wars later
in the 1840s.²⁰
To be sure, the grand emir’s intentions in suppressing these Druze families did
not initially have any sectarian motivation, i.e. ‘deliberate mobilization of religious
identities for political and social purposes’.²¹ In fact, he forged a military alliance
with his namesake, Sheikh Bashir, the head of the Jumblatt family since 1792. The
suppression of rival families empowered the Jumblatts and made them the most
influential Druze muqatadjis.²² But it also upset the traditional ‘muqata system in
which the overlords of the mountain, the grand emirs, ‘had no right to inflict
personal injury in punishing a feudal lord’.²³
Bashir II killed many muqatadjis and confiscated their property, although
custom ‘specified other means of punishment such as exile or destruction of
property’.²⁴ He was arguably the first to violate this centuries-long tradition,
which overturned the balance of power and the culture of recognition among
the families. To Bashir II, oppression was a necessary evil. Even though he brought
stability to a region of continuous factional conflicts, his methods also contributed
substantially to the defilement of the ‘muqata system.²⁵ It was during his reign that
the seeds of class and sectarian violence were sown, the first shoots of which
marked the beginning of sectarianism in Mount Lebanon.
A plethora of factors enflamed sectarian inclinations in the mountain. Among
these were the ascendancy of the Maronites, as a result of their demographic
boom, their material enrichment as the foremost Lebanese silk producers, the
gradual empowerment of the Maronite church, and the weakening of the Druze
due to inter-factional fighting.²⁶ Since the capitulatory agreements of the sixteenth
century, France had cultivated interests in Syria and acted as the protector of the
Maronite Church, while Roman Catholic missionaries such as the Franciscans,
Jesuits, and Lazarists had advised the Maronite patriarchs.²⁷ In the late eighteenth
century, besides the Maronite college that had been established in Rome in 1584,
new Catholic schools were opened in Lebanon. They helped spread literacy and
educated generations of Maronite ‘ammiyyah (commoners) who later took up
positions as scribes, clerks, and household agents in the service of the notables,
both Maronite and Druze muqatadjis, including the Jumblatts.
²⁰ For a detailed account of the Nakad family, see Naila S. Kaidbey, ‘Shihab–Druze Discord in the




²² Thomas Philipp, Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002), 78–9; Harik, Politics, 39.
²³ Ibid. 6. ²⁴ Ibid. ²⁵ Firro, Druzes, 54–5; Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 68–71.
²⁶ Hazran, ‘Junblat’, 349. ²⁷ Salibi, Lebanon, 12.
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The clergy acted as one of the channels which maintained the French name in
the country, but also imported egalitarian ideas which posed a threat to the
‘muqata system.²⁸ Thanks to new interpretations of reform, the church gradually
decoupled itself from the muqatadjis (Khazins, Hubayshes, and Dahdahs) who
had long acted as patriarchs, supplied protection, formed the higher echelon of its
hierarchy, and levied taxes on the clergy during the first two decades of the
nineteenth century.²⁹ It freed itself from these taxes, which allowed it to amass
considerable cultivable land. Moreover, instead of relying on the muqatadjis, the
clergy came to receive physical protection from Grand Emir Bashir II, a Maronite
himself with clerical advisers behind his throne.
All these modifications were pivotal in the forging of a communal conscious-
ness among the Maronites under the influence of modern, egalitarian ideas,
transmitted through the French-inspired clergy.³⁰ Already in 1807, Maronite
nazirs (responsibles) were appointed in place of the muqatadjis for tax collection
in the Khazins’ Kisrawan district.³¹ Inspired by the erudite Bishop Joseph Istfan
(1759–1823), the peasantry was introduced to the system of vekils (representa-
tives) who raised the concerns of each Christian village they represented and,
concurrently, manifested the transformation in the political perspective of the
commoners. A shift occurred in the ‘muqatas, albeit largely incomplete, from
personal and kinship-based allegiance to ties based on communal (initially class/
peasant and eventually sectarian) and public interest. That is, in Mount Lebanon,
class and sectarian consciousness formed virtually simultaneously in the early
nineteenth century.
*
A peasant rebellion that broke out in Kisrawan in 1819–20 on the initiative of
Bishop Istfan was a catalyst of the shift. It displayed the dual nature of the
emergent communal-based allegiance of the Maronite peasantry. Burdened by
the tax demands of the grand emir (who, in turn, had been hard pressed by the
Ottoman governor of Sidon, who had doubled the tribute due), the peasants
rebelled. On the one hand, as a religious sect (Maronites), they demanded to be
‘treated at least on equal terms with the Druzes’, because the latter, under the
leadership of Bashir Jumblatt, had refused to pay extra tributes to the grand emir,
who had then not dared to challenge them.³² On the other hand, the peasantry had
acted as a financially and politically oppressed class that rose against the control of
the muqatadjis. They invited their co-religionists, the Maronite peasants, in the
southern districts controlled by the Druze muqatadjis, to join them in rebelling
against their chiefs. But the Jumblatts’ Maronite tenants responded negatively to
²⁸ Churchill, Mount Lebanon, 89–90. ²⁹ Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 72–3.
³⁰ Ibid. 74; Fawaz, An Occasion, 18. ³¹ Firro, Druzes, 54.
³² Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 77–8.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
236  
such calls, as they did not have to pay the extra levies imposed on their northern
co-religionists.
While, in the Maronite north, a dual communal consciousness grew chiefly
through the medium of the clergy and from below, in the south of Lebanon, the
Druze sectarian identity took a political form. The difference was that the latter
was forged from above and mainly through the agency of the Jumblatts, especially
when they turned against Grand Emir Bashir Shihab II in the mid-1820s.
In fact, the Jumblatt chief had helped the grand emir suppress the peasants’
rebellion and kill its prime movers in 1821. Thereafter, however, the two figures
had become rivals and engaged in a struggle for power. Bashir Jumblatt frowned
upon his namesake grand emir’s desire to consolidate his power by corroding the
‘muqata system. At the same time, he strove to unite the Druze under him.³³
Against the demographic rise of the Maronites, Jumblatt resettled hundreds of
Druze families between the eastern Mediterranean coasts and Hawran, the strong-
hold of the Druze.³⁴ He harboured hopes to ‘attain the highest authority of the
Mountain’, taking over from Bashir II the sub-governorship of the Druze.³⁵
The rivalry between the two Bashirs turned into hostility in 1822 in the context
of a complex altercation between the Ottoman governors of Damascus and Sidon,
when Jumblatt sided with the pașa of Damascus and Bashir II with the pașa of
Sidon.³⁶ As the sultan endorsed the former’s cause, Bashir II found himself in a
perilous position and went into self-exile in Cairo. There Mehmed Ali Pașa
received him warmly. Having set his eyes on an invasion of Syria, the pașa of
Egypt first resolved the differences between the pașas of Damascus and Sidon, and
then made a secret pact with Bashir II. As the grand emir set out for Lebanon,
Mehmed Ali told him ‘we will meet again . . . [O]ur meeting [will take place] in
Syria’, indicating his intentions of occupation.³⁷
This was the point at which Lebanon was drawn into Mehmed Ali’s sphere of
influence. From then on, the pașa supported the grand emir’s policies. When the
latter found out that the Jumblatts had schemed with the Sunni Shihabs against
³³ Firro, Druzes, 57; Hazran, ‘The Junblat’, 352; Abu-Shaqra, al- Harakāt, 15.
³⁴ But Jumblatt’s policies were hardly inimical to the Maronites. He concomitantly accorded the
Maronite peasants new lands in his district in Mukhtara, and even contributed to the construction of a
monastery for which Pope Pius VII sent him a letter of gratitude. Hazran, ‘The Junblat’, 352.
³⁵ Henri Guys, Beyrouth et le Liban. Relations d’un séjour de plusieurs années dans ce pays, vol. 1
(Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, 1985 [1850]), 79; ‘Note relative à la victoire du pacha d’Acre et de l’émir
Béchir sur les Druzes, 7 Feb. 1825, AMAE Papiers Desages 60PAAP/34/146.
³⁶ Hasan Damietta to Mehmed Ali Pașa, 21 July 1822, DWQ Bahr Barra Files (8). N. 53; Abdullah
Pașa to Mehmed Ali Pașa, 5 Aug. 1822, DWQ Bahr Barra Files (8). N. 54; Muhammad Necib Efendi to
Mehmed Ali Pașa, 2 July 1822, DWQ Bahr Barra Files (8). N. 48; ʿAbdullah Abi ʿAbdullah, Tārīkh al-
muarinh wa-masī :hī al-sharq ʿabr al-ʿusur III (Dar Malaqāt, 1997), 218.
³⁷ ‘Amil Khury and ‘Adil Sulayman, al-Siyasāt al-duwaliyyaa fi-l-sharq al-arabī II (Beirut: Dār al-
nashr li-l-iyāsa wa-l-nashr, 1960), 95; BOA HAT 384/20615; 384/20627.
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him in order to control Lebanon, and the mountain subsequently descended into
civil war, the pașa of Egypt unreservedly supported Bashir II.³⁸
Against this alliance, Bashir Jumblatt rallied the support of several families that
included all the grand emir’s nemeses—Muslim Shihabs, some Maronite sheikhs
from Kisrawan, Orthodox Christians, and even the Yazbakis and their Druze
peasants, who harboured personal animosity towards the grand emir or were
charmed by the Jumblatts’ lucrative gifts. Some 14,000 Druze were enlisted against
the grand emir’s troops. The latter consisted largely of Maronite peasantry but
were also backed by Mehmed Ali (and through him the pașa of Sidon) and some
Druze sheikhs.³⁹ This inaugurated a wider and more perilous period of Shihab–
Jumblatt rivalry in the mountain that was to last at least until 1861.
Even though it might at first sight seem to be a cross-sectarian conflict, religious
slogans were adopted to mobilize men and rouse the soldiers among the Druze in
the Jumblatt camp as well as among the Maronites on the grand emir’s side.⁴⁰
Religious identities were mobilized for political purposes. In the end, despite their
numerical superiority and all the sectarian exaltation, the Jumblatts could not hold
in Samqaniyya against the Mehmed Ali-backed army of Bashir II in early 1825.
After several weeks of pursuit in the snow, the Druze leaders, including Bashir
Jumblatt, were captured. The latter was then strangled in Sidon.⁴¹ His palace and
assets in Mukhtara were destroyed, and the family’s lands confiscated.⁴²
The Jumblatts’ fall is often considered as one of the milestones of the open-
ended sectarian political struggle in Mount Lebanon. According to the Lebanese
historian Kamal Salibi, the Druze never forgot Bashir II’s treatment of them, even
though the grand emir had crushed the Jumblatts not because they were Druze but
because he saw them as dangerous political opponents. The Druze would there-
after cease to cooperate wholeheartedly in the affairs of the emirate, instead
awaiting an opportunity for revenge.⁴³ The American scholar Leila Fawaz argues:
‘the death of [Sheikh Jumblatt] . . . introduced sectarianism into Lebanese
politics.’⁴⁴
It is not entirely correct to confine the origins of sectarian violence in Lebanon
to one single event. The rise of sectarianism in the mountain was a complex
process that, for the moment, included the growing communal consciousness of
the Maronites through the burgeoning clergy and the peasantry, as well as the
³⁸ BOA HAT 386/20670; 386/20671; 386/20672; 386/20676; Mehmed Ali Pașa to Abdullah Pașa, 4
Feb. 1824, DWQ Bahr Barra Files (22). N. 40; BOA HAT 387/20678; Haydar, Lubnan, 723; cf. Harik,
Politics, 224.
³⁹ Ibid. 226–7.
⁴⁰ ‘Note relative à la victoire du pacha d’Acre et de l’émir Béchir sur les Druzes’, 7 Feb. 1825, AMAE
Papiers Desages 60PAAP/34/146; Firro, Druzes, 58; Mishaqa, Murder, 94.
⁴¹ BOA HAT 1231/47990; see also HAT 1229/47938; Salibi, Lebanon, 47; Firro, Druzes, 61.
⁴² For the details of the fighting, see BOA HAT 668/32604; 1231/47987; 1231/47988; 1231/47989;
Hariki, Politics, 226, 235; Polk, Opening, 84.
⁴³ Salibi, Lebanon, 27. ⁴⁴ Fawaz, An Occasion, 19.
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Jumblatts’ bid for leadership in the mountain which provoked a fierce and deadly
rivalry with the Maronite grand emir, Bashir II.⁴⁵ It unfolded at a time—before
1840 and in the first decades of the nineteenth century—when the old ‘muqata
system and the allegiances between the lords and peasants had been somewhat
tarnished by egalitarian ideas circulating among the clergy and the commoners.
The influence of the once-powerful muqatadjis was now reduced to the admin-
istration of their peasants, ‘though in a precarious manner unlike the past’, and
without any significant influence over the grand emir which they had previously
enjoyed.⁴⁶
As for the Jumblatts, after their suppression by the Egyptian-backed Bashir II,
the remaining family members fled to the Hawran plains—a Druze-dominated
region in the south-east. There they sought shelter, keeping a low profile until a
new opportunity arose for them to return to their lands in Mukhtara. That
opportunity manifested itself when Mehmed Ali’s daring Syrian campaign
began in 1831.
When the Egyptians Came
After Grand Emir Bashir II eliminated the Jumblatts and established his absolute
authority in Lebanon in 1825 with the support of Mehmed Ali, he sent news to
Cairo, thanking the pașa and declaring his ‘continued compliance with [Mehmed
Ali’s] orders’.⁴⁷ Six years later, when Mehmed Ali sent his army and navy to Syria
and asked for Bashir II’s assistance, however, the latter was at first hesitant. He was
uncertain how to react to a conflict between Istanbul and Cairo, fearful of being
jammed between their political differences.
Bashir II made his mind up only after receiving a furious letter from the pașa of
Egypt, who asked him to support the Egyptian army in its campaign—otherwise
‘my great love for you will change and . . . I will send five regiments of Jihadis to
[Mount Lebanon] and I will destroy it.’⁴⁸ Mehmed Ali did more than threaten
Bashir II, though, pledged also that he would help Bashir II ‘cut out the Druze’ for
good this time.⁴⁹ The grand emir then sent his son to aid the Egyptian campaign,
and remained loyal to Mehmed Ali until he was dismissed from power in 1840.
⁴⁵ Perusing the archival documents of the Maronite church, Harik concludes that the Maronite
clergy were vigorously seeking ‘to sever political and social relations between the Maronites and the
Druze’, which meant ‘not only the separation of the two communities but also the rejection of the iqta
tie [the ‘ammiyyah] between the Maronite subject and the Druze lords, or between the Druze subject
and his Maronite lord.’ Harik, Politics, 241–2.
⁴⁶ Ibid. 231; Firro, Druzes, 61–2; see also M. Michaud and M. Poujoulat, Correspondance d’Orient,
vol. 4 (Paris: Ducollet, 1834), 341–2.
⁴⁷ Amir Bashir al-Shihabi to Mehmed Ali Pașa, 5 Sept. 1825, DWQ Bahr Barra Files (10) N. 1.
⁴⁸ Polk, Opening, 96.
⁴⁹ Mehmed Ali Pașa to Amir Bashir al-Shihabi, 6 Sept. 1831, DWQDafatir Mu’ayya Turki Files (40),
N. 766.
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For the Jumblatts, and other Druze sheikhs—Abu Nakads, Talhuqs, and Abd ‘al
Maliks—all of whom had been defeated at least once by Bashir II, the civil war
between Istanbul and Cairo was the moment for revenge and the opportunity to
return home. As the news of Mehmed Ali’s démarche reached them, they sent
each other secret massages deciding to declare their allegiance to the sultan. With
what resources remained in their hands from the fighting in previous decades,
they joined the Ottoman imperial army.⁵⁰ The Ottoman authorities reinstated
Numan Jumblatt, Bashir’s elder son, as the sheikh of the sheikhs in the mountain,
as a measure against ‘the clear evidence of the treachery of [Bashir II] toward the
Supreme State’, alluding to his alliance with Mehmed Ali.⁵¹
However, the hopes of the Jumblatts and the other Druze sheikhs were shat-
tered when Ibrahim’s army defeated Ottoman forces in Homs and Konya.⁵²
Sheikh Numan Jumblatt then ran away to Asia Minor, together with the fleeing
Ottoman regiments. The Porte settled him first in Bursa and then Karahisar-i
Sahib (modern day Afyon), though neither the local population nor the sheikh
himself was happy with this new arrangement, the former finding it too expensive
to host him, the latter asking for resettlement in more developed İzmir (Smyrna)
or Rumelian provinces of the empire.⁵³ Numan stayed in Western Anatolia until
1839. The remainder of his family continued a silent residence in Aleppo and the
Shuf region, while some fled back to Hawran.
*
After the war between Istanbul and Cairo was arrested by the Kütahya truce of
May 1833, Mehmed Ali’s son Ibrahim Pașa became fully engaged in the admin-
istrative reorganization of Syrian provinces, which were almost entirely excluded
from the internal policy of the Ottoman government.⁵⁴ In the beginning, the
Syrian population, and particularly the Christians, showed enthusiasm for the
arrival of the Egyptians.
The French-backed Egyptian rulers of Syria knew that they needed domestic
collaboration in their campaign. They therefore followed a very active policy of
positive public relations with generous payments for supplies provided by locals to
their army, ordered their men to avoid plunder, and sought to generate friendly
relations with the wider populace, particularly the ‘rich local inhabitants’,
⁵⁰ Polk, Opening, 97. Hammud Abu Nakad’s plan to join the Ottoman forces failed, however, as his
correspondence with the Ottoman pașas was intercepted by Bashir II: Firro, Druzes, 62. In his
chronicle, Amir Haidar Shihab notes that the Druzes and Christians were engaged in limited fighting
in Deir al-Qamar before the Ottoman and Egyptian forces confronted one another: Polk, Opening, 136.
⁵¹ BOA HAT 354/19898; 908/39773; Polk, Opening, 99–100, 103; Hazran, ‘Junblat’, 352; Firro,
Druzes, 62.
⁵² See Ch. 5. Sebahattin Samur, İbrahim Pașa Yönetimi Altında Suriye (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi
Yayınları, 1995), 29.
⁵³ BOA HAT 696/33505; 1231/47997. ⁵⁴ Petrunina, Social’no, 314.
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introducing themselves as the liberators of Syrians from the oppressor Ottoman
pașas.⁵⁵ They promised to lower taxes and exempt the locals from conscription,
and made active efforts to improve the condition of the Christians.⁵⁶
As the Russian traveller Lieutenant-General P. P. Lvov and Consul Bazili
observed, non-Muslims were admitted to the administrative bodies such as city
councils (majlis al-shura) as well as in judicial functions and the tax offices.⁵⁷ In
Lebanon, representatives (vekils) were appointed for each village according to
their dominant denomination, and a main court, comprising three judges allo-
cated with respect to their sects (two Maronites and one Druze), was established—
a measure usually and mistakenly attributed by the revisionist literature to the
post-Tanzimat restoration politics of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁸
Ferdinand Perrier, a French aide-de-camp in the Egyptian army in Syria, wrote
that ‘all [the] humiliating distinctions’ held against the Christians in the past—
such as only being permitted to dress in certain colours and fabrics, or not being
allowed to ride horses—were abolished, ‘as Muslims and non-Muslim believers
were declared equal’.⁵⁹ These all proved to be crucial changes which dovetailed
with growing egalitarian sentiments among the Maronite clergy and peasantry.
But they also engendered the institutionalization of sectarian politics.
Furthermore, the implementation of modern Egyptian state apparatus war-
ranted broader public security. The sanitary system was improved. Freedom of
movement was facilitated through the introduction of government orders to enter
towns.⁶⁰ The Bedouin threat was checked and roads were secured.⁶¹ Thanks to
these measures, Beirut transformed from a backwater town into one of the
Levant’s major commercial ports, with a brisk increase in the volume of trade in
the 1830s.⁶² Equally importantly, under Mehmed Ali’s protection, local mer-
chants, mostly consisting of Christian families, ‘began to coalesce into a powerful
class of their own’, which (as we will see) would within a few decades significantly
⁵⁵ P. P. Lvov, Siriya, Livan i Palestina v opisaniyax rossijskix puteshestvennikov, konsul’skix i voennyx
obzorax pervoj poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1991), 214; Petrunina, Social’no, 316; Edward
Hogg, Visit to Alexandria, Damascus and Jerusalem during the Successful Campaigns of Ibrahim Pasha,
vol. 1 (London: Saunders & Otley, 1835), 193.
⁵⁶ Samur, Ibrahim, 49. ⁵⁷ Lvov, Siriya, 214; Bazili, Siriya, 126; Petrunina, Social’no, 319.
⁵⁸ Lvov, Siriya, 214; Petrunina, Social’no, 317–18; Latīfa M. Salem, Al- Hukm al-ma:srī fi al-shām
1831–1841 (Cairo: Madbouli, 1990), 84–5.
⁵⁹ Ferdinand Perrier, La Syrie sous le gouvernement de Méhémet-Ali jusqu’en 1840 (Paris: Bertrand,
1842), 108.
⁶⁰ Polk, Opening, 112–13.
⁶¹ Samur, Ibrahim, 49. For Mehmed Ali Pașa’s control over the Bedouins and the hajj routes, see
Aharoni, The Pasha’s Bedouin.
⁶² Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, ‘Quarantine and Trade: The Case of Beirut, 1831–40’, International
Journal of Maritime History 19(2) (Dec. 2007): 233; ‘Commercial Report’, 16 Nov. 1835, TNA FO
78/264. See also Charles Issawi, ‘British Trade and the Rise of Beirut, 1830–1860’, International Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies 8(1) (Jan. 1977): 92, 94. As Issawi tells us, ‘the total number of ships entering
[Beirut] rose from 341 in 1835 to . . . 680 in 1838.’
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challenge the authority of the muqatadjis and the feudal order, alongside the
Christian peasantry and the clergy.⁶³ In the latter half of the 1830s, new consulates
were opened in Beirut by Britain, Belgium, the United States, and Russia, to
oversee growing commercial relations as well as to protect the interests of their
co-religionists.⁶⁴
*
Once a hero and liberator of the Syrians, Mehmed Ali and his son Ibrahim turned
into tyrants in the eyes of the locals within just a few years. Because of the
continuous risk of war with Istanbul in the mid-1830s and the need for resources
from Syria, they began to levy troops in coastal Lebanon, disarm the mountaineers
and particularly the Druze to prevent an Ottoman-backed uprising, monopolize
silk production (which was the main local industry), and impose the heavy firda
taxes on all males regardless of their religion.⁶⁵ The locals were further aggravated
by the imposition of corvée labour, the deforestation carried out to provide timber
for the Egyptian navy, and the increase in prices due to the presence of a high
number of troops.⁶⁶
All these prompted resistance against the Egyptian rule. The Druze risings in
Palestine, Tripoli, and the region of Latakia in 1834 were quelled only when
Mehmed Ali ordered, in the interests of ‘politics and humanity’, the suspension
of conscription among the Druze.⁶⁷ But, due to fears of war with Istanbul, it was
reimposed in 1837, and new revolts broke out in Hawran at the end of the year.
A region traditionally inhabited by the Druze, the population of Hawran swelled
in the 1830s with the arrival of their co-religionists who had fled the mountain or
Palestine to avoid Egyptian oppression. During the 1837–8 uprising, Druze forces
achieved successive victories against the Egyptian units.⁶⁸ According to Firro, the
sense of Druze communal solidarity grew stronger at the time.⁶⁹
This was another major moment in Lebanon where religious identities were
used for political ends. Adamant Druze resistance led Ibrahim Pașa to ask for
⁶³ Abou-Hodeib, ‘Quarantine and Trade’, 241–2; Kirsten Alff, ‘The Business of Property: Levantine
Joint-Stock Companies, Land, Law, and Capitalist Development around the Mediterranean,
1850–1925’ (doctoral thesis, Stanford University, 2019), 56.
⁶⁴ M. Baron to Minister AE, 10 Oct. 1838, DIPLOBEL 940/38/9; Butenev to Nesselrode, 13 Nov.
1839, AVPRI, f. 149, o. 502/1, d. 397, ll. 1–3.
⁶⁵ Perrier, Syrie, 359; Farah, ‘Road to Intervention’, 12–13.
⁶⁶ Bashir II to Hannah Bahri, 7 June 1835, DWQ Abdin File No. 251, D.N. 104; Ibrahim Pașa to
Mehmed Ali Pașa, 7 June 1835, DWQAbdin Files (251), D.N. 100; Mehmed Ali Pașa to Ibrahim Pașa, 6
June 1835, DWQ Abdin Files (251), D.N. 51; Ibrahim Pașa to Mehmed Ali Pașa, 25 May 1835, DWQ
Abdin Files (251), D.N. 64; Polk, Opening, 123–4, 156–9; Makdisi, Culture, 53; Mishaqa, Murder, 121;
Henry Churchill, The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860 (London:
Bernard Quaritch, 1862), 31.
⁶⁷ On Mehmed Ali’s order, Mehmed Ali Pașa to Ibrahim Pașa, 15 June 1835, DWQ Abdin Files
(212), D.N. 76. For an Ottoman report written on the origin of the uprising, see BOA i.MTZ.(05) 3/91.
See also Firro, Druzes, 68–9.
⁶⁸ BOA HAT 380/20555; Alexandre Deval to Comte Mole, 16 May 1838, DDC 218.
⁶⁹ Firro, Druzes, 66–78.
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reinforcements from Bashir II. The latter took the reins into his own hands and in
1837 campaigned hard, with extensive use of sectarian vocabulary. The grand emir
not only enlisted Maronite peasants against their former overlords but also
expelled all the Druze working in his palace, and issued proclamations that
those who joined the insurgents would be subject to harsh punishments including
the destruction of their houses and villages.⁷⁰
By June 1838, about 15,000Maronites fully equipped for war were ready to fight
under Bashir II.⁷¹ Even though some historians argue that the Christians did not
fight the Druze out of religious zeal,⁷² before the fighting began Bashir II had sent a
letter to ‘all the Christian soldiers on Mount Lebanon’, thanking them for their
‘love and obedience’ to the Egyptian government, and announcing that Ibrahim
Pașa distributed arms ‘in order to defend your property and to manifest your pride
against your enemy, the community of the heretical Druzes, who deny the
prophets’.⁷³
The country then descended once more into terror. The Druze forces were
overwhelmed during major encounters over the summer, at least 1,000 of them
being slaughtered by Bashir’s men in the post of Bardah.⁷⁴ What makes this
second major Druze rising against Egyptian rule so important is that some of
the Druzemuqatadjis fought with, and were suppressed by, their former Maronite
tenants, which aggravated tensions between certain members of the two sects.⁷⁵
The sectarian disaggregation among Lebanese society grew stronger still in
1840, ironically at a point when the Maronite peasantry, Maronite Khazin sheikhs,
and the Druze chiefs had in May once more formed a pragmatic alliance with each
other to rise against Ibrahim Pașa and Bashir II.⁷⁶What had drawn them together
was the common threats they suffered from: unremitting conscription, corvée
labour, and heavy taxation.⁷⁷ They made a covenant in Antelias to act as one.
However, when some of the Druze sheikhs dropped out of the league because
Bashir II promised them the legal possession of the lands in the Kisrawan region,
the Maronite peasantry became immensely resentful of the ‘betrayal’ of the
Druzes.⁷⁸ They nonetheless persevered, surrounding Beirut and attacking the
⁷⁰ Ibrahim Pașa to Muhammad Serif Pașa, 28 Feb. 1838, DWQ Abdin Files (255), D.N. 346; Firro,
Druzes, 73.
⁷¹ On Mehmed Ali’s order, Mehmed Ali Pașa to Ibrahim Pașa 15 June 1835, DWQ Abdin Files
(212), D.N. 76. On the origin of the uprising, see BOA i.MTZ.(05) 3/91; Firro, Druzes, 68–9.
⁷² Makdisi, Culture, 55.
⁷³ Firro, Druzes, 80–81; Chafseand to Secretary of State (Washington, DC), 30 Sept. 1838, NARA
R59/T367.
⁷⁴ Mahmud Bey to the Governor of Beirut, 5 July 1838, DWQAbdin Files (256), D.N. 67; Alexandre
Deval to Comte Mole, 16 May 1838, Deval to Mole, 20 Sept. 1838, DDC, 224–5; BOA HAT 380/20555;
BOA 374/20428; Firro, Druzes, 74–5; Wood to Ponsonby, 14 Oct. 1839, RWEC, 136.
⁷⁵ Fawaz, An Occasion, 21. ⁷⁶ Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 70, 79–85.
⁷⁷ Defter III, 102- a, b; ʿAbdullah, Tarikh, 242–4.
⁷⁸ Farah, ‘The Road to Intervention’, 13–14; Harik, Politics, 246.
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town every day, exchanging fire with the regulars within the town before retiring
again.⁷⁹ In the end, the rebellion was brutally quelled in July 1840.
As noted in the previous chapter, this moment of defeat and desperation for the
Lebanese—more precisely, Maronite peasants—coincided with the London
Convention of 15 July. British, Ottoman, Russian, and eventually Austrian and
Prussian agents daily arrived in Lebanon to end the rule of Mehmed Ali and
Ibrahim there. From then on, Mount Lebanon became the epicentre of inter-
imperial cooperation and competition.
In conclusion, a serious blow had already been dealt to the old ‘muqata system
in Lebanon before the 1840 intervention. The pre-1840 era had seen fierce inter-
familial (Jumblatt/Yazbaki, and more importantly, Druze Jumblatt/Maronite
Shihab) animosities, the suppression of the muqatadjis by Bashir II, the rise of
egalitarian ideas among the Maronite clergy and peasantry, their claims to prop-
erty, the establishment of new representative institutions, Druze aspirations for
autonomy led by the Jumblatts, fierce religious conflict, and the formation of
quasi-sectarian councils. Sectarianism and class consciousness emerged in
Ottoman Lebanon during Bashir II’s rule, not after he was discredited in
October 1840 by the agents of the Great Powers.⁸⁰ I will beg to differ from
Makdisi here: ‘the conditions for a sectarian storm’ had already been created
before the Powers arrived.⁸¹ In reality, it was the existing crevice in the social order
that provided European and Ottoman imperial actors with channels for influence,
interference, and control, and with unique opportunities to sustain their interests.
What the imperial agents did was to hasten the movement of the storm clouds
towards each other, and magnify the intensity of the impact, as the age of the
Eastern Question began in Mount Lebanon.
⁷⁹ Chafseand to Secretary of State, 24 June 1840, NARA R59/T367.
⁸⁰ Ponsonby to Wood, 2 Sept. 1840, RWEC, 159. ⁸¹ Makdisi, The Age of Coexistence, 64.
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The Age of the Eastern Question
A few months after the Ottoman defeat in the Battle of Nizib (June 1839), the
Ottoman grand vizier Hüsrev Pașa dispatched the two heads of the Jumblatt
family, Numan and Said, from Asia Minor to Egypt. A few other Druze muqa-
tadjis, Qasim al-Kadi and Yusuf Abu Nakad were to accompany the Jumblatts.
Hüsrev’s was a tactical move to destabilize Mount Lebanon, as he asked his old
nemesis Mehmed Ali to procure for the Druze the restoration of their property in
the mountain. The grand vizier expected that that it would deal a blow to Cairo’s
relations with Grand Emir Bashir II.¹
Since the European Great Powers had just declared their support of the Porte,
and Mehmed Ali was anxious to solve the dispute with Istanbul before ‘foreign
involvement’, the pașa of Egypt accepted Hüsrev’s request. He did not immedi-
ately send the Druze sheikhs to Lebanon, though. He knew that the grand emir
would refuse to return the property of his Jumblatt rivals. What Mehmed Ali did
instead was keep Numan and Said in Egypt and grant them an allowance of
£170 per annum, with the purpose of attaching the Jumblatt brothers to his
interest. His plan was to use them at the right time.²
Mehmed Ali dispatched the Druze chiefs back to Mount Lebanon only one year
later, when the intervention of the Quadruple Alliance and the Porte began in
August 1840 and proved disastrous to him. He endowed Numan and Said with
military command, money, and decorations, and tasked them with consolidating
the south of Lebanon, where, according to Mehmed Ali, the Maronites were ‘the
fiercest of [all] the Maronites’.’ He pledged to them the restitution of their ancient
privileges and rights as well as their traditional role as the rulers of the mountain.³
It was with these expectations that the Jumblatt leaders bade their farewell to him
in late 1840 and set out for home after nearly ten years of exile. But, once back in
Mount Lebanon, they did not find peace and quiet. The mountain was embroiled
in inter-imperial rivalries, and struggles for liberties and privileges. It was already
ripe for civil war.
¹ L’Ambassade de France à Constantinople to Desages, 7 July 1840, AMAE PAAP37/77.
² Rose to Aberdeen, 22 June 1841, TNA FO 226/26, f. 112; Mishaqa, Murder, 224.
³ Bashir al-Qasim to Wood, 18 Nov. 1840, RWEC, 182–3.
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‘The Old Days Have Passed’: The Civil War of 1841 and its
Aftermath
When Numan and Said arrived in the mountain in late January or early February,
they observed that British influence was paramount there. Especially since the
Ottoman serasker and interim governor İzzet Pașa left Syria in November 1840
after accidentally shooting himself in the leg, the British dragoman Wood had
emerged as the most influential figure. He had been endowed with wide author-
ities by the Porte, and then he had successfully orchestrated the Lebanese revolt
since the summer of 1840. A contemporary French author compared the British
dragoman to ‘a vizier speaking with the authority of the Qu’ran’.⁴ The French
consul in Beirut, the comte de Meloizes, grudgingly wrote that Wood was the ‘de
facto governor general of Syria’.⁵ Wood himself was proud that ‘the country may
be said to have been administered by us [the British]’.⁶
He had deposed Grand Emir Bashir II the previous October and sent him
into exile due to the Shihab leader’s loyalty to Mehmed Ali and reluctance to
cooperate with the Quadruple Alliance. The new grand emir, Bashir Qasim Shihab,
was regarded by many as an instrument of Wood’s control.⁷ To the Jumblatts,
Bashir II’s deposition from power was good news. But they were wary of Wood’s
dominant position. They believed that Wood was a Catholic, and therefore a
Maronite sympathizer. That he had procured a decoration from the Ottoman sultan
for the Maronite patriarch Hubaysh and direct representation before the Porte
in Istanbul were testaments to this, they assumed.⁸ Moreover, they sensed that
Wood was politically and emotionally distant from the muqatadjis.
Only in the latter sense were they correct, however. In fact, Wood was brought
up by his family as a Protestant.⁹ But he was indeed opposed to feudal rule in
Mount Lebanon. He had collaborated with the Christian peasants during the 1840
intervention, and had pledged to them at the time that with the Gülhane Edict of
1839, their liberties, property, and security, both as Christians and peasants, would
be placed under the guarantee of the imperial state. The British dragoman knew
that the peasants had clung to this hope ever since, while fighting tooth and nail
against Mehmed Ali’s armies. And now, they eagerly waited for the promises to
be kept.
The quandary was that, even theoretically, guaranteeing the peasants’ liberties
by law was at odds with the restitution of the feudal privilege of the muqatadjis,
⁴ Bouyrat, La France, 283.
⁵ Meloizes to Guizot, 26 Feb. 1841, AMAE CPC Beirut, vol. 2; cf. Bouyrat, La France, 283.
⁶ Wood to Ponsonby, 17 Feb. 1841, RWEC, 213.
⁷ Steindl Diary, 8 Oct. 1840, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI 76; Stürmer to Metternich, 21 Oct. 1840,
HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI 76.
⁸ Defter IV, p. 67 a–b. Also in Ata, ‘Osmanlı’, 179; Rose to Palmerston, 22 June 1841, TNA FO 226/
26/112.
⁹ Grenville Withers to Wood, 7 April 1842, SAMECO Box 5, File 1.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
246  
who expected that their properties would be fully restored to them. This was why
Wood considered the return of former lands of the muqatadjis to them by feudal
right to be ‘impossible’. It would undermine the authority of the sultan since it was
‘diametrically opposed’ to the liberties introduced in the Gülhane Edict. He sided
with the peasants, even if not with the Maronite church, considering the muqa-
tadjis as ‘little tyrants’ who were inclined to oppress the ‘poor peasants’ at their
‘muqatas. To Wood, the establishment of full security in the mountain entailed
the peasants’ protection from the ills of the old order.¹⁰
Due to the suspicions the Jumblatts harboured toward Wood, even though he
de facto ruled the mountain, once Numan Jumblatt returned to the mountain, he
immediately went to see Niven Moore, the British consul in Beirut (and Wood’s
brother-in-law). The Jumblatt leader sought to obtain by ‘feudal right’ the pos-
session of the Jumblatts’ former landed property that had been confiscated in
1825.¹¹ This had been promised to them by both Hüsrev Pașa in Istanbul and
Mehmed Ali in Cairo. Moore gave him only a tentative answer, lacking any
authority and any clear views on the matter.
Shortly afterwards, though, it became clear that the Jumblatts’ property in the
Shuf region had been confiscated by the imperial treasury (not by Bashir II), and it
was returned to them by law. The family then resettled in their residence in
Mukhtara and retained control of most of their former muqatas. They immedi-
ately became the richest family in Mount Lebanon once again, only to realize that,
as with most other Druze sheikhs reinstated to their lands, the quality of their
relations with their Maronite tenants had changed.¹²
After more than a decade of absence of their overlords, the Maronite peasantry
had grown accustomed to direct rule and the protection of a Maronite Shihabi
emir against the muqatadjis.¹³ Now more vocal political actors, with the support
of the Church behind them, they held on tightly to the religious rights and liberties
that had been introduced first during the Egyptian interregnum and then pledged
by the Gülhane Edict of 1839. They were therefore unhappy with the return of the
Jumblatts and other Druze sheikhs in exile. They complained to Patriarch
Hubaysh about ‘the harsh treatment they were receiving from their lords’, and
the obnoxious attitude of the Druze officers whom the muqatadjis, including the
Jumblatts, had appointed to collect taxes.¹⁴ The patriarch’s attempts to intervene
in the muqatas on behalf of the peasants became a recipe for crisis.
¹⁰ Wood to Huseyin Pașa, 22 Feb. 1841, RWEC, 218–19.
¹¹ Wood to Ponsonby, 24 Feb. 1841, RWEC, 222–3; Harik, Politics, 253; Hazran, ‘Janblat’, 353.
¹² Rose to Palmerston, 22 June 1841, TNA FO 226/26/112; ‘Rapport de Bourée sur les évènements
du Liban’, n.d.; ‘Tableau des familles druzes classées en raison de leur importance et de leur influence’,
AMAE 50MD/43/12–15.
¹³ Harik, Politics, 251–3.
¹⁴ Hubaysh Papers, MS 5812, 8215, and 3522; cf. Harik, Politics, 253–4.
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Observing these tensions as early as February 1841, Wood presciently reported
that a ‘partial civil war’ might erupt in Lebanon ‘sooner or later’ as a natural
outcome of ‘the effervescence that had existed for years in the minds of the people,
of the [feudal] tyranny and oppression under which they suffered, of smothered
and angry feelings, and of the [peasantry’s] sudden emancipation from slavery’.¹⁵
He listed seven material causes that could stir up hostilities:
firstly, the [Muslim] population began to evince a disposition to assume their
ancient superiority over the Christians. Secondly, the Christians of the different
persuasions revived old religious animosities and controversies among them-
selves. Thirdly, the Druses betrayed their secret intention of separating them-
selves from the Maronites whose supremacy over them is a matter of national
vexation to them, fourthly, the [muqatadjis] or Lords of the Manor of every
denomination insisted upon having restored to them their feudal rights over the
peasantry, fifthly, the peasantry said they would resist it and claimed the equal
participation of rights granted to them by the [Tanzimat], which promise made
them take up arms to expel the enemy [in 1840]. Sixthly, the Sheikhs reproduced
their old family feuds . . . and, seventhly, the Arabs of the [d]esert commenced
their encroachments and their predatory excursions on the borders. Added to the
above the French [government] began to intrigue more openly.¹⁶
These emotional and material factors illustrate the degree of convolution in the
politics of Lebanon. And each of these merits serious attention in analyses of the
origins of the civil wars in the 1840s and later in 1860.¹⁷
The land disputes, however, were of pivotal importance, as by the end of the
year they had sharpened all other differences into violence. As early as the first
months of 1841, as Makdisi tells us, Mount Lebanon buzzed with questions over
which land belonged to whom, and how to ‘reconceptualize’ these lands and the
people that dwelt on them.¹⁸ Not all Druze muqatadjis were as fortunate as the
Jumblatts in terms of retaining possession of their pre-1831 lands. Particularly in
the environs of the silk-rich Deir al-Qamar, the land issue became very strained
because the Nakads were not allowed by Grand Emir Bashir Qasim Shihab
to return to their former muqatas, possibly at the direction of Wood.¹⁹
Furthermore, the Maronite inhabitants of these muqatas adamantly refused to
submit to the authority of their former ‘Druze’masters. They would agree only to
¹⁵ Wood to Ponsonby, 17 Feb. 1841, RWEC, 213–14. ¹⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷ However, due to limitations of space, I will not delve into all of these dynamics in my discussion
here. For a truly thorough and comprehensive study that details the origins of conflict with a multi-level
analysis, see Farah, Politics, esp. ch. 4.
¹⁸ Makdisi, Culture, 67.
¹⁹ The grand emir based his argument on the grounds that these muqatas had been confiscated by
Bashir II in the 1810s and had become a Shihab belonging according to the Ottoman law.
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a Maronite sheikh as an overseer of the region. The Nakads were thereupon settled
in ‘Baiy, where they worked to turn the situation in their favour.²⁰
From the outset, a degree of sectarian mistrust, reminiscent of pre-1840 politics,
was discernible in the mountain. So was the weakening of old feudal ties. Seeing
that the differences and resentments amongst the mountaineers were critical and
had to be urgently addressed, Wood encouraged the establishment of a mixed
consultative council (divan), which duly assembled in May 1841.²¹ In a similar
vein to the council established under Egyptian rule in the 1830s, this new
Tanzimat council consisted of members to be elected by the patriarchs of the
Christian churches (Maronite, Greek Catholic, and Greek Orthodox), by the
Druze, Turkish (Sunni), and Metuwali (Shi’ite) law (one each), by the people of
the five districts of Mount Lebanon (one each), as well as by a president to be
appointed by the grand emir.
The mixed composition of the council—sectarian and ethnic as well as
regional—reflected the mixed solution that Wood strove to introduce in the
country under the inspiration of the Gülhane Edict. He wanted to prevent the
return of the ancient feudal system that had characterized pre-1831 Lebanese
politics by means of introducing a new model whereby the council would protect
the liberties of peasants without completely excluding the muqatadjis from pol-
itical decision-making processes and maintaining their status as elites.
However, a majority of the Druze feudal lords, and in fact also the Maronites
muqatadjis, cleaved to their class instincts, and felt ill-disposed to permit the curbing of
their powers through the institution of a superior authority (the council) that would
intervene in the ‘internal’ problems of their muqatas. The Jumblatts sought to block
the assembly of the council by suggesting an increase in the number of Druze
representatives. Issues remained unaddressed. Bitter sentiments lingered. Small-scale
skirmishes even took place in the disputed lands of Deir al-Qamar region between the
Maronite peasants and the Druze Nakad sheikhs in the spring of 1841.²² With
hindsight, one might say that these were the rolls of thunder before the storm.
*
The prime movers and victims of the violence that would soon ensue were almost
entirely Lebanese, mainly the Maronites, the Druze, and the Greek Orthodox. But
like the Mamluks and Albanians of the 1800s in Ottoman Egypt,²³ these local
actors also looked to grasp the hands of European and Ottoman imperial agents in
the overwhelmingly rapid stream of events while navigating their direction in the
²⁰ Bourée to Guizot, 19 Aug. 1841, DDC vol. 6, 423; Harik, Politics, 253.
²¹ ‘Memorandum from Wood to Emir Bashir for forming provisional regulations for the govern-
ment of Mt Lebanon’, 11 Feb. 1841, SAMECO Box 4.
²² Farah, Politics, 91–7. ²³ See Ch. 3.
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confused tide of their time. Unlike all the previous civil wars fought in the
mountain, violence in 1841 and after proved to be of an inter-imperial character.
In fact, already in the 1830s, when Lebanon had turned into a major commer-
cial centre with increasing missionary activity under the relatively more stable
Egyptian rule, the country had become an arena for sectarian/inter-imperial
competition among the European Powers. For instance, when the Russian general
consulate in Jaffa had been moved to Beirut, ‘this market of the whole of Syria’,
one of St Petersburg’s specific aims was to ‘supervise the intrigues of [the
Maronites against the Orthodox] and to take timely action [against them]’.²⁴
In 1839, during their anti-Egyptian rebellion in Hawran, the Druze had sought
the guardianship of Britain against French-backed Egypt ‘with perfect conviction
that they would enjoy the same protection and privileges as [Britain’s] other
Colonies[,] particularly India . . . ’²⁵ In return, British authorities agreed that they
would ‘obtain for [the Druze] the best security that hereafter they shall not be
disturbed in the free enjoyment of their own institutions & liberty & security for
their persons and property’.²⁶ Just like the Mamluks in the 1800s, the Druze would
repeatedly remind the British of this promise.
In the early 1840s, Mount Lebanon was subsumed in the transimperial security
culture. The Powers continuously and directly intervened in its domestic affairs.
They held ambassadorial and consular conferences in Istanbul and Syria at the
time, so that they could act in accord with each other, perpetuating their interests
while cushioning their rivalries. Controversial as it might sound, this European
co-imperialism aimed to establish a ‘benevolent’ Western protectorate over the
East to supervise the ‘half-civilized’mountain-dwellers to civilization—something
that Alphonse de Lamartine had argued for in 1840.²⁷ But, at the same time, the
agents of the interfering Powers, and particularly Britain and France, were
engaged in ardent competition, in a geostrategic struggle that aimed to restrain
each other from becoming the paramount power in the Levant—a status that
France had previously experienced alone and that Britain was currently enjoying.
They did not want to allow any actor control of the lucrative silk industry of the
mountain. Nor did they wish to permit any religious establishment to dominate
the field of missionary activity.
All these demarcated the age of the Eastern Question in Lebanon. As Arsan
explained better than anyone, for French thinkers and politicians, in the geostra-
tegic sense, the Eastern Question,
²⁴ Butenev to Nesselrode, 13 Nov. 1839, AVPRI, f. 149, o. 502/1, d. 397, ll. 1–3; ‘O peremeshhenii
Konsul’stva iz Jaffy v Bejrut. Na podlinnike Sobstvennoyu Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva rukoyu
napisano. Byt’ po semu’, 30 Dec. 1830, AVPRI f. 149, o. 502/1, d. 397, ll. 41–5.
²⁵ Wood to Ponsonby, 14 Oct. 1839, RWEC, 136.
²⁶ Ponsonby to Wood, 17 Oct. 1839, RWEC, 138.
²⁷ N. Moore to [?], 31 May 1844, AMAE 50MD/43/94. For Lamartine’s arguments, see Ch. 8.
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was never . . . simply [a concern to strengthen France’s position in the
Mediterranean and to consolidate its hold over Algeria]. Nor was it primarily
about maintaining the continental balance of power, though such concerns were
undoubtedly of great consequence. Rather, their eyes were trained upon the
Mediterranean—upon securing French supremacy upon its waves and around
its shores and on preventing Britain from establishing its own hold on the middle
sea. Mount Lebanon, that distant outpost of France, served an important func-
tion in such strategic calculations.²⁸
Lamartine wrote in 1838 that Syria at large could be the ‘Ancona of the East’—a
crucial port for French preponderance in the Mediterranean within a ‘European
system of alliance’ that could be attached to Paris by means of local co-religionists
who ‘offered themselves to France’.²⁹
But France had found herself in an awkward and humiliating position since
August 1840, when the Maronites, her historical protégés and local co-religionists,
revolted against the French-sponsored Mehmed Ali and the latter had ferociously
suppressed them. Accordingly, Franco-Maronite relations had been enfeebled,
and then threatened, by the Austrian schemes to establish special relations with
the Maronites with a view to assuming the historical role of France.³⁰
This was why the Guizot government took a more assertive line of action in
1841, and energetically toiled to reconfigure the Syrian order.³¹ They developed a
fourfold programme with which France (i) reinforced her military presence on the
spot, promising to dispatch a naval ship (which arrived only in September 1841),
as some 1,500 British troops were still stationed in the Lebanon;³² (ii) initiated a
diplomatic dispositive by the appointment of fixed, experienced, and well-paid
diplomats particularly in the key towns of Tripoli, Sayda, Jaffa, and Caiffa;
(iii) launched a triple offensive in London, Istanbul, and Beirut to pressure for
the removal of Austrian and British troops from Syria as a precondition for the return
of France to theConcert of Europe.³³ For this, French agents strongly advisedOttoman
officials to preserve their independence from London. And (iv) France supplied credit
to poor Maronite families and ecclesiastical institutions, who had suffered materially
during the revolt against Mehmed Ali, and provided gifts for the propagation of
religion and scholarships for education at French schools.³⁴
Day by day, the ‘muqatas of the Lebanese feudal lords were drawn into the
Eastern Question. Receiving the eager succour of French agents, the Maronite
²⁸ Arsan, ‘Mount Lebanon’, 80–81. ²⁹ Lamartine, La Question, 234.
³⁰ ‘Note sur les influences étrangères et la politique turque au Liban’, 28 Dec. 1841, DDC vol. 6, 66.
³¹ ‘Notes diverses relatives au Liban, 1840–63’, n.d., par L. de Amandy, AMAE 50MD/138/327.
³² Bouyrat, La France, 286–7.
³³ Baron de Bourqueney to Guizot, 11 Mar. 1841, AMAE CP Angleterre 657; cf. Bouyrat, La
France, 287.
³⁴ Bourée to Guizot, 18 Apr. 1841, AMAE CPC Beirut, vol. 2; cf. Bouyrat, La France, 287.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
      251
peasantry grew in confidence and found the courage to stand against their Druze
overlords. Figures like bishop Tobia ‘Awn (1803–71), a hardline Maronite clergy-
man openly devoted to the French cause, encouraged the peasants to stand for
their rights. The Maronite Church had in view the continuing rule of the Maronite
Shihab family, maintaining their own influence over the country, and cementing a
Maronite community (‘imarriyah)—ideals that coalesced with French imperial
objectives over time.
These Franco-Maronite affective ties adversely affected the peasants’ personal
bonds of loyalty with the Druze muqatadjis, tarnished as they already were. The
Jumblatts were alarmed. Numan believed that the Maronites were now consider-
ing the French, the Greek Orthodox, the Russians, and the Greek Catholics, the
Austrians, ‘as their protectors’, and the Druze were in need of one. It was
necessary, above all, to maintain landlord–tenant ties and to secure the family’s
authority and prestige in relation to their muqatas. In May 1841, during an
interview with Colonel Hugh Rose, who was in command of the British contin-
gent in Lebanon at the time and who would soon become the British consul in
Beirut (Wood was on his way to Istanbul at the time to advise on the future of
Syria and peace talks with Mehmed Ali), Numan maintained that his family had
‘now more money than [they] required and that, all he wished for now was good
government and order, which would ensure him the possession of his large
property’.
In Numan’s view, the most effective way to secure his wealth was the ‘main-
tenance of British connection with Syria and the education of his countrymen’. He
professed that ‘he himself and his people as far as he could influence them would
be ready to be guided in [their] conduct by the wishes of Her Majesty’s
Government’. Following the model of the Catholic Jesuits, Franciscans, and
Lazarists, Numan proposed setting up a college run by the British (Protestants)
where his countrymen could be educated. He was ready to give Rose substantial
proof of his sincerity and confidence in the British government. ‘I am going to ask
you to forward my request to Viscount Palmerston to permit my youngest brother
Ismail to be educated in England.’He added: ‘[W]hen I give my brother, I give my
soul.’³⁵
This was how a special relationship formed between Britain and the Jumblatts
and the Druze under their sway, while Wood was away. As in 1803, when the
Mamluk Alfi Bey had himself set out for London to obtain British protection,
Numan sent his brother with the same purpose in 1841. Palmerston approved the
dispatch of Ismail Jumblatt, Numan’s brother, to London for education but not
without stressing that the relationship between Britain and the Druze be based on
an understanding that this link would be used to strengthen the connection of the
³⁵ Rose to Palmerston, 22 June 1841, TNA FO 226/26, f. 107.
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Druze with the sovereign authority, the sultan. Britain would only use her
influence in Istanbul in favour of the Druze—the very promise the British
authorities had delivered to the Mamluks in 1801.³⁶
Ismail spent two years in London, mostly melancholic and homesick, and
decided to return home after his instructor, Mr Pain, attempted to convert him
to Protestantism. Back in Mount Lebanon, it remained for Rose to follow orders
and put the Druze in touch with the Protestant (mostly American) missionaries
operating in Lebanon.³⁷ Numan invited the latter to offer education to make ‘our
children better than their parents’ as they were ‘alive to our own imperfections’, so
that ‘our children should not inherit them by seeking the aid of those [Protestant
missionaries] who had the means of raising us in the seal of civilisation’.³⁸ Shortly
after, missionaries were sent also from Britain to open schools with a view to
evangelizing the Druze.³⁹ Protestant–Druze activity concerned the Maronite
clergy as well as the Catholic missionaries. The religious hue of the inter-imperial
competition in the mountain became ever more apparent from then on.⁴⁰
*
To underline once again, the Eastern Question was an intersubjective and dia-
chronic process, and as much an Ottoman question as a European one. Besides the
ambitions of the Great Powers and the interests of the Lebanese, the ambivalent
policies of the Porte to restore its imperial domination in its periphery constituted
a major factor that shaped the tragic course of events on the way to the civil war in
Mount Lebanon in September 1841.
In the first three months of the year, ruling elites in Istanbul continuously
welcomed advice from their allies in Vienna, Berlin, St Petersburg, and London on
the new order to be established in Syria. The sultan’s cabinet had been keen to discuss
how to conduct the reforms there. But, after the fall of the cabinet of Grand Vizier
Rauf and Foreign Minister Mustafa Reșid in March 1841,⁴¹ imperial authority passed
into the hands of more conservative figures, a group of reluctant reformists.
The new grand vizier, İzzetMehmet, the former serasker who had led the Lebanon
campaign in 1840, and hismen followed a policywhich sat uneasily with the form and
formula of the Tanzimat.⁴² They laboured to reverse some of the Tanzimat reforms
such as the abolition of the tax-farming system, the system of direct tax collection, and
the reduction of the powers of the governors. The newministers called for caution and
³⁶ Firro, Druzes, 85. ³⁷ BOA HR.SFR.3 4/67/1, May 1843.
³⁸ ‘Numan’s Testament’, in Rose to Aberdeen, 7 Dec. 1841, SAMECO Box 5, File 1. In fact, a great
proportion of the higher class among the Druze were literate at the time. Bird to Anderson, 17 Oct.
1834, ABCFM vol. 1, Syria, 118/45.
³⁹ Rose to Palmerston, 7 Sept. 1841, TNA FO 78/486/86 ; cf. Rizk, Mont Liban, 108.
⁴⁰ Rose to Aberdeen, 7 Dec. 1841, SAMECO Box 5, File 1; Will Thomson, ‘Report on the Political
Institutions of Lebanon and their Probable Influence on the Prosperity of the Mission’, 6 Apr. 1844,
ABCFM vol. 1, Syria, 118/33.
⁴¹ See Ch. 8. ⁴² BOA A.DVN.MHM 2/21; also in Farah, Politics, 52–3.
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greater watchfulness in the implementation of other reforms.⁴³ Their policy was also
bent on resisting Great Power interference in Ottoman domestic politics in Lebanon,
hoping to preserve the sovereignty of their empire.
Ironically, in early April 1841, only days after Reșid’s fall, before the news broke
in Syria, the provisions of the Gülhane Edict of 1839 were read out before the local
gentry and European consuls in Beirut. But, a few weeks later, two conservative
pașas with notoriously anti-Reșid sentiments, Selim and Necib, were dispatched to
Syria as the pașas of Sidon and Damascus respectively.
The onlookers found Necib’s appointment in particular to be ‘absurd’ because
he had served as an agent of Mehmed Ali of Egypt in Istanbul for nearly three
decades, and was known to be a man ‘with retrograde ideas’. Just over a year
after his appointment, the European consuls believed that they could better
understand his appointment when Necib allegedly ‘frankly admit[ted]’ that it
was a consequence of the desire ‘to neutralise the pernicious effects of the system
of Reșid Pașa, [i.e. the Tanzimat] . . . that the main members of the [Ottoman
imperial council] intended to make Syria the house of Islamism and thus bring
about the fall, piece by piece’ of Reșid’s scheme.⁴⁴
This did not simply mean that the two pașas were against reform of any kind, as
reports of European historical actors would have us believe. Recent scholarship
has already demonstrated the futility of the binary divisions between reformist
and anti-reformist pașas in analysing the contestations within the Ottoman
bureaucracy.⁴⁵ Selim and Necib were conservative reformists, with strong reser-
vations concerning Reșid’s project, which they believed was a product of European
interference. Despite their lack of tact and an empty treasury, they sought to
establish a direct, centralized Muslim authority in the country through adminis-
trative reform and the presence of a new Arabistan army with around 25,000 men,
though they were never able to enlist more than 10,000. With their initiatives and
following their reports, the seat of Sidon was moved to Beirut. The grand emirate
of Mount Lebanon was subordinated to the governor of Sidon, while previously it
had reported directly to the Porte.⁴⁶
However, in almost each of their moves, the two pașas antagonized the
European consuls.⁴⁷ And with each European interference, in the form of advice
or complaint, the Ottoman governors felt more and more aggrieved.⁴⁸ The pașas
were then caught up in an unpleasant feud with European authorities about the
lingering presence of British troops as well as the purportedly ‘Islamist’ policies of
⁴³ İnalcık, Tanzimat, 19–20.
⁴⁴ ‘Memorandum of what has been obtained of the Sublime Porte for the Syrians’, by R. Wood,
9 Aug. 1841, TNA FO 881/2983/5; Bourée to Guizot, 26 Mar. 1842, DDC vol. 6, 107.
⁴⁵ Olivier Bouquet, ‘Is It Time to Stop Speaking about Ottoman Modernisation?’, in Marc Aymes,
Benjamin Gourisse, and Elise Masicard (eds), Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey
from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 62–3.
⁴⁶ BOA i.DH. 40/1867. ⁴⁷ BOA i.HR. 11/552.
⁴⁸ BOA i.HR. 11/526; BOA HR.MKT. 1/17.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
254  
Necib, who, Rose argued, consciously fomented troubles in the country in order to
destabilize Syria, while the negotiations of the Porte and the Powers with Mehmed
Ali, Necib’s alleged master, were still under way.⁴⁹
Necib rejected such accusations. Nonetheless his presence and arguably anti-
Christian policies, with an unofficial, quasi-paramilitary unit under his command
(led by the Druze Shibli al-Aryan) dragged the country closer to violence.⁵⁰ To
check Necib’s actions, Wood was appointed as British consul to Damascus in
October 1841. Wood then fought a bitter, secret war with Necib until the pașa was
removed from office in early 1842.⁵¹
All this is to say that the European Powers’ quest for sway in the Levant
overlapped, at least at first, with the Porte’s ‘conservative turn’ and quest for
independence more than with the (non-)introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in
Lebanon. The council of representatives in the mountain, for instance, was unable
to convene due to domestic opposition. The change of the cabinet in Istanbul
created confusion and fear on the part of the non-Muslim Lebanese and drove
them closer to their co-religionists among the Powers, while the Syrian Muslims
found in this a baffled hope. The Druze, for their part, and especially the
Jumblatts, tried to win over the Porte’s conservative pașas, while simultaneously
fostering ‘special relations’ with British agents.
*
It was at this hour that war came. There is no single, linear explanation as to why
violence broke loose in Mount Lebanon in September 1841. As we have seen,
compound, intertwined factors fed into the complex realities of the country: the
interests and threat perceptions of the different sects, classes, missionaries and
empires whose agents were daily operating and interacting with each other on the
spot. Violence was therefore the catastrophic ‘emergent property’⁵² of a fluid constel-
lation—the sudden frenzy that accompanied an unfaltering collapse into enmity.
The mountain-dwellers spent the summer of 1841 attempting to take a collect-
ive position against the Porte with regards to the heavy new taxes imposed by the
Istanbul government in violation of what had been promised during the 1840
intervention. Just when the Lebanese needed unity and cooperation the most,
acrimonious sentiments poured forth. Their assemblies for the reduction of taxes
were overshadowed by the embittered Nakads’ call for the election of a
⁴⁹ Rose to Palmerston, 24 July 1841, TNA FO 226/26/121; Memorandum of what has been obtained
of the Sublime Porte for the Syrians, signed by R. Wood, 9 Aug. 1841, TNA FO 881/2983/5. For Otto-
Egyptian negotiations in 1841, see Ch. 8.
⁵⁰ Wood to Mustafa Pașa, 2 Feb. 1842, BOA HR.SYS 912/1.
⁵¹ BOA i.HR. 11/537; Caesar Farah, ‘Necip Pasha and the British in Syria 1841–1842’, Archivium
Ottomanicum 2 (1970): 115–53.
⁵² On the notion of ‘emergent property’ and the use of complexity theory in conflict analysis, see
Diana Hendrick, ‘Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and
Implications’ (University of Bradford Working Paper 17, 2009), 6, 33, 34, 39.
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non-Shihab grand emir.⁵³ The Porte’s agents and the Lebanese agreed on a
common tax scheme in early September, with the mediation of Wood. But the
stage for violence had already been set.
The civil war began on 13 September 1841 in Deir al-Qamar, the very region
where unresolved land disputes between the Druze Nakad family and the
Maronite peasants had been under way. A small quarrel between Maronite and
Nakad hunters quickly snowballed into fighting and pillaging, and then spread
from Deir al-Qamar to other villages, though the most violent scenes transpired, it
was reported, in this district. The main perpetrators were Druze and Maronite
peasants, as well as impoverished sheikhs who had been unable to retain their
lands in the ancient system.
The Jumblatts, and a number of other leading Druze and Maronite families, at
first sought to placate them, convening meetings with Maronite Patriarch
Hubaysh and other leading clergy of the mountain. Numan sent his brother
Said to the villages in the ‘war zones’ to calm the atmosphere, where he swore
‘to severely punish the guilty’.⁵⁴Numan himself went to Grand Emir Bashir Qasim
to ‘concert measures against his Druze co-religionists’, because the Maronites had
by that point heavily overwhelmed their co-belligerents and there were cries for
vengeance.⁵⁵ But, in the end, the Jumblatts joined the fighting when a mob of
Druze peasants turned up at their residence, criticized their pacifist position,
insistently called for their support in compelling the Maronites to return the
‘murderers’ of their families, and threatened to kill Numan otherwise.
Rose reported that Numan was known to be a man ‘certainly . . . not cruel’, and
ready to show ‘humanity and liberality’ to the Christians, as he reportedly avoided
pillaging their property and had been seen ‘holding an old Christian [villager] in
each hand and asking for peace’ amidst all the violence. That said, as Numan
himself explained after the fighting was over, he had also grown antipathetic to the
‘Maronite party’, since the clergy had been looking to ‘greatly curtail’ the feudal
rights of the Druze sheikhs and when ‘the Patriarch illegally and secretly endeav-
oured to do away with [them]’, taunting them ‘continually with our savageness’.⁵⁶
Numan’s 17-year old Said, on the other hand, was described as a ‘wild boy . . .
with a good deal of courage’ and ‘guilty . . . of great cruelty’ during the clash.⁵⁷ In
November 1841, with the involvement of the Jumblatts, the Druze gained a
significant advantage over the Maronites. The combat later spread to the
Shuwfayat region, the Greek Orthodox–Druze district, as the Orthodox commu-
nity, ‘suspicious of the Maronites and resentful of their numerical superiority’,
supported their Druze neighbours against the Maronites.⁵⁸
⁵³ Farah, Politics, 67; Rose to Palmerston, 28 May 1841, TNA FO 226/26/78; Rose to Palmerston,
6 June 1841, TNA FO 226/26/104.
⁵⁴ J. Conti to Bourée, 22 Sept. 1841, DDC vol. 6, 448. ⁵⁵ Ibid.
⁵⁶ ‘Numan’s Testament’, in Rose to Aberdeen, 7 Dec. 1841, SAMECO Box 5, File 1.
⁵⁷ Rose [?] to Foreign Secretary, 6 May 1842, TNA FO 226/24/36. ⁵⁸ Salibi, Lebanon, 51.
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The theatre of war in Lebanon and the stance of the Powers and the Porte
illustrate how the Eastern Question played out on the spot. In the initial phases of
combat in October, when Maronites (the French protégés) held an advantage over
the Druze (the British protégés), the French consul, Nicolas Prosper Bourée,
ignored Colonel Rose’s calls to ride together to Deir al-Qamar and persuade the
mountain-dwellers ‘to stop bloodshed for the sake of humanity’.⁵⁹ But then, when
the Druze gained control at the end of November, the roles reversed. Bourée’s calls
for joint action were dismissed by ‘the senior British officers [with] an unusual
reserve’.⁶⁰ After Necib Pașa’s irregular (paramilitary) Druze army arrived, adding
to the miseries of the Christian victims of the war, the French agents described the
grim situation and lack of cooperation between the Powers as ‘a blatant abandon-
ment of the rights of justice and humanity’.⁶¹ Bourée even suggested an armed
European intervention in Syria, but Rose objected, reckoning that such an inter-
vention could jeopardize Britain’s advantageous position in Lebanon.⁶²
The consuls of the five European Great Powers acted together only after Grand
Emir Bashir Qasim, a Catholic Maronite, was captured and tortured by Nakad
sheikhs in December. The consuls believed that Ottoman authorities purposely
refrained from intervening and stopping the violence, and disarmed the Christians
in certain districts.⁶³ The Ottoman pașas, for their part, accused the European
agents of triggering violence for their immediate interests and denied accusations
of indifference.⁶⁴
A war of blame thus started while violence was still ongoing. Anxious that the
Powers might intervene again, the Porte invested serasker Mustafa Nuri Pașa,
another conservative figure, with extraordinary powers, and dispatched him to
Syria to suppress the fighting. But, before his arrival, by the end of December, the
war had ended—with 1,460 casualties (the majority of these were the Druze, and 390
Maronites), tens of villages and the silk and mulberry harvests pillaged, and over
4,000 houses burnt down. The material cost was estimated at half a million pounds.⁶⁵
*
As soon as Mustafa Pașa landed in Beirut, the Ottoman serasker found himself on
the receiving end of the narrative war. According to the inhabitants of the
mountain, both Maronite and Druze, what had happened in the autumn had
been a renewal of ancient quarrels (referring to the 1820s and 1830s) and a
continuation of existing blood feuds and vendettas (kan davası).⁶⁶ Both the
⁵⁹ Bouyrat, La France, 302; Bourée to Guizot, 22 Oct. 1841, DDC vol. 7, 34.
⁶⁰ Bourée to Guizot, 28 Nov. 1841, DDC vol. 7, 52.
⁶¹ Pontois to Guizot, 23 Nov. 1841, AMAE CP Turquie 284; cf. Bouyrat, La France, 310.
⁶² Ibid. 309.
⁶³ ‘Les consuls généraux des cinq puissances a Beyrouth à S.E. Selim Pacha, seraskier de Syrie et
gouverneur de Sayda’, 30 Nov. 1841, DDC vol. 7, 54.
⁶⁴ BOA i.MSM 75/2152. ⁶⁵ Rizk, Mont Liban, 110–11. ⁶⁶ Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 649.
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Maronites and the Druze were discontent with the rule of Bashir Qasim III. The
Druze wanted a replacement and declared that they would approve any Muslim,
including a Turkish pașa, to be the new ruler of the mountain in place of a
Maronite. The Maronites, on the other hand, suggested a Shihab grand emir,
even if not necessarily the current grand emir, Bashir Qasim III, who was
unpopular among a majority of their coreligionists due to his lack of charisma
and poor health. In their view, there was nobody other than the Shihabs who could
maintain order in the mountain except the pro-Egyptian Amir Arslan.⁶⁷
Mustafa Pașa’s mission signified the position of the Porte and the Ottoman
authorities’ eagerness to impose their direct rule in Lebanon. Only by this means,
the serasker believed, could the allegedly irreconcilable demands of the mountain-
dwellers be transcended, the mutual blaming between Maronites and the Druze
brought to an end, and the ‘provocations of European consuls’—which, in his
view, stirred up violence among the Lebanese in the first place—be fended off.
As a result, Mustafa resolved, at the demand of both parties, to remove Bashir
Qasim Shihab from his post as grand emir due to his ineffectiveness. He sent the
latter into exile in Istanbul (13 January 1842).⁶⁸ Two days later, while European
diplomats and most of those on the mountain were expecting the appointment of
another Shihab as the new grand emir, the serasker proclaimed Ömer Pașa—alias
Michel Lattas, an Ottoman officer of Austro-Hungarian (Croatian) origin—as the
interim governor of Mount Lebanon for his experience in dealing with similar
‘disturbances’ in the Balkans.⁶⁹
According to Mustafa, with the dispatch of a few warships that would blockade
the coasts of Beirut and Sidon to prevent ‘foreign aid’ (ecnebi yardımı) and a
number of Albanian soldiers—albeit notorious for their unruliness—as well as
with the disarmament of the mountaineers and the payment of indemnities to the
Christians (for 1840 rebellion and the 1841 civil war), order and tranquillity could
be brought to Lebanon.⁷⁰
The new Istanbul regime thus brought down its fist on the mountain, and
ended the centuries-long Shihab era, and the age of the grand emirs in Lebanon. It
came as a bombshell to many—the Maronites, the European consuls, and par-
ticularly the French, who were the historical protectors of the Maronites and the
main European beneficiary of Shihab rule. The French ambassador to Istanbul,
François-Adolphe Bourqueney, objected that this was a counteroffensive for the
Porte to establish direct rule, and a patient ‘anti-European’, and ‘anti-reformist’
conspiracy run by the conservative cabinet to neutralize the 1839 Edict.⁷¹ The
⁶⁷ Ibid. 649–50. ⁶⁸ BOA A.DVN.10/84/1.
⁶⁹ BOA HR.SFR.3 3/63; BOA HR.SFR.3 3/64; Nesselrode to Titov, 22 Mar. 1843, BOA HR.SYS 912/
1/48; Harik, Politics, 266.
⁷⁰ Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 650. ⁷¹ Boyrat, La France, 315.
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other European ambassadors did not react as strongly in the beginning, giving
Ömer, the interim governor, the benefit of the doubt.
However, from the very beginning, it proved almost impossible for Ömer to
assert his authority over the Christians and gain the trust of the Powers’ agents,
due to his lack of refinement and magnanimity. His immediate actions instantly
riled everyone. In line with his religious inclinations, he circulated petitions for the
expulsion of British (Protestant) missionaries from Lebanon and removed a
number of Christian officials from office. He returned the sequestered lands of
those Druze sheikhs, such as the Nakads of Deir al-Qamar, who had been
deprived of their lands under Bashir Qasim’s rule and who were known by the
European consuls to be guilty of inhumane crimes during the 1841 civil war. And
he renounced his direct authority over the ‘muqatas of the leading Druze houses
such as the Jumblatts. All these were seen as signs of his overt anti-Christianism
and endorsement of the Druze. The Maronite clergy and peasantry claimed that,
in order to justify his actions, Ömer had urged local Christians to sign petitions in
favour of his rule, threatening them with exclusion from the payment of indem-
nities to be made by the Druze for the losses in 1841.⁷²
If anything, what transpired under Ömer’s rule was the complete opposite of
the system pledged by the 1839 Edict. Like Grand Vizier İzzet and Mustafa Pașa,
Ömer’s main concern was not to enact reforms, but to establish order and
sovereignty in Syria by using Islam as a rhetorical tool and eliminating any foreign
interference and local allegiance to the European empires. In this specific sense,
the French agents were not entirely wrong in suspecting the Porte’s intentions,
and neither were the Lebanese Christians in worrying for their future.
The latter sent petition after petition to Istanbul over the following months to
complain about their treatment by Ömer. In response, the Porte dispatched a
commissioner (the former governor of Morea, Selim Bey) to observe for himself
Ömer’s rule. Along with him, ulemas were sent to Syria in March and April 1842
to convert the Druze to Sunni Islam (with the purpose of recruiting them in the
army in due course) or at least to discipline them. And then Ömer began to urge
the Druze to make their due indemnity payments to the Maronites, who had asked
for a much higher amount anticipating that it would later be reduced. All these
alienated the Druze within just three months of Ömer coming to power. Now
exasperated by the demands for payment of what they considered unjust indem-
nities (also because it was the Maronites, they believed, that had started the war),
the Druze also turned against Ottoman rule, refused to obey the orders of the
interim governor, and ignored his calls for the payment of any tax.⁷³
⁷² BOA HR.SFR.3 2/8; Rose to Canning, 30 July 1842, BOA HR.SYS 912/1/64; Wood to Ponsonby,
4 May 1842, SAMECO Box 5, File 1; Bouyrat, La France, 312–13.
⁷³ Farah, Politics, 218–26; Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 653–4; Bourée to Guizot, 7 May 1842, DDC vol. 7, 128;
[?] to Reverend Clark, 16 Mar. 1870, ABCFM vol. 6, Syria, 291/368.
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Ömer responded to Druze disobedience by arresting their leaders during an
invitation to his palace. After the civil war, Numan Jumblatt had retired himself
from all worldly affairs and devoted his life to religion and spiritualism. His
younger brother, Said, assumed the leadership of the family. On 7 April 1842,
the latter rode to the pașa’s residence along with Arslan, Nakad, Talhuq, and
Al-Malik sheikhs. When they descended from their horses, on a signal given by
Ömer, the great gates of the palace were shut, its meidan was filled with the pașa’s
troops, and ‘the Dru[z]e chiefs were taken like mice in a trap’.⁷⁴ A few days later
Numan, despite his retirement, and other Druze chiefs were also detained for
having refused to pay indemnities to the Christians.⁷⁵ Hoping to save their
sheikhs, the Druze mobilized but were swiftly crushed by the Ottoman forces.
In the past, such imperial repression would have allowed the Porte to maintain
its rule and ensure the payment of tributes until the locals wielded enough power
to disobey the sultans again. But now, after its successive defeats at the hands of
Mehmed Ali, and after the restoration of its rule in Syria with the aid of the Powers
and the 1840 intervention, the standing of Istanbul before local eyes had been
weakened. Ömer’s inept policies had damaged even more the trust of the
Lebanese, Druze or Christian, in the Porte.
More importantly, now the Lebanese felt the support of the European Powers
behind them. The sultan’s agents and intermediaries no longer had the monopoly
over security and violence in the country. The European consuls in Beirut, Tripoli,
Latakia, and Damascus considered it appropriate to repeatedly complain that
Mustafa and Ömer Pașas were not ‘consulting’ them before taking decisions
over the future of the mountain. For their part, those living on the mountain
looked to the European actors on the spot for protection. Numan Jumblatt asked
for British help to obtain release from detention.⁷⁶ The French consul in Beirut,
Bourée, mediated between the Druze and the Maronites to foster a coalition
against the Porte, conjure the patriarch to ‘forget past quarrels and agree to a
renewal of the Maronite-Druze union’, and put an end to the common ruin. And
he succeeded for the time being.⁷⁷
The Jumblatts were eager to join forces with the Maronites. They even prom-
ised to accept the restoration of Shihabi rule and the compensation of the losses
incurred during the 1841 conflict.⁷⁸ Ömer Pașa’s method of rule created so much
consternation and opposition that, in the end, the consuls of the Powers also set
aside their competition, and agreed to request from the Ottoman authorities the
demission of Ömer and the re-establishment of Shihab rule under Bashir II or
Bashir Qasim.
⁷⁴ ‘Syria’, The Times, 14 May 1842; Bourée to Guizot, 7 Apr. 1842, DDC vol. 7, 36.
⁷⁵ Rose to Canning, 10 Apr. 1842, TNA FO 226/29.
⁷⁶ Rose to Canning, 6 May 1842, TNA FO 226/24/36.
⁷⁷ Bourée to Guizot, 7 May 1842, DDC vol. 7, 128. ⁷⁸ Ibid.
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But Mustafa Pașa turned down these claims on the grounds that under the
Shihabs, Lebanon had become a site of violence and terror. Their return would be
‘against humanity’.⁷⁹ The direct rule Mustafa established in Lebanon was a
triumph of conservative ministers. But it proved short-lasting. A hitherto unseen
diplomatic intervention in the mountain terminated it before the year had ended.
*
In February 1842, the Powers came up with a plan for the administrative reorgan-
ization of the Lebanon in lieu of the Porte’s scheme for direct rule. It originated
from one of the few representatives of the so-called Congress system generation
still around: Prince Metternich. His idea was to cut Mount Lebanon in half along
Map 4. Lebanon
⁷⁹ Bourée to Guizot, 26 Apr. 1842, DCC vol. 7, 38.
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geographical lines. Taking the Damascus–Beirut road as the dividing border, the
north, inhabited by the Maronites, would be ruled by a Maronite kaymakam
(district governor); the south, albeit a demographically more mixed region with
Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Maronite, and Metuwali inhabitants,
would be placed under the authority of a Druze. The two kaymakams would
report to a Shihab grand emir.
The premise of Metternich’s idea was that Maronite and Druze inhabitants of
Lebanon were practically incapable of coexistence.⁸⁰ In the European imperial
gaze, one way to prevent further violence between them was to separate these
people administratively. Even though the Porte exhibited a similar degree of
imperialist scorn towards the Lebanese, from the outset the sultan’s men objected
to the plan, because, on the one hand, they strove to avoid another European
diplomatic intervention in their empire’s domestic affairs. On the other, they
considered the plan far-fetched due to the mixed population of the southern
part of the country. It was impossible to separate these ‘hostile’ populations
from one another. The Lebanese, for their part, hardly welcomed Metternich’s
plan because of its ambiguous nature, which did not at all address their immediate
differences with respect to rights, privileges, and property.
However, the five European Powers persevered in the implementation of the
plan, conceiving of their role as a buffer between the ‘Sunni Islamist’ policies of
the Porte’s agents and their co-religionists (the Lebanese Christians) and protégés
(the Druze) in need of protection. Throughout 1842, at several ambassadorial
conferences convened in Istanbul, the plan was discussed and repeatedly proposed
to Ottoman ministers. When the Porte resisted accepting it, Metternich reminded
the former of the imperative of reinstating the Shihabs as the ruler of the
mountain so as to be able to ‘have the satisfaction of . . . Europe . . . By this
means, and by this means only, the Sublime Porte will be spared very great
embarrassment.’ He alluded to—nay, admonished the Porte with a threat of—
potential armed intervention that would overrule the sultan’s authority in the
Levant.⁸¹ Ten days later, the Russian foreign minister, Nesselrode, used the very
same language—the 1840 intervention was a friendly ‘assistance’ to the sultan and
the Lebanese.⁸² According to Nesselrode, the sacrifices made at the time would
justify another intervention on the part of the Powers, which ‘could not remain
indifferent to the prosperity or the ruin of [the Syrian] populations’.⁸³
European pressure on the Porte mounted every month. At the ambassadorial
conference of 27 May 1842, the Ottoman foreign minister, Sarim Efendi, was
reminded that ‘[b]y delaying in fulfilling the wishes of the Powers, the Sublime
Porte gains nothing . . . but instead exposes itself . . . to dangers which from one day
⁸⁰ N. Moore to [?], 31 May 1844, AMAE 50MD/43/94.
⁸¹ Stürmer to Testa, 10 Mar. 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/33. Emphasis mine.
⁸² Nesselrode to Titow, 22 Mar. 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/48. ⁸³ Ibid.
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to the next can become real . . . ’⁸⁴ When Sarim argued against Metternich’s idea,
maintaining that partition was ‘impracticable because the Druzes and the
Maronites live mixed together in the same villages’, it was pointed out to him
that ‘this mixture only occurred in two or three districts, but that the greater
portion of the Druzes and of the Maronites inhabit separate districts’.⁸⁵ Despite
his repeated protests, Sarim was silenced.
What is important here is not simply how the Powers kept the Porte at bay, but
that the exchanges between the Powers’ agents and the Porte, and the Lebanese
rejection of Metternich’s plan, were a quintessential example of the dialogical yet
nonetheless top-down, hierarchical, and transimperial patterns of supplying
security in the Levant at the time. Despite all their differences, virtually none of
the Lebanese peoples accepted the partition of the mountain nor the single-
handed reterritorialization—a practice that would be frequently repeated in the
twentieth-century Middle East with comparably disastrous results.⁸⁶
The reports of European consuls in Syria who were better acquainted with local
experiences expose the blatancy of Metternich’s plan. The British consul in
Damascus, Richard Wood, insightfully explained in early May 1842 that the
division of authority in Mount Lebanon was ‘likely to lead to future contests for
supremacy between [the Druze and the Maronites], and consequently to blood-
shed and disorder’. He explained that the plan was ‘scarcely practicable’; its
accomplishment would be very difficult because of ‘the pretended feudal rights
of the Druze and Christian chiefs over some of the muqatas or districts’, which
had in effect become obsolete. Moreover, there were Christian feudal lords with
mostly Druze tenants. ‘[T]o the south, the Lords of the manor are mostly Druzes,
but a great portion of the peasants are Christians. In both cases many of the
peasants have landed property and hold tenements which it cannot be expected
they will either abandon or transfer.’⁸⁷
In response, the British ambassador to Istanbul, Stratford Canning, acknowledged
that there were some ‘difficulties of detail’ in the application of the plan but these
‘nonetheless should not stop the adoption of a measure in other respects satisfac-
tory’—a tragic testament to how decisions over the future of the people who lived
their own realities in the distant (Levant) were made in the metropoles.⁸⁸
To be fair, leaving aside the Powers’ desire to immediately resolve the Lebanese
issue, beneath the blatancy of European imperial actions were several other
pressing concerns. Imperial anxieties had been whipped up by news from different
⁸⁴ M. Titow to M. George Kirico, 3 June 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/59.
⁸⁵ Conference at Constantinople 29 May 1842, SAMECO Box 5, File 1.
⁸⁶ Rose to Canning, 30 July 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/64; Rose to Aberdeen, 25 July 1842;
SAMECO Box 5, File 1.
⁸⁷ Wood to Canning, 4 May 1842, SAMECO Box 5, File 1.
⁸⁸ Canning to Pisani, 26 Aug. 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/79. Emphasis mine. See also Makdisi,
Culture, 78–9; Said, ‘Blind Arrogance’.
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parts of Syria and especially from Lebanon with regards to the mounting
‘Islamism’ of the İzzet Pașa government and the conduct of the unruly Albanian
regiments. That the Ottoman Albanians were involved in excesses, plundered
churches, assaulted priests, and abused consuls in different, but mainly Christian,
parts of the country led the Powers to compel the sultan’s agents in Istanbul,
London, and Vienna to agree to Metternich’s plan. The Porte’s diplomats in
Europe, Âli Efendi and Akif Bey, daily reported back and warned Istanbul of the
possibility of an armed intervention.⁸⁹
In the end, the Porte’s defiance was broken down on account of three factors.
The first was the cabinet change in August 1842, when the hardline conservative
İzzet Pașa was replaced by the moderate conservative Rauf Pașa as grand vizier.
The second was the eruption of Druze resistance led by Shibli al-Aryan, who
attacked Ömer’s palace and embarrassed the pașa in a smaller-scale civil war.
Thirdly, there was the emergence of conflicts on the Serbian and Wallachia
borders. The French ambassador, Bourqueney, advised the Porte that it would
be to its benefit to make sacrifices in Lebanon for the resolution of the crisis in the
Balkans in the sultan’s favour.⁹⁰
The Ottoman ministers stepped back, choosing the lesser of two evils, as they
saw it. Still they would not accept a Shihab ruler. They suspected that the mixed
areas would pose serious problems for the stability of Lebanon. But they gradually
agreed, from October 1842 onward, first, to partition the country into Maronite
and Druze sub-governorships (kaymakamlık), and sent the able and moderate
Esad Pașa as the new governor of Sidon to oversee the new system; then, to recall
unruly Albanian troops; then, to dismiss Ömer, restore the plundered property of
the Maronites; finally, to concede the ancient privileges of the Lebanese with
respect to religion (free exercise of worship) and taxation.⁹¹
After a series of conferences in Istanbul over the next two months, the repre-
sentatives of the Powers and the Porte agreed on the dual-kaymakamlık system.
With the new system, each kaymakam would come from a senior Maronite or
Druze families, and would report to the Ottoman governor in Sayda. The fate of
the mixed areas in the south were to be considered by the men on the spot, Esad
and the European consuls. The Powers accepted the Porte’s one major condition:
the Shihabs were excluded from the Lebanese administration.
Ottoman Foreign Minister Sarim Efendi announced the final decision of the
Porte in favour of the new system on 7 December 1842. His statement included his
deepest regret that this question has given rise to so many discussions and talks
over the past year . . . The Sublime Porte moved nonetheless by the feelings of
⁸⁹ Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 431; Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 174–5.
⁹⁰ Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 657–8.
⁹¹ Rose to Aberdeen, 27 Sept. 1842, Aberdeen to Canning, 24 Oct. 1842, SAMECO Box 5, File 1.
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respect . . . to the five Powers, its dearest friends and allies, [and] preferred to
arrive at the solution of a very delicate question, which was at the same time one
of its internal affairs, by complying with [the Powers’] wishes rather than to
refuse [them],
because they tended ‘only to the same object: the re-establishment of good order
in the Mountain’.⁹² Sarim was worried not only about the plan’s ill-designed
foundations but also about having to concede to the Powers’ collective domin-
ation, which could pave the way for similar interference in the future.⁹³ Canning
consoled him:
Any feeling of regret which could mingle with that of [your] satisfaction because
of certain doubts that [the Porte] seems to have conceived for the future, is
effaced by the conviction that the success, as well as the execution, of the measure
will depend mainly on the Porte itself.⁹⁴
It was now all in the Porte’s hands to successfully implement a plan it had
fervently opposed. Russian Ambassador Butenev similarly assured Sarim that all
the measures taken could ‘certainly not fail’ to ensure the maintenance of tran-
quillity and well-being of Lebanon.⁹⁵ But, as we will see below, they did fail—
immensely.
As a local scribe, Husayn Abu al-Hassan of Zahle, wrote in c.1842, Mount
Lebanon would never be the same again. ‘The old days’ of the muqatadjis, the
peaceful coexistence of the Maronites and the Druze in their manors, had ‘now
passed’. A new era was coming ‘like racing clouds’.⁹⁶
The Racing Clouds: The Stand-Off and the Civil War of 1845
If the persistent discrepancy between the policies adopted in the European
metropoles and their reception and flawed implementation in the Levant was
one of the defining characteristics of transimperial security culture in the nine-
teenth century, another was the fact that this culture reproducted insecurities both
for the Levantines and, often indirectly, for the European imperial actors them-
selves. However much goodwill it might have embodied, Metternich’s dual-
kaymakamlık plan, or the diplomatic intervention of 1842, did not appease the
⁹² Sarim Effendi to Baron de Bourqueney, 7 Dec. 1842, AMAE CP 133/286.
⁹³ Boutenieff to Hamjiery, 18 Nov. 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/80; Canning to Sarim, 14 Dec. 1842,
BOA HR. SYS 912/2/44.
⁹⁴ Ibid. ⁹⁵ Boutenieff to Sarim Efendi, 15 Dec. 1842, BOA HR. SYS 912/2/4.
⁹⁶ Isa Iskandar al Ma’luf, Tarikh Madinat Zahlah (Zahlah: Matba’at Zahlah al Fatat, 1911), 203; cf.
Harik, Politics, 48.
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various communities in the mountain. All practices in the name of security and
order were undertaken in such an injudicious manner that in the end they proved
ever more troublesome for local peace. They complicated existing problems,
created new ones, and kindled inter-imperial rivalries, both among the Powers
and between the Powers and the Porte.
After the arrival of the sultan’s moderate agent Esad Pașa, the Jumblatt brothers
Said and Numan were released from prison in November 1842. The two had
harboured hopes of being chosen the kaymakam of the ‘Druze country’ in the
belief that they were the strongest family in the mountain, both economically and
in terms of their manpower. But Numan and Said were caught in a disagreement
with each other over sharing their four ‘muqatas, which created a lasting schism
within the family.⁹⁷ This tarnished their reliability, particularly that of the hot-
headed 19-year-old Said.
In January 1843, Esad Pașa put the Metternich plan into action even though the
official announcements were made in March. Ömer was dismissed, the Maronite
Amir Haydar Abu’l Lama was appointed by Esad, and the Druze emir, Ahmed
Arslan, was elected by the Druze as the kaymakams of their respective districts in
the Maronite north and the Druze south.⁹⁸ The new kaymakams were nominated
in concord with the hierarchical system of the ancient feudal order. The Abu’l
Lama and Arslan families were both hakim families which came just after the
Shihabs in the feudal hierarchy pyramid, which signified that Metternich’s plan
was, to a degree, an elitist attempt to accommodate the ancient feudal order.
However, the incongruity between the ancient and the new prevented its proper
implementation.
*
As had been predicted by both Ottoman and European agents on the spot, the
main problem with the plan was the mixed districts that fell under the authority of
the Druze kaymakam. The moderate Esad Pașa, European consuls, the kayma-
kams Haydar and Ahmed, the muqatadjis, the Maronite clergy, and the Christian
peasants had to work out what to do with the administration of those predomin-
antly Maronite (or Christian) mixed villages, in such regions as Deir al-Qamar
(where the 1841 civil war had begun) or the Shuf, the heart of the Jumblatts’
‘muqatas.
The plan had left unaddressed the exact questions that they were now bound to
answer—would the mountain be divided along ‘geographical lines’? This would
mean that the mixed villages in the south would remain under the jurisdiction of
the Druze kaymakam. Or would the division be made along ‘sectarian lines’? Then
the Maronite kaymakam in the north, Amir Haydar, would be responsible for the
Maronites in the south, which would violate the ancient rights of the Druze feudal
⁹⁷ Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 670. ⁹⁸ BOA HR.SFR.3 4/34.
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chiefs over their ‘muqatas.⁹⁹ All these questions sparked new debates, brought
forth new categories like ‘minorities’ into the political lexicon of Syria, and then
spiralled into violence again.¹⁰⁰
Backed by the British consul, Rose, and Said Jumblatt, Esad believed that the
involvement of the Maronite kaymakam in the affairs of the Maronites in the
southern part of the country (or ‘the sectarian rule’, as they put it) was ‘imprac-
ticable’ because the double authority would become a source of continued ill will
due to its violation of the rights of the Druze.¹⁰¹ It was therefore not in keeping
with the ‘beneficial and healing’ measure that ‘the Powers intended’ to introduce.
They advocated division along ‘geographical’, not ‘sectarian’, lines, and proposed
securing the rights and property of the ‘Christian minorities’ of the south by
means of Christian vekils (representatives) that would be elected by them.¹⁰² These
vekils would represent their interests before the muqatadjis and, in case of
disagreements, or in the event that the Druze lords violated their rights and
freedoms, would bring issues to the attention of the Ottoman governor in
Sidon. Moreover, a Turkish garrison of the Ottoman pașa would be stationed in
the problematic Deir al-Qamar region to inhibit any unlawful behaviour and
violence. The Christians of the mixed villages in the ‘Druze country’ would thus
be placed under the double guarantee of the vekils and the pașa of Sidon. If they
should still feel insecure, voluntary emigration to the northern part of the country
would be facilitated with reimbursement as well as by the supply of lands and
houses of equal value to those they owned in the south.¹⁰³
Even though the partition plan was imposed from above in 1842, those on the
mountain itself were eventually listened to by the imperial agents between 1843
and 1845. At the numerous meetings held between Ottoman authorities,
European consuls, and Christian and Druze deputies, a majority of the Druze
adamantly rejected ‘sectarian rule’, but reluctantly agreed on the vekil system.¹⁰⁴
The Maronite Church kept perfect silence until a final decision over the mixed
districts was made in late 1844. The Maronite peasantry, for their part, more than
once agreed on having vekils and celebrated the option of emigration at the
meetings, but then as many times changed their opinion later, declaring that,
for their tranquillity and security, ‘[n]othing will do but one Governor, a Shihab,
for both Christians and Druzes’.¹⁰⁵
Esad and Rose at first could not fathom the Maronite peasantry’s wavering. But
ultimately they became convinced that a ‘wicked scheme’ was under way against
the plan. The Shihabites, those supporters of the ex-Bashir II, the exiled ‘Red
⁹⁹ Farah, Politics, 256–87. ¹⁰⁰ Makdisi, Culture, 80.
¹⁰¹ Rose to Aberdeen, 6 May 1843, CRAS 14. ¹⁰² Ibid.
¹⁰³ Rose to Canning, 30 Apr. 1843; Rose to Aberdeen, 6 May 1843; Rose to Canning, 15 Feb., 3 Mar.,
1 Oct. 1844, CRAS 14, 17, 34, 40, 94.
¹⁰⁴ Rizk, Mont Liban, 114. ¹⁰⁵ Rose to Aberdeen, 6 May 1843, CRAS 34.
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Emir’, now residing in Istanbul, were plotting his return to the mountain.¹⁰⁶
According to Rose, the ‘Shihab party’ prompted the Christians in the mixed
regions to reject all guarantees Esad proposed, threatening violent assault against
their fellow townsmen.¹⁰⁷
More than a year passed in this state. In early 1844, Esad grew exasperated by
the lack of progress and admitted in despair the unworkability of both plans. He
hinted to the European consuls the necessity of re-establishing direct Ottoman
rule, but was met with categorical rejection. He then expressed to the Porte his
desire to resign.¹⁰⁸ This was an expression of self-criticism during a moment of
defeat over the Porte’s helpless subordination to the Powers’ ‘ill will’.
For his part, Rose was equally embittered. He lamented that Metternich’s plan
was ‘foiled . . . by insubordination of the subjects towards the Sovereign’. He
candidly asked, if the inhabitants were so stubbornly opposed,
do not then any moral obligations which induced the Powers to interfere in the
government of Mount Lebanon at once cease? . . . Can the Great Powers credit-
ably further interfere? . . . Is it fitting that the [Powers] should be occupied for two
or three years, more perhaps, in endeavouring to conciliate the jarring interests
and the never-ending hatreds of a semi-barbarous peasantry of a foreign country
given up to intrigue and uncharitable partisanship?¹⁰⁹
Rose’s questions signalled the uncertainty as to when and why the Powers could
and should intervene, as to whether the legitimacy of interferences lay in the
benefits procured for the locals, and as to the willingness of the locals to obtain
such benefits by way of foreign aid.
Rose further lamented that the same Christians were now signing petitions for
the return of Bashir II and Bashir Qasim, about whose rule they had bitterly
complained not long before. But what he did not see was that Christian peasants
had not opposed the plan merely under pressure from the Shihabites. Their hopes
and expectations as Christians and as peasants had been repeatedly shattered since
the time of the Egyptian interregnum, when partial liberties had been introduced
to non-Muslims, and especially since the 1840 intervention, during which the
aforementioned promises of religious and class rights under the auspices of the
Gülhane Edict of 1839 had been delivered by British and Ottoman imperial
agents. There was now a haunting sense of insecurity amidst the unpredictability
of the obscure intra- and inter-imperial politics. These Christian peasants were
troubled by the Porte’s ‘Islamist’ policies under conservative pașas, the Powers’
quest for influence through their co-religionists and proxies, the non-payment of
the indemnities of the 1841 civil war by the Druze, and the fact both Christian and
¹⁰⁶ Rose to Canning, 23 Mar. 1844, CRAS 44. ¹⁰⁷ Rose to Canning, 3 May 1844, CRAS 52.
¹⁰⁸ Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 669–71. ¹⁰⁹ Rose to Canning, 25 Mar. 1844, CRAS 46–8.
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Druzemuqatadjis were claiming the restoration of their ancient rights, pointing to
the same points of references and with the same degree of confidence in the
justness of their cause. Finally, they had hardly received any security at all, with
their houses burnt, property pillaged, and people killed. It was this immense
distrust that brought about their eventual reluctance to agree to Metternich’s plan.
*
In 1844, the Maronite peasantry once more found a helping hand in France. Since
the dreadful experience of the 1841 civil war that had resulted in part from his
revisionist policies in the Levant, the French prime and foreign minister, Guizot,
had been ‘very reserved’ about interfering in Lebanese politics again. But now,
seeing that Metternich’s plan could not be fully implemented, and that the Porte
was imposing a patched-together plan on the Christians in the mixed districts, he
identified a leeway for just interference and began to openly advocate for the
restoration of the Shihabs.¹¹⁰
Guizot’s apprehension was that, although France was associated with the other
Powers in Lebanon, her position as the protector of the Maronites was ‘pecu-
liar’.¹¹¹ Paris had to act because it was her historical duty, but, of course, a more
tangible motivation lay in the fact that the return of the Shihabites would place
France’s political power in the Levant on its former footing.
To be sure, the French minister followed a more cautious policy with respect to
the Eastern Question this time, careful to proceed in concert with the other
Powers. He approached Metternich and the British foreign minister, Lord
Aberdeen, for a joint agreement for the return of the Shihabs, while demanding
from the Porte the immediate implementation of the indemnities of the 1841
war.¹¹² Ambassadorial conferences began again in Istanbul to decide upon the
future of Mount Lebanon. Metternich received the French suggestion positively.
London, on the other hand, opposed the withdrawal of the plan, as it would go
against the interests of the Druze. A Catholic/non-Catholic schism unfolded
among the Powers when Russia and Prussia sided with Britain, albeit with
much less enthusiasm.¹¹³
Soon after the Porte announced its final decision to implement the vekil system
in the mixed villages in November 1844, encouraged by France, the Maronite
Patriarch Hubaysh broke his silence and announced his opposition to the plan to
side with the Christian peasantry.¹¹⁴ In fact, the hardline bishop Tobia ‘Awn had
already begun campaigning for the Shihab cause.
¹¹⁰ Guizot to Bourqueney, 13 Apr. 1844, AMAE CP Turquie 291; cf. Bouyrat, La France, 341.
¹¹¹ Bouyrat, La France, 342; Rose to Aberdeen, 3 Nov. 1844, TNA FO 226/90/65.
¹¹² Desages to Bourqueney, 18 Dec. 1844, AMAE 60PAAP/37/106.
¹¹³ Rose to Aberdeen, 3 Nov. 1844, TNA FO 226/90/65.
¹¹⁴ Rose to Aberdeen, 30 Nov. 1844, CRAS, 111–12.
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Moreover, Archbishop Nicholas Murad, vicar apostolic to Rome representing
the Maronites in Europe, had been lobbying for the same cause in Istanbul and
Paris.¹¹⁵ In 1842, he had in his letters to Guizot and Desages portrayed the
importance of the restoration of the Shihabs as a means of liberating the oppressed
Christians from the yoke of the Porte.¹¹⁶ In 1844, he changed his strategy and
wrote a pamphlet on Maronite–French relations for the attention of the French
authorities in which he depicted the Druze as an idolatrous sect. He suggested
France, as their ‘protectors’, could not remain indifferent to the ‘pains’ of the
Maronites, whose ‘devotion to France’ was ‘well known’.¹¹⁷He appealed to French
hearts, inaugurating a new literature that looked to forge emotional bonds
between Mount Lebanon and France. Moreover, the Lazarist, Capuchin, and
Franciscan missionaries, many of whom were French subjects, assiduously propa-
gated French influence among the peasantry through their schools and activities,
assuring the peasants that ‘because we are in the Levant, we are under France’.¹¹⁸
These endeavours spawned a great deal of concern on the part of the Porte.¹¹⁹
The sultan’s agents in Paris and London, the former foreign minister, Mustafa
Reșid Pașa, and his protégé, Âli Efendi, fretted that the policy France had adopted
‘for the Eastern Question . . . is a serious and dangerous mistake’.¹²⁰Mustafa Reșid
called Guizot and his agents to reconcile their policies with Britain: their differ-
ences were not only weakening the Ottoman Empire but also paving the way for
Russian interferences in the Balkans, which could potentially have a boomerang
effect and threaten European peace.¹²¹ Differences endured, however, until vio-
lence broke out in the mountain once more in April 1845.
The Porte’s role was not negligible in the eventual eruption of violence either. It
failed to meet French and local demands, as the restitutions of the 1841 war could
not be agreed upon among the mountain-dwellers even after a mixed commission
consisting of imperial, Christian, and Druze delegates was established specifically
for this task. To bolster the position of the sovereign, Grand Admiral Halil Pașa
was sent to Beirut with eight warships in a show of authority and power in
April 1844, and the exasperated Esad was replaced with the conservative Vecihi
Pașa in April 1845.¹²² But the sultan’s men could not establish their authority over
the Lebanese.¹²³ This became all the more difficult when Rıza Pașa, another
hardline conservative, became grand vizier, and showed great antagonism to
¹¹⁵ Bouyrat, La France, 342.
¹¹⁶ Nicolas Murad to Desages, 27 Sept. 1842, AMAE 60PAAP/41/365.
¹¹⁷ Nicholas Murad, Notice historique sur l’origine de la nation Maronite et sur ses rapports avec la
France, sur la nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban (Paris: Adrien le Claire, 1844),
3, 20, 32, 34, 35.
¹¹⁸ Moore to Rose, 4 Dec. 1844, TNA FO 226/20/62. ¹¹⁹ Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 182.
¹²⁰ ‘Notes sur la condition des Rayas sur le Ministre de Riza Pacha, conversation entre Rechid Pacha
et M. Ali’, 29 Feb. 1844, AMAE MD Turquie 45/59.
¹²¹ Ibid.; Kaynar, Mustafa Reșit, 63–6; Kodaman, Les Ambassades, 184.
¹²² BOA i.MSM. 44/1143. ¹²³ BOA C.DH. 110/5494/2/1, 27 June 1844.
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Anglo-French intervention and little sensitivity to the demands of the sultan’s
non-Sunni subjects.¹²⁴
*
By the spring of 1845, Franco-Austrian (Catholic) diplomatic initiatives for the
return of Bashir II had been repeatedly blocked by the Porte, Britain, Russia, and
Prussia. The Christian (Maronite) peasantry of the mixed villages rallied behind
the Shihabites and resolved to fight. Secret committees were formed. Plans to
attack mixed villages in Deir al-Qamar and the Jumblatts’ lands were made. Some
11,000 soldiers were assembled. Funds, even those donated by the French and the
Austrians for relief for the 1841 war, were channelled for ammunition. French
flags were purchased from the French consul to Beirut, Eugène Poujade, for a
taxed price. These were all orchestrated from Istanbul by Bashir II Shihab. The
mountain was humming with rumours of French ships bringing troops—a
rumour that Poujade purposely started—to aid the Maronites.¹²⁵
In response, the Druzemuqatadjis also began their preparations for war. Under
the leadership of the Jumblatts, they held secret meetings at Mukhtara, and agreed
to forget their past (Jumblatt–Yazbaki) feuds and act together to fend off the
aspirations of the peasantry and the Shihab.¹²⁶What would transpire soon was not
a fully fledged sectarian civil war: the Maronite muqatadjis remained neutral, in
the belief that the toppling of the Druze lords would make them the next target.¹²⁷
The showdown began during the end of April and beginning of May 1845, just
after the Ottoman grand admiral had sailed back to the imperial capital.¹²⁸
Maronite peasants attacked first the two Shufs that were under Jumblatt rule,
and then themuqata of the Nakads in Deir al-Qamar. They burned 13 villages in a
few hours. With French flags hoisted in their hands and promises of French
military support in their minds, they declared that ‘one or the other must leave
the country; we cannot exist together; it must end in war; [either] they, the Druzes,
or we must be destroyed and leave the country.’¹²⁹
Acting as one with the other Druze chiefs, Said Jumblatt declared his allegiance
to the sultan and ordered his men to rise up and fall upon the Christians.¹³⁰ This
was a war of ‘supremacy’, a war of ‘extermination’, the Maronite patriarch told
European consuls, not a common war. ¹³¹ It quickly spilled over 18 different sites.
And, as had happened in 1841 and would happen again in 1860, thanks to their
numerical superiority, the Maronites gained the upper hand at first and then,
¹²⁴ ‘Notes sur la condition des Rayas sur le Ministre de Riza Pacha, conversation entre Rechid Pacha
et M. Ali’, 29 Feb. 1844, AMAE MD Turquie 45/59.
¹²⁵ Farah, Politics, 375–7. ¹²⁶ Ibid. 376; BOA HR.MKT 3/73/2/1.
¹²⁷ Farah, Politics, 376. ¹²⁸ Thomson to Anderson, 7 June 1845, ABCFM vol. 3, Syria 176/14.
¹²⁹ Rose to Canning, 30 July 1845 TNA FO 226/20/82; see also Farah, Politics, 381.
¹³⁰ Rose to Aberdeen, 12 June 1845, TNA FO 78/619/39.
¹³¹ Rose to Aberdeen, 8 June 1845, TNA FO 78/619/37.
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lacking the discipline and stamina which their opponents possessed in abundance,
they were repelled from the Druze districts, and pushed back to the Maronite
north.
When the Druze offensive on the Christians began, the Maronite Church, the
French, and the Austrian agents accused Ottoman forces of supporting the Druze,
blocking the Maronites’ routes when they were on an offensive, receiving a certain
part of the Christian plunder by the Druze, and even participating in the Druze’s
‘great cruelty’. The European consuls collectively called Governor Vecihi to
suppress the violence.¹³² Yet, Ottoman sources suggest otherwise. According to
these, in many instances, Ottoman forces had stopped massacres in villages by
intervening at the last minute, although they were ‘unable’ to prevent the violence
due to lack of men and sources, Ottoman commanders and Vecihi claimed.¹³³
They also maintained that they endeavoured to discipline both sects (terbiyelerine
kalkışıldığı gibi) despite the conflicting demands of the British and French
consuls.¹³⁴
Discerning whose account was true(r) is an almost impossible task. But what
matters here is the fact that inter-imperial rivalries persisted even during
the clashes, and worked against the order and tranquillity of the mountain.
After a month of fighting, around 1,500– 3,000 people, including a French priest
and an Ottoman sergeant, had perished. A large majority of the casualties were
Druze (double the Maronites). Some 5000–10,000 houses were burnt or pil-
laged.¹³⁵ Violence was suppressed at the end of May 1845 with the arrival of
Ottoman reinforcements, and the efforts of Vecihi and Rose, the elders of the
mountain, and those clergy of all sects who were intent on peace. But tensions
lingered.
*
When the violence was over, with the purpose of preventing the recurrence of war,
Bashir II Shihab was transferred from Istanbul to Safranbolu, whence his influence
over the mountain would be greatly curtailed. In the meanwhile, Vecihi Pașa
looked to settle peace between the Lebanese sects (taifeteyn araları bulunduktan)
the ‘Ottoman way’.¹³⁶ In his meetings with the delegates from the mountain, he
blamed European diplomats for their ‘mischievous interference’ and urged the
Druze and the Maronites to cooperate with the Ottoman authorities, rely on
Ottoman troops alone for security and protection instead of their own arms,
and avoid any conspiratorial activities with the consuls. He also followed the old
¹³² Copy of letter by Hugh Rose, L. D. Wildenbruck, C. Basily, Eugene Poujade, and George Lausella
to Vecihi Pasha, 17 May 1845, TNA FO 78/619/44.
¹³³ Farah, Politics, 385–92; Rose to Canning, 17 May 1845, TNA FO 78/619/44.
¹³⁴ BOA A.MKT.MHM. 1/73/24, 25 June 1845. ¹³⁵ Farah, Politics, 398.
¹³⁶ BOA A.MKT.MHM. 1/73/2, 1 July 1845.
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tradition of oblivion, inviting the Lebanese to ‘forgive and forget’ what had
happened (mazi mâ mazi demek).¹³⁷
When Shihabite agitation continued after the war, signalling the importance
attached to the Lebanon and recognizing the inter-imperial nature of the conflict,
the Porte sent its foreign minister, Mustafa Șekib Efendi, to Beirut in July 1845 as
extraordinary envoy for the administrative reorganization of the country and to
establish order and tranquillity.¹³⁸ Șekib’s decisions were guided by the new,
moderate imperial cabinet that had risen after the fall of the staunch conservative
Rıza Pașa due to the unsettled affairs in Syria and the Balkans, and as a result of
palace intrigues in Istanbul.¹³⁹ In his place, Mustafa Reșid Pașa, the ambassador to
Paris, was appointed as the new grand vizier.¹⁴⁰
The return of Mustafa Reșid to Ottoman government is of considerable import-
ance for at least two reasons. First, as we have seen in the second part of this book,
Reșid was the very man that had spearheaded the economic and (together with
Hüsrev) diplomatic opening of the Ottoman Empire to freer trade and foreign
interventions, showing an unwavering trust in the Vienna order. But the experience
in Lebanon, which had been a battleground for the Porte to fight for its sovereign
authority since 1840, had shown to him that, once allowed, the Powers’ interference
in the politics of the Levant could not be contained—a lesson that he had learned
too late. Before Reșid left Paris for his new post in Istanbul, he therefore reminded
Guizot that in order to ‘secure peace’ in Mount Lebanon, European consuls had to
‘cease their interference in the internal affairs’ of the empire.¹⁴¹
Second, together with Sultan Abdülmecid and a generation of Naqshbandi–
Mujaddidi network, he had initiated the proclamation of the Gülhane Edict and
the early Tanzimat reforms, some of which had been withdrawn, if not reversed,
by the hardline Anglophobic conservatives since 1841. It was after his return to
Istanbul, and through Șekib Efendi, that the propositions of the Gülhane Edict
were finally, albeit imperfectly, projected onto Lebanon, which had by now
become an intricate contact zone of colonial ambitions, conservative Ottoman
imperialism, class and sectarian differences, financial disputes, and enduring
familial hostilities, such as that between the Shihabs and the Jumblatts.
Although Șekib had come from Istanbul with a plan in hand, he adjusted it in
conjunction with local realities while also keeping in view, to a degree, the
erstwhile promises of rights to be accorded to the Christians and peasantry and
the pledges of privileges to be restored to themuqatadjis—both resulting from the
¹³⁷ BOA A.MKT.MHM. 1/73/15, 30 June 1845; see also Farah, Politics, 401.
¹³⁸ BOA i.MSM. 45/1155. ¹³⁹ BOA A.MKT.MHM 1/73.
¹⁴⁰ ‘Explications sur la chute de Riza Pacha et celle de son collègue Saffet Pacha’, par le Docteur
Barrachin, Apôtre de l’émancipation des Chrétiens et des Israelites d’Orient (Athens: Imprimerie de
N. Angelidis, 1845), AMAE 50MD/45/66, 2, 17.
¹⁴¹ Farah, Politics, 424.
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1840 intervention. The end product, Règlements de Șekib Efendi, setting out the
new administrative structure, proved accordingly to be a very composite system.
Announced on 15 October 1845, the new regulations preserved the dual-
kaymakamlık arrangement along geographical lines in order to mute any
Shihabite initiative, and refrained from tactlessly imposing direct Ottoman
rule—although Russia and Austria were now endorsing this option (Metternich
had changed his mind for the third time)—so as not to provoke Great Power
pressures, as had happened in 1842.¹⁴²
Șekib established tribunals in each district with an equal number of represen-
tatives and judges from each sect in the problematic mixed south.¹⁴³ The vekils
represented the Christians in the mixed districts. Moreover, a müdür (responsible
official) was appointed for each sub-district to respond to the kaymakams who
would respond to the governor of Sayda. Finally, the Ottoman foreign minister
designated the Deir al-Qamar region as a neutral zone, appointing a military
officer to supervise its affairs. With the purpose of ensuring the workability of
these regulations, he issued a general pardon to those who were not involved in
deliberate murders or engaged in acts of plunder, allocated the Christians 10,000
purses for losses incurred during the 1841 civil war, and strictly ordered the two
kaymakams to avoid seeking European protection at any time and intervening
with each other’s districts. These measures were complemented by an arduous
process of disarmament in the mountain.
*
This was the Tanzimat order—an amalgam of the Ottoman principle of the ‘circle
of justice’ (Chapter 1), Islamic teachings, and the idea of ‘civilization’
(Chapter 7)—that paradoxically placed the purportedly ‘uncivilized’ muqatadjis
at the heart of the new Lebanese social order, securing (as it had promised) their
property. It allocated to the feudal lords the central tasks of policing (security) and
tax collection. After the war, both Said and Numan aided the Porte’s agents during
the punishment of the those who had committed crimes during the civil war and
in the settlement of the Maronite–Druze disputes, while communicating to the
Porte’s agents the Druze demands for ‘security and order’ (asayiş ve istirahatimiz)
in place of ‘disturbances’ (uygunsuzluklar).¹⁴⁴
The Tanzimat order succeeded in certain respects. No major sectarian or
muqatadji–peasant conflict broke out again until 1858. The unsettled tax issues
of the country (those living on the mountain had not paid any tax to Istanbul since
the restoration) were resolved by an able commissioner (Mehmed Emin Efendi)
¹⁴² Ibid. 425–7.
¹⁴³ One exemption was made here. Unlike the other sects, the Metuwalis did not have a judge of
their own. The Sunni Muslim judge was to attend to their affairs.
¹⁴⁴ BOA A.MKT.MHM. 1/73/16.
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sent by the Porte to Lebanon in 1848, to the satisfaction of the locals.¹⁴⁵ With the
tax receipts, the Porte’s agents could arrange for the payment of indemnities in
three instalments, which were completed in 1848. Rose reported the same year
that the system worked ‘fine’, the tribunals were assembling, and taxes were being
distributed justly.¹⁴⁶
It was, however, a remarkably imperfect order from the outset, as it clipped the
wings of the muqatadjis by imposing new administrative bodies on them. At the
same time, it confined the peasantry under the authority of the muqatadjis from
which they had been struggling to break free. Ottoman agents in Lebanon had
poorly implemented those liberties introduced for non-Muslims intended to
strengthen their loyalty to the sultan (such as the entitlement to testify in courts).
No less importantly, as Metternich warned Mustafa Reșid in 1845, the Anglo-
French rivalry on the spot, which ‘posed an immediate threat’ to peace in Mount
Lebanon, could not be entirely calmed.¹⁴⁷
This was due largely to the fact that the prime and foreign minister, Guizot, was
under immense pressure in the French chamber. The Catholic party and the
French conservatives—both in correspondence with the Maronite clergy and the
Shihabites—pleaded with him to implement a more dynamic policy in Lebanon,
not to yield to Șekib’s regulations for the (French) protection of the Maronites,
and to uphold the strategic interests of France in the Mediterranean.
Besides this, the Lebanese campaign of forging affective ties with France, which
Archbishop Murad had started in 1842, continued during the latter half of the
1840s. In 1847, for example, Bishop Abdullah al-Bustani (1819–83) wrote an
emotional plea to ‘the women of France,’ as mothers, asking them to ‘save us
from our enemies,’ and reminding them that ‘our blood mixed with yours is none
other than your blood . . . Our children are your children . . . ’¹⁴⁸ The Shihabites in
Paris blamed the ‘Turks’ and the Druze for their ruin, depicting a grim picture of
the realities of the ‘muqatas of the Druze chiefs, especially the Jumblatts.¹⁴⁹
In response to these pressures, Guizot sent a commission to Lebanon, which the
Porte authorized with the sole purpose of inhibiting France from further agitation.
The detailed report on the state of the country prepared by this commission
claimed that the allegations of the Shihab and Catholic party were baseless, and
‘accredited Ottoman officials with just intentions’. After Amin Shihab, the son of
Bashir II, for whose return France had campaigned, converted to Sunni Islam, the
Eastern Question began to lose prominence in Guizot’s foreign policy.¹⁵⁰
According to Puryear, this became even more the case when, during Tsar
Nicholas I’s visit to London in June 1844, the British and Russian authorities
¹⁴⁵ Farah, Politics, 476–7. ¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 489.
¹⁴⁷ Guizot to Bourqueney, 27 June 1845, BOA HR. TO. 189/20/2. See also Farah, Politics, 456.
¹⁴⁸ Abdallah Boustani, Lettre de Mgr l’Archevêque de Saida (Paris, 1847), 2–6, 23–4; cf. Arsan,
‘Mount Lebanon’, 84–5.
¹⁴⁹ Farah, Politics, 488–9. ¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 488.
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agreed on a common pacific policy towards Syria to facilitate peace in the sultan’s
empire. As Russia declared her support for Britain in the Anglo-French dispute
over Tahiti, Guizot did not see much value in standing for the Maronite cause, a
stance that could harm France’s global interests.¹⁵¹ Finally, the 1848 revolutions in
Europe and the political turmoil in France before the coup d’état of 1851 would
render the Eastern Question of secondary importance in Paris for now.
In conclusion, it was during the five-year period between the summers of 1840
and 1845 that the Eastern Question came to inform local realities as much as it
was shaped by the agency of the Lebanese. An Ottoman document dated 1847
states that, by the mid-1840s, Lebanon had ‘turned into a battlefield’ (meydan-ı
ma’reke) for the rival imperial states, and formed the ‘central tier’ (merkez
tabakası) of British and French foreign policies.¹⁵² Indeed, in this period
France’s revisionist motivations were repeatedly countered by the British-led
Quadruple Alliance; and the war for dominant influence in the Levant, which
the Powers had not dared to fight among themselves in 1840, was fought on the
ground through their local co-religionists and proxies.¹⁵³
ThePorte’s ‘conservative turn’ inMarch1841 and its subsequent efforts to stave off
Great Power interventions rendered the situation in Mount Lebanon all the more
complex. The pledges made during the 1840 intervention were not kept, and the
promises of the Gülhane Edict were poorly implemented—if they were implemented
at all—until 1845. The series of disastrous civil wars in late 1841, 1842, and finally
1845, the abolition of the ancient grand emirate and the introduction of a new dual-
kaymakamlık systemwere all the emergent features of a complex set of problems and
ambitions. These included the pursuit of imperial influence by various powers,
existing and mounting sectarian and class differences among the Lebanese, and the
peasants’ claims for egalitarian rights which were arguably irreconcilable with the
feudal privileges demanded by the muqatadjis. All these problems were compacted
together in the mountain, bursting out in successive explosions of violence.
Mount Lebanon saw relative (even if not permanent) peace only after 1845,
when Russia and Britain formed a common pact for the stability of Syria and
France pulled back her active support to the Shihabites. The Porte, for its part,
decided under Mustafa Reșid to pursue a pacific policy towards the Powers from
then on, hoping to keep their consuls in Beirut content (hoşnut tutulması) by
means of goodwill (sûret-i hasene).¹⁵⁴ The following fifteen years witnessed a rapid
bounce back from total chaos to considerable economic prosperity in the moun-
tain. Yet the same period also proved to be a new gestation phase for the most
disastrous civil war in Lebanon in the nineteenth century.
¹⁵¹ Vernon J. Puryear, England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844–1865 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1931), 40–44.
¹⁵² BOA HR.SYS 1527/50/1/1, 20 May 1847. ¹⁵³ See Ch. 8.
¹⁵⁴ BOA HR.SYS 1527/50/1/1, 20 May 1847.




Crimea and Mount Lebanon
During Tsar Nicholas I’s visit to London in June 1844, Russia and Britain not only
agreed on taking a common position against France. They also reached a secret
verbal agreement over the Eastern Question. The tsar and the British prime
minister, Robert Peel, concurred that the sultan’s empire was very weak, ‘a
dying man’, as the former said. They decided to cooperate in maintaining her.
But ‘if in future it became evident that [the Ottoman Empire] could no longer be
maintained’, the courts of London and St Petersburg would act in concert to draft
a preliminary understanding ‘on the details of the partition’ along with Austria.
They purposefully excluded France from the plan because of the tsar’s personal
dislike of King Louis-Philippe, as well as Russia’s policy of separating Britain from
France, and their disapproval of the ongoing revisionist aspirations of the Guizot
government in the Levant at the time.¹
One issue remained vague, unaddressed and therefore open to different inter-
pretations between the two courts in the coming years, however. How would one
determine the impossibility of maintaining the Ottoman Empire and the time of
her partition? On what principles and legal grounds? British and Russian states-
men held contrasting views with respect to these questions. And their differences
became one of the most pressing reasons why they were dragged into war a decade
later, in 1854–6—the so-called Crimean War, which was actually fought from the
Baltic to the East Asia and the Pacific.²
The first inter-imperial war amongst the Great Powers since the end of the
Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the CrimeanWar shook the world, devastating peoples,
economies, and finances. Some historians argue that it symbolized the destruction
of the Concert of Europe.³ In the following pages I will offer an alternative
assessment, and discuss that the Concert continued to exist even after the
Crimean War. That being said, the peace established on the heels of the war was
delicate, and continued to test peace in Europe and the Levant. Like the
¹ Puryear, England, Russia, 40, 51.
² Clive Ponting, The Crimean War (London: Chatto & Windus, 2004), 5.
³ Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the CrimeanWar: The Destruction of the European
Concert (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); Charles Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends:
The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 237.
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aftershocks of a disastrous earthquake, its aftermath witnessed further Great
Power wars, civil strifes, and rebellions.
The precarious climate that emerged at the time dovetailed with existing and
newly emerging tensions in Mount Lebanon. These snowballed into further
fighting on the mountain during the summer of 1860—a much more devastating
conflict, with a death toll around three to five times greater than the civil wars of
1841 and 1845 combined. Here we will consider the global and local dynamics
that led once again to violence in Ottoman Lebanon, starting with the new
implications of the Eastern Question in the 1850s that prompted the Crimean
War, and their unsettling effects in the Levant.
The Crimean War and a Perilous Peace
After the Gülhane Edict of 1839, the Ottoman Sublime Porte’s policies of central-
ization on taxation, codification, and conscription missed their mark. Coupled
with growing economic discrepancies between non-Muslims and Muslims, they
provoked continuous instability in the Ottoman Empire in the short run. Tax
revolts in Akdağ, Niş, Vidin, and Canik were accompanied by violence in Syria at
large (Lebanon, Aleppo, Damascus), Mosul, Nablus, Jeddah, Montenegro, Bosnia,
and Crete. Moreover, the incessant border quarrels with Persia and Greece and the
uncontrollable issue of paper money kaime (introduced in 1839), the trade deficit,
and the poor financial performance of the Porte after the commercial agreements
of 1838–41 cast dark clouds over the future of the sultan’s empire. Adding to
these the international politics of the post-1848 revolutions and the tensions
over Ottoman Palestine and the Balkans in the run up to the Crimean War of
1853–6, the Eastern Question steadily became a popular theme again for strat-
egists, international lawyers, military men, journalists, and intellectuals in the
early 1850s.
During the 1848 revolutions in Europe (including the Balkan dominions of the
sultan’s empire), Tsar Nicholas I, with his conservative disposition and in his role
as ‘the gendarme of Europe’, supplied military aid to suppress the revolutionaries
in the Austrian and Ottoman Balkans. The next year, however, with the strong
backing of the liberal British and French governments, Grand Vizier Mustafa
Reșid Pașa’s rejection to return to Austria a number of Polish and Hungarian
revolutionaries who sought refuge in the sultan’s empire met with Austrian
and Russian protests.⁴ St Petersburg threatened to remove the Principalities
⁴ Candan Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856) (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 46; BOA i.DUiT
147/1; cf. Bayram Bayraktar, ‘Osmanlı Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Devletler Hukuku Açısından 19.
Yüzyılda Osmanlı’ya Sığınan Lehistan ve Macar Mültecileri Hakkında Düşünceler’, Çağdaş Türkiye
Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 19(39) (2019): 759–78, at 773.
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from the sultan’s jurisdiction.⁵ Britain sent a squadron in October 1849 into the
Dardanelles as a sign of commitment to the defence of Istanbul. Since this
constituted a violation of the stipulations of the inter-imperial Straits agreement
of 1841 (see Chapter 8), a crisis was immediately provoked among the Powers.⁶
It culminated with a British apology and the withdrawal of her squadrons in
January 1850. But the event served as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for what was to come a
few years later.⁷
At about the same time a squabble took place between the French Catholic and
Orthodox Churches over the sanctuaries in Judaea in Ottoman Palestine. What
had begun as an inter-church conflict in 1847 turned into an inter-imperial crisis
by 1852, especially when Napoleon III, Bonaparte’s nephew, declared himself
emperor following a coup d’état. With the purpose of reasserting the greatness
of France as well as satisfying his Catholic supporters, Napoleon III sought a
resolution to the sanctuary dispute on the basis of the capitulatory agreements.
But Tsar Nicholas I opposed French officialdom’s scheme, reminding France of
the 1774 Russo-Ottoman treaty that had granted Russia the protection of the
Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire.⁸
As results, the Porte delegated commissions (one consisted of a Greek, a
Catholic, and an Armenian, the other, Muslim ulema) to investigate the matter.
Faced with persistent exhortations on the part of French and Russian agents,
Sultan Abdülmecid I changed his mind more than once.⁹ France even sent a
frigate, the Charlemagne, to the Bosphorus in order to obtain a satisfactory
decision from the sultan, and staged a demonstration with six battleships and
six frigates just off Tripoli.¹⁰
The personal animosity and ideological difference between Nicholas I and
Napoleon III—the tsar detested the latter’s ascendancy and refused to recognize
him as emperor—intensified the strain among the Powers. Public debates began
between the foreign ministers of France and Russia.¹¹ Against the Anglo-French
pact, Russian officialdom believed that they had Austria in their pocket.¹² In the
late 1840s, the tsar had aided the court of Vienna in the suppression of the
revolutionary threat. In 1852, the dispute between Austria and the Porte over
Montenegro garnered the support of St Petersburg as the latter attempted to tie
⁵ David M. Goldfrank. The Origins of the Crimean War (Harlow: Longman, 1994), 69–70.
⁶ Puryear, England, Russia, 149, 153. ⁷ Goldfrank, Origins, 70–71. ⁸ See Ch. 1.
⁹ Puryear, England, Russia, 197, 222; Goldfrank, Origins, 80–84.
¹⁰ Frémeaux, La Question, 101–2; Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals, 69–70; Badem, The CrimeanWar,
66; Goldfrank, Origins, 94.
¹¹ Ibid. 125.
¹² On Austro-Russian relations in the 1850s, see B. Unckel, Österreich und der Krimkrieg.
Studien zur Politik der Donaumonarchie in den Jahren 1852–1856 (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1969), and
E. V. Sirotkina, ‘Vostochnyj Vopros, Krymskaya Vojna i Konec “Svyashhennogo Al’yansa” v
Avstrijsko-Rossijskix Otnosheniyax’, Izvestiya Saratovskogo Universiteta. Novaya seriya. Seriya:
Istoriya. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 18 (1) (2018): 77–83.
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together the differences in the Balkans with the disputes in Palestine in order to
gain diplomatic leverage.¹³
Even though Austro-Ottoman friction over Montenegro ended in early 1853,
the Russo-Ottoman altercation lingered after St Petersburg persisted in its
demands for a sened (bill) for a virtual protectorate over the Greek Christian
subjects of the sultan, which would be extended to the holy sites in Palestine.¹⁴ In
part under French pressure, but also on the grounds that authorizing Russia to
provide such protection would legally open the path for further Russian interven-
tions subsequently, the Porte stubbornly rejected the Russian demand. The tsar
then mobilized his troops in the Danubian Principalities and embarked upon
naval operations in the Black Sea.¹⁵
*
The Eastern Question returned to the agenda of inter-imperial politics in the early
1850s in this context, amid the rising tides of war, revolutions, a coup d’état,
rebellions in the Ottoman Empire, and religious competition. Tsar Nicholas
I refashioned it as a question not of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire
but of her ‘peaceful’ partition among the Powers, as Russia and Britain had
secretly agreed upon in 1844.¹⁶ Since the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15, the
inter-imperial order had been based on a conservative and anti-revolutionary
understanding of the preservation of stability in Europe and its periphery. Now, in
the early 1850s, the sultan’s empire came to be considered by revisionists as a
fundamental threat to European peace and security.
For a decade, a number of pamphlets, journal articles, and opinion pieces were
published with the same title, ‘The Eastern Question’. There was a familiar theme:
‘[T]he Asiatic Turkish race, fortunately or unfortunately, has evinced an utter
incompetency for . . . a fundamental and internal civilisation,’ one such piece read.
‘The Turks’ did not have a place among ‘the civilized nations of Europe’.¹⁷
By the same token, in his talks with the British ambassador, George Hamilton
Seymour, in January 1853, Tsar Nicholas I infamously referred to the Ottoman
Empire as ‘the sick man of Europe’, doomed to die.¹⁸ In line with the 1844 secret
agreement, he suggested that, before the sick man died, Britain and Russia ought
to take precautions.¹⁹ The next day he shared with Seymour concrete plans of
¹³ Richmond, Canning, 239–40. The Austro-Ottoman crisis resulted from the slow evacuation of
Ottoman troops from Montenegro following the successful suppression of a riot there.
¹⁴ Bernadotte E. Schmidt, ‘The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War’, American Historical
Review 25(1) (1919): 36–67, at 37–8.
¹⁵ Bilal Şimşir, ‘Kırım Savaşı Arifesinde Mustafa Reșid Paşa’nın Yazışmaları’, inMustafa Reșid Pașa
ve Dönemi, 77–83.
¹⁶ Anait Surenovna Akop’janc, ‘Vostochnyj Vopros v Geopolitike Rossii’, Interekspo Geo-Sibir’
(2015): 44–8, at 45.
¹⁷ Anonymous,Hints on the Solution of the Eastern Question by OneWho Has Resided in the Levant,
(London: R. Clarke, 1853), 19; Frémaux, La Question, 101.
¹⁸ Ibid. ¹⁹ Şimşir, ‘Kırım Savaşı’, 78.
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partition, offering London control over Cyprus and Egypt.²⁰ But the Aberdeen
cabinet in London was not prepared to accept such a scheme—in fact, they were
entirely opposed to it. They wanted to preserve the sultan’s empire even if this had
now become a much more taxing endeavour for Britain.²¹
The tsar also shared his plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire with the
Austrian king, Franz Joseph.²² Grateful as he was for the Russian policing and
diplomatic assistance in 1848 and 1852–3, Franz Joseph also followed a conser-
vative inter-imperial policy in line with Metternich’s diplomatic policy since the
1810s, which meant keeping the Ottoman Empire intact. Subsequently, in the
slipstream of the transimperial security culture of the time, a series of ambassa-
dorial conferences were held in Vienna in 1853 under the initiative of Britain and
Austria and with the purpose of remedying Russo-Ottoman disputes and restrain-
ing the tsar from following any such scheme he had proposed. Notes were
presented to both courts for the settlement of a lasting peace: for the Porte to
acknowledge Russian protection of the Greek Orthodox and for Russia to evacuate
the Danubian principalities. But both the Porte and Russia were disinclined to
accept these terms, and came up with their incompatible counter-proposals.²³ The
logjam was followed by belligerent acts in the Black Sea. In September 1853, the
Russian fleet destroyed the Ottoman port of Sinop.²⁴ On 5 October, the Ottoman
Empire declared war on Russia.²⁵
Over the next five months the attempts to obtain a settlement between the two
cabinets during ambassadorial meetings in Vienna yielded no results. In the end,
seeing that there was no prospect for a peaceful settlement, Britain responded
positively to the adventurous Napoleon III’s calls to enter the Black Sea with
British fleets that were already stationed in Istanbul.²⁶ At the end of March 1854,
the Russo-Ottoman war became a Great Power war.²⁷ Britain and France formed a
costly alliance with the Porte ‘for the maintenance of [the Ottoman Empire] and
[the] general equilibrium of Europe’.²⁸
The Crimean War was not simply a disruption of the transimperial security
culture of the time nor the destruction of the Concert of Europe, as has been
previously argued.²⁹ Aside from calculations of strategic gain and prestige, it was
fought mainly for the preservation of the existing patterns of security, self-
restraint among the Powers, multilateral action (towards the Porte), and the
²⁰ Goldfrank, Origins, 127. ²¹ Puryear, England, Russia, 206–15.
²² BOA i.HR 21231/17.
²³ BOA i.HR 21220/6/8 and 21231/17; cf. Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Savaşı (1853–6) (Ankara:
T. C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2006), 35–41; Puryear, England, Russia, 296–8;
E. V. Tarle, Krymskaya Vojna, vol. 1 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Yurayt, 2018), 147–92.
²⁴ Ibid. 296–333. ²⁵ BOA HR.SYS 903/2/37–9; cf. Osmanlı Belgelerinde, 57–69.
²⁶ Puryear, England, Russia, 301; Şimşir, ‘Kırım Savaşı’, 87–9.
²⁷ Schmidt, ‘The Diplomatic Preliminaries’, 38–9.
²⁸ Hugh McKinnon Wood, ‘The Treaty of Paris and Turkey’s Status in International Law’, The
American Journal of International Law 37(2) (April 1943): 262–74, at 265.
²⁹ Schroeder, The Destruction.
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maintenance of the European balance of power by ensuring the Ottoman terri-
torial integrity.
More than 900,000 people died during the next two years. Military victories and
Austrian support of the Anglo-French–Ottoman alliance became decisive in
forcing Russia’s back against the wall. Paramount too was the Porte’s declaration
of an edict on 18 February 1856 which facilitated the subsequent Paris Peace
Treaty of 30 March 1856 and hastened the termination of the war. But both the
Ottoman edict and the Paris peace unintendedly gave rise to new perils, jeopard-
izing the stability of Europe and the Levant—particularly in Mount Lebanon.
*
The Hatt-ı Hümâyun of February 1856, also known as the Islahat Fermanı
(Reform Edict), was above all a diplomatic response to wring favourable terms
from the upcoming peace negotiations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
It is usually considered the second major official document in the Ottoman
Tanzimat era (1839–76) after the Gülhane Edict of 1839. The contexts of the
production of the two edicts were similar in many respects. Both were promul-
gated in times of transimperial crisis. Both made arguably liberal pledges to an
Ottoman as well as a European audience. In 1839, the Porte’s object was to attract
foreign support against one of its vassals. In 1856, it looked to obtain an agreement
with Russia in a way that would prevent St Petersburg from future intervention in
its domestic affairs with respect to Greek Christians. Moreover, the 1856 edict
complemented the 1839 edict in perpetuating the Porte’s commitment to the
ambiguous principle of ‘civilization’.
Yet, unlike 1839, the 1856 edict was not drafted by Ottoman statesmen
alone. It was not ‘home-grown’.³⁰ Instead, a commission comprising British
ambassador Stratford Canning, French ambassador Édouard Antoine Thouvenel
(1818–66), and the Austrian internuncio to the Porte, Anton von Prokesch-Osten
(1795–1876), Prince Callimachi, an Ottoman Greek representing the Greek
Orthodox subjects of the sultan, as well as Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin Âli Pașa
and the foreign minister, Fuad Pașa, discussed its content and drafted it.
The latter two were both protégés of Mustafa Reșid. Born in the same year
(1815), Âli and Fuad had followed the same educational path through the
Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası), where they mastered French, before serving
the Ottoman foreign ministry in Paris, London, Vienna, and St Petersburg as
second-tier bureaucrats under Reșid’s supervision. Their relations with their
patron were tarnished when Âli accepted appointment as grand vizier in place
of Reșid in 1855. Even then, they both furthered Reșid’s pro-liberal Europe
policies and considered it their ultimate end to make the sultan’s empire a
³⁰ Deringil, Conversion, 66.
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member of the Concert of Europe, to guarantee her security and territorial
integrity against European, and especially Russian, aggressions.³¹
By this point, the Great Powers had come to police almost the entire world
‘from a position of assumed cultural, material and legal superiority’, having
engaged in wars and interventions in different parts of the world from China
and Siam to the Americas.³² They had granted themselves the authority to
intervene in the political affairs of so-called ‘less civilized’ polities as a special
right and responsibility and an instrument of global order maintenance or order
transformation. The so-called standard of civilization thus served as a licence for
the political, legal, and armed interventions of the European Powers.³³
The principle of ‘civilization’, now the over-arching theme and grand narrative
of international political thought, was also adopted by the Ottoman ministers Âli
and Fuad Pașas.³⁴ By the mid-1850s, the two embraced medeniyetçilik (civiliza-
tionism) as an ideology for reforming and securing the Ottoman Empire. While in
the 1830s Mustafa Reșid had upheld the notion as a discursive apparatus to garner
the support of the Powers against the Porte’s ‘uncivilized’ Egyptian ‘other’ (see
Chapter 7), Âli and Fuad utilized the notion as a discursive practice with the
purpose of avoiding being on the receiving end of Great Power interventions,
subordination, or informal rule. For this purpose, they thought, the sultan’s
empire had to be elevated to the level of ‘the civilized’, or at least she had to
‘pretend’ to be one.³⁵
Their appeal to ‘civilizationism’ was a distinctly opportunistic, power-oriented,
and imperialist policy. They were mesmerized by the military, economic, techno-
logical, and political achievements of the European Powers. In a similar vein to
Japan, instead of steadfastly resisting the perils of the new global order, or rebelling
against the insecurities it posed for less privileged peoples, the Ottoman ministers
preferred to change their empire’s standing in the global imperial order. For Japan,
the matter became one of ensuring the civilized identity of their empire by means of
expansionism.³⁶ For the Porte, at least for now, it was a matter of becoming a
member of the Concert of Europe or the Family of Nations.
While preparing the Reform Edict together with British, French, and Austrian
ambassadors and Prince Callamachi, the eyes of Âli and Fuad were trained on the
specific objective of marking the civilized character of the Porte.³⁷ The edict
³¹ For more detailed accounts of the lives of the two Ottoman ministers, see Rasim Marz, Ali
Pascha—Europas vergessener Staatsman (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2016); Yılmaz Öztuna, Ali Pașa
(Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988); Fuad Andıç and Suphan Andıç, Sadrazam Ali Pașa.
Hayatı, Zamanı ve Vasiyetnamesi (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2000); Fuad Andıç and Suphan Andıç,
Kırım Savaşı, Ali Pașa ve Paris Antlaşması (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002); Engin D. Akarlı, Belgelerle
Tanzimat. Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri (Istanbul: Boğaziçi
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978).
³² Simpson, Great Powers, 5.
³³ Suzuki, Civilization and Empire; Bell, ‘Empire and Imperialism’, 867–8; Anghie, Imperialism, 4.
³⁴ Osterhammel, ‘Approaches to Global History’, 12. ³⁵ Çetinsaya, ‘Kalemiye’den’, 55–6.
³⁶ Suzuki, Civilization and Empire. ³⁷ BOA i.HR 129/6534.
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accordingly echoed and extended the guarantees and rights that had been pledged
in the 1839 Gülhane Edict, even though these pledges had remained largely
unfulfilled. Yet the subtext of 1856 differed immensely from its antecedent.
The sacred shari’a law, the Qur’an, and ancient laws and glories were not
mentioned in the new edict.³⁸ This symbolized the elimination of the centuries-
long hierarchy between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the empire.
Nor was there any direct correlation to the ‘circle of justice’ in the script. In 1856,
instead of the principle of security-with-prosperity, an egalitarian ethos was
accentuated, i.e. equality ‘without distinction of classes and of religion’ and ‘in
matters of military service, in the administration of justice, in taxation, in admis-
sion to civil and military schools, in public employment, and in social respect’
such as forms of dress and the erection of new buildings.³⁹ The 1856 edict pledged
to make it ‘lawful for foreigners to possess landed property in [the sultan’s]
dominion, conforming themselves to the laws and police regulations . . . after
arrangements have been come to with Foreign Powers’, an act that took effect
only in the late 1860s. Taxes were ‘to be levied under the same denomination from
all the subjects of my Empire’.⁴⁰ The sultan promised:
Every Christian or other non-Mussulman community shall be bound, within a
fixed period, and with the concurrence of a Commission composed ad hoc of
members of its own body, to proceed . . . to examine into its actual immunities
and privileges, and to discuss and submit to my Sublime Porte the reforms
required by the progress of civilisation and of the age.⁴¹
With its bold, forward-looking European language and clearly formulated plan of
action, the 1856 Edict aimed to consolidate the allegiance of non-Muslim subjects
of the sultan.
Seen together, all these proposals stemmed, in part, from the desire to thwart
revisionist (Russian) schemes for the partition of the sultan’s empire, and to serve
as an all-encompassing guarantee that Russia had wanted to obtain from the Porte
for the protection of the Greek Orthodox since 1853. It aimed to take away from St
Petersburg the right to play any part in Ottoman reform, and to present the tsar
with a fait accompli at the Paris Peace Conference.⁴²
*
In the latter sense, and almost in this sense only, the edict yielded the intended
results. Having suffered heavy defeats and humiliation at the hands of the allies,
Russia, under her new tsar, Alexander II (Nicholas I died of pneumonia in 1855),
³⁸ Davison, Reform, 54–5.
³⁹ ‘Firman and Hat-i Humayun [sic] Sultan of Turkey)’, in Bailey, British Diplomacy, 287, appendix
6; emphasis mine. See also Davison, Reform, 55.
⁴⁰ ‘Firman and Hat-i Humayun’, 290. ⁴¹ Ibid. 287. ⁴² Davison, Reform, 58–9.
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was already inclined to peace. The Porte’s declaration of a reform edict left the
court of St Petersburg with little diplomatic margin during the peace talks in Paris
in 1856. Consequently, Alexander II subscribed with great reluctance to the
neutrality of the Black Sea. He also complied with the establishment of a river
commission to ensure free navigation and security for the Danube, and to address
any difference among the riparian states as well as countries like Britain and
France which traded in high volume with the region.⁴³ And he agreed on the
autonomy of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, while restoring to the sultan the
prewar territories that had been lost during the fighting.⁴⁴
The Paris Conference of 1856materialized what the Vienna Congress of 1814–15
had aspired to obtain with respect to the Eastern Question. In 1815, the Powers had
been unable to guarantee the territorial integrity of the European dominions of the
sultan’s empire under European public law as a result of the Porte’s unrelenting
dismissal of their propositions.⁴⁵ But, in 1856, the court of Istanbul was more than
willing for such a transimperial guarantee. In fact, as already mentioned, under Âli
and Fuad its efforts had been bent on being ‘admitted to the Concert of Europe’
which would seal their empire’s right to exist.⁴⁶
The seventh article of the resulting Treaty of Paris, which Grand Vizier Âli Pașa
himself proposed, accordingly spelled out that the signatories of the treaty ‘declare
the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and
System (Concert) of Europe’.⁴⁷ They would respect ‘the Independence and
Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, jointly guarantee the strict obser-
vance of this commitment, and will therefore consider any act [tending to its
violation] as a matter of general interest’.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the ninth article expli-
citly referred to the sultan’s Reform Edict of 18 February, stipulating that the
latter’s communication to the signatories of the treaty ‘cannot in any case, give to
the said powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the
relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects nor in the internal adminis-
tration of his empire’.⁴⁹
The signing of the Treaty of Paris, and its ratification a month later, meant that
Russo-Ottoman differences in the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, which
had haunted generations of Ottoman sultans and risked European peace since the
eighteenth century, and which had formed the crux of the many crises relating to
the Eastern Question, were now brought under the jurisdiction of European public
⁴³ For a recent, well-researched, and beautifully written study, see Constantin Ardeleanu, The
European Commission of the Danube, 1856–1948: An Experiment in International Administration
(Leiden: Brill, 2020).
⁴⁴ T. W. Riker, ‘The Concert of Europe and Moldavia in 1857’, English Historical Review 42 (1927):
227–44; H. Temperley, ‘The Treaty of Paris of 1856 and Its Execution’, Journal of Modern History 4
(1932), pt 1: 405–7.
⁴⁵ See Ch. 4. ⁴⁶ Ali Pasha, Political Testament, 35.
⁴⁷ Wood, ‘The Treaty of Paris’, 262–3; emphasis mine. ⁴⁸ Ibid. 263.
⁴⁹ Davison, Reform, 413.
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law. The Ottoman Empire had already de facto been an integral feature of the
European security system.⁵⁰ Now her territorial integrity was guaranteed de jure.
Whether she was placed on an equal footing with the other five Great Powers was
deliberately left ambiguous (especially in Article 7).⁵¹
Irrespective of this ambiguity, to Ottoman statesmen the Treaty of Paris was the
realization of an ultimate objective. The so-called Christian provinces of their
empire had now been officially withdrawn from Russian protection. This meant
not only the annulment of the 1774 Kaynarca Treaty but also, in the eyes of the
Ottoman ministers, an end to the ambiguity of their empire’s position in the
global imperial order. Âli Pașa, the Ottoman plenipotentiary who affixed his
signature to the treaty in Paris, wrote in his political testament that, in 1856, the
Porte had become ‘a member of the family of great nations who respect each
other’s rights’.⁵² When the news from Paris arrived in Istanbul, Sultan
Abdülmecid I jubilantly and prematurely declared his hope that ‘my Empire,
henceforth a member of the great family of Europe, will prove to the entire
universe that it is worthy of a prominent place in the concert of civilised nations’.⁵³
Many historical actors argued that the Eastern Question was permanently
resolved at one blow by placing the Ottoman Empire under the guarantee of
European public law. One hour after the treaty was signed at the French ministry
of foreign affairs at 1 p.m. on 30 March, the prefect of police in Paris announced
the news, stating that ‘the peace of Europe’ was placed ‘upon a firm and durable
basis . . . in settling the Eastern Question’.⁵⁴ The argument that the Eastern
Question had been ‘definitively settled’ repeatedly appeared in the publications
of the day.⁵⁵ The treaty was considered proof of the strength of international law
in Europe, as the two major antagonists of the tsar, Britain and France, had
become allies with Austria and thus confined a permanent threat. Recent scholarly
studies have likewise claimed, ‘After 1856, the Eastern Question receded in
European diplomacy for decades.’⁵⁶ However, as Temperley rightly argues, there
would be ‘more danger of [a total European] war after, than before, the peace was
signed.’⁵⁷ Equally perilously, there would be more instability in the Ottoman
Empire immediately after the 1856 edict was promulgated than before.
*
The adverse results of the Paris Peace and the 1856 edict in the sultan’s dominions
and Europe and the endurance of the Eastern Question resulted from a number of
factors. For one, the proclamation of the 1856 edict incited graver schisms among
⁵⁰ Palabıyık, ‘The Emergence’, 247. ⁵¹ Wood, ‘The Treaty of Paris’, 274.
⁵² Ali Pasha, Political Testament, 35.
⁵³ Edhem Eldem, ‘Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank
and the Ottoman Public Debt’, European Review 13(3) (2005): 431–45, at 432.
⁵⁴ ‘Conclusion of Peace’, The Times, 31 Mar. 1856, 9. ⁵⁵ Ibid.; Le Moniteur, 1 Apr. 1856.
⁵⁶ Mitzen, Power in Concert, 210–11. ⁵⁷ Temperley, ‘Treaty of Paris’, 387.
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the elites in Istanbul and insecurity in the wider empire. The manner in which it
had been drafted, with the direct involvement of European diplomats and its
language purified of Islamic nuances, was considered a disgrace to Ottoman
dignity and sovereignty not only by the hardline conservatives but even by more
moderate figures like Mustafa Reșid Pașa himself.⁵⁸ This intensified the struggle
between Âli and Fuad Pașas, on the one hand, and conservative, pro-Russian
statesmen such as Rıza Pașa, on the other.
Secondly, at the hands of ultra-conservative and sometimes incompetent gov-
ernors, virtually all of whom condemned the edict, the reforms pledged were
hardly implemented to any satisfaction in several provinces. The rights and
liberties granted to Christian subjects prompted a religious backlash, widespread
antagonism, and outrage on the part of a considerable portion of the Muslim
population, who viewed the edict as an encroachment on their laws, regulations,
and religious privileges.⁵⁹ All the while, Christian subjects of the sultan remained
dissatisfied with new reforms because, despite the rights granted to them,
aside from their poor (or non-)implementation, they were still made subject to
heavy new taxes for exemption from military service, which they detested.⁶⁰ The
four years between 1856 and 1860 witnessed a series of Christian rebellions
and ‘disturbances’ in Crete, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, and Montenegro, and
Muslim outrages against Christians in Syria (Nablus, Gaza, Aleppo, and
Damascus) and Jeddah, where 19 individuals, including the British and French
consuls, were killed in 1858.⁶¹
Thirdly, the Paris peace did not bring to an end—in fact, by contrast, it even
inspired—imperial revisionism in Europe. Even though France and Russia had
been belligerents during the war, the postwar settlement paved the way for their
rapprochement.⁶² Tsar Alexander II was anxious to revise the stipulations of the
Treaty of Paris with respect to the Balkans and the Black Sea. And his revisionism
sat well with Napoleon III’s ambitions to redraw the map of Europe.⁶³
The French emperor’s victories during the Crimean War had boosted his
prestige, and set him on a similarly revisionist, if not expansionist, course of
foreign policy. During the war he had developed new schemes to reinvigorate
France’s naval capability and shift the borders of Europe eastwards by appropri-
ating much of Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhineland, and by creating loose federal
⁵⁸ Davison, Reform, 57–8.
⁵⁹ ‘Memo on the Province of Tripoli par M. Blanche’, 18 Apr. 1857, AMAE Corr. Consulaire
Beyrouth, 42CCC/7/178.
⁶⁰ Farah, Politics, 499–519.
⁶¹ BOA HR.TO. 232/17; 231/7; Farah, Politics, 525–6; Thouvenel to Fuad Pacha, 29 Dec. 1859,
AMAE 133CP/343/15.
⁶² S. Gorianov, ‘Les Étapes de l’alliance franco-russe (1853–1861)’, Revue de Paris 19(1) (1912):
1–29; 19(3): 529–44; 19(4): 755–76; Temperley, ‘Treaty of Paris’, 387.
⁶³ François Charles-Roux, Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoléon III (Paris: Plon–Nourrit, 1913),
179–80.
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structures in Italy and Germany over which to exercise informal influence. An
idea entertained by the emperor at the time was the establishment of an Arab
kingdom in the Levant under the Algerian leader Abd al-Qader (1808–83).⁶⁴
In 1858, however, Napoleon III limited his ambitions to Italy. He endorsed the
Sardinian cause with the aim of establishing an Italian confederation, under the
presidency of the pope, that would free northern Italy from Austrian rule.⁶⁵ His
aggressive policy resulted in a battle with the Austrians in Piedmont, while Britain
was embroiled in rebellions and battles in Asia—the Great Mutiny in India (1857)
and the second Opium War in China (1856–60)—to sustain her colonial inter-
ests.⁶⁶ France thus positioned herself once more as a competitor to Britain (despite
their joint mission in China), while French policy seemed ‘designed not just
to achieve parity with Britain but actively to subjugate Britain to the French
political will’.⁶⁷
Napoleon III brought Austria to heel at the Conference of Villafranca in 1859.
A few months later, in the spring of 1860, when he signed a treaty with the prime
minister of Piedmont–Sardinia, the count of Cavour, to annex Nice and Savoy,
eyebrows were again raised in London and Berlin for fear of an adventurous
expansion by France.⁶⁸ Having anticipated such disquiet, Napoleon III made
secret pacts with Alexander II on 25 September 1857 (verbally) and 3 March
1859 (officially) with respect to Austria. The two emperors also agreed to act in
concert over the Eastern Question and to adopt a common stance in the event of
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁹ That is, Russia revived her 1844 agreement
with Britain, which had fallen by the wayside in 1853. But now, St Petersburg
replaced London for the France of Napoleon III as the other party, a party which,
unlike British cabinets, welcomed the revisionist dispositions of the Russian tsars
and the establishment of a European protectorate over the Christian subjects of
the sultan.⁷⁰
In 1859 and early 1860, Russian strategists were prepared for the disintegration of
the sultan’s empire and devised material schemes for establishing a confederation of
small Christian states in the Balkans—proclaiming Istanbul (Constantinople) a
free city—in a similar vein to Napoleon III’s designs in Italy.⁷¹ Since the foreign
minister, Gorchakov, knew that Italy, not the Eastern Question, was France’s prior
⁶⁴ Abd al Qader was the leader of the Algerian resistance movement against French colonial
occupation in the 1830s and 1840s. When the resistance was suppressed, he left for Bursa and, in
1858, for Damascus. Michele Raccagni, ‘The French Economic Interests in the Ottoman Empire’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies 11(3) (1980): 339–67, at 346.
⁶⁵ Brown, ‘Palmerston’, 693.
⁶⁶ James F. McMillan, Napoleon III (Harlow: Longman, 1991), 84–92.
⁶⁷ Brown, ‘Palmerston’, 693. ⁶⁸ Persigny to Thouvenel, 10 May 1860, AMAE 8CP/717/4.
⁶⁹ Charles-Roux, Alexandre II, 214, 219, 239, 245, 300. ⁷⁰ Ibid. 237.
⁷¹ Kiselev to Gorchakov, 25 Apr. 1860, AVPRI, f. Kantselyariya, d. 149, l. 246; cf. M. T. Panchenkova,
Politika Francii na Blizhnem Vostoke i Syrijskaya Ekspediciya, 1860–1861 gg. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo
Nauka, 1966), 36.
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concern at this point, he decided on a patient policy.⁷² When his diplomats
approached France, the message they were instructed to deliver attested that the
courts of Paris and St Petersburg had to act in alliance ‘in the event of the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire’, but this did not require an immediate resolution. France
could ‘introduce points on which to agree’ and to which ‘the Russian government
would respond with complete frankness.’⁷³
Simultaneously, Gorchakov endeavoured to bring the border disputes in
Montenegro and the situation of the Christians in Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina,
and Greece to the agenda of the Powers, as they were all ‘intolerable’ for Russia.
He was aware that his calls to redraw the map of the Balkans would be met by
Austro-British opposition. He therefore proposed to Paris and Berlin the creation
of a union (soyuz) between Russia, Prussia, and France, against whom ‘Britain and
Austria will be powerless’.⁷⁴
The French foreign minister, Thouvenel, who had only recently arrived from
Istanbul to take up his new post in February 1860, reacted positively to the Russian
proposal in general, though he noted, just like Gorchakov, that they would be in
‘no hurry’ to set out the specific points of the projected agreement, and that there
should be ‘no rush for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire’.⁷⁵ According
to Thouvenel, the sultan’s empire was an anomaly and would ‘fall herself as a
consequence of internal contradictions’.⁷⁶
But Prussia did not affirm the proposal for the ‘separation of the Christian
provinces from the Ottoman Empire’ by a triple alliance.⁷⁷ A relatively silent actor
in the politics of the Eastern Question since the late eighteenth century, usually
following the other Powers, Berlin suddenly emerged as one of the key players in
1860–61. Its position also signified the persistence of the Concert of Europe after
the Crimean War.
When Gorchakov hinted at the idea to his ambassador, the Prussian foreign
minister, Baron Schleinitz, instead suggested a collective approach to the Eastern
Question, which ‘should naturally involve the Ottoman Empire as well’. He
warned his Russian correspondents that the British would oppose the Russian
approach.⁷⁸ The Austrian foreign minister, Count Rechberg, was pleased with the
⁷² Kiselev to Gorchakov, 27 June 1860, AVPRI, f. Kantselyariya, d. 149, l. 362; cf. Panchenkova,
Syrijskaya Ekspediciya, 36.
⁷³ Ibid.
⁷⁴ Kiselev to Gorchakov, 12 June 1860, AVPRI, f. Kantselyariya, d. 150, l. 42–3; cf. Panchenkova,
Syrijskaya Ekspediciya, 37; Charles-Roux, Alexandre II, 288–9.
⁷⁵ Lynn M. Case, Édouard Thouvenel et la diplomatie du Second Empire, trans. Guillaume de Bertier
de Savigny (Paris: A. Pedone, 1976), 72–102.
⁷⁶ Kiselev to Gorchakov, 30 June 1860, AVPRI, f. Kantselyariya, d. 150, ll. 246; cf. Panchenkova,
Syrijskaya Ekspediciya, 37.
⁷⁷ Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von Schleinitz to [Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen], 15 May
1860, GStA I HA Rep 81 Petersburg nach 1807, I Nr. 206 Bd 2.
⁷⁸ Schleinitz to Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff, 13 May 1860, GStA I HA Rep 81, f. 249–51;
Panchenkova, Syrijskaya Ekspediciya, 36.
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Prussian response. The courts of Berlin and Vienna concurred that ‘the Russian
plan approaches the Eastern Question from a wrong angle’.⁷⁹
Gorchakov’s proposal and the positions of Prussia and Austria were testaments
to how bellicose nationalism and inter-imperial cooperation went hand in hand
during the nineteenth century. Divergence among the Powers again produced
cooperation and a series of ambassadorial meetings in St Petersburg in May 1860.
While a campaign of systematic recrimination began in Russian newspapers
‘hostile to Turkey’ at the time, at the negotiation table Gorchakov suggested the
dispatch of an inquiry commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸⁰ The commission
would be composed of an Ottoman committee and the respective consuls of the
five Powers. The Powers consented to this; but the Porte rejected the scheme.
In the eyes of the sultan’s ministers, the ‘discontent’ in the Balkans had in fact
existed ‘rather in appearance than in reality’, and any complaints had been
‘inspired by ulterior motives’ of foreign (Russian) agents who produced ‘com-
pletely inaccurate’ reports.⁸¹ When the proposal of the establishment of a mixed
commission to inquire into an Ottoman domestic problem in the Balkans reached
him, Foreign Minister Fuad Pașa complained that the suggestion plainly was a
‘strange idea . . . to annihilate both the sovereignty of the sultan and the independ-
ence of his Empire, and to take a step closer to violate her integrity’.⁸² Little did he
know then that less than two months later he would preside over an international
commission of exactly the same nature in Syria.⁸³
Fuad presciently feared that great complications awaited the Porte, as Russia
looked to ‘tear our allies apart from the Treaty of Paris and make us give up our
sovereignty’.⁸⁴ He believed that Britain had to interpose the full weight of her
influence to prevent a Franco-Russian accord, though he suspected that
France might still not like to separate from Britain for Russia, and her economic
and financial interests would not permit the bold decision of disintegrating the
sultan’s empire.
This was precisely what Prussian and Austrian statesmen also wished to believe.
However, when, at the end of May 1860, rebellions broke out in Ottoman
Montenegro and Herzegovina and a civil war erupted in Ottoman Syria simul-
taneously, and, in July, when Thouvenel began to brainstorm with Prussian
and Russian agents ‘several alternatives for the separation of the Ottoman
Empire into . . . smaller entities’, Prussia and Austria came to share Fuad’s
fears.⁸⁵ Trying to make sense of what was actually happening, Prussian diplomats
⁷⁹ Georg Freiherr von Werthern-Beichlingen to Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von Schleinitz,
Vienna, 16 May 1860, GStA I HA Rep 81 Petersburg nach 1807, I Nr. 207.
⁸⁰ Dervich Pasha (St Petersburg) to Fuad Pasha, 16 Feb. 1860, ODD 34.
⁸¹ Fuad Pasha to Musurus (London), 30 May 1860, ODD 61.
⁸² Fuad Pasha to Musurus (London), 16 May 1860, ODD 40. ⁸³ See Ch. 13.
⁸⁴ Fuad Pasha to Musurus (London), 16 May 1860, ODD 40.
⁸⁵ Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz to Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von Schleinitz,
Paris, 27 July 1860, GStA III. HA MdA I. Nr. 7303, f. 100.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
290  
found consolation only in the fact that the French were still very ‘vague’ and did
not seem to have as yet a clear plan.⁸⁶ But they were not sure. Were the events
concurrently transpiring in the Balkans and Syria a ploy, a conspiracy, and did
they represent the immediate theatres of a larger scheme? That they did not know.
Anno 1860: The Civil War in Mount Lebanon
This was an impossible puzzle. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the
1840s the correlation between the Eastern Question and the origins of violence in
Lebanon were evident. The French enterprises to retain her anterior standing in
the Levant through Mehmed Ali and Bashir Shihab II, and attempts by the other
Powers, and especially Britain, to maintain their stronghold in Syria had sustained
the Eastern Question in the country, in fact, well into the ‘muqatas of the local
feudal lords. In 1860, the origins of the civil war were equally complex.
Even though Ottoman officialdom and European writers such as Karl Marx
were persuaded that the concurrent outbreak of violence in the Balkans and Syria
was a ploy, France’s eastern policy appeared to be less defined, oscillating between
idealistic ambitions, economic considerations, and strategic realities.⁸⁷ The nar-
ratives of various historical actors concerning the influence of Ottoman and
European imperial agents on the ensuing violence were so diverse and contra-
dictory, and the archival evidence so thin, that, from an empirical point of view,
we can make only tentative assumptions concerning any direct correlation
between the Franco-Russian schemes and the war in Lebanon.
*
By the 1850s, Ottoman Lebanon had become a very different world from that of
the previous decades, having been transformed from a war zone into a commercial
centre. As noted in previous chapters, its economic boom had begun during the
Egyptian interregnum. Especially after the signing of the 1838–41 commercial
treaties between the Sublime Porte and the European Powers, and following the
restoration of Syria to the sultan’s rule in 1841, all monopolies were abolished in
the eastern Mediterranean, and import tariffs were reduced and fixed as in other
parts of the empire, prompting even more economic growth.
When order was largely restored in 1845, the volume of trade in Lebanon
increased exponentially, and the social and economic landscape of the country
rapidly metamorphized. Gregory M. Wortabet, a Protestant Levantine born in
Beirut, who had been travelling in Britain and United States for his religious
mission since the early 1830s, was mesmerized by the transformation of his
homeland upon his return in 1854. He found that the difference between the
⁸⁶ Ibid. ⁸⁷ See Ch. 12.
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small town he had left behind and the thriving Beirut he had just arrived in was
like ‘midday and midnight’.⁸⁸ Its wealth could be seen in shops and stores well-
endowed with European and American goods. The oriental feel of a few decades
before had been replaced by ‘a European air of business’. Lebanese Christians had
risen, Wortabet noted not so impartially in his memoirs, from ‘ignorance, poverty
and degradation to knowledge, wealth and refinement’.⁸⁹ He poured scorn on the
native Muslims, who, in contrast, and ‘in face of the rising intelligence of their
Christian fellow-citizens, are in the same status quo they were fifty years ago’.⁹⁰
According to Wortabet, the great lever that enabled the material progress of
non-Muslims in Syria was missionary labour, and the ensuing influence of the
Europeans who arrived after the missionaries had opened the doors. In reality, the
driving forces of change were much more diverse. For one, there were material
factors such as technical developments in the domain of transportation (especially
the introduction of regular steamship routes from 1835 onwards, a mode of
transport which was faster, more reliable, and allowed the carriage of heavy weight
cargo), the opening of new banks and arrival of new creditors, and ‘the rapid
extension of credit and the growing use of the system of purchase’.⁹¹ During the
decades Wortabet had been away, Lebanon had become a major producer of silk
and supplier for global industry following the great drop in cocoon production in
France. This had led to a rapid increase in international prices, which meant
instant prosperity for the Lebanese. Several spinning factories were established by
mostly French and Lebanese entrepreneurs.⁹² The economic growth was accom-
panied by a demographic boom: by 1860, the Maronite population in Mount
Lebanon rose to 200,000 people, while the Druze population numbered about
100,000.⁹³
In these transitional years, approximately 30 local merchants—predominantly
Greek Orthodox and few Catholics—which included the famous Sursuq, Misk,
Tabet, Debbas, Khury, Sayyur, Bustrus, and Tuenis families, prospered and
coalesced into a class that ‘dominated Lebanese trade and finance’ with the ‘shared
goal of capital accumulation’.⁹⁴ As Kirsten Alff aptly demonstrates in her work,
they did not simply ‘mimic Western capitalist models’, but developed their own
transregional and transimperial networks, established joint-stock companies, and
forged mutually beneficial links with their European business partners in
⁸⁸ Gregory M. Wortabet, Syria and the Syrians; or Turkey in the dependencies, vol. 1 (London:
J. Maaden, 1856), 36.
⁸⁹ Ibid. 43. ⁹⁰ Ibid. 33.
⁹¹ Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914 (London: Methuen, 1981),
88–90.
⁹² As Owen details, ‘the price of an oke of new cocoons rose from an average of 12 piasters in 1848 to
over 20 piasters in the early 1850s and to a high of 45 piasters in 1857’: ibid. 155.
⁹³ ‘For the monthly convert: Civil War on Mount Lebanon, Missionary House’, 1 Aug. 1860,
ABCFM v. 6 291/105.
⁹⁴ Alff, ‘Levantine’, 81, 92; Issawi, ‘British Trade’, 98–9.
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Manchester, Liverpool, London, Marseilles, and Lyon, such as George Peter
Lascaridi, Michael Spartali, Paul Cababe, and Louis Desgrand.⁹⁵ They constituted
the ‘hinge’ between ‘the world market and large-scale commerce and banking on
the one hand and small-scale peasant and artisan production on the other’.⁹⁶ They
thus played a crucial role as intermediaries who knew local markets, who spoke
local languages and were familiar with local practices, and who could therefore
more easily ‘enforce contracts’, collect debts or ‘find retail outlets’.⁹⁷While ‘corner
[ing] the silk market’, they used the revenues they harvested to ‘extend credit to
peasants in return for a percentage of their agricultural yield’ as of the 1850s, thus
creating new dependencies in the hinterland.⁹⁸
Besides the transregional networks they had formed, the success of Christian
merchants was underpinned also by the age-old berat system, i.e. capitulatory
legal privileges granted to the employees of the European consuls as dragoman,
which placed the latter under foreign jurisdiction and exempted them from
paying the taxes levied on Ottoman subjects according to commercial agreements.
As contemporaries observed, these local Christian merchants ‘bought’ berats
(licences) to enjoy such privileges and acquire legal security or protection from
the European consuls overnight, and changed them with the same ease.⁹⁹ In very
rare cases, when the consuls were reluctant to grant berats, merchants would use
their connections in the European metropoles for facilitation.¹⁰⁰ In 1845–6,
despite the Porte’s decrees on disarmament in Lebanon, berat-holders in Juniah
continued arms trade for a certain period, as the Porte’s agents could not bring
them to the court for their ‘misdoings’.¹⁰¹
A still worse consequence of the morally polluted and economically defiled
berat system was that the berat-holders’ evasion of the charges of the state
increased the liability of the others.¹⁰² Acrimonious sentiment grew on the part
of disadvantaged Muslim merchants and artisans as their commercial activity was
confined more and more to the interior.¹⁰³ The uneven competition intensified
de-industrialization among the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire that had begun
in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. For example, the number of cotton
handicrafts significantly declined between the 1820s and 1870s in Aleppo and
Damascus.¹⁰⁴ Violence broke out in both of these towns more than once in the
⁹⁵ Outrey to Thouvenel, 23 Apr. 1862, AMAE 42CCC/7/318; Issawi, ‘British Trade’; Fawaz,
Merchants.
⁹⁶ Owen, Middle East, 88. ⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Alff, ‘Levantine’, 94.
⁹⁹ Edwards, La Syrie, 79. ¹⁰⁰ Outrey to Thouvenel, 23 Apr. 1862, AMAE 42CCC/7/318.
¹⁰¹ Beyrouth to Brussels, 1 Feb. 1846, DIPLOBEL Turquie, 1839–1846 4117/1/22; BOA
HR. SYS 2927/72 ; BOA A.MKT. 36/41.
¹⁰² Edwards, La Syrie, 81–2. ¹⁰³ Owen, Middle East, 99.
¹⁰⁴ Pamuk and Williamson, ‘Ottoman De-industrialization’, 10–11. For a counter argument, see
Orhan Kurmuş, ‘The 1838 Treaty of Commerce Re-examined’, Économie et sociétés dans l’empire
ottoman, ed. J.-L. Bacque-Grammont and Paul Dumont (Paris: CNRS, 1983), 411–17.
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1850s and in 1860, as an expression of ‘resistance to the new order in terms of
Islamic ideology’—though tax issues, the Porte’s conscription policies, the unrest
of the thousands of Janissaries who had remained in these towns (particularly
Aleppo) after the abolition of their hearths in 1826, and increasing anti-Christian
sentiments also contributed.¹⁰⁵ Thousands were left dead, 3,400 in Aleppo alone
in 1850.¹⁰⁶
In Lebanon, social tensions manifested themselves under comparable circum-
stances, though the country was unique in many respects. Silk factories that were
situated largely in the so-called Druze district, and particularly in Deir al-Qamar,
rendered the mixed south one of the wealthiest districts and the economic capital
of the country. Thanks to brisk economic activity and emigration, the population
of Christian peasants significantly increased in Deir al-Qamar and Zahle.
The socioeconomic division between Druze and Christian peasants then
became more noticeable. Christian peasants were employed in silk-spinning
mills that were run by the new Lebanese Christian as well as European (again,
chiefly French) entrepreneurs. These peasants attained economic status and
strength over time, as they were supplied with working capital by Christian
bankers and merchants.¹⁰⁷ In due course, they even began to lend to other groups,
such as the struggling muqatadjis, who had once been their overlords, as well as
the two kaymakams of the mountain.¹⁰⁸ The indigenous Christian owners were
distressed by the inability of the weaker Druze sheikhs (both in status and wealth)
to pay their debts. The dissonance between ancient feudal privileges and economic
status became so striking a feature in social relations in the 1850s that several
petitions were dispatched to the Ottoman authorities by the Christian cultivators
in the mixed districts, requesting the exclusion of their villages from the jurisdic-
tion of the Druze chiefs.¹⁰⁹
In addition, the emerging middle classes, Christian merchants, creditors, and
the economically ascendant peasantry slowly started to purchase lands, and called
on ‘state intervention to control production and distribution’, demanding from
the Porte cadastral surveys and censuses to ‘identify whom to tax and how
much’.¹¹⁰ For fear of unveiling any irregularity that might have emerged, and of
the future undertaking of tax collection by the Porte itself, the muqatadjis resisted
¹⁰⁵ Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, ‘Introduction: “Oriental Despotism” ’, in The Ottoman Empire and the
World Economy, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 22; Bruce
Masters, ‘The 1850 Events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria’s Incorporation into the Capitalist World
System’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 22(1) (Feb. 1990): 3–20; Rogan, ‘Sectarianism’;
Abdul-Karim Rafeq, ‘The Impact of Europe on a Traditional Economy: The Case of Damascus,
1840–1870’, in Économie et sociétés, 420–21.
¹⁰⁶ Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 161.
¹⁰⁷ Firro, Druzes, 103, 115–17. ¹⁰⁸ Moore to Alison, 6 Jan. 1858, TNA FO 195/656/2.
¹⁰⁹ Owen, Middle East, 161. ¹¹⁰ Alff, ‘Levantine’, 92.
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such demands. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, the Druze Jumblatts spearheaded
the opposition that blocked the cadastral survey project of the Porte.¹¹¹
Finally, after the Porte introduced a new conscription policy that made the
Druze liable for military service while allowing Christians to buy themselves out,
Lebanon and Hawran found themselves embroiled in more strife in 1852–3.¹¹²
Nearly 5,000 Druze were brutally supressed by Ottoman imperial forces. But it
was not merely political resistance that had burst and faded. It also marked the
point when the Druze began to cling more firmly to their traditional way of life
against the political and economic transformation of the mountain in the 1850s.
As Firro tells us, they ‘increasingly enclosed themselves within their sectarian
particularism’, considering their mounting impoverishment, Christian immigra-
tion, and the rise of new landowner classes as ‘an invasion of their territory.’¹¹³
They vowed to retaliate. And in 1860 they did.
*
Historical scholarship has long demonstrated that local actors were the prime
agents of change in the late 1850s and in 1860 before the civil war broke out in
Mount Lebanon.¹¹⁴ The widely accepted narrative points to a continuum between
the 1856 Reform Edict and the subsequent violence. As the narrative goes, seeing
that the edict had promised both religious and class equality and that the Maronite
peasants were not represented in the northern Maronite district, unlike the
Christian peasants of the Druze-governed mixed districts of the south, a sporadic
peasants’ uprising broke out in the Kisrawan against the Maronite Khazin sheikhs
in 1858.¹¹⁵ Led by Tanyus Shahin, a muleteer from Rayfun, the rebels demanded
‘rule of law’, ‘equality’ with their sheikhs both in political terms (representation)
and also in the abolition of extra levies (for holiday, marriage, etc.), and taxation
and land distribution in accordance with the 1856 Edict and the individualistic
premises of the sultan’s 1858 Land Code.¹¹⁶
The Kisrawanite peasants styled themselves as the jahala (the ignorant),
manipulated ‘a well-established trope of the “ignorant” commoner’, and used it
as an excuse for the ‘indecencies’ they committed. They kidnapped the family
members of the northern muqatadjis, and staged mysterious, fear-inducing
murders.¹¹⁷ On their shoulders they carried weapons amassed since the
Egyptian interregnum and especially since the Crimean War. In a short period
¹¹¹ De Lesseps to de Hitte, 5 Aug. 1850, DDC 373; Firro, Druzes, 107.
¹¹² Evelessesie to Lhuys, 29 May 1854, AMAE 42CCC/7/11. ¹¹³ Firro, Druze, 115–16.
¹¹⁴ Makdisi, Culture; Fawaz, An Occasion; Farah, Politics. ¹¹⁵ Makdisi, Culture, 96, 98, 99.
¹¹⁶ Attila Aytekin, ‘Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and
the Tanzimat Reforms’, International Review of Social History 57(2) (2012): 206, 214; Attila Aytekin,
‘Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire’,
Middle Eastern Studies 45(6) (2009): 935–51; M. Macit Kenanoğlu, ‘1858 Arazi Kanunnamesi ve
Uygulanması’, Türk Hukuk Tarihi Araştırmaları 1 (spring 2006): 107–38; Makdisi, Culture, 101.
¹¹⁷ Makdisi, Culture, 100.
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they not only managed to force the Khazin sheikhs out of their ‘muqatas and
thus uproot a notable family—an unprecedented incident, as Makdisi under-
scores. They also declared a republic (jumhurriyyah) in early 1859, organized
their villages instead of looting the Khazin property, elected representatives
and a spokesperson (Shahin), ‘set up tribunals’, and ‘distributed harvests and
provisions . . . in the name of the common people’. The commoners became the
prime movers of change thanks to a ‘subaltern understanding of the [1856
Edict]’.¹¹⁸ When the Kisrawanite peasants came to stage irregular attacks on
Shiite villages and attempted to get the Maronite peasants in the mixed districts
of the mountain to rise against the muqatadjis, Lebanon came to the brink of yet
more large-scale violence.¹¹⁹
What transpired between 1858 and 1860 was at first a class conflict. When
Maronite peasants rallied behind Shahin and against the Khazin sheikhs, the
muqatadjis, both Christian and Druze, made a ‘compact to be one hand . . . to
discipline the [disrespectful peasants]’.¹²⁰ Another, less mentioned factor in the
translation of the dissention into a civil war was the formation of a capitalist–
clergy alliance in Beirut under the name of the Young Men’s League, also known
as the Beirut Committee. According to its members who secretly met with Charles
Schefer, the French professor of oriental languages who joined the French exped-
itionary troops in 1860, the committee was led by the aforementioned bishop,
Tobia ‘Awn, and prominent Protestant bishop and writer Butrus al-Bustani. Its
executive members allegedly involved Naum Kicano, Assad Tabet, and Micheal
Fargialla.¹²¹ They established a secret network with some 23 members in the
hinterland which belonged to the leading merchant, banker, artisan, and clergy
families of Lebanon.¹²² They sided with the peasants’ anti-muqatadji campaign
because they considered the feudal muqatadjis to be primordial obstacles to free
¹¹⁸ Ibid. 105. ¹¹⁹ Ibid. 111. ¹²⁰ Ibid. 114.
¹²¹ ‘Letter from a writer settled for the last 20 years in the country, and is well acquainted with the
various tribes which inhabit the mountain, 30 June 1860’, The Times, 21 July 1860, 10. On the role of
Bustani, see also Abū Shaqrā, Al- Harakāt, 108.
¹²² Schefer to Le Ministre, 30 Nov. 1860, AMAE Papiers Charles Schefer, Mission du Liban
161PAAP/3a/264; Hajjar, L’Europe, vol. 3, 1292. In Schefer’s report the names of the committee
members in the districts outside Beirut are listed thus (in French transliteration): Esaad Eldjaounieh
(Greek Catholic), Hassan Id (Maronite), Amoun Youssef (Maronite), Chakin Aga (Maronite), Gabriel
Mechakka (Greek Catholic) in Deir al-Qamar and Messagip; Sheikhs Bashir El Khory, who was the
qadi and Maronite judge of the Shuwafiyat council in Jund and Kachmaya; Mansour Maouchy [sic] in
Djezzin; Youssef Elmubbeikykh (Greek Catholic) in Toffah; Khattar Nadi al-Boustani, cousin of Butros
al-Boustani (Maronite) in Kharrouf; Nedjin Abou Shakra (Maronite) in Shuf; Youssef El Khoury
(Maronite) and Faris Shakkour (Greek Catholique) in Arkoub; Abdulah Nassour (Greek Orthodox)
in the two districts of the Gharb; Abbas el Halou (Maronite), Khalil Neffa (Greek Orthodox) in the
Beirut coasts (sahil); Chadjan ‘Awn, the bother-in-law of Tobia ‘Awn in Chabbar; Abou Hatem
(Maronite) and Hanna El Khoury (Greek Orthodox) in Metn; Abdullah Museelliem (Maronite),
Nassif Djeddoun (Greek Catholic) in Zahle and its environs; Masoud Ferah (Maronite) in the west
of Beqaa; and Emir Medjid Qasim Shihab, the grandson of Bashir II and Emir Haydar, representing the
interests of the Shihab family.
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trade and commercial enterprise as well as to buying and selling of property.¹²³
Moreover, a number of committee members were unable to claim the large sums
they had loaned to the muqatadjis, who would flee to the mountains to avoid
arrest and punishment.¹²⁴ After the 1857 recession in Europe and the mounting
financial crisis in the Levant, the repayment of such due loans had become a
greater source of anxiety for them.¹²⁵
The clerical members of the committee, for their part, acted as the patrons of
the peasants and represented their interests against the muqatadjis, as had been
the case at least since the beginning of the century. The delegates of the committee
told French agents that, in the beginning, there were in fact two groups within
their committee, one Greek and the other predominantly Maronite, both of which
received ‘the support of patriarchs and bishops’, and both of which aimed, for the
moment, ‘to . . . deal with the interests of the Christians in the [silk-rich] mixed
districts’.¹²⁶
What is unclear is whether the committee looked to support the peasants before
or after the 1858 rebellion began, and whether they aimed to instigate violence in
the mountain when their members assembled together. Hurșid Pașa, the Ottoman
governor of Sayda, repeatedly notified Istanbul that the principal aim of the Beirut
committee was to provoke war under ‘instructions from a European Consulate,
namely the French’. Russian agents on the ground likewise reported that, ‘sup-
ported by French influence’, the committee sought to ‘release their co-religionists’
in the silk-rich mixed districts besieged by the Druze.¹²⁷
However, other archival evidence and secondary sources suggest that the
French consul to Beirut, the comte de Bentivoglio, was dazed by the outbreak of
violence in 1860 and that he, as well as Tobia ‘Awn, had expended much effort to
prevent the Druze–Maronite skirmish at Beit Miri in August 1859. Bentivoglio’s
correspondence with his seniors in Paris and Bishop Tobia’s letters to the
Maronite patriarch usually displayed a pacific tone that looked to prevent violence
rather than provoke it. Even then, several contemporary observers pointed out
that throughout late 1859 and early 1860, the Beirut Committee clandestinely
furnished the peasants with money, arms (up to 14,000 muskets), and ammuni-
tion smuggled by Maronite bankers in Beirut, and organized the inhabitants of the
mountain for a potential fully fledged war.¹²⁸
¹²³ Schefer to Le Ministre, 30 Nov. 1860, AMAE Papiers Charles Schefer, Mission du Liban
161PAAP/3a/264; Joseph, ‘Material Origins’, 157–8; Owen, Middle East,161; Alff, ‘Levantine’, 92–5.
¹²⁴ ‘Kopiya raporta general’nogo konsula Rossii v Bejrute’, 3 June 1860, AVPRI f. 133. Kantselyariya,
o. 469, l. 258; Owen, Middle East, 162, 165.
¹²⁵ See Ch. 13.
¹²⁶ Schefer to Le Ministre, 30 Nov. 1860, AMAE Papiers Charles Schefer, Mission du Liban
161PAAP/3a/264.
¹²⁷ Russian General Consul in Beirut to Lobanov, 1 July 1860, AVPRI f. 133, o. 469, l. 380–82.
¹²⁸ Edwards, La Syrie, 133–4; ‘The Civil War in Syria’, The Times, 21 July 1860, 10; Wood to
Dufferin, 30 May 1861, PRONI D 1071/H/C/3/49/3; cf. Makdisi, Culture, 215; Fawaz, An Occasion, 56.
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Quickly and spontaneously, the Maronite purchase of arms, and rumours and
innuendo that the Christians of the south had united with Shahin (though, in fact,
the southern villagers were disinclined to join Shahin’s army) and that the French
fleet was on its way to support the Maronites, gave the conflict a religious
colouring. In the spring of 1860, as with the Kisrawan uprising of 1858, mysterious
and gruesome murders began to take place in the southern, mixed districts of the
mountain under Druze jurisprudence. These instilled great fear, and were under-
stood as acts directed against entire religious groups. They thus provoked reciprocal
incidents of sectarian violence between Christians and Druze.¹²⁹ The muqatadjis
of both sects tried to disperse the clouds of war, attempting in vain to calm their
peasantry. But a series of trivial quarrels between Druze and Maronite commoners
sufficed for the mountain to spin out of control once again.¹³⁰
*
In May 1860, hoisting French flags in the hope of garnering Emperor Napoleon
III’s sympathy and preventing French authorities from backing their traditional
Khazin associates, Tanyus Shahin’s so-called Kisrawan army marched toward the
Jumblatts’ ‘muqatas in the south.¹³¹ The Druze muqatadjis then sent for help to
Hawran—their traditional sectarian base—with the aim of quelling a potential
rebellion in their lands, as they had done in the 1820s, and also of fending off
another latent attempt to exterminate their sect, as had been the case in the
1840s.¹³² A large number of their brethren marched to their relief immediately,
and the confrontation quickly spiralled into a full-blown class/sectarian civil war
from May to June, which was fought in several locations and lasted for about
a month.
More than 10,000 inhabitants perished this time. Droves of people, approxi-
mately 80,000 of them, fled their homes and streamed towards the coast or
Damascus for refuge. Hundreds of villages were burnt and pillaged, and properties
and harvests were ravaged. As had happened in 1841 and 1845, because of
their numerical superiority the Maronites had the upper hand at first. They ‘set
the houses of the Druses [sic] on fire wherever possible’. On 20 June, Mount
Lebanon was likened by the Prussian consul, Theodore Weber, to ‘a sea of flames
at night . . . covered with a cloud of black smoke during daytime’.¹³³
Soon after Druze reinforcements arrived from Hawran under the leadership of
a certain Ismail al-Attrash, their more disciplined armies took control in the south
¹²⁹ TheodorWeber to Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz, Beirut, 26 May 1860, GStA I. HA
Rep 81 XI Nr. 66, f. 1.
¹³⁰ Fawaz, An Occasion, 45; Husayn Ghadban Abū Shaqrā (narrator) and Yūsuf Kha:t:tār Abū Shaqrā
(author), Al- Harakāt fī Lubnān Ilā Ahd al-muta:sarrifīn (Beirut: Maba’at al-ittihad, 1953), 99–131.
¹³¹ Makdisi, Culture, 101–2. ¹³² Ibid. 117–18.
¹³³ Weber to Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz, Beirut, 3 June 1860, GStA, I. HA Rep 81
XI Nr. 66 E, f. 7.
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and anti-Lebanon, sweeping through all the villages in their route inhabited by the
Maronites and some Greek Orthodox in Hasbaya, Rashaya, and Zahle, amongst
others.¹³⁴ Some of the most tragic scenes unfolded in Deir al-Qamar.¹³⁵
The properties of non-Muslim merchants, the silk factories of the French,
Maronites, and Greek Orthodox, and the premises of the Catholic missionaries
(Jesuits, Franciscans, and Lazarists) were all attacked, pillaged, or looted. Maronite
and Orthodox priests and monks, and even some Muslim Shihab emirs, were
killed because of their families’ alleged links to the Beirut Committee. The Anglo-
Druze special relations which had existed since the early 1840s allowed Protestant
(American or British) missionaries to remain untouched in Mount Lebanon,
though 11 Protestants could not escape the wrath of the Hawran Druze in anti-
Lebanon.¹³⁶ An anonymous observer reported that, as soon as it became clear that
the Druze had taken control of the war, executive members of the Beirut
Committee, such as Naum Kicano and a certain M. Naqqash, both bankers in
Beirut, fled the country, taking with them their assets and ‘leaving shareholders
and creditors to whistle’.¹³⁷
This was not a total war of religions nor of whole communities. All the while,
Maronites and Druze, Christians and Muslims provided refuge and safety for each
other in their houses and properties. The true heroes and heroines of the civil war
were the helping hands. For example, Naife Jumblatt, the sister of Said Jumblatt
(one of the protagonists of the previous chapter about whom we will see more
below), saved a large number of Maronite women, children, and some men,
bringing them to Mukhtara to the family residence.¹³⁸Qasim Abu Nakad, another
prominent muqatadji, conducted the women and children fleeing from Deir
al-Qamar to the coast, in the neighbourhood of Sidon.¹³⁹
In the end, the 1860 civil war almost irrecoverably upset all that had remained
from the ancient order of things in Lebanon, the muqatadji–tenant bonds of
loyalty, the harmonious coexistence between the Maronites and the Druze, and
the relative autonomy of the feudal system. Again, before the fighting was over, a
narrative war began over the origins of the war, its instigators, and its perpetrators.
¹³⁴ ‘Prilozhenie Kopiya otnosheniya G. Statskogo sovetnika Bergera k G-nu Komandiru fregata
Il’ja Muromec’, 22 June 1860, AVPRI f. 133, o. 469, l. 460; Al Bitar, Haliyyāt vol 1. 261; Abū Shaqrā,
Al- Harakāt, 119–20.
¹³⁵ Weber to Schleinitz, Beirut, 23 June 1860, GStA, I. HA Rep 81 XI Nr. 66 E, f. 25; ‘Détails sur les
massacres à Deir-el-Сamar’, n.d., AVPRI f. 133, o. 469, l. 460.
¹³⁶ ‘For the monthly convert: Civil War On Mount Lebanon, Missionary House’, 1 Aug. 1860,
ABCFM v. 6 291/105.
¹³⁷ ‘Letter from a writer settled for the last 20 years in the country, and is well acquainted with the
various tribes which inhabit the mountain, 30 June 1860’, The Times, 21 July 1860, 10. This, I believe,
needs to be read with a grain of salt, as it might as well be a pro-Druze statement putting the blame for
the origins of violence on the so-called ‘Christian party’.
¹³⁸ Brant to Bulwer, 30 June 1860, TNA FO 78/1557; ‘Kopiya raporta general’nogo konsula v
Bejrute’, 7 June 1860, AVPRI f. 133, o. 469, l. 2602.
¹³⁹ ‘The Civil War in Syria’, The Times, 21 July 1860, 10.
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The Khazin sheikhs who had been chased out from their ‘muqatas by the
Maronite peasants in 1858 blamed the Maronite bishop, Tobia ‘Awn, and
Patriarch Bulus Masad for inciting the peasantry to a rebellion.¹⁴⁰ Tobia ‘Awn
suspected that ‘[f]oreign hands’ had been at work when the rebellion in Kisrawan
began. He later blamed the Ottoman authorities for inertia as the rebellion turned
into a civil war and the Druze gained the upper hand in the combat.¹⁴¹ Druze
eyewitnesses laid the blame at the door of the French, who, according to one
account, stirred up the Druze–Maronite conflict in order to find an excuse for
occupation.¹⁴²
European consuls virtually unanimously believed that Hurșid Pașa, the
Ottoman governor of Sayda, deliberately refrained from crushing the rebellion
in Kisrawan and did almost nothing to quell the Druze–Maronite violence in 1860
because of anti-Christian sentiments. Seeing that Ottoman pașas disarmed the
Maronites, and that their troops were sometimes involved in pillaging and looting,
the Prussian consul to Beirut, TheodoreWeber, claimed that ‘the outbreak of a full
scale civil war between the Druses [sic] and the Maronites . . . was incited especially
by the actions of Churchid [sic] Pasha’.¹⁴³ Another Prussian agent wrote that the
Druze were ‘the stick to beat the Christians in the hand of someone high above’.¹⁴⁴
These views were shared by some local onlookers.¹⁴⁵
For his part, Hurșid Pașa complained that he did not have enough men and
resources at his disposal to suppress either the rebellion or the 1860 war, especially
after the imperial Arabistan army stationed in Damascus was ordered to leave
Syria by the minister of war, Rıza Pașa, in May–June 1858 in order to quell the
uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prompting a void which had been filled by
the başıbozuks and other irregular corps recruited from the natives.¹⁴⁶ Hurșid
simply could not fathom that an egalitarian movement had sprung out of the
‘ignorant’ Maronite peasantry interpreting the 1856 edict in their favour, and
tactlessly described the Kisrawan rebellion as ‘sedition’.¹⁴⁷ And, as noted above, he
accused the Beirut Committee (with French schemers behind them) of instigating
the civil war in 1860.
Again, what matters for our purpose here is not which of these historical,
imperial actors’ accounts were more accurate, but the fact that each of them had
an unwavering belief that the Lebanese were mere tools manipulated for the
¹⁴⁰ Makdisi, Culture, 102. ¹⁴¹ Ibid. 112.
¹⁴² Abū Shaqrā, Al- Harakāt, 99–100. This book was written and published decades later, and it is
likely that the argument of its author is a post hoc interpretation.
¹⁴³ Theodor Weber to Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz, Beirut, 3 June 1860, GStA I. HA
Rep 81 XI Nr. 66 E, f. 1.
¹⁴⁴ Johann Gottfried Wetzstein to Theodor Weber, Damascus, 18 June 1860, GStA I. HA Rep 81, XI
Nr. 66 E, f. 15.
¹⁴⁵ Muhammad Kurd ‘Alī, Khi:ta:t al-Shām, vol 3 (Damascus: al-Ma:tbaʻah al- Hadīthah, 1925–8), 79.
¹⁴⁶ Rizk, Mont Liban, 224; Gökbilgin, ‘Cebel’, 689–90. ¹⁴⁷ Makdisi, Culture, 143–4.
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perpetuation of one or another empire’s interests—the almost unanimous
presumption that violence escalated on account of the locals’ gullible, credulous,
and ‘uncivilized’ nature. It requires little effort to discern a bewildering apathy on
the part of European and Ottoman agents towards the Kisrawanite peasants’ quest
for egalitarianism, the new middle class’s attempts to secure its economic and
financial interests, and the desire of the muqatadjis and Christians of the mixed
districts to preserve their politically or economically propitious status. Yet, as we
will see in the following chapters, the narrative war took place less to obtain a
veritable truth about the origins of the war and more to determine the next action
the Powers and the Porte ought to take to bring order to Lebanon.
The reaction of the imperial metropoles from late June onwards reveals more of
whether the fact that simultaneous revolts broke out in the Balkans and Syria just
when the Russian agents were looking to persuade the French and the Prussians
for the partition of the Ottoman Empire was simply a coincidence, or whether it
was a strategic move. The imperial responses also illustrate the obstinacy and
limitations of the Concert of Europe after the Crimean War, and to what degree
the persistence of the Eastern Question determined the future of Mount Lebanon.
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12
An Untimely Return of the Eastern
Question?
Before the news of violence in Mount Lebanon broke in early June 1860, European
public opinion was preoccupied with the issues of the unification of Germany, the
war in Italy, the Balkan crisis, and the Arrow (Opium) War in China. The first
reports of the civil war in the mountain that described Maronite superiority over
the Druze aroused little interest.¹ But, when the course of the conflict reversed
and the reports began to depict the sanguinary disturbances as ‘massacres’ of
Christians by ‘Muslim fanatics’ in early July, religious sentiment was excited.
Lebanese affairs provoked immense feeling, receiving much greater coverage
from then on.²
In the absence of telegram lines in Syria and Asia Minor, news of an event in
Lebanon would normally reach the European and Ottoman metropoles between
one week to ten days later, depending on the schedule of the steamships. More
often than not, this would mean discrepancies between the actions on the ground
and the information at hand in the metropoles. For instance, in late June 1860, by
the time the news of massacres in Lebanon reached Europe, fighting in the
mountain had largely come to an end.³ After the arrival of several Ottoman
army corps under the command of prominent officers and admirals (including
General Ismail Kmety, Mahmud Pașa, and Mustafa Naili Pașa), Mount Lebanon
had become more tranquil. Moreover, the fact that four French battleships, one
Russian frigate, and a British corvette had visibly anchored off Beirut to oversee
the situation had instilled a degree of fear in the belligerents and a sense of security
among the victimized inhabitants.⁴
¹ Julia Hauser,German ReligiousWomen in Late Ottoman Beirut: CompetingMissions (Leiden: Brill,
2015), 52.
² E.g. in Spain the two major newspapers, the liberal leftist La Discusión and the absolutist La
Esperanza, began to cover the Lebanese ‘atrocities’ in early July, when the Druze gained the upper hand
in the civil war. La Discusión, 7, 12, 18, 19, 29, 31 July, 1 Aug. 1860; La Esperanza, 10, 13 16, 21, 24 July
1860. I should like to thank Rebeca Gonzalez-Rolfe and Elvira María González Salmón for drawing my
attention to these sources.
³ ‘Kopiya raporta General’nogo konsula Rossii v Bejrute Lobanovu-Rostovskomu’, 15 July 1860,
AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 472–9.
⁴ Fawaz, An Occasion, 101; Peter Akos, ‘L’Intervention et l’activité du General Kmetty au Liban,
1860–62’, in Mélanges serpentini, ed. Laszlo J. Nagy (Szeged: Universite de Szeged, 2014), 105–17; La
Patrie, 7 July 1860; La Roncière to La Baronne de La Roncière Le Noury, 5 July 1860, in Correspondance
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Unaware of the situation, in Paris, the French foreign minister, Édouard
A. Thouvenel, proposed to the courts of the four Powers an intervention in the
Lebanese civil war in the shape of the dispatch of an international commission and
a European expeditionary army. He appealed with an emotional vocabulary,
arguing that theirs was a responsibility towards humanity.⁵ He maintained that,
in line with the beliefs of the majority of the European public, the Great Powers
had to act urgently and decisively.
Even though Thouvenel’s call received endorsement on the part of, first, Russia
and then Austria, Prussia, and Britain, the Porte objected to the intervention plan.
Ottoman ministers believed that, following the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris,
the European Powers ought to respect the territorial integrity of the sultan’s
dominions as well as the internal affairs of his empire. They suspected that the
Powers’ eagerness to intervene stemmed from a foreign ploy. In their view,
violence in Lebanon was part of a grand scheme that would serve as a pretext
for Russian and French interventions in the Balkans and the Levant and help
them realize their revisionist ambitions. A tug of war then began, when pro-
interventionist Powers and Ottoman elites looked to influence European public
opinion by means of funding newspapers and active lobbying. Britain increasingly
suspected the real intentions of France and Russia, and more than once changed
her position over the intervention.
The discursive practices employed by the Powers and the Porte in the 40 days
between the arrival of the news of Christian ‘massacres’ fromMount Lebanon and
the final decision of whether or not to send European troops to the Levant
constituted a unique episode of the Eastern Question, which suddenly returned
to the centre stage of inter-imperial diplomacy. The incongruence between time
(the transmission of the news) and space (local realities) revealed one of the blind
spots of the imperial gaze in the nineteenth century. The legal, commercial,
religious, and strategic undertones of the intervention plan and the counter-
intervention propaganda not only testified to the intersectoral aspects of the
Eastern Question. Seen together, they also demonstrated how ‘humanitarian’ the
ensuing intervention actually was.
Responsibility Towards Humanity: Thouvenel’s Démarche
Having spent four years in Istanbul in times of grave political and financial crises
for the Ottoman ministers, French Foreign Minister Thouvenel was well versed in
the Eastern Question. In 1860, hearing the news from Lebanon, he was very
intime de l’amiral de La Roncière Le Noury avec sa femme et sa fille (1855–1871), ed. Joseph L’Hopital
and and Louis de Saint-Blancard (Paris: Champion, 1928–9), 228.
⁵ Circulaire de Thouvenel, Paris, 6 July 1860, AMAE CP Angleterre, 717/194.
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sceptical about the Porte’s competence and the local Ottoman authorities’ will-
ingness to safeguard Christians. He became even more assured of his suspicions
after receiving intelligence that local Ottoman armed forces, having received no
salary for several months, had done little to protect the Christians in Mount
Lebanon, and had, in certain places, engaged in pillage themselves.⁶ He therefore
ardently campaigned for an armed intervention.
Besides, the French minister saw in military intervention multiple political,
material, and moral gains. Since France was traditionally the protector of the
Maronites in the Levant, she could consolidate her influence over them by being
actively involved in their safeguarding. Secondly, even though before 1840 British
subjects had been able to go to the Levant only with French passports, and their
ships with French flags, London had managed to take the lead in commercial
imports in the region in several sectors, and France could now seek ways to return
to the status quo ante 1840.⁷ Thirdly, it would be a good opportunity to divert
public attention from France’s recent annexation of Savoy and Nice while inter-
fering in Italian affairs. The Catholic right, which had despised the interference in
Italy, would be silenced, and popular support, much shaken since the annexation
of Savoy, would be retained. Fourthly, the construction of the Isthmus of Suez was
under way, which rendered Mount Lebanon doubly important for geostrategic
reasons.⁸ Fifthly, the crisis between the Druze and Maronites had heavily damaged
cocoon production in Syria, which had led to a crisis in the French textile industry,
and this could be rectified.⁹ Finally, France could regain the prestige she had lost in
the Levant since the 1840 intervention, and by this means realize the dream of
Bonaparte and Talleyrand by turning the Mediterranean into a French lake.
*
Thouvenel was an international lawyer by formation. He knew well the legal
complications of the intervention arising from the Treaty of Paris, and was
familiar with the legal doctrines of the time that upheld the principle of non-
interventionism. The latter had been brought to the fore by the jurists of inter-
national law following the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.¹⁰ As the Oxford don
⁶ Lavalette to Thouvenel, 13 June 1860, AMAE CP Turquie 345/49; Lavalette to Thouvenel, 25 July
1860, AMAE CP Turquie 345/333.
⁷ [French Consulate in Beirut] to Lhuys, 29 May 1854, AMAE 42CCC/7/11; Marcel Émerit, ‘La
Crise syrienne et l’expansion économique française en 1860’, Revue historique 207(2) (1953): 211–32, at
212–13.
⁸ Ibid. 217–21; see also Karl Marx, ‘Events in Syria, Session of the British Parliament, the State of
British Commerce’, in Karl Marx and Frederic Engels: Collected Works, vol. 17, trans. Rodney
Livingstone (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 429.
⁹ ‘Note sur les causes de l’évacuation de la Syrie par la France’, n.d., AMAE Mémoires Turquie,
50MD/122/145; Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, 1 Aug. 1860, AMAE 42CCC July 18241.
¹⁰ Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr, Non-intervention: The Law and its Import in the
Americas (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), 14.
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Montague Bernard maintained in 1860, non-interventionism was considered a
cardinal condition for the continuation of the system of states, because it had:
[a] direct tendency to produce mischiefs worse than it removes . . . It destroys
national self-respect and self-reliance. It interrupts the natural process by which
political institutions are matures through the ripening of political ideas and
habits. What it plants does not take root; what it establishes does not endure.¹¹
On a theoretical level, the problem was whether there was a rule that could admit
interventions in the interests of humanity.
In his recent works, the Swiss scholar Davide Rodogno has aptly shown that the
exception was intervention in ‘the barbaric East’, which instinctively created a
ground for justification for the European powers. ‘The vast majority of European
scholars either assumed that intervention [in the Ottoman Empire] was . . . per-
missible’, because it was often seen as a barbaric or semi-civilized country ‘whose
sovereignty was neither fully recognised nor respected’.¹² Intervention was thus
justified on ‘moral and political grounds’, and in legal discussions over the
question of intervention in the Ottoman Empire, the terms ‘civilization’, ‘human-
ity’, and ‘humanitarian’ were emotionally exploited to galvanize public support, in
which selectiveness rather than universality prevailed and through which inter-
ventions were legalized.¹³
As importantly, Christian rhetoric was simultaneously adopted as a coda to tip
the scales when attempts at intervention were barred. This was partly why and
how European scholars and statesmen often overlooked the fact that ‘equality
before the law and religious freedom in their own states, let alone colonies, did not
exist’, and that the French rule in Algeria was ‘a far more intolerant, discrimin-
ating and despotic one’.¹⁴ All these factors rendered the peripheral experience of
international law dramatically different from the experience of the Great Powers
in the mid-nineteenth century.
Thouvenel managed to garner the support of European public opinion at large.
In early July, the news from the Levant had stirred up ‘deep feelings’ in Paris.¹⁵
¹¹ Montague Bernard, On the Principle of Non-intervention: A Lecture Delivered in the Hall of All
Souls College (Oxford: J. H. & J. Parker, 1860), 9–10. Eliav Lieblich underscores that much of Bernard’s
reasoning contended with the rejection of consent as a ‘justification for intervention’. ‘First, he rejected
the legality of forward-looking intervention treaties . . . which are concluded in advance for the main-
tenance of a particular dynasty or of particular institutions.’He went on to deal with the issue of ad hoc
intervention requested by a legitimate sovereign, which, he believed, could not exist since ‘there was no
such thing in international law . . . as a legitimate ruler’: Eliav Lieblich, ‘International Law and Civil
Wars: Intervention and Consent’ (doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 2012), 244.
¹² Davide Rodogno, ‘European Legal Doctrines on Intervention and the Status of the Ottoman
Empire within the “Family of Nations” Throughout the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of the History of
International Law 18 (2016): 5–41, at 6, 11. For similar arguments, see Simpson, Great Powers, 244.
¹³ Rodogno, ‘European Legal Doctrines’, 36.
¹⁴ Ibid. 8–9. ¹⁵ Le Moniteur, 17 July 1860.
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French public opinion was almost unified in its attitude towards the incidents in
Syria. Le Moniteur, the official organ of the empire, and government-funded
papers such as Le Constitutionnel, La Patrie, and Le Pays, as well as opposition
and progressive papers including Le Siècle and Les Débats, and Catholic news-
papers, particularly L’Ami de la religion, made spirited pleas for active European
interference to suppress the ‘massacres’.¹⁶ Their publications teemed with refer-
ences to a ‘war of humanity’ and ‘Christian civilization’ against ‘barbarism’.
On July 10, Paulin Limayrac of La Patrie wrote: ‘la France est toujours la nation
des Croisades.’¹⁷ ‘Christian Europe and especially France’ would stop the Druze,
who appeared as ‘the last and odious representatives of Eastern barbarism’.¹⁸ Le
Moniteur announced that the massacres of Christians provoked in French public
opinion ‘a painful emotion’ of commiseration for the victims and indignation
against ‘their barbarous murderers’.¹⁹ French military intervention had to take
place, the moderately liberal Journal des Débats wrote, ‘for our honour, for our
legitimate interests and for the rest of the world’.²⁰ These arguments were boosted
by the distorted and exaggerated description of events in Lebanon, where for
example Maronite women were said to have been ‘bathed in their children’s blood
before being burnt by the Muslims’, while several petitions from the Maronites of
Lebanon, demanding military intervention by French troops ‘to protect them’,
were presented to the parliament by Catholic deputies.²¹
The deeply emotional atmosphere made the Eastern Question of primary
importance to Emperor Napoleon III, whose attention had been previously been
fixed primarily on Italy.²² Thouvenel was given authorization to speak with
Russian and Prussian agents about possible scenarios involving the partition of
the Ottoman Empire.²³ Pamphlets were published to determine the course
of action France ought to follow. For example, conservative historian Adolphe
de Lescure suggested dealing with the ‘unexpected and painful awakening of the
Eastern Question’ by means of a unilateral intervention instead of letting the
Concert of Europe, ‘that disparate association, which stifle all generous initiatives’
and prevent France from ‘the Mediterranean rule’ to which she was ‘predes-
tined’.²⁴ But Thouvenel remained committed to multilateral action, as it was
¹⁶ Roger Bellet, Presse et journalisme sous le Second Empire (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), 46.
¹⁷ La Patrie, 10 July 1860. ¹⁸ Ibid. ¹⁹ Le Moniteur, 17 July 1860.
²⁰ Bouyrat, Devoir d’intervenir, 120.
²¹ Davide Rodogno, ‘The “Principles of Humanity” and the European Powers’ Intervention in
Ottoman Lebanon and Syria in 1860–61’, in Humanitarian Intervention: A History, ed. Brendan
Simms and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 166–7.
²² Panchenkova, Politika Francii, 36.
²³ Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz to Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von Schleinitz,
27 July 1860, Paris, GStA III. Ha MdA I. Nr. 7303, f. 100–103.
²⁴ Mathurin François Adolphe de Lescure, La Nouvelle Question d’Orient (Paris: E. Dentu, 1860), 5,
13, 27.
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practically impossible to gain support of the majority of the Powers, given that
Prussia was disinclined to join Russia and France in a scheme of the partition.²⁵
When the foreign minister circulated his plan to the imperial metropoles, he
received the instant support of Russia. The correspondent of The Times reported
on 15 July that there was but ‘one voice, one cry’ in Russia: ‘We must succour the
Christians, exterminate their barbarous oppressors, revenge religion and outraged
humanity, finish with the Turks and drive them out of Europe.’²⁶ But no other
response came from the other metropoles. They all laid low for the moment.
Their silence was broken when a new series of tragic news was received from
Damascus, just hours away from Mount Lebanon. On 9–10 July, a Muslim group
led by impoverished artisans, shopkeepers, and local notables that allegedly
included Mustafa Bey al-Hawasilim Rashid Agha and Al-Sayyif Mahmud al-
Rikabi, was joined by the Druze of anti-Lebanon and Hawran who chased after
the runaway Maronite refugees, and attacked Bab Tuma, the Christian district of
the town.²⁷ More than 3,000 people were killed. Christian properties, including
those of the French and American consuls, were pillaged and looted. It was also
reported that the American consul, Mikhail Mishaqa (1800–88) was wounded,
and the Dutch Consul S. A. Cutsi (Coetzee or Contzi²⁸) was ‘murdered’.²⁹
Consular and journalistic reports suggested that the Ottoman governor of
Damascus, Ahmed Pașa, another allegedly conservative and anti-Christian figure,
and the troops under his command, did nothing to end the violence. Instead they
joined the perpetrators in pillaging.³⁰ Hundreds of Damascene Christians took
refuge in the mansion of a respected inhabitant, Abd al-Qader the Algerian. Once
these events had ended on 10 July, the Christians under his protection began to
stream into Beirut every day, in bands of 200 or 300 and escorted by Ottoman
soldiers, the sight of whom brought great fear to Lebanon.³¹
The news of the Damascene massacres immediately rekindled religious hysteria
in Europe. Le Constitutionnel wrote that Muslim fanatics were no longer respect-
ing the rights of humanity.³² The Cabinet of Vienna instantly responded to
²⁵ See Ch. 11. ²⁶ ‘Foreign Intelligence’, The Times, 25 July 1860, 10.
²⁷ Al-Bitār, Haliyyāt, vol. 1, 263–5; Ibrahim ‘Urbaylī, Mudhākarāt Ibrahim ‘Urbayli (1913), 155–6;
Rogan, ‘Sectarianism’; Kamal S. Salibi, ‘The 1860 Upheaval in Damascus as seen by al-Sayyif
Muhammad Abu’l-Su’ud al-Hasibi, Notable and Later Naqib al-Ashraf of the City’, in Beginnings of
Modernisation in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, ed. William R. Polk and Richard
L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 185–204; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, ‘New Light
on the 1860 Riots in Ottoman Damascus’, Die Welt des Islams XXVIII(1/4) (1988): 412–430.
²⁸ The name of the Dutch consul appears in different forms in Dutch newspapers and parliamentary
meetings. But in the two letters I was able to see he signs his name as ‘Cutsi’.
²⁹ ‘Per Telegraaf ’, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 16 July 1860. I would like to thank Bert-Jan van
Slooten for this source. ‘The Massacres at Damascus’, The Freeman’s Journal, 3 Aug. 1860; BOA HR.SYS
1520/3/107; Van Camet (Smyrna) to W. E. Frecken (Beirut), 20 July 1860, HNA 2.05.32.213.05.32.31/9.
³⁰ Johann Gottfried Wetzstein (Damascus) to Theodor Weber, 16 July 1860, GStA I. Ha Rep 81 XI
Nr. 66, f. 95–8. See also Kurd ‘Alī, Khi:ta:t, vol. 3, 84.
³¹ Sami Kuri, Une histoire du Liban à travers les archives des jésuites, 1816–1845 (Beirut: Dar el-
Marchreq, 1986), 270.
³² Le Constitutionnel, 19 July 1860.
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Thouvenel’s proposal, agreeing to endorse France to stop the course of ‘excesses’
and prevent the recurrence of such ‘atrocities’.³³ On 20 July, it assented to the
French proposals, but, because the cabinet did not want to leave Venice without
troops, Austria preferred not to send her forces to Syria.³⁴ In Berlin, Foreign
Minister Baron Alexander von Schleinitz expressed his agreement with
Thouvenel’s sentiments about acting in the ‘interests of humanity’, though
Prussia herself could not contribute to the expeditionary forces because of mater-
ial obstacles.³⁵
Only the British cabinet remained hesitant over Thouvenel’s proposal. In fact,
as soon as the first news of ‘Lebanese massacres’ received in London and even
before the French proposals were dispatched, the immediate reaction of Sir John
Russell, the British foreign secretary, was no different from his French counter-
part. The facts spoke for themselves, he believed: the issue was ‘a question of
humanity’. He told Jean Fialin, duc de Persigny, the French ambassador to
London, that he desired an accord between the British and French governments
concerning the situation in Syria.³⁶
However, Russell found Thouvenel’s proposition of military intervention ‘too
serious and even dangerous’.³⁷He dithered, reminded Persigny that the sultan had
already sent new battalions, and (as we will see) had also sent his foreign minister,
Fuad Pașa, to Syria. But Persigny assured him of the ‘disinterestedness’ of the
French plan, and that Britain would assume ‘a terrible responsibility’ if she
declined the proposal. The news of the Damascene massacres, during which the
Dutch consul had allegedly been murdered, and the persistence of the violence,
proved a strong enough impetus for the British cabinet to subsequently endorse
the plan. Britain agreed, but not without guaranteeing to confine the French
expedition by means of a convention that would limit the size of the expeditionary
army, set temporal limits to the intervention, and involve the Porte’s signature.
Orders were then sent to Marseilles and Toulon to make ready at once for the
transport of the French troops. General Charles-Marie-Napoléon de Beaufort
d’Hautpoul (1804–90), who was reporting from Nice and the Savoy border at
the time and who had served in the 1830 campaign in Algiers as well as under
Ibrahim Pașa in Syria in 1834–7, was appointed as the commander of the French
expeditionary army.³⁸ Thouvenel even drafted a convention for the Powers.³⁹ But
just before the embarkation day (24 July), a counter-order to suspend military
³³ De Moustier to Thouvenel, 14 July 1860, AMAE CP Autriche 477/216.
³⁴ De Moustier to Thouvenel, 20 July 1860, AMAE CP Autriche 477/242.
³⁵ Auvergne to Thouvenel, 12 July 1860, AMAE CP Prusse 336/252; Auvergne to Paris, 21 July 1860,
AMAE CP Prusse 336/280.
³⁶ Persigny to Thouvenel, [13?] July 1860, AMAE CP Ang 717/193.
³⁷ Persigny to Thouvenel, 18 July 1860, AMAE CP Ang 717/226.
³⁸ Papiers de personelle, Beaufort d’Hautpol, AMAE 393QO/281.
³⁹ Thouvenel to Lavalette, 21 July 1860, AMAE CP Turquie 133/345/297.
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preparations was suddenly submitted.⁴⁰ ‘Something must have occurred since
yesterday to occasion the counter-order,’ The Times reported in confusion.⁴¹
Against Intervention: Propaganda and Diplomacy
What happened was that once the news of Thouvenel’s enterprise reached Istanbul,
the Porte’s agents in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, Turin, and London (but, due to
poor relations with Russia, not in St Petersburg) had embarked on a vigorous
lobbying campaign to stop the intervention.⁴² They had achieved their ends for
the time being.
As noted above, in the eyes of the sultan’s ministers, events in the Levant were
considered to be machinations on the part of Russia and France. As early as 1859,
intelligence had conveyed that some Arabs (Algerians) with French passports who
were connected with Abd al-Qader had arrived at Syria ostensibly looking for
settlement but had immediately caused disturbances.⁴³ In the eyes of Ottoman
ministers, this intelligence fitted well with Emperor Napoleon III’s 1858 schemes
for carving out from the Ottoman Empire an Arab kingdom under Abd al-Qader’s
rule. The ambassador in Paris, Ahmed Vefik, wrote that it followed ‘from all the
facts . . . that the Franco- Russian entente’, which the Porte had been closely
following since 1859, was not ‘unrelated to the deplorable events’. He had gathered
intelligence himself and suspected that the command of the French expeditionary
force to be dispatched to the Levant purportedly to suppress violence in Mount
Lebanon and Damascus would be extended to Abd al-Qader in Damascus, which
would be placed under the latter’s authority in due course.⁴⁴
Given all these, the Porte believed that it was not coincidental that two
‘disturbances’ occurred in the Balkans and Syria simultaneously. Nor was it that
the Kisrawan army of Tanyus Shahin had hoisted French flags during their
rebellion.⁴⁵ Nor the fact that the ‘French-backed’ Maronites had prepared for
the war for a year and had attacked the Druze first.⁴⁶
Faced with the crises in the Balkans and the Levant, the sultan’s ministers acted
with alacrity. In early June, Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pașa had departed for
Herzegovina for inspection and punishment of the culpable there. And in early
⁴⁰ Russell to Bulwer, 24 July 1860, TNA FO 195/659/26.
⁴¹ ‘Foreign Intelligence. France’, The Times, 26 July 1860.
⁴² Aristarchi Bey (Berlin) to Fuad Pașa, 11 July 1860, ODD 90; Musurus (London) to Safvet Efendi,
12 July 1860, ODD 91; Rüstem Bey (Turin) to Safvet Efendi, 12 July 1860, ODD 94.
⁴³ BOA HR.SYS 1528/23.
⁴⁴ Ahmed Vefik to Musurus, 20 July 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 52/3/11.
⁴⁵ According to Ussama Makdisi, the flags had been used to undercut traditional French support of
the Maronite Khazin sheikhs whose property the Maronite peasantry had seized: Makdisi, Culture,
101–2.
⁴⁶ Ahmed Vefik to Musurus, 20 July 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 52/3/11.
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July, after negotiations with the Powers’ agents in Istanbul, the foreign minister,
Fuad Pașa, was appointed as extraordinary envoy invested with special adminis-
trative and military powers to establish full order and tranquillity in Syria.⁴⁷
A man with considerable international stature, charisma, and a good know-
ledge of the French language and of European diplomatic habits, as well as a
famous wit, Fuad’s appointment was received with satisfaction and approval on
the part of the Powers. At his disposal an army of 16,000 men, supplies of grains,
and funds for reparations and indemnities that emptied the imperial treasury, he
left for Syria on 12 July and landed five days later.⁴⁸ His object was to show the
world that the Ottomans could handle this domestic ‘disturbance’ on their own.⁴⁹
However, while Fuad was still on his way to Beirut, the emerging news of the
Damascene massacres undermined the full effect of the sultan’s move.
*
In mid-July, the French proposals for an armed intervention had transformed the
suspicions of the Ottoman ministers over foreign ‘machinations’ into an inexor-
able conviction.⁵⁰ While an active propaganda campaign for intervention was
under way in Europe, Ottoman diplomats complained to European statesmen
about the level of exaggeration in the press about the events in Lebanon and the
constant calls for a crusade against Islam. They strove to explain that Ottoman
Lebanon had been administratively reorganized in 1842 under pressure from the
Powers.⁵¹ They reminded their interlocutors that the Porte had been forced to
send its troops previously stationed in Syria to the borders of Montenegro and
Serbia, and that their absence had prevented them from stopping the ‘carnage’ in
Mount Lebanon.
They also placed blame on the ‘barbarism’ of the Syrians. By this means, they
tried to separate and distance ‘civilized’ Istanbul from its ‘uncivilized’ periphery in
order to avoid any responsibility. Equally importantly, they warned that if
European (Christian) troops landed in Syria under the pretext of ensuring the
security of the Christians, in the rest of Asia, Christians of other cities would
inevitably find themselves exposed to dangers: ‘[t]roublemakers would inevitably
spill into the interior life in the name of religious vengeance.’However, if the Porte
took the same measures against Muslims, no such vengeance would occur.⁵² In
⁴⁷ BOA HR.SFR.3 53/12/4.
⁴⁸ Lavaletta to Thouvenel, 20 June 1860, AMAE CP Turquie 345/98; Abro Sahak Efendi to Cabouly
Efendi, 17 July 1860, ODD 97; Fawaz, An Occasion, 106.
⁴⁹ Aali Pasha to Musurus, 14 July 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 53/4/2.
⁵⁰ Aristarchi Bey to Fuad Pasha, 11 July 1860, ODD 90.
⁵¹ Rüstem Bey (Turin) to Safvet, 12 July 1860, ODD 70; Aristarchi Bey to FP, 18 July 1860, ODD 82.
⁵² Cabouly to Musurus, 18 July 1860, ODD 80; Aristarchi Bey to FP, 18 July 1860,ODD 82; Musurus
to Palmerston, 18 July 1860; Musurus to Safvet, 19 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3. 52/3; Ahmed Vefik to
Musurus, 15 July 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 52/3/3; Musurus to Ahmed Vefik, 18 July 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3
52/3/4; Diran Bey to Safvet, 19 July 1860, BOA 1520/3/232; Ahmed Vefik to Musurus, 20 July 1860,
BOA HR.SFR.3 52/3/4.
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addition to these, Sultan Abdülmecid I himself sent letters to French Emperor
Napoleon III (July 16) and Queen Victoria (20 July) to give assurances that he
would employ all means in his power to re-establish order and security and to
punish the guilty severely.⁵³
These Ottoman efforts were disregarded in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and
St Petersburg. In these capitals the unwavering belief was that the sultan’s men
were liable for the ‘atrocities’ in Syria due to their inertia. Only in London did
Ambassador Musurus Bey find a ready ear to Ottoman concerns.⁵⁴ This was
because Britain had only reluctantly agreed on the proposed armed intervention
in the first place. Both Russell and Palmerston had found the Porte’s counter-
arguments plausible, and they were both suspicious of French intentions.
Since 1840, the status quo in the Levant had been in favour of British economic
and political interests.⁵⁵ Palmerston and Russell were concerned that, with this
expedition, France might upset the status quo by suppressing the Druze, the so-
called perpetrators of the massacres, with whom Britain had forged a special
relationship since 1841.⁵⁶ Moreover, particularly after Palmerston returned to
office in 1859, Britain had played up Anglo-French rivalry to justify her high
level of military expenditure, and had been seeking to regain an independent
voice in international affairs.⁵⁷ In 1860, France, traditionally seen as a rival, was
perceived by London as a great threat given her naval expansion under Napoleon
III.⁵⁸ While the Cobden–Chevalier free trade treaty of January 1860 had amelior-
ated relations and led Palmerston to reluctantly acquiesce to French annexation of
Savoy and Nice, French expansionism led Queen Victoria to complain angrily that
the French were ‘the universal disturbers of the world’.⁵⁹
In addition to these strategic considerations, the British cabinet kept in mind
the warnings of cautious public voices in Britain. In the House of Lords, the
conservative politician Sir James Ferguson recommended caution in dealing with
Syrian affairs, because the Druze-Maronite quarrel there had ‘very little to do with
religion’, but had arisen from racial differences, and had been fomented by French
⁵³ ‘The East’, The Times, 21 July 1860, 9; Cowley to Russell, 20 July 1860, TNA FO 195/659/12.
⁵⁴ Musurus to Safvet, 20 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS 1520/3/323; Russell to Cowley, 23 July 1860, TNA
FO 195/659/22.
⁵⁵ Musurus to Fuad Pasha, 5 Apr. 1860, ODD 35. In 1860, imports into Britain from the Ottoman
Empire had risen from the previous year and amounted to £2,682,058, while exports to the
Ottoman Empire, including Syria and Palestine, equalled on average TL4,668,346 per annum.
⁵⁶ See Ch. 10.
⁵⁷ David Brown, ‘Palmerston and Anglo-French Relations, 1846–1865’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 17
(4) (2006): 675–692, 683.
⁵⁸ Ibid. 681.
⁵⁹ Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians, 8 May 1860, in The Letters of Queen Victoria:
A Selection from Her Majesty’s Correspondence between the Years 1837 and 1861, ed. A. C. Benson
and Viscount Esher, 3 vols (London: John Murray, repr. 1908), vol. 3, 386, 399.
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and Russian agents.⁶⁰ The German intellectual Karl Marx, resident in London at
the time, similarly argued that Russia and France deliberately sought to bring
about a politico-religious row—the former on the Dalmatian, the latter on the
Syrian coast, ‘both movements supporting each other, since the troubles in
Montenegro and the Herzegovina compelled the Porte to withdraw almost the
whole Turkish army stationed in Syria, so as to leave the arena open to the high-
pitched antagonism of the barbarous clans of the Lebanon.’⁶¹ The London news-
paper The Globe, which was close to the Whigs, suggested that the British ought
not too easily ‘lend their ear to the denunciations against Turkey’, and should
thoroughly consider the ‘indirect foreign influences’ in the outbreak of violence
before causing ‘injustice to the Porte’ by putting the responsibility for tragic events
onto Istanbul.⁶²
All these diplomatic efforts, lobbying, public warnings, and political calcula-
tions—and, perhaps most importantly, the arrival of the news of a truce made
between the Maronites and the Druze on 21 July—led Palmerston to decide to
wait and see.⁶³ It was then that Britain asked France to defer or abandon the plan
to dispatch troops, using the argument that news of violence had stopped since the
Damascene massacres and sending troops to Syria at this point would degrade the
sultan’s dignity.⁶⁴Meanwhile, Russell gave Musurus 14 days to assess the results of
Fuad’s measures on the ground.⁶⁵
*
When Thouvenel heard the news that the British had reversed their decision, he
was enraged. The information of a Maronite–Druze truce had not reached him.
He could not accept Russell’s reasoning. But he did what he had to do. He put the
embarkation in Toulon on hold so as not to strain relations with Britain. France
reacted immediately, though, by the publication of an open letter on 25 July signed
by Emperor Napoleon III.
In this open letter, the emperor first tried to soothe British anxieties about
Italian affairs and the French invasion of Savoy and Nice, explaining why he had
intervened, and that his actions in central Italy were bound by the Treaty of
Villafranca. He then turned to the Eastern Question, and stressed that when his
ambassador, Charles marquis La valette, had travelled to Istanbul in early 1860,
the instructions the emperor had given him were confined to using every effort to
⁶⁰ BOA HR.SYS 1520/3. ⁶¹ Marx, ‘Events in Syria’, 429.
⁶² The Globe, 11 July 1860; cf. Journal des débats, 12 July 1860.
⁶³ Persigny to Thouvenel, 22 July 1860, AMAE CP Ang 717/243; Lavalette to Thouvenel, 25 July
1860 AMAE CP 133/345/333. In fact, Thouvenel was right. The residents of Deir al-Qamar had refused
to comply with the truce.
⁶⁴ Persigny to Thouvenel, 22 July 1860, AMAE CP Ang 717/244; Cowley to Russell, 22 July 1860,
TNA FO 195/659/18.
⁶⁵ Musurus to Safvet Efendi, 20 July 1860, ODD 110.
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maintain the status quo. ‘The interest of France is that Turkey should live as long
as possible.’ The emperor further argued that, if he instantly proposed an
expedition to Syria during the civil war, it was because ‘my feelings were those
of the people which has put me at its head, and the intelligence from Syria
transported me with indignation. My first thought, nevertheless, was to come to
an understanding with England. What other interest than that of humanity could
induce me to send troops into that country?’
He concluded by noting that, as ‘an honest man’, he would very much wish to
be obliged to undertake the Syrian expedition, and in any case not to undertake it
alone. First, this was because it would be a great expense, and secondly, because
‘I fear that this intervention may involve the Eastern Question’; on the other hand,
he did not see how he could resist public opinion in his country, which would
never understand that ‘we could leave unpunished, not only the massacre of
Christians’ but ‘the burning of our consulates, the insult to our flag, and the
pillage of the monasteries which were under our protection’.⁶⁶
In the interim, Le Constitutionnel, which was close to Thouvenel, published
pieces that echoed Lamartine’s pacific arguments during the 1840 crisis almost
word for word.⁶⁷ The Eastern Question should not entail the division of Europe,
it maintained; on the contrary, it should unite the European Powers in the
defence of interests and principles which imposed the same obligations on ‘all
Christian states’.⁶⁸
While in public Thouvenel sought, with positive messages, to prevent an
international crisis between France and Britain, in private, he did not hold back
in his audience with Henry Wellesley (1804–84), earl of Cowley, the British
ambassador to Paris.⁶⁹ As an Italian witness details, in a ‘violent’ discussion,
Thouvenel shared with Wellesley the latest correspondence from Syria which
reported the disastrous state of affairs as late as 12 July, when the Damascene
massacres, the alleged murder of the Dutch consul, the situation of the refugees,
and the state of the premises of foreign consuls were reported.⁷⁰ He then strongly
instructed the British ambassador to announce to his government that he would
address a circular to all platforms telling them that Christians had been slaugh-
tered in Syria, that all the Powers had agreed to stop this horrible slaughter, but
that only the British cabinet had opposed this action.
Responsibility for a probable recurrence of violence was too great a risk for
Britain to take. It was beyond her control. France had given public and private
⁶⁶ ‘The Policy of the Emperor Napoleon Towards England’, The Times, 1 Aug. 1860, 9.
⁶⁷ See Ch. 8. ⁶⁸ Le Constitutionnel, 25 July 1860.
⁶⁹ Pollone to Cavour, Paris, 25 July 1860, Carteggio Cavour-Nigra, IV, 104–5; cf. Lynn M. Case,
Edouard Thouvenel et la diplomatie du Second Empire, trans. Guillaume de Bertier de Savigny (Paris:
A. Pedone, 1976), 339.
⁷⁰ Cowley to Russell, 22 July 1860, TNA FO 195/659/28.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
      ? 313
assurances, the intervention would be bound by a convention, the (albeit dated)
news of disastrous massacres was still arriving, the majority of the public were
calling for military intervention, and there was still no concrete news as to the
achievements of Fuad Pașa in establishing order in Syria—though it was practic-
ally impossible to receive news due to the absence of telegraph lines in Syria at the
time. The day after Lord Wellesley withdrew from Thouvenel’s audience and
reported the content of the interview to Russell, the British cabinet caved.⁷¹ The
French ambassador triumphantly reported from London that Russell was willing
to approve the dispatch of troops on the condition that they would act under the
requisition of Fuad Pașa.⁷² Thouvenel had won the tug of war.
*
The five European Powers thus agreed on a concerted action in Syria. Since, aside
from France, it was not logistically possible for the other Powers to supply troops,
Paris would take over the responsibility—a fact well known by Thouvenel since
the beginning. Preparations in Marseille and Toulon began once again. Only two
things stood in the way now. First, the Powers had to reach agreement over the
wording of the convention in order to set temporal limits to the expedition and
decide on the number of troops and the rules in the field; second, they had to
obtain the consent of the Porte for the armed intervention.
Thouvenel wasted no time in organizing a conference in Paris for the prepar-
ation of the convention. It began on 25 July, and, in accordance with Russell’s
suggestions, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, Ahmed Vefik Pașa, was also
invited to the gathering, along with the ambassadors of the five Powers.⁷³
Ahmed Vefik received no instructions from Istanbul until the end of the month
because the Porte aimed to delay the expedition of French forces as much as
possible, in the interim allowing Fuad Pașa enough time to establish full order and
tranquillity in Syria, which would render the intervention redundant.⁷⁴
All the while the French ambassador in Istanbul had been urging Âli Pașa for
the Porte’s consent. ‘With a tone of conviction and despair’, Âli repeated to
Lavalette, a Christian intervention would only destabilize the entire Ottoman
Empire.⁷⁵ On 21 July, the Ottoman Council of Ministers categorically refused
armed intervention. On 22 July, Lavalette went to see Sultan Abdülmecid I, whom
he found ‘pale, nervous, agitated, silent’ due to the political and (equally import-
ant) financial distress of his empire. In a friendly interview, the French ambassa-
dor gave his assurances as to Napoleon III’s affectionate feelings for the sultan,
and managed to obtain the sultan’s promise to urge his ministers to consider the
⁷¹ Pollone to Cavour, Paris, 25 July 1860, Carteggio Cavour-Nigra, IV, 104–5; cf. Case, Thouvenel, 339.
⁷² Persigny to Thouvenel, 25 July 1860, AMAE CP Angleterre 717/268.
⁷³ Cowley to Russell, 26 July 1860, TNA FO195/659/31.
⁷⁴ Lavalette to Thouvenel, 25 July 1860, AMAE CP Turquie 345/333.
⁷⁵ Lavalette to Thouvenel, 24 July 1860, AMAE CP Turquie 345/303.
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matter again. After the meeting the sultan called Âli Pașa, and the next day (23
July), the latter informed France’s agents in Istanbul that the Porte would agree to
the intervention if France accepted the responsibility of the dangers that might
result from sending troops to Syria, and if the troops disembarked and camped in
the vicinity of Beirut only, and acted on the directions of Fuad Pașa. Lavalette
refused these conditions.⁷⁶
What changed the Porte’s position five days later, and first allowed Ahmed
Vefik to begin negotiations in Paris and finally submit to the Powers’ plan, was a
defining feature of the Eastern Question and the transimperial security culture
woven around it. True, under the continuous pressure of Lavalette and Bulwer,
Sultan Abdülmecid was both anxious and angry. But, as we will see, he also felt
cornered: he needed the Powers’ guarantees over the ongoing loan negotiations
between the Porte and the European financial houses to remedy the disastrous
financial situation of his empire.⁷⁷
To Ottoman ministers, the situation was a choice between the hammer and the
anvil. They believed that Russia was ‘trying to establish a [link] between the acts
committed by the Druze and the alleged grievances of the provinces of Rumelia
[the Balkans]’, and that she was pursuing an ‘invasive intention in intervening’.⁷⁸
Yet Ottoman officialdom came to uphold what Prussian Foreign Minister Baron
Schleinitz advised them to do at the time. It could be to the Porte’s ‘advantage that
any European intervention has the character of collective action. It is only the
isolated intervention that would pose serious dangers’—the very idea that had
been propounded by Mustafa Reșid some 21 years earlier.⁷⁹ If the Porte agreed to
collective intervention led by France in Syria, it could prevent another interven-
tion in the Balkans.
As a result, on 29 July, Âli Pașa gave his explicit, if reluctant, consent to the
dispatch of the troops ‘to give her Allies a proof of [the Ottoman Empire’s]
confidence, and her loyal desire to suppress the disorders which she deplores
more than anyone else’. In consenting to the armed intervention, the Porte looked
to show its good faith and commitment to ‘the Concert of Europe of which it saw
itself a member’. At the same time, it aimed to save face by avoiding diplomatic
embarrassment.⁸⁰
On the day of the Porte’s assent, Thouvenel’s Le Constitutionnel elatedly wrote:
‘Turkey herself, henceforth admitted into the great family of European states,
must forget that she has been for centuries the personification of Mussulman
fanaticism, for she has now promised to take part in the signal chastisement
⁷⁶ Ibid.
⁷⁷ MAE to [?], 28 July 1860, AMAE Corr. Ang. 8CP/717/278; Lavalette to Thouvenel, 1 Aug. 1860,
AMAE CP Turquie 346/7.
⁷⁸ Aristarchi to Fuad Pacha, 28 July 1860, ODD 128; Diran Bey to Safvet, 2 Aug. 1860, ODD 133.
⁷⁹ Aristarchi to Fuad Pacha, 28 July 1860, ODD 128.
⁸⁰ Musurus to Russell, 30 July 1860, TNA FO 195/659/45.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
      ? 315
demanded by humanity and Christian civilisation.’⁸¹ Ministers in Istanbul must
have been puzzled. Had the Porte not been admitted into the family of nations
in 1856?
After the Porte’s consent had been obtained, the stipulations of the convention
were carefully revised in Paris in such a manner as to remove all that might have
provoked the susceptibilities of Ottoman ministers, or that might have even
indirectly attacked the sovereign independence of the sultan and tarnish his
dignity. As the Porte feared, Russia made a last-minute move and suggested the
insertion of an additional clause that would enable similar interventions in other
regions of the sultan’s empire.⁸² But the other Powers, including France, imme-
diately rejected the clause, from which we might be able to infer the absence of
a fully fledged Franco-Russian entente at this hour.⁸³ On the last day of July and
in early August, the Powers agreed to sign two protocols with respect to the
intervention.
In the first, the juridical legitimacy of the intervention was placed in the
Treaty of Paris of 1856, Article IX of which guaranteed the rights of Ottoman
Christians—the intervention was vindicated with the argument that in Syria these
rights had been violated. The second protocol (signed in September) set the
conditions of the intervention.⁸⁴ The expedition was limited to a period of six
months and 12,000 men, half of whom would be provided by the French. If more
men were needed, the Great Powers would decide with the Porte on which
countries among them would provide troops (Article II). Upon arriving in Syria,
the expedition’s commander would contact Fuad Pașa, with the aim of taking all
measures necessary to occupy the positions that would allow the execution of the
mission (Article III). In the meantime, the British, Austrian, French, Prussian, and
Russian rulers would allow sufficient naval forces to monitor the Syrian coast so as
to ensure its tranquillity (Article IV). The expedition would remain in Syria for no
more than six months, and troops would only camp on the coasts—only one or
two regiments would march into Damascus. And the expeditionary army’s sub-
sistence and supplies would be covered by the Ottoman government, despite its
depleted treasury, so far as it was able.⁸⁵
To conclude, in 1840, it was Foreign Secretary Palmerston’s Britain that had
spearheaded an intervention in the Levant to put an end to Mehmed Ali’s reign in
Syria, and it was only France among the Powers that had opposed the interven-
tion. In 1860, the roles were reversed. Now prime minister, Palmerston hesitated
over whether France had ulterior motives that included the ascendancy of Britain
in Syria since the 1840s. In both cases, the agency of the Porte proved pivotal. It
⁸¹ Le Constitutionnel, 31 July 1860. ⁸² Diran Bey to Safvet Efendi, 2 Aug. 1860, ODD 133.
⁸³ Thouvenel to Montebello, 30 July 1860, AMAE CP 112/221/277; Montebello to Thouvenel,
31 July 1860, AMAE CP 112/221/278; Thouvenel to Montebello, 1 Aug. 1860, AMAE CP 112/221/
279; Montebello to Thouvenel, 1 Aug. 1860, AMAE CP 112/221/290.
⁸⁴ ‘Copy of the Convention of September 5, 1860’, TNA FO 93/110/16a. ⁸⁵ Ibid.
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had previously enlisted the Powers’ intervention through commercial agreements,
by the 1839 reform edict, and by helping incite a rebellion in Lebanon. In 1860,
Ottoman ministers vigorously opposed European intervention by running their
own propaganda campaign, and delayed it as long as they could. But both in 1840
and in 1860, the very same game of assuming European public sentiments and
gaining the consent of a majority of the Powers determined what course of action
ought to be taken.
In July 1860 the news of the Damascene massacres and the alleged murder of
the Dutch consul would make it impossible for the hesitant British authorities to
hold out any longer. This being said, even though the Dutch government, after
heated debate in parliament, had decided to send three frigates to Lebanon, and
issued protests to the Porte against the ‘murder’ of their consul, it became clear
only after the decision of the intervention was taken that M. Cutsi (Coetzee) was
actually alive.⁸⁶ As he wrote in a letter dated 20 July, when the ‘frantic’ crowds had
arrived at his house during the mayhem, he had secretly taken shelter in his
neighbour Muslim Huseyin Agha’s house, together with his eldest son, and had
hidden in the chimney for three days, before sheltering in Abd al-Qader’s mansion
along with other European ministers.⁸⁷ That his murder was false news received
no mention in diplomatic correspondence among the Powers in early August.
By then, differences between the European Powers and the Porte had been
addressed and the agreement on the intervention had already been reached,
despite the lingering resentment of the sultan and his ministers. With the dispatch
of French troops and an international commission to Syria in August and
September respectively, the diplomatic struggle that had begun in the metropoles
continued through incessant tensions over the limits of French military action and
the European commissioners’ right to interfere with Fuad Pașa’s mission. Soon
after the departure of French troops from Toulon, The Times dolefully reported,
‘The Eastern Question has returned at a considerably less interval than most of
our periodical difficulties.’⁸⁸ A new tussle at once began on the spot over how to
return the sense of security in Syria.
⁸⁶ Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, no. 196, 17 July 1860; I should like to thank Bert-Jan van Slooten
and Huub Mool for drawing my attention to this source.
⁸⁷ M. Cutsi (Damascus) to W. E. Fercken (Beirut), 20 July 1860, HNA 2.05.32.213.05.32.31/9.
⁸⁸ The Times, 16 Aug. 1860.
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13
Returning the Sense of Security
The International Commission on Syria
Here they were again. In Toulon. Sixty-two years after Napoleon Bonaparte’s
campaign to Egypt,¹ in August 1860 the French port town was once again busy for
an expedition to the Levant. Its destination was well known this time: Syria. On
the 6th day of the month, Bonaparte’s nephew Napoleon III addressed the 6,000
soldiers before him with a familiarly heroic language. In 1798, Bonaparte had
reminded his men of the colossal importance of their mission for the world’s
commerce and civilization. Now, Napoleon III declared that his soldiers were
going to make ‘the rights of justice and humanity triumph’.²
As in 1798, the French mission was framed as an ‘aid’ to the Ottoman sultan.³
We have seen in the previous pages that, in both cases, the ultimate objective of
the expeditions was to secure French interests in the Levant. It was to imprint a
French mark on the Eastern Question, and help realize the dream of Talleyrand
and Bonaparte by establishing a zone of influence on the western coasts of Syria in
addition to direct or informal control over the Mediterranean shores of Algiers,
Tunis, Nice, and Egypt.⁴
We have also seen how times and the meaning of the Eastern Question, and for
that matter, the cultures of security in Europe and the Levant, had since
changed—how they interacted with each other, transformed one another, and
then intercrossed. Unlike 1798, the mission of Napoleon III’s men was not a
single-handed intervention. The French army was acting on behalf of the other
four major European Great Powers and with the consent of the sultan, however
reluctant the latter had been.⁵ Unlike 1798, the French army in 1860 was accom-
panied by an international commission that consisted of the delegates of each
major European Power, as well as the Ottoman Empire.
¹ See Ch. 1. ² Edwards, La Syrie, 196–7; also in Fawaz, An Occasion for War, 115.
³ ‘Note sur les causes de l’évacuation de la Syrie par la France, 1860–61’, AMAE MD Turquie
50/122/145.
⁴ For an in-depth study on French informal empire in the 19th c., see David Todd, Velvet Empire:
French Informal Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2021).
⁵ See Ch. 12.
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The first international security institution established in what we call today ‘the
Middle East’, the commission consisted of those very men on horseback with
whose observations in Syria this book began: Rehfues, Béclard, Novikow,
Weckbecker, and Dufferin, alongside the Ottoman foreign minister, Fuad Pașa.
I will conclude the book with their experience, going into some depth as to how
their mission took shape on the ground—their attempts to hold in check the
operation of the French troops while labouring to find ways to prevent the
recurrence of violence, monitoring the relief, retribution, and reparation pro-
cesses, and proposing new administrative models in Mount Lebanon. I will
explain here how their work epitomized the emergence of a transimperial culture
of security in the Levant, whereby the Powers had now a greater say in the supply
of security than ever.
Presided over by the Ottoman foreign minister, the international commission
sought to address issues in Syria in 50 meetings that were held in Beirut,
Damascus, and Istanbul until 1862. The commissioners received an influx of
instructions from their capitals which repeatedly placed imperial objectives,
suspicions, and their conflicting threat perceptions and interests on the agenda
while addressing the security problems in Syria. The men on the ground, or the
professional agents of security, were thus torn between local realities and the
expectations of their superiors in the metropoles. The retribution, repayment of
indemnities, and administrative reorganization processes were inevitably politi-
cized, and bolted the fate of security in Syria onto the reconciliation of imperial
interests. The commission became a contact zone of inter-imperial competition as
much as cooperation, of hidden war as much as ‘universal peace’. It became an in-
between imperial space, where security was uttered, discussed, and idiosyncratic-
ally turned into policy.
Reluctant Imperialists
With the arrival of the last European commissioner, Rehfues, from Istanbul to
Beirut on 27 September 1860, Lebanon became a hub for European and Ottoman
imperial agents. There was Fuad Pașa, his aides-de-camp, the Ottoman adminis-
trators, and approximately 20,000 soldiers at his disposal, General Beaufort and
his 6,000 French men, the European commissioners and their delegation, and the
European diplomatic corps already situated in Beirut. They shared intelligence,
plans, and ideas with each other, all harbouring the single aim of establishing
order and tranquillity in the country, while at the same time sustaining the
interests of their respective empires.
Fuad Pașa’s mission pertained above all to maintaining the dignity of the sultan,
mitigating the stigma of the negotiations for an armed intervention and also
making the world see the ‘civilized face’ of the Ottoman world that was able to
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‘cope with’ the ‘savage other’ within.⁶ This was why some of the most able men in
Istanbul had been appointed as his aides-de-camp: Halim Pașa had been the
president of the council of war, Armenian Abro Sahak Efendi, the director of
French correspondence at the foreign ministry, and the Syrian Catholic Franco
Nasri Efendi, had been serving as the director of the disputed claims bureau, prior
to their appointment into Fuad Pașa’s mission.⁷ Before they set out for Syria, the
Ottoman foreign minister had told George Outrey, the French dragoman in
Istanbul, that he was determined, even at the peril of his life, to ‘wipe out the
stain which rests upon the honour of humanity’.⁸
After his arrival in Beirut on 17 July 1860, moved by the sad spectacle of so
much misery and tragedy, the pașa took immediate measures for the provision of
relief as well as the repression of the ‘disturbances’.⁹ A mixed (Muslim and non-
Muslim) commission was founded under the presidency of Abro Efendi to
distribute relief for the wounded and poor Maronites who lost their houses.¹⁰
Together with Franco Nasri, Abro was also appointed to the reparations commis-
sion that would determine the claims of the foreigners for compensations and
interests for their losses during the disorders. The pașa then detained the suspects
and set up two extraordinary tribunals in Beirut and Mukhtara for their swift trial,
alongside a military tribunal. By early August, 400 in total had been arrested, while
many of the allegedly ‘worst guilty’ Druze muqatadjis fled to Hawran or anti-
Lebanon.¹¹
Among those arrested by order of the pașa and sentenced to death by the
military tribunal were senior figures, including the governor of Damascus and the
commander of the army, Ahmet Pașa, and several officers of Ottoman regi-
ments.¹² The governor of Sayda Hurșid was detained and awaited a trial by the
extraordinary tribunals that looked into civil affairs. The Ottoman delegation
from Istanbul was dismayed by the conduct of their agents on the ground. By
⁶ Deringil, ‘They Live’, 318; Makdisi, ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, 781.
⁷ Fawaz, An Occasion, 106.
⁸ James L. Farley, The Massacres in Syria (London: Bradbury & Evans, 1861), 96; Edwards,
La Syrie, 165.
⁹ Abro (Beirut) to Cabouly, 23 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/95.
¹⁰ Abro and Franco Cussa Efendi to Cabouly, 18 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/81; Abro (Beirut) to
Cabouly, 21 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/93; Abro (Beirut) to Cabouly, 23 July 1860, ODD 114. To
prevent abuses, Abro reported, they classified the people as (i) sick and wounded to be placed in a
military hospital, over which the Ottoman commission would exercise surveillance, (ii) widows and
orphans who would be received by the Lazarists of the city, and (iii) people who had left their villages
for fear of massacres but who had not suffered losses in the Druze–Maronite conflict. These would be
maintained temporarily until they were redirected to their homes. As refugees hailed from nearby
towns and villages, Abro’s relief commission provided bread, candles, and, when there was insufficient
food, piastres to the poor—11,803 of them on 23 July 1860.
¹¹ Abro to Cabouly, 28 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/106; Dufferin to Bulwer, 1 Oct. 1860, TNA FO
195/656/22.
¹² Yūsuf Al-Dibs, Tārīkh Sūrīyah, vol. 18 (Beirut: al-Ma:tbaʿah al-ʿUmūmīyah, 1893–1905), 192; Al
Bitar, Haliyyāt, vol. 1, 267–8; vol. 3 (1963), 1326; Kurd ‘Alī, Khi:ta:t III, 92.
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the failure to stop the Damascene massacres, Abro wrote, Ahmed Pașa had signed
an invitation for foreign troops to go to Syria and therefore deserved to be hanged,
while Hurșid Pașa, ‘by the dark, inert anti-Christian conduct’, deserved at least
forced labour.¹³ He complained: ‘How long will the general governors [continue
to] undermine the Empire?’¹⁴
Fuad’s punitive mission to Damascus saw the adoption of strict retribution
measures that included mass executions (21 August saw the execution of 172
Muslim Damascenes¹⁵) as well as the evacuation of Muslim houses for the use of
the Christians victimized by the massacres. Abro Efendi reported that all these
punishments had a very positive effect on the local Christians: ‘Tranquillity
reigned’ and the forces available were ‘sufficient to deal with any eventuality [of
violence]’—which was unlikely. In Aleppo, everything was ‘peaceful’. In
Jerusalem, imperial authorities were ‘in control of the situation’. So, Abro wrote,
‘I come back to the same question: what will the French division do [here]?’¹⁶
For his part, Fuad Pașa was equally ‘disapproving of the hasty decision of the
European Powers’.’ He had been ‘quite confident of showing Europe that . . .
without external interference, [the Porte] could energetically act against the rebels,
exerting most rigorous and impartial justice’. As he told a Russian agent in Syria,
foreign intervention appeared to him ‘completely untimely’.¹⁷
After French troops arrived in Beirut in mid-August, he therefore laboured to
forestall General Beaufort’s mission, limiting it to the reconstruction of French silk
factories in Deir al-Qamar and the construction of roads (Beirut–Damascus) as
well as the supply of aid to those in need.¹⁸ Only a small contingent out of the
6,000 French troops were allowed to go into the hinterland and Damascus. All
these measures deeply frustrated the French general, who had arrived in the
Levant with the expectation of defending ‘all the noble and great causes . . . in
the name of civilised Europe’.¹⁹
The meagre communication between Fuad and Beaufort, usually saturated with
misunderstandings, added fuel to Beaufort’s frustration. For example, at his arrival
in Lebanon, the French general was very eager to immediately undertake a joint
Franco-Ottoman campaign against the Druze muqatadjis in order to expel them
‘from mixed districts and to draw a new line of demarcation between the two
races, [the Maronites and the Druze]’, and thus bring the Christian refugees on the
coast back to their homes. When his proposals met with Fuad’s reluctance and
caution, he became more annoyed.²⁰ He reported back to Paris his suspicions that
¹³ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 18 Oct. 1860, GStA III. HAMdA, I Nr. 7569, 125; Abro (Beirut) to Cabouly,
23 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/95; Bitar, Haliyyāt, vol. 1, 168.
¹⁴ Abro to Cabouly, 28 July 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/106. ¹⁵ Salibi, ‘Upheaval’, 200.
¹⁶ Abro to Cabouly, 6 Aug. 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/110.
¹⁷ ‘Kopiya s doneseniya G.k.a. Makeeva’, 21 July 1860, AVPRI f. 133, Kantselyariya, o. 459, e. 42,
ll. 591–4.
¹⁸ Beaufort to Randon, 23 Sept. 1860, AMV, V.G4/5/8. ¹⁹ Fawaz, An Occasion, 120.
²⁰ ‘Rapport de Novikow’, no. 4, 8/20 Sept. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 37, l. 39.
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Fuad was knowingly protecting the Druze. But Fuad’s strategy was to confine the
French. The pașa wrote to Istanbul the same day that, if they attacked the Druzes
and started waging war on them all at once, it would be impossible to hold the
French even if they were otherwise occupied. But if he could find the best way to
seize ‘the guilty chiefs of the Druze by address, and to make them accept the
compensation and the domicile of the Christians, it would be possible to bring
about a good result in this way’.²¹
*
Fuad Pașa’s relation with the European commissioners was equally problematic in
the beginning. It took a long time for them to establish effective communication.
The pașa was at first disinclined to cooperate with the commissioners. ‘Apart from
personal vanity’, Fuad wrote, he found it ‘very surprising’ that the Ottoman
foreign minister was made ‘the member of a commission having the same quality
as [European] secretaries and consuls’. He not only detested the lack of diplomatic
courtesy and considered it an insult, but also lamented that since he was at the
centre of all civil and military matters in Syria, it would be impossible for him to
add a new duty to his existing ones and make time to preside over the
commissioners.²²
It is true that all European plenipotentiaries in the commission were second-
tier bureaucrats. The first one named to the commission, the British plenipoten-
tiary Dufferin, had previously served as attaché to Lord John Russell’s mission to
Vienna to end the Crimean War; he proved to be an excellent orator and a
promising young diplomat, as justified by his appointment to the delicate mission
to Syria. Despite his previous short visits to Istanbul, Egypt, Syria, and other parts
of the empire, his experience of the Levant was limited to hunting along the Nile.²³
Dufferin’s appointment was followed on 11 August by that of the Russian
commissioner, Novikow.²⁴ Having received his education in Slavic dialects at
Moscow University, the Russian plenipotentiary had mainly worked on Balkan
affairs.²⁵ He had also served as a trainee and clerk in the Asian Department of the
Russian ministry of foreign affairs and, at his appointment, was secretary at the
Istanbul embassy.²⁶
²¹ ‘Copie d’un rapport de S.E. Fuad Pacha en date du 28 Safer 1277’, BOA HR.SFR.3 52/3, 14 Sept.
1860.
²² Ibid.
²³ Musurus to Safvet, 2 Aug. 1860, ODD 132; Fawaz, An Occasion, 195; Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall, The
Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1905), 93; Andrew Gailey, The
Lost Imperialist: Lord Dufferin, Memory and Mythmaking in an Age of Celebrity (London: John
Murray, 2016).
²⁴ Montebello to Thouvenel, 11 Aug. 1860, AMAE CP Russie 222/9; Lavalette to Thouvenel, 17 Aug.
1860, AMAE CP Turquie 346/131.
²⁵ Y. S. Kartsov, Za Kulisami Diplomatii (Petrograd: Tipografiya «Т-vа gаz. Svet», 1915), 12–13.
²⁶ E. P. Novikow to M. P. Pogodin, 22 Dec. 1871, RGB f. 231/II, K. 22, e. 44, ll. 1-ob; Al’manax
sovremennyx russkix gosudarstvennyx deyatelej (St Petersburg: Tip. Isidora Gol’dberga, 1897), 49;
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Before he was dispatched to Syria on 16 August, the French commissioner Leon
Béclard’s only involvement in the Levant consisted of two years as attaché at the
French consulate in İzmir (Smyrna) (1844–6) and five months as consul general in
Alexandria (1860).²⁷ Similarly, the Prussian commissioner, Guido von Rehfues,
had had experience in the Levant only since March 1859, when he was appointed
as legation secretary in Istanbul.²⁸ Of all the commissioners, it was only Pierre
Weckbecker, who had been Austrian consul general in Beirut since 1856,
that had any real familiarity with and understanding of the complexities of
Lebanese politics.²⁹
The principal idea behind the establishment of an international security insti-
tution in Syria was to develop an ‘objective’ strategy to address the key issues that
had dragged the country into violence and war. With the exception of
Weckbecker, the European commissioners were all appointed from outside
Lebanon for this very reason: to make their institution ‘as independent of ideas,
preconceptions and local prejudices as possible’, because European consuls resid-
ing in the field tended to ‘wind up more or less being influenced’ by their local
experience.³⁰
However, aside from Weckbecker, all four commissioners held their own
presumptions and prejudices before their arrival. Just like General Beaufort,
looking at Lebanon with a hubristic, imperial gaze, they rarely, if ever, got off
their high horse, and harboured a firm belief in the grandiose importance of their
missions and responsibilities. They all considered the Lebanese to be semi- or
uncivilized barbarians, and insistently included this among the causes of the
violence. Again, bar Weckbecker, they all unceasingly suspected that an
Ottoman ploy was the main cause of the civil war. In the succeeding months
these prejudices and assumptions informed the policies and behaviours of the
commissioners while they followed their identical instructions to: (i) investigate
the origins and cause of the ‘outbreak and massacres’, (ii) see that the guilty were
punished, (iii) inquire into and advise on ‘the best means of preventing a renewal
K. A. Dzikov,Vostochnyj vopros v istoriosofskoj koncepcii K.N. Leont’eva (St Petersburg: Aleteiya, 2006),
9, 36.
²⁷ Annuaire diplomatique de l’empire français pour l’année 1865 (Paris: Veuve Berger-Levrault,
1865), 192–3; Léon Béclard, ‘Papiers de personnelle de MAE’, AMAE 233/PAAP4.
²⁸ Johann Ludwig Guido von Rehfues to Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von Schleinitz, 26 Aug.
1859, and Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz to Alexander Gustav Adolph Freiherr von
Schleinitz, 22 Sept. 1860, AA PA Nr. 11,881; Dietmar Grypa, Der diplomatische Dienst des Königreichs
Preußen (1815–1866). Institutioneller Aufbau und soziale Zusammensetzung (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 2008), 244f., 292 n. 277, 413, 422, 429, 436, 468, 477, 479, 594; Thouvenel to Béclard, 31
Aug. 1860, BOA HR.SYS.3 54/215.
²⁹ Rudolf Agstner and Elmar Samsinger (eds), Österreich in Istanbul: K. (u.) K. Präsenz im
Osmanischen Reich (Vienna: LIT, 2010), 50; Robert-Tarek Fischer, Österreich im Nahen Osten. Die
Großmachtpolitik der Habsburgermonarchie im Arabischen Orient 1633–1918 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2006),
162–4.
³⁰ Lobanov to Gorchakov, 16/28 Aug. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 601–3.
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of the late bloody scenes, and of ameliorating the government of Syria’, and (iv)
monitor the indemnification and reparations processes.³¹
The commissioners’ lack of familiarity with local realities and the time-
consuming obligation to discover those realities was at odds with the demand
for the swift completion of their tasks. They had to be quick not only to ensure
security in the mountain but also to prevent the prolongation of the French
expedition which, as we have seen, had been limited to six months by the
conventions of August and September 1860. The risk of its evolution into an
occupation and even annexation (as had happened in Nice and Savoy early in the
year) was ever-present, despite the assurances of Emperor Napoleon III and the
conventions, and because of the immense distrust that both European and
Ottoman statesmen harboured toward him.
Also paradoxical was the expectation that the commissioners were to act as a
single, European, Christian unit. They were expected to be ‘closely united with one
another . . . to deliberate on the means of ensuring the well-being of Christians on
solid foundations . . . for the dignity of the Commission as well as for the success of
its work’ under the gaze of the Ottoman authorities and for the prestige of
‘identical and collective action by Europe . . . in the eyes of the people of Syria’.³²
They should carefully avoid ‘any personal rivalry, any struggle for dominance’,
and their action should be ‘guided solely by the general interest, which so rightly
considers the fate of all Christians in the Ottoman Empire’.³³ This meant pro-
tracted negotiations among the commissioners on almost every subject in order to
reach a common position.
Another difficulty here was the fact that the commissioners appeared reluctant
to make any concessions detracting from their immediate national interests. As
candidly expressed by the Russian commissioner Novikow, none of them ‘wanted
to believe in [the] final character’ of the expectations from them outlined in the
collective brief.³⁴ In fact, aside from the collective brief, each of the commissioners
received separate orders from their seniors. Dufferin’s was one of preservation of
the status quo. Russell wrote to him that the chief object of the Commission
would be
to obtain security for the future peace of Syria. But internal peace cannot be
obtained without a speedy, pure and impartial administration of justice . . . [Y]ou
³¹ Russell to Cowley, 9 Aug. 1860, TNA PRO 30/22/104; Joseph Hajjar, L’Europe et les destinées du
Proche-Orient II. Napoléon et ses visées orientales 1848–1870, vol. 3 (Damascus: Dar Tlass, 1988), 1303.
³² Lobanov to Gorchakov, 16/28 Aug. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 601–3.
³³ ‘Copie d’une instruction spéciale au Commissaire Impérial en Syrie’, 25 Aug. 1860, AVPRI f. 133
(Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 666–71.
³⁴ ‘Kopiya raporta Komissara Rossijskoj imperii v Sirii, gosudarstvennogo sovetnika Novikova’,
11/23 Sept. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 736–9.
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will always bear in mind that no territorial acquisition, no exclusive influence, no
separate commercial advantage is sought by Her Majesty’s Government, nor
should be acquired by any of the Great Powers,
alluding particularly to France.³⁵ Thouvenel warned Béclard to pay extra attention
to the situation of the French nationals and protégés in the payment of repar-
ations, while Novikow was instructed to support whichever plan for the potential
reorganization of Mount Lebanon would give Orthodox Christians a separate
political standing, equal in importance to that of the Maronites and the Druze.³⁶
And Rehfues was ordered to
act under the premises that the Sublime Porte itself bears no guilt in the events in
the Lebanon (although the Ottoman local agents might) . . . [His] main goal . . .
should be justice for the Christian victims of the massacres and addressing the
systematic grievances the Christians have in their dealings with the local
Ottoman authorities.³⁷
With these diverse instructions in their pockets, during the numerous formal and
informal meetings they held in the following two years, despite usually remaining
‘calm in appearance’, the commissioners felt the immense gravity of their national
and religious responsibilities.³⁸ Fluid and separate alliances were formed and
dissolved between them on each separate issue. They did succeed in many cases
in forming a common front against Fuad Pașa, who began to attend the meetings,
irregularly, only from late October. But a struggle for influence characterized the
commissioners’ work all along. The more they discovered about the histories,
customs, habits, ideals, and emotions of the inhabitants and the Ottoman author-
ities, the more they began to feel the weight of the glaring discrepancies between
local realities and global imperial anxieties. How they strove to sustain the
momentum of the meetings, I will attempt to demonstrate in thematic rather
than purely chronological order, explaining the hurdles that the commissioners
repeatedly confronted in different domains.
³⁵ Lord John Russell to Lord Dufferin, 30 July 1860, TNA FO 195/659/42.
³⁶ Thouvenel to Béclard, 16 and 31 Aug. 1860, AMAE MD 138, f. 157 and 213; Lobanov to
Gorchakov, 16/28 Aug. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 601–3. ‘Copie d’une
instruction spéciale au Commissaire Impérial en Syrie’, 25 Aug. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o.
469, e. 42, ll. 666–71.
³⁷ Schleinitz to Rehfues, 30 Aug. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 11–14.
³⁸ Dufferin was replaced by Colonel A. J. Fraser in July 1861; and Rehfues by the Prussian consul in
Beirut, Heinrich Ludwig Theodor Weber, in Jan. 1862. Foreign Office to Colonel Fraser, 10 July 1861,
TNA FO 78/1706; Theodor Weber to Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff, 30 Jan. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA,
I Nr. 7572, f. 130; Abro to Cabouly, 30 Apr. 1861, ODD 336.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
     325
Securing Hearts: Relief and Reparations
In the summer of 1860, as the violence in Mount Lebanon and Damascus was
being subdued, Syria was replete with grim scenes. Thousands were sick. Children
were dying with alarming rapidity in the hot climate. Epidemics were spreading in
overcrowded hospitals amongst ‘the half-fed, half-clothed and half-sheltered
multitudes’.³⁹ The immediate provision of relief proved to be the most pressing
of all the issues that the commissioners faced on their arrival in the country.
In fact, their work only paralleled the relief efforts that had already begun in an
orderly and systematic manner before the European commission was formed. In
addition to the Ottoman committees set up by that Abro and Franco in July and
August 1860, various religious missions that had been operating in Syria since the
1820s had been the first to take up the task of offering relief. The Lazarists and
their female counterpart, Filles de la Charité, the Jesuits and their protégés, Sœurs
de Saint-Josep de l’Apparition, the Church of Scotland, and the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) had all established committees for
the distribution of alms, with the support of their respective consulates.⁴⁰ The
Protestant missions later merged under the Anglo-American Relief Committee
(AARF). The Austrian, Greek, and Russian consulates instituted their own com-
mittees for the same purpose. And French troops under General Beaufort pro-
vided both funds and manpower for the reconstruction of damaged roads and
buildings.
The relief committees collected donations from the United States and Europe
and fromMuslim notables in the Ottoman Empire.⁴¹ They distributed bread daily,
provided houses and tents for shelter, operated hospitals for the sick, and opened
soup kitchens for nursing mothers. They also published several appeals for aid,
describing the gloomy situation in the Levant. ‘[U]nless better food, clothing, and
medical care are provided,’ the AARF announced in one of its pleas, ‘the victims of
disease will ere long outnumber those of the sword.’⁴² Another appeal in October
1860 read:
The poor sick are sleeping by the thousand on the earth or the stone floors, with
nothing to cover them, and are dying by hundreds from dysentery. Do not relax
³⁹ ‘Anglo-American Relief Committee Statement ordered to be printed for circulation in England
and America’, signed by Niven Moore, 23 Aug. 1860, ABCFM v. 6. Mission to Syria, 1860–1871, v. 1.
[291], 102.
⁴⁰ Hauser, German, 61–2; Sami Kuri, Une histoire du Liban à travers les archives des jésuites,
1846–1862 (Beirut: Dar el-Marchreq, 1986), 286; BOA HR.SFR.3 50/22/3.
⁴¹ ‘Operations of the Anglo-American Relief Committee and its Auxiliaries’, 4 Nov. 1860, GStA
I. HA Rep 81, XI Nr. 66, f. 169. On the limits of the altruism of the missions, see Hauser, German, 58.
⁴² ‘Anglo-American Relief Committee Statement ordered to be printed for circulation in England
and America’, signed by Niven Moore, 23 Aug. 1860, ABCFM v. 6. Mission to Syria,1860–1871, v. 1.
[291], 102.
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your efforts to help these miserable people. They cannot get their bread from
burnt stones and plundered fields and orchards.⁴³
Circulars travelled fast among the various establishments calling for the expansion
of ‘the loins’ of their charities, for their ‘abundant alms’ to ‘cross [ . . . ] the seas’ and
bring ‘a precious alleviation to miseries whose heart-breaking tales have deeply
moved anyone who has retained some feelings of humanity and religion’.⁴⁴
In their first gatherings in October 1860, held in the absence of Fuad Pașa, the
European commissioners considered how to make the workings of these various
committees most effective and unanimously agreed on the third meeting to coord-
inate them according to need, regardless of the specific confession for which they
were established.⁴⁵ A central aid committee was then formed to coordinate inter-
national efforts. However, the commission’s influence remained thin.
This was because, even though several missions cooperated with each other
transferring funds in between them time and again, as the German historian Julia
Hauser tells us, ‘Internal divisions [of the commission] were mirrored in the field
of charity.’⁴⁶ The ‘vigorous competition between missions’ that had existed for
decades continued even after the civil war. Violence in Syria was regarded by both
Protestant (American, British and Prussian) and Catholic (predominantly French
and Austria) missions as a ‘major chance for consolidating their influence, as a
prime opportunity for mission work’, whereby ‘[c]hildren were [considered to be]
a particularly promising target group, given their alleged malleability’.⁴⁷ They
wished to build better schools in better buildings (mansions) for the orphans.
They even toyed with the idea of mass exportation of children to Europe to secure
them for their missions.⁴⁸ But the competition amongst them made the central-
ization of relief impossible.
Existing forms of cooperative action among the different denominations were
also undercut in due course. For example, the AARF, which, alongside the Sœurs
de Saint-Josep, was one of the most active charities, received the support of Prussia
in the beginning and thus coalesced into a tripartite Protestant alliance.⁴⁹ The
Prussian consul in Beirut, Weber, described it as ‘one of the rare cases of a
multinational-cooperation’.⁵⁰ A few months later, however, nationalist sentiments
came into play: the Prussian agents worked to increase their own influence on the
⁴³ ‘The Syrian Massacres: A Second Appeal for the Syrian Sufferers’, New York, 22 Oct. 1860,
ABCFM v. 6. Mission to Syria, 1860–1871, v. 1. [291], 106.
⁴⁴ ‘Monseigneur L’Évêque de Coutances et d’Avranches (Niederbronn) aux clergé et fidèles de notre
diocèse’, 9 Aug. 1860, BNFM E-2400, no. 76.
⁴⁵ Weckbecker to Rechberg, 21 Oct. 1860, AT-OeStA/HHStA PA XXXVIII 134–5, 9.
⁴⁶ Hauser, German, 61. ⁴⁷ Ibid. 76. ⁴⁸ Ibid. 20, 58.
⁴⁹ ‘Anglo-American Relief Committee Statement ordered to be printed for circulation in England
and America’, signed by Niven Moore, 23 Aug. 1860, ABCFM v. 6. Mission to Syria, 1860–1871, v. 1.
[291], 102; ‘Operations of the Anglo-American Relief Committee and its Auxiliaries’, 4 Nov. 1860,
GStA I. HA Rep 81, XI Nr. 66, f. 169.
⁵⁰ Weber to Schleinitz, 13 Jan. 1861, GStA I. HA Rep 81, XI Nr. 66, f. 54–5.
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ground by means of charity, and decided to establish a separate ‘German com-
mittee’ in January 1861.⁵¹
Who the net beneficiaries of these policies were, and if, and to what extent, the
donors sought to influence political and administrative decision-making processes
on the spot, is difficult to establish. The absence of primary sources and therefore
of studies which reconstruct the histories of religious missions from the perspec-
tive of the local Levantines constrains our insight into this question, and certainly
necessitates further research. Even then, regardless of competition among mis-
sions, in an emergency that was so unexpected, pressing, and overwhelming for
the men and women on the spot, the quest for ‘humanitarian relief ’ in 1860
proved to be a partial success—all the more so because meeting the needs of
thousands required a large and steady flow of funds. Proactive fund-raising
campaigns in New York, London, Paris, and other major metropoles almost all
over the world, in collaboration with major philanthropist families such as the
Rothschilds and the Montefiores, helped to allay the disquiet and to meet needs.⁵²
For the almost bankrupt Sublime Porte, which was also liable to pay indem-
nities and reparations to the Lebanese and foreign victims of the war for justice
through compensation, the only way to go forward and to address local expect-
ations was to obtain loans from the very same metropoles. That would turn out to
be an entirely different story.
*
The fact was that, financially speaking, in early 1860, before the civil war in Syria
and the events in Montenegro erupted, the Ottoman treasury had been under
immense strain. A few months after his arrival in Syria, the funds at Fuad’s disposal
had been exhausted by heavy spending on the relief of the victims. Since the Porte
could not supply any more funds, the pașa and the commissioners found themselves
confronted with the issue of raising money for restoring the infrastructure and for
the relief of the displaced Christian refugees in November 1860.
In the eighth meeting of the commission in Beirut, after giving an account of
the needs of the Syrians and the means of providing for them, Fuad explained that
the only way to obtain the money the Porte needed to add onto its budget, which
amounted nearly to 100 million piastres (£775,000) (while the estimated total
amount needed for reparations was 250 million piastres), would be to secure a new
loan with the assistance of the Powers.⁵³ But his proposal was declared inadmis-
sible by the European commissioners.
⁵¹ Wolz to M. J. Bosgiovich, 31 Dec. 1860, BOA HR.MKT 363/47. See also Hauser, German, 63.
⁵² Abigail Green,Moses Montefiore (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 290–91; ‘The
Syrian Relief Fund’, New York Times, 23 Aug. 1860, 4; ‘British Syrian Relief Fund’, Sydney Morning
Herald, 28 Dec. 1860, 5.
⁵³ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 3 Nov. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 218–20; Lavalette to
Thouvenel, 4 Dec. 1860 AMAE CP 133/347/313.
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The Prussian commissioner, Rehfues, suggested that the sum necessary for the
restoration of the Christians could be taken from the Muslims of Damascus and
Sayda as well as from the Druze, by way of an extraordinary tax. Dufferin
intervened on behalf of the Druze, and opposed any such extra taxation.⁵⁴ In
order to induce his government to take the same position, he ‘launched against the
Maronites the most bitter diatribes’, sending to Istanbul exaggerated numbers of
the losses incurred by the Christians during the war.⁵⁵ Following incessant
pressure by the commissioners, and the intervention of Dufferin, Fuad Pașa
agreed to demand only some 12.5 million piastres from the Damascene
Muslims.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the lands sequestered from the Druze muqatadjis were
leased to the Christian peasants on a two-year contract.
What interests us here the most is not how much was paid to whom, but who
paid for security in the end, and how. As we have seen, the economic suffering that
the Syrian Muslims had been subjected to since the incorporation of the Levant
into the global capitalist economy were one of many causes of violence that had
erupted in Mount Lebanon and Damascus as well as in other parts of Syria and the
Ottoman Empire in the 1850s and 1860s. Yet, rightly or wrongly, the fact that the
same people were now taxed for the rehabilitation of their belligerents constituted
another paradox, provoked bitterness, and once more heightened insecurities.
Uncontrollable waves of refugees went on to emigrate to the coasts (sahil) from
Damascus.⁵⁷ Thousands looked for opportunities to travel even further—to Egypt,
Europe, and the Americas.⁵⁸
In the meantime, mixed (Muslim and Christian) inspection committees were
established and tasked with listing the victims (namely, the Christian subjects,
foreign residents in Syria, and religious institutions and establishments) and
assessing the economic damage in order to decide upon collective and individual
reparations and property compensation. But their work became more and more
complex because of the absence of funds at the disposal of Fuad Pașa, as well as
the inconsistent (and therefore often bloated and implausible) demands of the
Syrians and foreign residents for reparations, as well as interference by the
European commissioners and consuls in the name of justice via compensation.⁵⁹
Only in May 1862, at the last, fiftieth gathering, could the commissioners reach an
⁵⁴ ‘Résumé des rapports de M. Nowikow’, No. 25, 23 Oct./4 Nov. 1860, AVPRI f. 133
(Kantselyariya), o. 469, d. 37, ll. 245–6.
⁵⁵ Rizk, Mont-Liban, 332.
⁵⁶ ‘Résumé des rapports de M. Nowikow’, No. 25, 23 Oct./4 Nov. 1860, AVPRI f. 133
(Kantselyariya), o. 469, d. 37, ll. 245–6; ‘Otryvki iz raporta komissara Rossii v Sirii’, 3/15 April 1861,
AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 37, l. 431.
⁵⁷ ‘Otryvki iz raporta komissara Rossii v Sirii’, 3/15 Apr. 1861, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469,
e. 37, l. 431.
⁵⁸ Rizk, Mont-Liban, 336. ⁵⁹ Farah, Politics, 635.
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agreement.⁶⁰ But what was decided upon was only a limited and symbolic
solution.⁶¹
*
It might be fitting to pause here in our discussion of the international commission,
and consider the broader financial and economic situation in the Levant at the
time. This will enable us to understand why the reparation payments made in the
end were only symbolic. It will also allow us to see that the 1860 civil war
coincided with a ‘financial turn’ in the Eastern Question, and not accidentally.
There were several reasons for the poor condition of Ottoman finances at the
time. These included the mounting trade deficits accrued since the commercial
agreements of the late 1830s, the extraordinary and high volume of expenditures
incurred by the Crimean War, the floating internal and external debts (the Porte
had contracted the first foreign loans in its history during and after the Crimean
War in 1854, 1855, and 1858), the global financial crisis that broke out in Western
markets in 1857 (which prevented the repayment of tranches of previous loans),
the conspicuously extravagant and unprofitable spending of the palace, and,
perhaps most importantly, the excessive issue of Ottoman kaimes (paper
money), which could not be retrieved for long. All these factors had resulted in
an economy unable to keep imperial finances afloat, not to mention the payment
of reparations for victims of the civil war in Syria.⁶² In 1860, the total debt of the
Ottoman Empire was estimated at 774 million francs (Fr. 310 million external and
Fr. 237 million domestic debt, for the most part to the Galata bankers), which
amounted to approximately £30.5 million and 390 million Ottoman piasters.⁶³
In mid-July 1860, days after Fuad Pașa’s departure for Syria, Ottoman corres-
pondence revealed that ‘the recent misfortunes of Syria are threatening new and
considerable expenses to [the Porte] . . .We absolutely need a loan of £5–6 mil-
lion.’ Even though Ottoman ministers were ready to ‘offer the most warranted
⁶⁰ The distribution to the Ottoman subjects (individuals) amounted to a sum of 25.5 million piastres
(23.93 million was to be paid to the Christians, 1 million to the Druze, 500,000 to the Metuwalis, and
70,000 to the Muslims), while 1,088,009 piastres was to be paid to the religious establishments (436,000
to the Franciscans, 49,000 to the Capucins, 202,000 to the Jesuits, and 400,000 to the Lazarists) and 5.2
million piastres to foreign residents in Syria. BOA HR.SYS 914/5/63–67.
⁶¹ Rizk, Mont-Liban, 338.
⁶² A financial commission had been established during the CrimeanWar to help the Porte repay the
loans it had contracted in 1855–6 by changing the tax base and tax collection methods. In June 1860, it
was named as Conseil Supérieur des Trésors. The council consisted of French, British, and Austrian
delegates MM. Falconnet and Lackenbachen and the marquis de Ploeuc, alongside Mehmed Rüşdü
Pașa, Fuad Pașa, and Hasib Pașa. Sublime Porte, MAE Bureau de Presse, 17 Aug. 1859, BOA HR.SFR.4
30/40/4; Falconnet to Bulwer, 24 Jan. 1860, NRO Bulwer Papers, BUL 1/221/1–40, 567X8; Lobanov to
Gorchakov, 19/31 July 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 535–8; A. Du Velay, Essai
sur l’histoire financière de la Turquie depuis le règne du sultan Mahmoud II jusqu’à nos jours (Paris:
Arthur Rousseau, 1903), 156–7.
⁶³ Velay, Essai, 154; André Autheman, La Banque impériale ottomane (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire
économique et financière de la France, 1996), 18.
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guarantees’ to secure the loan, talks with the Rothschild, Bischofsheim, and
Goldsmith financial houses would yield no favourable results. The grim situation
of the treasury and the policies of the Porte had led to a severe loss of credit-
worthiness. Now it was able to access loan offers from European syndicates only
on considerably harsher terms compared to the previous loans contracted in
1855–6.⁶⁴
In the slipstream of monetary distress, the Eastern Question took a ‘financial
turn’. It was the French and British governments that had acted as guarantors of
the 1854 and 1855 loans that the Porte now appeared unable to pay back. A large
portion of the Ottoman bills of exchange had been bought by French and British
investors. The financial survival of the Porte was now both a European and
Ottoman concern; French and British statesmen therefore considered it in their
‘best interests to help [the Ottoman Empire] extend her sad existence’.⁶⁵
Yet the Eastern Question, as I have argued time and again in this book, was
almost never a one-way dilemma. In a similar vein, Ottoman ministers recognized
their dependence on the British and French governments, which was (as already
noted) one of the reasons for their consent to the Great Power intervention in
Syria. In early August, the interim grand vizier, Âli Pașa, admitted that the
realization of a new loan relied ‘absolutely on the benevolent offices of Britain
and France’.⁶⁶
In fact, in late 1860 a way out of this dilemma was found. After failing to
contract loans with several European syndicates, the sultan’s government had
managed to secure a deal with Jules Mirès, the French financier and director-
general of the combined treasury of the French railway companies, in
November.⁶⁷ However, this deal dragged the Ottoman finances into an even
graver crisis by the end of 1861.⁶⁸
The first draw-down of the loan, which amounted in total to £16 million with a
record low issue rate (53.75 per cent) and high interest (14 per cent), was to be
made on 1 June 1861.⁶⁹ But on 18 February, Mirès was arrested in Paris on charges
of escroquerie (swindling). This dealt a severe blow to the Porte.⁷⁰ It was not only
because with this deal its treasury would have been significantly relieved of
internal floating debts. The loan would also have alleviated the markets and
reduced the circulation of bills of exchange. The failure of the deal sparked a
crisis in Istanbul as well as in Britain and France, whose nationals were holders of
⁶⁴ Musurus to [Sublime Porte], 15 Aug. 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 53/10/3, Musurus [?] to
M. Rodocanachi, 16 Aug. 1860 BOA HR.SFR.3 53/10/5; Eldem, ‘Stability’, 435–6.
⁶⁵ Lavalette to Thouvenel, 20 June 1860, AMAE CP 133/345/86.
⁶⁶ Aali Pasha to Bulwer, 28 Aug. 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 53/10/6.
⁶⁷ Aali to Musurus, 7 Nov. 1860, BOA HR.SFR.3 55/5.
⁶⁸ Edhem Eldem, ‘Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank
and the Ottoman Public Debt’, European Review 13(3) (2005): 431–45, 436.
⁶⁹ Velay, Essai, 158–9. ⁷⁰ ‘Matters at Paris’, New York Times, 13 Mar. 1861, 2.
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most of the existing Ottoman bills of exchange.⁷¹ While several major commercial
houses dealing with the Levant (e.g. Ede, Rodochanachi, Hava, and Baltazzi) filed
for bankruptcy, real panic seized the Galata bankers in Istanbul, and the value of
the Ottoman currency dropped by two-thirds. One pound British sterling was
quoted to 129 Ottoman piastres in January 1861. By May, this exceeded 200
piastres.⁷²
Due to its lack of creditworthiness, it was now almost completely impossible for
the Porte to seek any immediate relief in the markets of Paris and London with a
new loan. In this grim context, the grand vizier, Âli Pașa, sent a desperate
memorandum to the British and French authorities, stressing that the further
fall of the commercial houses of the Levant ‘would cause such disruption and
increase the distress of the Ottoman Treasury . . . that the Eastern Question [la
question d’Orient], which we hope to reduce, could, as a fatal consequence of this
catastrophe, be posed immediately’. The Porte asked for the ‘moral support’ of
Paris and London in drafting financial reforms, achieving its borrowing, and
liquidating the existing circulation, which was ‘the sole cause of the crisis which
threatens the greatest misfortunes of the merchants of the Levant, the French and
British interests adhering to it, and what is more serious still, perhaps the future of
the political order’.⁷³
Intending to obtain at least a portion of the Mirès loan deal and acquire ‘the
moral support’ of Europe in their quest for financial survival, Ottoman ministers
also made an unprecedented concession in the customs tariff negotiations with the
European empires, which (as already noted) had been periodically held since the
1800s and which had restarted in 1857. They agreed on the immediate reduction
of average export duties by 4 per cent (from 12 to 8 per cent) and then to their
further reduction at the rate of 1 per cent per year for the next eight years, after
which only a nominal duty would be levied.⁷⁴
This was a vital milestone. Even though the liberalization and opening up of the
Ottoman Empire to ‘free trade’ is usually associated with the 1838–41 commercial
agreements signed with the European Powers, what had in fact happened at the
time was only a reregulation of tariffs and the abolition of monopolies. Ottoman
economic liberalization was made nearly complete after the Crimean War, with
the land reform of 1858 (that allowed international banks control the property)
and finally with the agreements of 1861. The first of these, the Kanlıca
Commercial Treaty, was signed with France on 29 April 1861, which was followed
by similar agreements with all major European Powers in the following months.⁷⁵
⁷¹ The main inspiration of Émile Zola’s best-selling book L’Argent originates from this financial
crisis in 1861.
⁷² Velay, Essai, 164–5. ⁷³ Ibid.
⁷⁴ Mr Foster and Lord Hobart, Report on the Financial Condition of Turkey (London: Harrison &
Sons, 1862), 14.
⁷⁵ Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire, 113.
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With these concessions, the Porte could obtain only a small payment from the
Mirès deal (Fr. 32 million francs; approximately £1.2 million) in return. But it did
little more than pay lip service to the complaints of the rising middle classes all
over the empire, which included the merchants and bankers operating in
Lebanon.⁷⁶
In Lebanon too, especially after the bankruptcies of the commercial houses of
Marseille and Istanbul in the spring of 1861, commercial transactions were almost
entirely interrupted. European and local traders withdrew all their capital from the
banks in Beirut, and immense pressure was put on the international commission-
ers for the swift resolution of the ongoing retributive proceedings and adminis-
trative reform talks, which, it was believed, would enable economic recovery.⁷⁷ As
we will see, during the following months the influence of traders and bankers on
the result of these proceedings would be profound.
As for the indemnities and reparation payments to the Christians of Lebanon
and Damascus, they began only after 1863, and only when a new loan was
contracted between the Porte and its newly established state bank, the Imperial
Ottoman Bank, which was in fact an Anglo-French enterprise.⁷⁸ The indemnities
were compensated also by the issue of long-term interest-bearing bonds to the
Lebanese.⁷⁹ In need of ready money, some of the poorer locals immediately sold
the bonds for a very small price. Moreover, due to the loss of the value of the
piastre, most of the claimants received much less than the actual cost of the
damage.
Symbolic as the reparation payments truly may have been, they still represented
the enforcing power of an inter-imperial condominium in the Levant. In reality, it
was with the aid of the French syndicates’ lucrative loan deals to the inhabitants in
1861–2 that the local (silk) economy was rescued. Moreover, out of the £250,000
(42.5 million Ottoman piastres) supplied by foreign donors, a considerable
amount was spent on the revitalization of the silk industry.⁸⁰ Thanks to the
work of the French troops in the mixed districts that helped rebuild many
factories, and the increase in the price of silk in international markets after the
shortage of cotton as a result of the civil war in North America, merchants and
peasants were able to procure immense profits from silk production as of the early
⁷⁶ Autheman, Banque impériale, 20. Because the amount produced after the Mirès deal was very
small, neither the litigation of the floating debt nor the withdrawal of the kaimes from circulation
became possible. Under the weight of indemnities and relief in Lebanon and the expenses of the
campaigns in the Balkans and the Levant, more paper money was issued, which increased the kaime’s
depreciation and disrupted transactions, since the traders refused to accept kaimes in payment. By the
time the amount of the indemnity payments for the Lebanese was agreed upon in May 1862, the
Ottoman currency had devalued immensely.
⁷⁷ Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, 5 May 1861, AMAE Papiers Thouvenel, 233PAAP/5/16.
⁷⁸ Edhem Eldem, A History of the Ottoman Bank (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Historical Research
Centre, 1999).
⁷⁹ Spagnolo, France, 82. ⁸⁰ Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, 6 July 1861, AMAE 42CCC/7/272.
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1860s.⁸¹ Equally importantly, the economic recovery of Lebanon was facilitated by
the elimination of the political privileges of themuqatadjis by means of retributive
justice and administrative reform.
The Scapegoats? Retributive Justice and Règlement Organique
The muqatadjis of Lebanon had long been considered, by the coalition of a rising
middle class, merchants, bankers, and their European associates as well as the
Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic) clergy, as barriers to
commercial enterprise and the acquisition of land. In 1861, when the muqatadjis
were put on trial, along with hundreds of Druze peasants, and when the dual-
kaymakamlık system was scrapped, the common front of this rising middle-class
coalition played a significant role.
European ‘traders and industrialists of all nationalities’, local merchants, and
clergy repeatedly submitted pleas to the commissioners for ‘prompt and energetic
solutions’ to the distress of Lebanon.⁸² They argued:
if the intervention of Europe has provided temporary security by stopping the
massacres, no satisfactory measure has been taken again to erase the traces and to
conjure the return . . . [T]he unfortunate victims have so far received only illusory
promises of compensation. Most of the culprits are still awaiting the punishment
that justice and the public opinion demands. The question of reorganization, an
absolute condition for a better future, does not seem to have been resolved, even
in principle.⁸³
These petitions accentuated the fact that the interests of commerce were
‘intimately linked to the re-establishment of order’, while ‘the delay in payment
of compensation due to Christians and foreigners, have long since stopped
business . . . ’⁸⁴ They symbolized the point at which the imperialism of free trade
(i.e. the dominant influence of commercial spirit) and the imperialism of security
represented by the international commission overlapped, and turned into a
transformative power in their own right.
The retributive justice and administrative reorganization in Mount Lebanon in
1860–64 needs to be considered against this background. Remarkably similar
⁸¹ Owen, Middle East, 165; Ulecaly to Outrey, 2 July 1863, AMAE 42CCC/7/403.
⁸² Gortschakoff to Kisselew (Paris), 2 May 1861, AMAE 112CP/224; Bentivoglio to Thouvenel,
20 Apr. 1861, AMAE 42CCC/7/263; Rehfues to Schleinitz, 9 Apr. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571,
f. 78–80; Rehfues to Schleinitz, 17 Apr. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 98–9.
⁸³ ‘Copie de la lettre accompagnant la révise de l’adresse par les délègues du Commerce (Beyrout)’,
10 Apr. 1861, AMAE 42CCC/7/266.
⁸⁴ Ibid.
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patterns were followed during both. In both, the imperial agents’ endeavours
focused on protecting the interests of their protégés and co-religionists as well
as the rising middle class. In both, the European commissioners displayed an
immense distrust of the existing systems. In both, pronouncements by men on the
spot were largely overruled by statesmen in the metropoles, who then made the
final decisions. After both, it was the muqatadjis’ privileges that were stripped in
the face of imperial ambitions, as they were unanimously considered the source of
the existing order’s ills. The causes of violence in 1860 were sought in the ancient
feudal system. The new middle class, merchants and bankers of Lebanon, and
their European associates emerged as the net beneficiaries of both.
*
During the judicial proceedings, the European commissioners loyally adhered to
their specific instructions that ‘the punishment must especially reach those that
had an official character’.⁸⁵ They were convinced that Fuad Pașa and the judges
who served in the extraordinary and military tribunals knowingly protected
Ottoman officials and officers during their trials, and deliberately laid the blame
at the door of the ‘uncivilized’ Lebanese and Damascene Muslims rather than of
their own imperial officials and officers, to deny their own responsibility.⁸⁶
For these reasons, even though the European plenipotentiaries appeared to
have had very little knowledge of the Ottoman penal code in use, they endeav-
oured to intervene in legal proceedings in the belief that they would render them
‘really useful and effectual’. They candidly recognized the ‘great delicacy for a
body foreign to the state to demand the liberty of . . . interfering with the action of
a sovereign Tribunal’. Nonetheless they demanded the right to supply supple-
mentary questions to the courts and prevent the quashing of any evidence
discreditable to the Ottoman officers and bureaucrats. This, they argued, would
‘satisfy . . . Europe’.’⁸⁷
As a consequence of their continuous pestering, the financial distress of the
Porte, and Fuad Pașa’s unwavering desire to demonstrate his attachment to the
‘public conscience of the civilised world’, the European commissioners managed
to get the Ottoman extraordinary envoy’s permission to attend the courts, purely
to monitor the legal proceedings, not to participate.⁸⁸ In due course, the pașa
agreed on the publication of the minutes of the extraordinary trials, and even
granted the commissioners the opportunity to express their ‘advisory opinions’
⁸⁵ ‘Copie d’une instruction spéciale au Commissaire Impérial en Syrie en date du 25 août 1860’,
AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 666–71.
⁸⁶ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 29 Sept. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 33–6; ‘Rapport de
Novikow’, 6 Sept. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 37, l. 39.
⁸⁷ Dufferin to Bulwer, 26 Oct. 1860, TNA FO 195/656.
⁸⁸ BOA I.MM. 935/1, 24 Jan. 1861; cf. Makdisi, Culture, 154.
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before the final verdicts on the culpable were made by the extraordinary
tribunals.⁸⁹
It would be untrue to argue that the influence of European diplomats over the
procedures was merely negative. They detected several irregularities in judicial
proceedings, such as the employment of certain Ottoman officials as judges even
though their names had been linked to pillaging or to the summary punishment
(execution) of people of low social standing in Damascus.⁹⁰ They managed to
‘correct’ some of these appointments.⁹¹ But, concurrently, the commissioners took
almost diametrically opposite positions among themselves with respect to the
punishment of the Druze, which complicated matters and, for better or worse,
prolonged the retributive justice procedures.
In the beginning, the British commissioner, Dufferin, validated the punishment
of the Druze muqatadjis in general, and Said Jumblatt, their leading figure, in
particular. After returning from exile upon Fuad’s summons, when Said requested
to see Dufferin to ask his protection, the latter refused to see the Druze sheikh on
the grounds that ‘he would not associate with common bandits’.⁹² However, when
the British commissioner received express orders from London ‘to save [Jumblatt]
whatever the costs’, on account of the special relations that had existed between
the British and the Druze since the 1840s,⁹³ he immediately changed his position.
Together with Niven Moore, the British consul in Beirut, he eagerly committed
himself to clearing Said and the other Druze of responsibility, striving to shield
them from any self-interested quest for imperial justice.
The French commissioner, Béclard, General Beaufort, and the Russian com-
missioner, Novikow, by contrast, pressed Ottoman authorities for summary
punishment for the Druze ‘atrocities’ against the Orthodox and Catholic
Christians of the mountain. As early as September 1860, even before the commis-
sion began its official meetings, Fuad Pașa’s fulminating decree, by which the
ranks and titles of the recalcitrant Druze muqatadjis were abolished, their prop-
erty was sequestrated, and the Druze kaymakamlık in the south was temporarily
divided into four military circles, was celebrated by Russian and French agents.
They considered these to be ‘dexterous’ acts against ‘the persecutors of
Christians’.⁹⁴ However, the British agents Dufferin and Moore questioned any ill
intention, i.e. whether the confiscation of the property of such figures as Said
⁸⁹ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 15 Oct. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, 111fs–121fs.
⁹⁰ The European commissioners argued that a certain Hüsnü Bey, a judge of the extraordinary
tribunal in Beirut, was ‘biased’ and unfit for service, as he had participated in the events in Baalbek he
was investigating and was suspected of robbing a church there. Rehfues to Schleinitz, 18 and 20 Oct.
1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 125, 131–6.
⁹¹ ‘Résumé des rapports de M. Nowikow’, 23 Oct./4 Nov. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469,
e. 37, ll. 245–6; Lobanov to Gorchakov, 11/23 Oct. 1860, AVPRI, f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42,
ll. 778–9.
⁹² Rehfues to Schleinitz, 28 Oct. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 179. ⁹³ See Ch. 10.
⁹⁴ ‘Kopiya raporta Komissara Rossijskoj imperii v Sirii’, 11/23 Sept. 1860, AVPRI, f. 133
(Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 42, ll. 736–9.
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Jumblatt, ‘a person of immense possessions’, was considered an ‘acceptable
accession to Fuad Pasha’s military chest’.⁹⁵ These rifts continued until the cases
against the Druze muqatadjis were definitively closed in 1864.
The subsequent trial of Said Jumblatt shows how the protection of European
and Ottoman imperial interests was intimately tied to questions of life or death for
the mountain’s inhabitants. The Ottoman authorities’ readiness to throw the
Druze muqatadjis before the world public as the culprits of the violence in order
to mitigate Ottoman (ir)responsibility during the civil war, British attempts to
prevent this to maintain their chains of influence with the Lebanese, and French
pursuit of their summary punishment in order to bolster the position of the
Maronites, all brought the Eastern Question into the courtroom in Beirut.
Not that no investigation was held into the Jumblatt case. Quite the contrary:
divergence of imperial concerns and rancorous competition among the Powers
meant that the case was more fastidiously tackled than it could possibly have been
otherwise. Said was interrogated in several sessions of the extraordinary
tribunals—albeit with a strongly prejudiced and hostile tone on the part of the
Ottoman judges. He was allowed to name witnesses, both Muslim (Sunni and
Druze) and Christian. Inspection committees were sent to Sayda, Djizzin, and
Mukhtara, where he was claimed to have been involved in violence. Dufferin even
made an effort to demand additional procedural safeguards for Said Jumblatt such
as granting him access to a counsel, but Fuad Pașa denied this because the
involvement of defence lawyers was not an Ottoman practice.⁹⁶ And in some
sessions of the trial, even though he was allowed in merely as an observer, the
British delegate Niven Moore more than once interrupted the interrogation,
arguing that the nature of the questions directed to Jumblatt was unacceptable
and that the minutes had been recorded improperly.
Said Jumblatt was also listened to. He pleaded his innocence, claiming that he
had nothing to do with the murder of the Christians in Deir al-Qamar and
Mukhtara and that he protected the Christians ‘whenever and wherever possible’.
As a matter of fact, Muslim and some Christian defence witnesses refrained from
incriminating him. But, apart from Dufferin, the European commissioners sus-
pected that Jumblatt had protected some of the Christians in order to obtain those
witnesses, while he had acted with ‘even more anger on the Christians in neigh-
bouring communities’.⁹⁷
As the Prussian commissioner reported back to Berlin, British endeavours to
protect the Druze prompted ‘bad blood inside the European Commission’.⁹⁸
⁹⁵ Dufferin to Bulwer, 26 Oct. 1860, TNA FO 195/656.
⁹⁶ Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, ‘Constructing Humanity’s Justice: Accountability for “Crimes
Against Humanity” in the Wake of the Syria Crisis of 1860’, in Historical Origins of International
Criminal Law, ed. Morten Bergsmo, CheahWui Ling, Song Tianying, and and Yi Ping, vol. 3 (Brussels:
Torkel Opsahl, 2015), 219.
⁹⁷ Weckbecker to Rechberg, 25 Oct. 1860, HHStA PA XXXVIII 134–5/10.
⁹⁸ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 7 Nov. 1860, GStA, III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 230–38.
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Dufferin suggested—possibly rightly so—that the least culpable position in the
hierarchy of crimes against Christians had to be reserved for the Druze, whose
excesses proceeded from a civil war into which they had been incited by their
Christian antagonists ‘very much against their will’.⁹⁹ But then, when other
Christian defence witnesses almost unanimously attributed to Jumblatt ‘all the
misfortunes of the Mountain, which he would have had . . . the power to prevent,
had he wanted it’, testifying to his involvement in the ‘massacres’, almost all the
commissioners were certain that capital punishment awaited Said.¹⁰⁰
*
In February 1861, the decision taken by the extraordinary tribunals was as
expected. Said Jumblatt and all the major Druze muqatadjis and sheikhs who
had returned to the mountain from exile in September 1860 after Fuad Pașa’s
summons—Hussein Talhuq, Karam Abu Nakad, Asad Hamad—were sentenced
to death for their rebellious behaviour, ‘dereliction of their dut[ies] and respon-
sibility[ies] to restrain and control [their] followers’, while hundreds (Druze and
Sunni) were sentenced to temporary deportation to Crete and Libya.¹⁰¹ Of all the
major Druze muqatadjis, only Yusuf Abd al-Malik was acquitted after French silk
spinners’ favourable testimonies of him for protecting their property during the
civil war.¹⁰² The Ottoman governor of Sayda, Hurșid Pașa, was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
When these pronouncements were brought to the attention of the European
commissioners for their ‘advice’ before the final verdicts were made, the commis-
sion held drawn-out sessions to reach a collective opinion. But their long delib-
erations yielded no such result. Even though each commissioner had attended the
same sessions, read the same minutes, and interviewed the same people, their
viewpoints differed irreconcilably. To arrive at a common position as ‘European’
commissioners, they agreed to make their decision by open vote.
Dufferin tried to reduce the responsibility of Said Jumblatt and the Druze,
pointing out that there was not sufficient evidence to sentence them to capital
punishment. Béclard followed French imperial policy. He condemned to death all
the chiefs, all the heads of ‘a plot’, both Ottoman and Druze. More experienced in
the affairs of Lebanon, the Austrian commissioner, Weckbecker, thought it a
necessity to acquit everyone, given the ‘extenuating circumstances contained in
the trials and in the [political] situation itself ’. It then came down to the votes of
the Prussian and Russian commissioners, Rehfues and Novikow. The manner in
⁹⁹ ‘Substance of an Interpellation addressed by Dufferin to Fuad Pasha at the 8th Meeting of the
European Commission’, 10 Nov. 1860, TNA FO 195/657.
¹⁰⁰ Weckbecker to Rechberg, 25 Oct. 1860, HHStA PA XXXVIII 134–5/10.
¹⁰¹ Makdisi, Culture, 154. ¹⁰² Fawaz, An Occasion, 185.
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which they made up their minds illustrated the decisive role of religious sensitiv-
ities in inter-imperial decision-making.
Both Rehfues and Novikow admitted that the interrogations during the trials,
‘far from clarifying the judger’s conscience’, cast them ‘into a strange perplexity’.
Yet they both considered that ‘rightly or wrongly, the unanimous [Christian]
public voice imputes to [Said Jumblatt] all the disasters [in Lebanon]. His acquittal
would be interpreted by the Christian population of the country as contempt for
justice, and his condemnation to any other punishment than the death penalty
may not seem sufficient.’ In the end, while formulating their opinion, they
weighed ‘in the scales of justice and the interests of the Christian cause in this
country’, and decided in favour of the death penalty, since Said Bey Jumblatt had
‘incurred the most serious responsibility in the evens of 1860’ by distributing war
ammunition to the Druze, organizing the massacres of Hasbaya, and acting as the
occult leader of a ‘great league which [had] linked the Druze of [Hawran] to those
of Lebanon against the Christians’.¹⁰³ Novikow, however, admitted that he was not
entirely sure. There was no clear evidence other than the testimonies of the
Christians, among whom were Bishop Tobia ‘Awn, members of the Beirut com-
mittee, and peasants of the mixed districts as well as Kisrawan.¹⁰⁴
What is striking about the judicial proceedings of the time is not only the fact
that the European commissioners, five foreign men with no legal or official
authority, had a say in the final verdict. It was also the fact that not one
Christian actor—neither the peasants’ leader Tanyus Shahin nor any member of
the Beirut committee, Tobia ‘Awn, nor any other Christian clergy, middle-class or
peasant actors who had been involved in the civil war—was brought to trial in
1860–61, other than to testifying against their Druze belligerents.¹⁰⁵ Despite
¹⁰³ Novikow to Gorchakov, 12/25 Feb. 1861, and ‘Instrukcii i glava pro Dzhemblata’, AVPRI, f. 133
(Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 16, ll. 251–6, 257–70.
¹⁰⁴ As for Hurșid Pașa, the governor of Sayda, with the exception of Weckbecker, all commissioners
asked for the increase of his sentence to capital punishment. At the 17th meeting of the commission,
when Béclard inquired into the decision on Hurșid, Fuad replied that the Ottoman penal code decreed
the death penalty only against the provocateurs of the disturbances or those who quarrelled personally.
This was the case for the Druze, he added, while the Ottoman authorities were immune to such an
accusation: Novikow to Gorkachov, 22 Dec./3 Jan. 1861, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 17,
ll. 96–9. According to Fuad, the sentence of Hurșid was the harshest possible, ‘a sentence which in the
penal code of the Empire comes immediately after that of death’, while the capital punishment of
Ahmed Pașa, after he was stripped of his rank, resulted from his role as military commander and trial
by the military tribunal: Fuad Pacha to Musurus Bey, 10 Mar. 1861, ODD 306–7. The commissioners
interpreted this as a ‘deficit of the Turkish system of justice’, though legal practices in Britain and
France (the Ottoman penal code was inspired by the French penal code) were analogously hierarchical,
bent on protecting imperial agents before the subjects. Rehfues to Goltz, 7 Mar. 1861, GStA I. HA Rep
81 XI Nr. 66.
¹⁰⁵ Farah, Politics, 616, 619–36. In fact, Novikow demanded that the Beirut Committee members
should also be put on trial for their role in the civil war. However, after several talks with Bishop Tobia
and having studied a memorandum addressed by the latter to the commissioners, Novikow withdrew
his demand. Rehfues suspected that there had never been a Beirut committee—that it was ‘a myth’—
and was surprised that Weckbecker spoke of it ‘as a factual entity’. Rehfues to Schleinitz, 15 Oct. 1860,
GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 95–110.
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Dufferin’s attempts to shield their interests, the Druze muqatadjis truly became
the scapegoats of a civil war which, as we saw in Chapter 11, actually had complex
origins and which they did not instigate.¹⁰⁶
Then again, the purpose of the retributive and judicial proceedings appeared
more to protect the Ottoman agents, assuage European public opinion, and thus
put an end to the French expedition than to genuinely bring the culprits into
justice. This was why, when Béclard pressed Fuad for the immediate execution of
the sentences, the pașa seemed more than ready.¹⁰⁷ But, when Dufferin asked him
for its postponement, the pașa again did not refuse, leaving the final decision to
Istanbul. Lip service was paid on both occasions. In the end, with the exception of
a majority of the deportations, none of the sentences on the Druze ex-muqatadjis
were carried out on the orders of the Porte. Thanks to British endeavours, all death
sentences were commuted to life imprisonment in May 1861.¹⁰⁸
If matters had been left to Fuad, he would have been inclined to invoke that old
Ottoman adage of oblivion, ‘Let bygones be bygones’ (mazi mâ mazi demek), and
declare an amnesty at the time, as he told Dufferin. In fact, the July 1860 truce had
been settled between the Druze and Maronites with the mediation of Hurșid Pașa
on the basis of this very principle.¹⁰⁹ But, despite Dufferin’s backing, since the
lands of the Druze muqatadjis had already been leased to the Christians and as a
result of the other commissioners’ contrary expectations, Fuad would not have
been able to enforce the Ottoman tradition, which attested to the subsuming of
Ottoman practices of security—in this case, through retribution—within a tran-
simperial system.
The fact is that the subsuming in question was never a complete process, and
never would be. It may be true that the Porte’s agents attempted to satisfy
European statesmen, bureaucrats, and public opinion by swift punishment of
the Druze; but they exercised their own authority by means of amending the
verdicts. During his second grand vizierate (c.1863–6), Fuad Pașa obtained a
pardon from the sultan for local Lebanese elites who had been under detention
or in exile. His cabinet announced an amnesty for the Druze ex-muqatadjis at the
end of 1864, maintaining that since ‘[the Porte’s] efforts to remove the traces of
[the] misfortunes [in Syria] have been rightly appreciated by Europe, and . . .
thanks to the current organisation of Syria’, and as the Druze ‘submitted to the
laws of the Empire’, they had solicited the sultan’s pardon.¹¹⁰ The ex-muqatadjis
¹⁰⁶ On the punishment of the Druze, and their targeting as scapegoats of the civil war, see also Farah,
Politics, 630–2; Makdisi, Culture, 153, 157.
¹⁰⁷ Fawaz, An Occasion, 185.
¹⁰⁸ MAE (Istanbul) to Musurus, 15 Apr. 1861, BOA HR.SFR.3 57/27/1; Aali to Musurus, 15 May
1861, BOAHR.SFR.3 57/27/4. Just before he was moved to house arrest due to his illness, Said Jumblatt
died from tuberculosis, on 11 May 1861: Fawaz, An Occasion, 185, 188.
¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 186, 192; Spagnolo, France, 31.
¹¹⁰ Aali to Musurus, 20 Dec. 1864; ‘Report of the Governor of Damascus’, n.d.; Aali to Musurus,
11 June 1865, BOA HR.SFR.3 96/17. The deported Druze were repatriated ‘only as long as their stay in
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were thus spared at the end of these long struggles—but not without having been
first stripped of their ancient rights and privileges.
*
The reorganization of the administrative structure of Mount Lebanon was also
preceded by a momentary and transitional resolution. At negotiations held among
the commissioners from November 1860, French agents rooted for the pre-1840
order whereby the Maronites would be reinstated as the rulers of the mountain
through the pro-France Shihab family.¹¹¹ The French commissioner, Béclard,
incorrectly argued that the misfortunes of Lebanon had begun with the partition
of the mountain in 1842, and could now be ended definitively by a return to the
status quo ante. He suggested that Amir Medjid, the grandson of the former emir,
Bashir II Shihab, should take power. Bishop Tobia ‘Awn and the foreign merchant
families, such as the Spartalis, actively campaigned in favour of this plan.¹¹²
British agents rejected the French proposition. Dufferin claimed that Béclard
and General Beaufort wanted to drive the Druze from the mountain at the point of
the bayonet, or to frighten them out of their homes through the instrumentality of
the Christians so that the latter could appropriate their villages. When French
agents made a pitch for the Christian settlement in the evacuated Druze houses on
the grounds of necessity and retributive justice, and when Fuad conceded,
Dufferin fervidly complained: ‘How speciously the plea of humanity can be used
to assist the accomplishment of a political purpose.’¹¹³ According to the Russian
commissioner, Novikow, the struggle for influence between France and Britain
became a ‘source of evil’ during the reorganization of Lebanon, ‘which did not
allow the application of a radical remedy’.¹¹⁴
Despite these differences, the commissioners quickly agreed upon the need to
undo the 1842/5 partition plan, concluding that it had been a cause of violence in
1860. This time the Porte’s agents, Fuad and Abro, endeavoured to maintain the
existing order. To them, preserving the status quo was a question of sovereignty,
though paradoxically the very order that they were advocating had been dictated
to the Porte by the Powers in 1842 (as we saw in Chapter 10).¹¹⁵
their native country did not offer any concern for public rest’. Those sentenced to punishments for
degradation, such as Hussein Talhuq, were not granted amnesty. Kaola Talhouk to Henry Bulwer,
5 Apr. 1865, NRO BUL 1/318/1–52, 569X7.
¹¹¹ See Ch. 10. Rehfues to Schleinitz, 16 Nov. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 276–9.
¹¹² ‘Otryvok iz raporta komissara Rossii v Sirii’, 9/21 Apr. 1861, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o.
469, e. 17, l. 441.
¹¹³ Dufferin to Bulwer, 3 Nov. 1860, TNA FO195/657. General Beaufort, for his part, voiced the
criticism ‘Dufferin est anglais avant tout’, for the latter always stated that the commission had to treat
the Druze only with equity. Beaufort to Thouvenel, 21 Dec. 1860, AMAE Papiers Thouvenel
233PAAP/43.
¹¹⁴ Novikov to Gorchakov, 15/27 Dec. 1860, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 17, ll. 51–9.
¹¹⁵ MAE (Istanbul) to Musurus, 9 Jan. 1861, BOA HR.SFR/3 56/4; Lavalette to Thouvenel, 28 Nov.
1860, AMAE 133CP/347/292; ‘Extrait de rapports du commissaire russe en Syrie’, 3/15 Nov. 1860,
AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, d. 37, ll. 296–7.
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Several administrative models were proposed, discussed, and then jettisoned,
both officially and at a private level, during the first five months of 1861. Eager to
prevent the prolongation of the French expedition, whose tenure would expire in
February 1861, Dufferin was the first to draw up a detailed plan that was officially
discussed. According to the British commissioner, the civil war had demonstrated
that Christians should no longer be subjugated to Druze supremacy: ‘But if the
Druze cannot govern Christians, certainly Christians must not govern the Druze.’
His January 1861 proposal was for the organization of the whole of Syria, not just
Lebanon, under an Ottoman governor-general (he had Fuad Pașa in mind) who
would be appointed by the Porte in conjunction with the Great Powers, and who
would be relatively independent from the ‘blackmail’ of Istanbul.¹¹⁶ Mount
Lebanon would be one of the provinces under the pașa’s strict control.
Dufferin believed that his plan would automatically solve the indemnity ques-
tion. By carving out a vice-royalty in Greater Syria along the lines of Egypt or the
Danubian principalities, a loan of £6 million secured against Syrian revenues
could be easily contracted after enacting a series of administrative, judicial, and
financial reforms under the supervision of the Powers.¹¹⁷ European capitalists
would be desirous to invest in the agricultural and industrial fields.¹¹⁸ The idea
was endorsed by Rehfues, Novikow, the Greek Orthodox clergy, and a group of
businessmen in Beirut and Damascus which included the merchant Nicholas
Medaur, who declared bankruptcy after the war.¹¹⁹
However, even though the Sublime Porte was impatient for the evacuation of
French forces from Syria, the plan was unacceptable to Istanbul. The interim grand
vizier, Âli Pașa, was dismayed that such a scheme for the semi-independence of
Syria had come from British diplomats, whose traditional policy had aimed to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Alluding to the Great
Mutiny in India in 1857, Âli wrote to the London ambassador that Britain also
had, not long ago, similar disasters to deplore and to be reproached in her
positions of East India. No one has ever thought of accusing the British admin-
istration of negligence or incapacity. Like us, she was surprised by the events, and
like us, she fulfilled her duty by inflicting severe punishments on the perpetrators
of the crimes committed.¹²⁰
The Porte categorically rejected Dufferin’s plan, given that the protocol of the
intervention had allowed the commission to discuss the reorganization of
Lebanon only, and the plan surpassed its geographical and political span.
¹¹⁶ Dufferin to Bulwer, 4 Nov. 1860, TNA FO 195/657.
¹¹⁷ MAE (Istanbul) to Musurus, 15 Jan. 1861, BOA HR.SFR/3 56/4/7.
¹¹⁸ Rizk, Mont Liban, 331.
¹¹⁹ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 20 Nov. 1860, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7569, f. 303–6.
¹²⁰ Aali to Musurus, 22 Jan. 1861, BOA HR.SFR/3 56/4/10.
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In February, when the six-month duration of the French mandate set by the
August 1860 convention was nearing its expiration, the prospect for an agreement
over the administrative scheme looked very grim. Worse, in January the Druze of
Hawran staged an unexpected attack on several villages in anti-Lebanon to obtain
the release of their co-religionists.¹²¹ The French foreign minister, Thouvenel,
used these to his advantage. He first mobilized foreign merchants and bankers in
Lebanon to submit a petition for the prolongation of the French expedition (the
British merchants refused to sign it).¹²² He then convened a conference in Paris to
the same end, where he managed to obtain the consent of the Powers for a
mandate for another three months, arguing that military intervention was the
only guarantee of security for Christians and for much-needed confidence in
Syria.¹²³ He succeeded.
The prolongation of the French military intervention hastened the efforts of the
commissioners to achieve administrative reform, as they hoped to prevent the
further extension of the mandate. It also led to further concessions on the part of
the Porte. One month later, in March 1861, Fuad Pașa was involved in the
preparation of a new plan with British and Russian commissioners. They initialled
a scheme through which 47 articles were delivered allowing for separate Druze,
Maronite and Orthodox kaymakams, and a Greek Catholic mudiriya in Zahla.
These kaymakams would all be placed under the jurisdiction of the governor-
general of Sidon. An accord between a majority of European and Ottoman agents
appeared to have finally been achieved.¹²⁴ Rehfues and Weckbecker endorsed the
triple-kaymakamlık plan. But the French commissioner, Béclard, opposed it,
because the scheme reduced Maronite influence. He then began to advocate the
first plan proposed by Dufferin, which could have ushered in the establishment of
a regime similar to the status quo ante 1840 or permitted the French-backed
Algerian Abd al-Qader come to power as the viceroy.
We must emphasize here that the French position with respect to administra-
tive reorganization overlapped with the demands of the so-called Beirut
Committee, which, as we saw in Chapter 11, was a coalition of Christian mer-
chants, bankers, and clergy. As the delegates of the Beirut Committee told the
French interpreter Schefer in November 1860, their plan was to ‘deliver Syria from
the yoke of the Turks and obtain their expulsion by all possible means’. And this
could be done by demanding from European governments ‘a prince of royal
Catholic blood, who would govern under the guarantee of the five Great
Powers’. Alternatively, a member of the family of Mehmed Âli Pașa of Egypt,
¹²¹ Fawaz, An Occasion, 185.
¹²² Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, 11 Feb. and 22 Apr. 1861, AMAE Papiers Thouvenel 233PAAP/5/10
and 14.
¹²³ Montebello to Thouvenel, 26 Feb. 1861, AMAE 112CP/223/116.
¹²⁴ Novikov to Gorchakov, 7/19 Mar. 1861, AVPRI f. 133 (Kantselyariya), o. 469, e. 17, ll. 356–60.
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ideally Halim Pașa, could be appointed as the new ruler. But, either way, Mount
Lebanon had to form, the delegates told the French dragoman,
a separate government . . . whose jurisdiction would extend as at the time of Amir
Fakhreddin . . . The Christians of the Lebanon would be ready, when the time
comes, to buy this independence at the cost of the most considerable pecuniary
sacrifices. We will live in dust like snakes, if necessary, to be free . . . but we will
never agree to fall back under Turkish domination. We are entirely devoted to
France . . . we will die for her . . .
According to Schefer, if the wishes of the committee were granted or the inde-
pendence of Syria or Mount Lebanon were imposed by the Powers on the Sublime
Porte, the Christians intended to request the extension of the French mandate in
order to establish, ‘under her protection, the foundation of a solid and sustainable
organization’.¹²⁵ Keeping these considerations in view, the step-by-step approach
followed by France oscillated between an endorsement of Dufferin’s single-
governor plan, instead of the triple-kaymakamlık project that would enable Abd
al-Qader’s vice-royalty in Syria, and the instalment of a Catholic or pro-French,
ideally Shihab, governor in Lebanon.
But Béclard lacked both the skill and the charisma to attract the other com-
missioners to the options France endorsed. This was why, by the end of March,
when he was entirely isolated in the commission, Thouvenel stepped up, took up
the reins, and did all he could to secure the adoption of a scheme in line with
French interests. While his agents on the spot began a new campaign of petitions
for a final prolongation of Beaufort’s expedition, he pointed out the disadvantages
of the triple-kaymakamlık scheme to his Austrian, British, Russian, and Prussian
counterparts with a series of circulars dated 26 March and 2 and 4 April 1861. He
argued that it would require relocating almost half the population of the moun-
tain. The return of the Shihabs would be a more plausible and efficient solution.
Since the majority of the region consisted of Christians, he maintained, a single
Christian governor should have ruled the mountain.¹²⁶
Thouvenel’s diplomatic move brought results in Berlin and Vienna. The
Prussian and Austrian commissioners were instructed by their seniors to change
their position regarding the new scheme a few weeks later. They abandoned the
idea of the continuation of the partition (triple-kaymakamlık) system.¹²⁷ But
the change of votes in the commission produced a perfect stalemate between the
¹²⁵ Schefer to Le Ministre, 30 Nov. 1860, AMAE Papiers Charles Schefer, Mission du Liban
161PAAP/3a/264.
¹²⁶ ‘Thouvenel à représentants à Londres, Vienne, Saint-Pétersbourg, et Berlin’, 26 Mar., 2 and 4
Apr. 1861, DDC 115, 117, 125; Flahaut to Thouvenel, 4 Jan. 1861, AMAE 8CP/719/320.
¹²⁷ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 22 Apr. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 112–15.
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French, Prussian, and Austrian commissioners, on the one hand, and the British,
Ottoman, and Russian, on the other.¹²⁸
*
The fate of administrative reform and security in Syria was thus tied to the
reconciliation of imperial interests. Fuad Pașa and Dufferin were hard pressed
for time. The French troops’ term was nearing to an end (the end of May 1860).
Under pressure from foreign and local merchants, who collectively petitioned for
immediate measures for the punishment of the culprits and the reorganization of
Lebanon, they drew up a new draft constitution (1 May 1860) of 16 articles
abolishing the dual-kaymakamlık system, but not permitting the return of the
Shihabs either. They left the question of governorship open.¹²⁹ And in mid-May
the commissioners were called to Istanbul for an ambassadorial conference, to be
held at the end of the month and early June, to finally decide upon the new form of
administration.¹³⁰
About ten days before the transport ships to evacuate French troops anchored
off Beirut, the essentials of the new regime were debated in the Ottoman imperial
capital at two conferences, as well as in all imperial metropoles where immense
lobbying activity occurred. Especially in St Petersburg, the Franco-Russian talks
proved to be fierce. When Russia appeared inclined to follow the line of Dufferin
and Fuad, the French agent in St Petersburg, Louis Napoléon Lannes, the duke of
Montebello (1801–74), urged the foreign minister, Gorchakov, to endorse the
French demand for the appointment of a Lebanese Christian governor, insistently
reminding him of ‘the agreement that we had promised to establish between us,
especially on the question relating to the East’. When Montebello linked the issue
of the administrative reorganization of Lebanon to ‘[the French] conduct in the
Montenegro case’, the Russian foreign minister capitulated ‘in accordance with
[the Tsar’s] desire to maintain an intimate understanding with France in the East
as elsewhere’.¹³¹
But the courts of Paris and St Petersburg could not obtain the consent of the
other Powers and the sultan for the appointment of a Lebanese Christian gov-
ernor. After a debilitating diplomatic give-and-take among the Powers and the
Porte, on 9 June 1861 a new semi-constitutional document, Règlement et protocole
relatifs à la réorganisation du Mont Liban, was finally signed.¹³² The Règlement
guaranteed the immediate departure of French troops, and inaugurated a semi-
autonomous administrative system unique in the Ottoman Empire: the
¹²⁸ John P. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1914 (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 37.
¹²⁹ Ibid. 39. ¹³⁰ Spagnolo, ‘Constitutional Change’, 31.
¹³¹ Thouvenel to Montebello, 23 and 24 May 1861, AMAE 112CP/224/50, 51, 55; Montebello to
Thouvenel, 26 May 1861, AMAE 112CP/224/83; Thouvenel to Montebello, 3 June 1861, AMAE
112CP/224/119; Spagnolo, France, 40.
¹³² Case, Thouvenel, 348.
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Mutasarrifat regime. The resulting agreement over the future of Lebanon was
considered by its architects to be most likely to prevent the domination of one
power (including the Porte) over the country, and to preserve, at least nominally,
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire—a fundamental question for
European security.
The Règlement was a consociational system that aimed at once to stifle local
actors’ antagonisms towards each other and, as much as possible, to accommodate
their demands. As France advocated, Mount Lebanon was placed under
the authority of a Christian governor. But, contrary to French expectations, the
governor was to be appointed by the Porte, and he would not be Lebanese.
The sect of the governor was deliberately left vague so that France, Britain, and
Russia could retain men of their religion or protégés as the new overseers of the
mountain. The governor was granted extensive powers for a term of three years
(extended to five in 1864). A mixed administrative council was formed for the
governor to consult and for the Lebanese to voice their concerns. It consisted of
two representatives of each of the six sects (Article II)—which failed to satisfy the
Maronites, as their numerical superiority was not reflected in proportional
representation.
The mountain was divided into six districts (arrondissements) with a sub-
governor (müdür) appointed by the governor from the ‘dominant sect, either by
virtue of number or by virtue of territorial possessions’ (Article III), and each
village was to elect its sheikhs following its sect.¹³³ By this means, the Druze and
the Greek Orthodox were permitted to sustain a degree of influence in areas where
they were in possession of lands, as they usually acted as sub-governors or sheikhs.
Yet their influence was held in check with mixed judiciary councils in each district
(Article VII). A mixed gendarmerie, to be composed of soldiers of different sects,
was also established for the security of the mountain, which had previously been
the preserve of themuqatadjis. At the same time, the mountain’s inhabitants were
exempted from military recruitment in the service of the sultan, while the annual
tax that the Porte could impose on the mountain was limited to 3,500 bourses,
with the potential to be increased to 7,000 with the approval of the Powers. These
granted Mount Lebanon a degree of autonomy.
The consociational Mutasarrifat regime tallied, at least on paper, with the
egalitarian ethos of the 1856 Reform Edict. Its Règlement declared all inhabitants
equal before the law, heeding the demands of the Christian peasantry. Moreover,
all feudal privileges, notably those granted to the muqatadjis, were definitively
abolished (Article VI). This unburdened the prosperity of the new middle classes,
merchants and bankers, as well as the silk-rich peasantry, as it cleared the way for
the institution of a regular system of land registration, tax collection, and
¹³³ ‘Règlement organique pour l’administration du Liban’, Pera, 9 June 1861, TNA FO 881/2983.
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cultivation, which the rising capitalist class had been demanding since the
1850s.¹³⁴ Finally, even though Beirut was not involved in the new Mutasarrifat
regime, all commercial (as well as civil) matters between a subject or protégé of
one of the foreign Powers and an inhabitant of the mountain were placed under
the jurisdiction of the commercial tribunals in Beirut (Article X), which permitted
foreign merchants to bring their Levantine debtors to court.¹³⁵
The Règlement could not be fully implemented for at least six years—and even
then, what was arguably thoroughly implemented was a substantially amended
version of it. Discontent, political dissension, vengeful and violent sentiments, as
well as inter-imperial quests for influence in the mountain lingered throughout
this period. Paradoxically, in the end it was the persistence of the challenges to the
system, not their absence, that ensured stability and peace in the mountain.
*
On 18 July 1861, Garabed Artin Davud Pașa (1816–73) was installed as the new
governor or mutasarrif of Mount Lebanon, with the consent of the Powers.¹³⁶
Davud was an Armenian Catholic from Istanbul, educated at French missionary
schools in İzmir (Smyrna). He studied law in Germany, and could speak perfect
Armenian, French, German, Turkish, and, to a lesser degree, Arabic.¹³⁷ With all
these qualities, and especially because of his non-Muslim origins, he personified
the new image of the Tanzimat pașas in the Ottoman Empire—indeed, he was to
be the first non-Muslim Ottoman minister after his tenure in Lebanon ended
in 1868.
Upon his arrival in Beirut, intending to alleviate the resentments and grievances
of the mountain’s inhabitants and inspire them to peace and harmony, Davud
announced that his task ‘had to do with the future, not with the past’, inviting his
audience to cooperate with him.¹³⁸ But neither the Druze nor the Maronites in
general were happy with the essentials of the Mutasarrifat regime or, for that
matter, with Davud’s appointment.
The blow was severe to the Druze chiefs in the mountain. The appointment of a
single Christian governor and the abolition of the Druze kaymakamlık were
grievous.¹³⁹ The Druze of Hawran engaged in a fierce struggle with the Ottoman
authorities in 1861–4 to avoid the payment of penal taxes and imprisonment.
Their brethren in Mount Lebanon were for the moment more concerned with
¹³⁴ See Ch. 11.
¹³⁵ ‘Règlement organique pour l’administration du Liban’, Pera, 9 June 1861, TNA FO 881/2983.
¹³⁶ Al-Dibs, Tārīkh, vol. 18, 193.
¹³⁷ Musa Kılıç, ‘Bir Ermeni Bürokratın Portresi. Vezaret Rütbesine Ulaşan İlk Gayrimüslim Karabet
Artin Davud Pașa’, in Tarihte Türkler ve Ermeniler. Merkez Taşrada Ermeniler, Nüfus ve Göç (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014), 34; Süleyman Uygun,Osmanlı Lübnanı’nda Değişim ve İç Çatışma. Marunî
Asi Yusuf Bey Kerem (1823–1889) (Ankara: Gece Kitaplığı, 2017), 154.
¹³⁸ Fraser to Bulwer, 27 July 1861, TNA FO 78/1708. ¹³⁹ Ibid.; Kuri, Une histoire, 306.
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procuring an amnesty for their chiefs and recovering their former lands.¹⁴⁰ Many
of them succeeded in the end thanks to the pressure of the British authorities, yet
disputes within families, particularly among the Jumblatts over land inheritance,
drastically reduced their influence in local politics.¹⁴¹
The Maronite reaction to the new regime was equally stark. During his cere-
mony of inauguration at Deir al-Qamar, Davud Pașa was greeted ‘by the scream
for blood’ and ‘for the banishment of the whole Druze race’ by the Maronite
victims of the war, mostly women, who ‘held up the bones and skulls of the slain
and walked towards him’.¹⁴² The Maronite peasants in the north were not allowed
to keep what they had seized from the Khazin sheikhs in Kisrawan in 1858–9.¹⁴³
For their part, the clergy were severely disheartened by the departure of the French
expeditionary forces, and by the fact that an outsider had been installed as
governor over their candidates. Assuaging their frustration was the hope that
the new regime was only an interim solution that France had agreed upon to gain
time for the restitution of Lebanese Christian rule in the near future.¹⁴⁴ Only the
Greek Orthodox were content with the new system and the appointment of a co-
religionist as governor.¹⁴⁵
Until their departure in the summer of 1862, the European commissioners
closely monitored Davud’s rule, his measures, his relations with the locals, and his
objectives. And until the very end of their tenure, they continued to quarrel among
themselves on a variety of issues that ranged from such trivial subjects as the
procedure of Davud’s inauguration ceremony to the endeavours to influence the
governor in the nomination of district governors.¹⁴⁶ Rehfues complained that
‘right next to the local intrigues [to undercut Davud Pașa’s position], the French
and English agents pulled out all the stops to facilitate the appointment[s] in their
interests’.¹⁴⁷
By ‘local intrigues’, the Prussian commissioner was not only alluding to the
general discontent among the mountain’s inhabitants. The major challenge to the
new regime was Yusuf Bey Karam, a secondary Maronite sheikh from the north,
who denounced the authority of the ‘outsider’ Davud Pașa.¹⁴⁸ Even though Davud
appointed him as district governor in Jazzin and offered him the command of the
regional army to gain him over, Karam resigned from the post and rejected
Davud’s offer so as not to become ‘subservient’ to the governor and the
¹⁴⁰ Firro, The Druzes, 141–2.
¹⁴¹ BOA A.MKT.MHM 277/62/2/1; G. Jackson Eldridge to Bulwer, 10 July 1863, NRO BUL 1/357/
1–18, 570X5.
¹⁴² Fraser to Bulwer, 27/7/61, TNA FO 78/1708. ¹⁴³ Owen, The Middle East, 164–5.
¹⁴⁴ Spagnolo, France, 56; Rehfues to Schleinitz, 25 July 1861, GStA GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571,
f. 233.
¹⁴⁵ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 18 Aug. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 248.
¹⁴⁶ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 19 Aug. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 207–10.
¹⁴⁷ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 20 Sept. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 297.
¹⁴⁸ Uygun, Yusuf Bey, 156–7.
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Powers.¹⁴⁹ In November 1861, he mobilized a militia of 1,200 men to urge Davud
to rescind the appointment of sub-governors in the northern district.¹⁵⁰
The point that concerns us here is not how Davud Pașa quelled Karam’s
dissidence and arranged for his exile to Istanbul and Egypt in 1862–4. It is instead
how he responded to the challenges to the system and, by the same token, how he
amended the system in due course. On the one hand, the new governor succeeded
in limiting the interference of the European commissioners in his task.¹⁵¹ On the
other, he consulted, obtained the support of, and acted together with figures like
Bishops Tobia ‘Awn and Butrus al-Bustani of the Beirut Committee, the French
consuls in Lebanon, Bentivoglio and Outrey (who was looking to install Amir
Mecid, a Shihab, as sub-governor in the north, to whom Karam opposed), and
Fuad Pașa (until his departure in late 1861).¹⁵² Furthermore, Davud tried to revive
the influence of the Jumblatts to counter Karam’s act of defiance, which gained
him the endorsement of British agents.¹⁵³
The European commissioners were thus brushed aside while a very loose
common front was formed against the major dissident of the new regime. In
dealing with perilous epidemic illnesses, sanitary problems, financial distress, and,
now, Karam’s opposition to the interests of all, and while implementing projects
for the construction of lighthouses and a telegraph line, and building the
Damascus–Beirut road, Davud capitalized on the shared threats posed to the
ex-belligerents—imperial and local, European and Ottoman.¹⁵⁴ A mixed gen-
darmerie force that consisted, on 1 January 1864, of 194 men (122 Maronite, 43
Druze, 16 Greek catholic, 5 Greek Orthodox, 1 Sunni, 5 Protestants, and 2 Latins)
was enlisted under the supervision of French Captain Fain, while several British
engineers and surgeons were employed to counterbalance the French in the
governor’s services.¹⁵⁵
Hindsight suggests that, seen together, all these developments did not just help
establish a steadier transportation and communicational infrastructure in Mount
Lebanon, rendering it more secure physically. Together with the economic boom
after the rapid recovery of the silk industry, they also laid the ground for gradual
yet substantial amendments to the Règlement in 1862 and 1864 which transmuted
¹⁴⁹ Spagnolo, France, 62.
¹⁵⁰ BOA A.MKT. UM. 523/71, 16 Nov. 1861; cf. Uygun, Yusuf Bey, 161.
¹⁵¹ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 25 Oct. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 362.
¹⁵² Spagnolo, France, 61, 63; Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, 20 Nov. 1861, AMAE 42CCC/7/302.
¹⁵³ Rehfues to Schleinitz, 19 Aug. 1861, GStA III. HA MdA, I Nr. 7571, f. 257–7; Spagnolo,
France, 70.
¹⁵⁴ BOA i.HR 180/9954; 187/10437. See also Engin Akarlı, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon,
1861–1920 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 38–9.
¹⁵⁵ Two members of the Shihab family commanded these forces. Max Outrey to MAE, 12 Dec. 1863,
AMAE 50MD/122/424; Capitaine Fain to MAE, 3 Sept. 1864, AMAE 50MD/122/423; Fain to MAE, 26
Dec. 1863, AMAE 50MD/122/426; Eldridge (Beirut) to Bulwer, 19 Sept. 1863, NRO BUL 1/357/
1–18, 570X5.
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previously destructive social differences into a protective power (against the
dissidents and other threats) and fostered rapport among the Lebanese.¹⁵⁶
To a certain extent the amendments weakened sectarianism and favoured
proportional representation and secularization by way of (i) dividing the northern
Maronite district into two and, by this means, (ii) increasing the number of
Maronite representatives in the council without allowing them the majority, (iii)
eliminating the election of village sheikhs by sect, (iv) introducing ‘territorial
representation to the previous sectarian distribution of seats’, and (v) expanding
the authority of the governor who could appoint the district judges directly, which
diminished the influence of the clergy.¹⁵⁷ As the French diplomat Ernest de
Bonnières de Wierre (1825–1909) observed, ‘This was an important achievement
which should be conducive to bringing the races and religious allegiances together,
and consequently hastening the time when the Lebanese populations will under-
stand their true interest is to live together in harmony under the government of a
single Christian leader.’¹⁵⁸
The legal particularities of these amendments have been aptly explained by the
British historian John P. Spagnolo.¹⁵⁹ But much recent, arguably more analytic
scholarship on violence in mid-nineteenth century Lebanon has tended to omit
his account, training their analysis on the 1861 Règlement only and ending their
narratives with it. This is unfortunate because these particularities were of para-
mount importance for attesting the limits of the perspectives and achievement of
the European and Ottoman commissioners on Syria, and those of the statesmen
and diplomats in the imperial metropoles. As already noted, the original version of
the 1861 Règlement aimed at preventing the political or religious domination of
any one imperial power or sect in the mountain. Yet the persistence of the
challenges to the new system, and the experience of Davud Pașa and his
Lebanese associates, engendered a legal transposition in the version revised in
1864. The particulars were important also because they embodied a pivotal shift
from a cautious attitude of preventing domination and potential violence by
means of partitioning or separating the Lebanese to a more ‘take-charge’ mindset
enabling their peaceful coexistence.
It is true that there were several more immediate and pragmatic factors that
allowed for stability in Mount Lebanon in mid-1860s, especially after Yusuf
Karam’s lingering aspirations were subdued and he was sent into exile once
again in 1867. Davud’s cordial relations with the French diplomats in the country
and with the leaders of the so-called Beirut Committee, Tobia ‘Awn and Butrus al-
¹⁵⁶ ‘Règlement organique du Liban. Projet de nouvelle rédaction par Daoud Pacha, 1863’, AMAE
50MD/122/474.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid.; Aali to Musurus, 4/10/64 BOA HR.SFR.3. 95/33; Spagnolo, France, 89–91.
¹⁵⁸ De Bonnières de Wierre to Drouyn de Lhuys, 14 Sept. 1865, AMAE CP Turquie 363; cf.
Spagnolo, France, 91.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid.
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Bustani, led to the abandonment of any radical revisionist inclination on the part
of France or the Shihabites.¹⁶⁰Moreover, the distress and suffering of war, and the
punishment to which they had been (partially) subjected, stifled feudal and Druze
ambitions. The Ottoman authorities, Fuad and Âli Pașas, accepted the new regime
in Lebanon, and admitted that it was the most practical way to prevent future
interventionism in the Levant as well as in the Balkans. Some historians argue that
the inspiration of the new provincial law in 1864 (the Vilayet Kanunnamesi)
originated in large part from the Lebanese model.¹⁶¹ But equally significant was
the fact that, after 1860, the mountain’s inhabitants learned the hard way, and
gradually adopted, modified, and interpreted into their world-views a more
inclusive understanding of peace and security.
The Lebanese elite came to argue that peace and security could be guaranteed
most effectively through subduing blind, ancient prejudices (al-ghardh) between
the peoples of Lebanon, which had ‘left behind destruction and peril and squan-
dered the land’s wealth and its families’. The maintenance of order and tranquil-
lity depended on upholding al-jinsiyya, as a source of attachment to kinship, and
bolstering Arab qualities such as al-adab (sophisticated habits, good behaviour),
which referred to an amalgam of al-akhlaq (morals) and al-ta‘lim (education). It
entailed synthesizing these qualities with a uniquely and locally defined idea of
civilization—one that ‘[stems from within (inner self)] and extends to society’,
‘[aims for] development’, ‘puts everyone on an equal footing’, and ‘[endorses]
concord among [the people] as individuals and groups’.¹⁶²
Aside from administrative reforms that enabled coexistence and economic
recovery which lasted until the 1880s, this proto-nationalist intellectual and
emotional momentum in Lebanon forged by the peace-minded local Lebanese–
partly by dint of their interactions with imperial agents, but largely by way of their
own, tragic learning experience—ensured what the Turkish historian Engin Akarlı
aptly calls ‘the long peace’ in the mountain in the decades to come.¹⁶³ It was these
reconceptualized peripheral relational dynamics guaranteed by the 1864 version
of the Règlement that helped gradually return the sense of security and withstood
future challenges to stability, more so than the presence of the French expedition-
ary forces or the investigations and top-down decisions made by the international
commissioners in 1860–62 through an unhindered imperialist hubris.
¹⁶⁰ Eldridge to Bulwer, 22 Aug. 1863, NRO BUL 1/357/1–18, 570X5.
¹⁶¹ Cenk Reyhan, ‘Cebel-i Lübnan Vilayet Nizamnamesi’, Memleket Siyaset Yönetim 1 (2006):
171–81.
¹⁶² Jens Hanssen, ‘Toward a Conceptual History of Nafir Suriyya’, in Butrus al-Bustani, The Clarion
of Syria: A Patriot’s Call Against the Civil War of 1860, introduced and trans. Jens Hanssen and Hicham
Safieddine (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 49–52, 68, 82–3, 124–5, 128–9.
¹⁶³ Akarlı, Long Peace. Also see, Carol Hakim, The Origins of Lebanese National Idea: 1840-1920
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2013), 149–158.
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Epilogue
‘ . . . acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time . . . let us
hope, for the benefit of a time to come.’
Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations¹
Thus it all began. The first Great Power interventions in the Levant that were
purportedly undertaken for the benefit of local inhabitants came into being in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the age of the Eastern Question.
Ever since then they have become a frequent reality, and have fatefully aggravated
many of the calamities that have struck the region. Even though each armed, legal,
and administrative intervention considered in this book had diverse specific
properties unique to its immediate context, I will conclude by making a few
general remarks before pondering what these historical ordeals tell us about the
Levant and the wider world today.
First of all, the historical actors, both European and Levantine, saw a continuity
in the affairs of the region from at least the late eighteenth century. For nearly
150 years, the patchwork Eastern Question hinged together their threat percep-
tions and interests, forging a transimperial security culture in the Levant. Like
most security issues, the Eastern Question was a dynamic and intersubjective
process. Historical actors attributed different meanings and functions to it in
different moments. And its intersubjective character helped the Great Powers
manipulate it as a trope and authorized their interventionism.
After decades-long discussions in the eighteenth century, French strategists
decided to pursue a proactive revisionist policy vis-à-vis the alleged weakness of
the Ottoman Empire, largely as a result of the initiatives of the young General
Bonaparte and Foreign Minister Talleyrand. Circumstances combined for the two
in the late 1790s, when French power and influence in Europe was at its peak.
When the interests of French merchants indebted to the Mamluk beys in Egypt
were jeopardized, the merchants’ lobbying as well as the idea of obtaining new
colonies, and turning the Mediterranean into a ‘French lake’ and thus into a buffer
zone against the menacing might of the British navy, led to a radical move. France
invaded Egypt in 1798.
¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. David Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 60.
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In the course of the long nineteenth century, the French Eastern Question took
shape under the long shadow of these economic and strategic reckonings and the
dreams of Bonaparte and Talleyrand. Moreover, the defeats during the Coalition
Wars in 1801 and later in 1815 rendered the Eastern Question a matter of national
prestige for the government in Paris. One reason for the French to join the
Navarino intervention in 1827 was to assert their empire’s position in the inter-
national order as a Great Power. The same desire also weighed during the
intervention in Algiers in 1830. Yet the quest for prestige and glory in France
became most evident in 1840, when the Thiers government almost went to war
with the other four Powers and the Ottoman Empire over the Eastern Question,
and then between 1841 and the 1860s, when France sought to reassert her
religious and commercial influence in the Levant—something that French states-
men believed they had lost to Britain. This was one of the major reasons for the
foreign minister, Thouvenel, to spearhead the 1860 intervention in Syria.
For Britain, having established dominant control in India after the Seven Years
War (1756–63), and particularly after the loss of the American colonies in the late
eighteenth century, the Levant became doubly important as a centre of commer-
cial activity as well as a strategic gateway to her colonies in Asia. The British fought
against the French in Egypt in 1801 with the purpose of securing these very
interests—their commerce, transportation and communication routes, and
India. Their troops did not evacuate Egypt on the date set by the treaties after
the war, as Britain looked to leverage her presence in diplomatic talks with the
Porte on the future administration of this bountiful country. They provided
support for the Mamluk beys when a civil war broke out between Ottoman
authorities and the beys, even attempting to invade Egypt in 1807 to secure India.
Yet, after the 1809 Treaty with the Porte, British authorities took a more
defined position and assigned to themselves the responsibility of ensuring the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire—a responsibility that they did
not renounce until the 1870s. Together with Austria, they looked to place the
sultan’s empire under the guarantee of European public law at the Congress of
Vienna in 1814–5—but to no avail. The Navarino intervention, which the duke of
Wellington eventually called an ‘untoward event’, was a hiccup in this history
when Britain joined Russia and France so that she might check the potential
ambitions of Tsar Nicholas I to turn Greece into a satellite state, but also because
of domestic pressures. After Navarino, and especially from the late 1830s, the
British strove to strengthen the sultan’s army and navy to prevent the informal
domination of the Ottoman world by any of the other Powers, and to ensure
tranquillity and order in the Levant. The very same motive prompted them to lead
the 1840 intervention with the Quadruple Alliance and the Porte, quelling the
ambitions of Mehmed Ali, the pașa of Egypt. It was again the same motive that
would make British authorities so wary of the 1860 French plan for an interven-
tion in Lebanon.
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The Russian policy with respect to the Eastern Question oscillated between an
eager revisionism (c.1762–95, 1807–12, 1824–9, 1849–64), which was more
than ever bent on the idea of (and even concrete plans for) total dismemberment
of the sultan’s empire, and a preservationist (from the 1800s, ‘weak neighbour’)
policy (c.1796–1806, 1812–23, 1829–49) which looked to keep the Ottoman
Empire intact but still weak, lest she grow into a threat in the southern borders
of Russia again. In the 1820s, Russian involvement in the Greek crisis was less
about obtaining guarantees for her co-religionists and more about dissolving in
Russia’s favour the lingering territorial disputes with the Ottoman Empire in the
Balkans and the Caucasus, which duly happened first at Akkerman (1826) and
then with the Treaty of Edirne (1829). Four years later, in 1833, when Tsar
Nicholas I intervened in the civil war between Cairo and Istanbul and signed a
defensive treaty with Ottoman ministers, his aim was to establish a dominant
Russian influence in Istanbul, reinforcing the ‘weak neighbour’ policy. At the end
of the decade Russia abandoned her privileged position so as not to be isolated in
the Concert of Europe, but also after seeing that anti-Russian Ottoman ministers
had gained the upper hand in Istanbul and the prolongation of an alliance treaty
with the Porte had thus become less likely. The tsar’s return to a revisionist policy
in the 1850s resulted largely from a precocious quest for glory in competition with
the aspirations of Emperor Napoleon III of France.
For Austria, the Eastern Question largely concerned containing Russian expan-
sionism towards the Mediterranean as well as in her backyard, the Balkans. Yet the
court in Vienna hardly ever followed this policy by confronting the Russians,
aiming instead to cooperate with them—in the eighteenth century by way of
forming alliances against the Ottomans, and in the nineteenth, by guaranteeing
the territorial integrity of the sultan’s empire by means of European public law.
Austria failed to achieve this diplomatic objective in 1815 during the Congress of
Vienna, but finally reached her goal with the Treaty of Paris in 1856. Austrian
officialdom involved itself in armed intervention only when the Porte sought the
assistance of the Powers or, at least, consented to it. This being said, Austria played
a leading role in the legal and administrative interventions of the 1840s and 1850s
with the aim of reviving the Ottoman Empire rather than partitioning it.
Prussia became a more vocal actor only after a new international (Vienna)
order was established by way of the Concert of Europe in the 1810s and 1820s. The
Great Powers strove to promote new sets of norms and codes to govern their
behaviour such as moderation, restraint, and cooperation in order to minimize
their differences and thereafter prevent another total war . However, it is import-
ant to note that the Vienna Order did not bar colonial expansionism or informal
imperialism elsewhere in the world. It even licensed the five Powers to assume
managerial responsibility over the ‘weak other’ and of ‘governing the world’.²
² Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Penguin Press, 2012).
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By the same token, their competition in the Levant never came to an end. The
Powers did endorse joint action from the 1810s onwards, the Russo-Ottoman war
of 1828–9, Russian intervention in 1833, and the Crimean War of the 1850s being
the only exceptions. Again, from then on, forming a majority within the Concert
became of vital importance in inter-imperial decision-making processes. This was
how Prussia occasionally emerged in a unique position with respect to the Levant.
For instance, in the late 1850s, when Russia and France were considering the idea
of dismembering the Ottoman Empire, they sought the support of the cabinet in
Berlin in order to strong-arm Britain and Austria in a likely conflict of interests.
But the Prussians remained loyal to conservative principles where the Eastern
Question was concerned. They persistently followed the policy of not getting
involved in any major revisionist scheme, and of maintaining the territorial
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
The Eastern Question developed out of and endured through these differing
and dynamic European perceptions, and truly became the most ‘complicated and
dangerous question’ of international politics during the long nineteenth century.³
Yet the alleged weakness of the Ottoman Empire—or, in European parlance, her
‘disorder’, the ‘barbarities’, ‘massacres’, ‘atrocities’, ‘piracy’, ‘religious fanaticism’,
and the ‘irregularities’ that occurred in the sultan’s dominions—also provided the
Powers, either individually or collectively, with quasi-legal pretexts to ensure
security or licence to intervene as the so-called ‘civilized’ superior authorities.
*
Secondly, it is important to add that the Eastern Question was not a European
question alone, as existing literature, and even some late Ottoman writers, would
have us believe. Besides the reckoning among the major Powers, the situation
persisted through other relational dynamics, such as the interactions of Ottoman
imperial agents and subject peoples among themselves and with European actors.
In other words, the Eastern Question was also an Ottoman question—a question
of how to deal with their empire’s alleged weakness, and her precarious charac-
terization among the other major European Powers as one whose identity and
durability was disputed.
As the military and technological power differentials between the Ottomans’
western and northern neighbours and their ‘Well-Protected Domains’ became
more evident in the eighteenth century, imperial agents in Istanbul shared the
belief that their empire was in decline. They found themselves in everlasting
ontological insecurity. The British historian F. A. K. Yasamee suggests that it
became ‘just as important for Ottoman statesmen to assess the nature and
dynamics of the overall international system of which their empire formed a
³ Schroeder, ‘The 19th-Century International System’, 6.
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part and upon which its fate depended’.⁴ The Ottomans proactively responded to
this evolving system by having the position of their empire affirmed among the
militarily strong powers of Europe in the 1790s. For this reason, they undertook
wholesale reforms, in an attempt to revive the underlying philosophies of security
(such as ‘the circle of justice’). They employed propaganda, through pamphlets
written for European audiences. And they initiated alliance-seeking diplomatic
endeavours. However, when the sultan’s empire became engulfed in the Coalition
Wars after the French expedition to Egypt in 1798, reform attempts were greatly
jeopardized and ontological insecurities were heightened. The hardliners in
Istanbul gained greater power, and the subsequent policy of isolation led to an
Ottoman rejection of involvement in the Vienna Order in 1815.
Ottoman isolationism did not last long. A series of developments unfortunate
for the Porte—the 1827 Navarino ‘catastrophe’, humiliating defeat in the Russian–
Ottoman war of 1828–9, the French invasion of Algiers in 1830, the independence
or semi-autonomy of Greece, Samos, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia in the early
1830s, and most importantly Mehmed Ali’s imperial dreams—all prompted the
Ottoman authorities to pursue a more dynamic strategy. By the 1830s, reforms
had picked up their pace, while Ottoman statesmen altered their diplomatic
parlance. Observing that the notion of civilization was gaining traction in
European international thought, they came to frame their empire among the
civilized nations of the world, first, to enlist Great Power assistance in the ongoing
civil war against Cairo (1832–41) and then, from 1841–2 onwards, to fend off
foreign intrusions into their affairs. They created their own ‘uncivilized others’,
and habitually blamed the instability of their empire on the latter’s ‘misguided’
ambitions. The Gülhane Edict was a late 1830s adaptation of the ‘circle of justice’
married with the idea of ‘civilization’.
In the 1850s, medeniyetçilik (civilizationism) prevailed. It was upheld as an
ideology for reforming and, more opportunistically, for securing the Ottoman
Empire by making it a member of the Concert of Europe, an objective finally
attained in 1856. Yet the political and economic path to obtaining this end—the
CrimeanWar—was so dangerous that in the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of
Paris, the empire was more destabilized than ever, with incessant uprisings,
rebellions, and even the imminent risk of partition at the hands of the revisionist
Great Powers. The principles of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire by means of European public law and respecting the sultan’s
relations with his subject peoples, both articulated in 1856, did not translate into
practice as smoothly as Ottoman and European preservationist statesmen
had hoped.
⁴ Yasamee, ‘The Ottoman Search for Security’, 61.
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The French-led 1860 intervention in Syria therefore not only meant for the
Porte a violation of the Treaty of Paris, but also rekindled the sense of insecurity at
a time when the Porte had become almost entirely dependent on European loans.
The Ottoman government reluctantly consented to the intervention in the end,
and equally grudgingly cooperated with the European agents on the ground,
which led to the formation of a unique administrative structure in Lebanon, the
Mutasarrifat regime.
An official declaration in November 1916 attests that the Ottoman ontological
insecurity persisted until the very end of the empire. Two years into the First
World War and the abolition of the capitulations, after negotiation with its allies,
the German and Austrian governments, the Sublime Porte lurched toward a
historical showdown with its enemies—Britain, France, and Russia—with a note
of defiance.⁵ Dated 1 November 1916, and published the next day in the semi-
official organ Hilal (The Crescent),⁶ the Porte’s note proclaimed that the imperial
Ottoman government had been led, during the events of the nineteenth century,
to sign in various circumstances two important treaties with the European Great
Powers, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.
The first established a state of affairs, a balance which the latter destroyed in very
great part, but both were misunderstood by the very signatory Powers who
violated their engagements, either openly or covertly, so as to obtain the execution
of the clauses unfavourable to the Ottoman Empire, [but] they did not care about
those which were stipulated to [the empire’s] advantage; [they were] much more
opposed to [these clauses] without discontinuity.⁷
The two treaties (the note continued) had stipulated commitments to respect
the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and excluded
all interference in the relations between the imperial government and its subjects.
But such commitments had not prevented the French government from exercising
an armed intervention in Ottoman Syria in 1860 and from demanding the
establishment of a new local regime. The co-signatory Powers had associated
diplomatically with this act in order not to ‘leave France free in her designs’,
fearing the latter could have annexationist aims. The Ottoman government would
then grant Lebanon ‘an organization of purely administrative and limited auton-
omy which gave a certain interference to the Great Powers’. Nor did the legal
⁵ Ambassade Impériale Ottomane (Berlin) to the Minister, 14 Oct. 1916; H. Abro to Munir Bey,
15 Oct. 1916, BOA HR.HMS.ISO 65/12.
⁶ Ibid., note dated 14 Oct. 1916; Abram Isaac Elkus (Constantinople) to Secretary of State,
6 Nov. 1916, NARA RG/M363, ‘Relating to Political Rel. between Turkey and other states’, 1910–29.
⁷ Hilal, 2 Nov. 1916; cf. Abram Isaac Elkus (Constantinople) to Secretary of State, 6 November 1916,
NARA RG/M363, Relating to Political Rel. between Turkey and other states, 1910–29.
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commitments with regards to respecting Ottoman independence and territorial
integrity hinder
the French government from occupying Tunis [1881] and establish a protectorate
over this dependence of the Empire; nor did it prevent the British Government
from occupying Egypt [1882] and to establish there her effective domination, nor
from making a series of encroachments of Ottoman sovereignty south of the
Yemen at Nedjid, in Kuwait, in El Qatar as well as in the Persian Gulf, nor did
these same provisions inconvenience the four Governments who are now at war
with Turkey in modifying by force the status of the island Crete and in creating
there a new situation in flagrant contradiction with the integrity which they had
undertaken to respect.⁸
On account of all these legal violations, the Ottoman ministers maintained, the
Porte would no longer consider the provisions of the treaties of Paris and Berlin as
binding on its part, and would abolish the special status of theMutasarrifat system
in Lebanon.⁹ The note ended with a bold statement: the Ottoman Empire ‘defin-
itely abandons her somewhat subordinate position under the collective guardian-
ship of the Great Powers which some of the latter are interested in maintaining.
She therefore enters the group of European Powers with all the rights and
prerogatives on an entirely independent government.’¹⁰
*
The 1916 note not only signals Ottoman historical resentments and her desire to
redefine her position in the global imperial order as a government which enjoyed
‘all the rights and prerogatives’ of the group of European Powers, and thus end her
sense of exclusion and subjugation. It also indicates how international law was
perceived and experienced inversely by the so-called ‘peripheral’ historical actors
in the long nineteenth century. This brings us to the third concluding remark,
which concerns the intersectoral relational dynamics or the sectoral continuum
that the historical actors saw in the affairs of the Levant.
The sequence of armed, legal, and administrative interventions ought not to be
traced only in relation to the strategic calculations of the Powers and the
Levantines. Emancipating the Eastern Question from this constricted arena, and
heeding at least the legal, economic, financial, and religious factors through an
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Hilal, 2 Nov. 1916; cf. Abram Isaac Elkus (Constantinople) to Secretary of State, 6 Nov. 1916,
NARA RG/M363, ‘Relating to Political Rel. between Turkey and other states’, 1910–29.
¹⁰ Emphasis mine. The Ottoman demands in relation to theMutasarrifat regime were duly accepted
by the German authorities one week later—although the German foreign minister, Arthur
Zimmerman, commented on 11 Nov. that the treaties of Paris and Berlin were concluded between a
large number of Powers and the Porte needed the consent of all of them. Hakki Pasha to
M. Zimmerman, n.d., BOA.HR.HMS.ISO 65/14/4.
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intersectoral kaleidoscope, allows us to see in a new light the complexity with
which the intervening actors were confronted. For instance, we must take into
account French indebtedness to Egypt in the late eighteenth century, in order
better to understand the origins of the 1798 intervention—a factor that is usually
omitted in the literature. For the same reason, without documenting the doomful
Ottoman experience with international law especially during the Coalition Wars
(1793–1815), we cannot explain why Ottoman statesmen refused to send a
representative to the Congress of Vienna in 1814 when the Powers invited them
to do so. Again, without recognizing that the Powers’ proposal of guaranteeing the
European dominions of the sultan under European public law was combined
with demands to reregulate the customs tariffs in order to liberalize trade in the
Ottoman dominions, we cannot explain why the sultan’s ministers turned the
Powers down once again in March 1815.
It is well known that the 1838 commercial agreements between the European
Powers (starting with Britain) and the Porte, which reduced the import tariffs to
the Powers’ advantage and abolished monopolies, permitted Istanbul to enlist the
support of the Powers in its civil war against Cairo (1832–41) the following year.
Much less chronicled are the 1861–2 commercial conventions, which were the last
of the periodical customs tariff negotiations between the Porte and the Powers.
The latter stipulated the reduction of the average export duties by 1% per year
until only a nominal duty would be levied over eight years. In the midst of an
unprecedented financial crisis at the time, the Porte was able to secure, in
exchange for this monumental concession, only a small loan. These economic
and financial developments following the Crimean War signified a financial turn
in the Eastern Question. The survival and revival of the Ottoman Empire was no
longer a strategic question, and did not simply concern her prized possessions. At
stake also were the interests of European lenders and owners of Ottoman bonds.
The list of intersectoral relational dynamics can be usefully extended by
pointing out the use of religion as an instrument for mobilizing people, forming
(transimperial) networks, or as a factor to tip the scales when strategic and
economic considerations produced an impasse. The latter was exemplified by
Britain’s dithering in the 1820s as to whether she should join Russia in interfering
in the Greek crisis, or when the international commissioners on Syria had to give
their final advice concerning the verdict on the Druze feudal lords during the
retributive justice proceedings, with extremely scarce evidence and information.
On both occasions, Christian sentiments unblocked and facilitated the decision-
making processes.
*
The fourth and last general conclusion pertains to the repercussions of Great
Power interventions for the subject peoples of the Levant. It would be a gross
exaggeration to claim that the armed, legal, and administrative interventions of
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the Great Powers were the chief cause of the civil wars that the local actors suffered
through in the period covered in this book. A ‘before and after’ analysis suggests
that circumstances for violence had pieced together and pre-dated these interven-
tions and the civil strifes that erupted in Egypt (1801–11), Greece (1821–7), the
wider Ottoman world (1832–41), and Lebanon (1841–60). The interventions
tended to intensify and perpetuate violence in a manner that required further
interventions, subsequently plunging the region into a violent vortex.
Egypt had already been in partial anarchy before the French intervention in
1798, and had witnessed comparable civil wars amongst local and Ottoman
imperial actors due largely to their struggles to control the lucrative customs
taxes and regions of the country. The Greek independence movement had already
been growing through kinetic intellectual, emotional, and political momentum.
‘Uprisings’ of sorts were not a new occurrence in the 1820s, though the eventual,
collective support of the Great Powers to the Greeks was. Mehmed Ali Pașa of
Egypt launched his own struggle for independence not because he had been
advised to do so by British and French agents, but because he wanted to secure
his reign and the future of his family by means of control of the Taurus Mountains
and Syria. The 1827 Navarino intervention and the 1830 French invasion of
Algiers (a project he was involved in initially) signalled to him that the time had
come to realize his ambitions. But none of these forced him into his Syrian
démarche. And finally, the Lebanese had already fought with one another over
sectarian and class issues before the Gülhane Edict of 1839, which marked a new
epoch in Ottoman imperialism, and before the 1840 intervention of the
Quadruple Alliance and the Porte which launched a (semi-)colonial contest in
the country.
To argue otherwise, and trace the origins of civil wars merely to imperialist
ambitions, reforms and Great Power interventions, would be to give too much
credit to imperial agents and too little agency to the aspirations of local actors. For
this reason, the popular, recently reiterated postulation that ‘European and
Ottoman imperial actors created the conditions for a sectarian storm [in
Ottoman Lebanon]’ appears to be misdirected.¹¹ New archival evidence suggests
that the rise of egalitarian ideas among the Maronite clergy and peasantry, their
claims for property in the opening decades of the nineteenth century, the estab-
lishment of new representative institutions at the time, Druze aspirations for
autonomy, the religious/class conflicts of 1820s and 1830s, and the establishment
of quasi-sectarian councils in the early 1830s had already forged a degree of
sectarian and class consciousness and sparked violence before the Tanzimat
reforms and the Eastern Question reached Lebanon.
¹¹ Makdisi, The Age of Coexistence, 64.
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Such popular beliefs are not only historically specious but also potentially
perilous, for they unintentionally underpin the ‘paranoia-turned-myth of imperi-
alism’ as the main cause of all tragedies in what has been called ‘the Middle East’—
the Levant, Mesopotamia, parts of North Africa, Persia, and Arabia—since the
1900s.¹² Indeed, the aspirations to expand and sustain empires or to exert a
dominant influence indisputably and incalculably fuelled the miseries of the
region. It is well documented that the European and Ottoman imperial authorities
dispatched armed forces, annexed or partitioned territories, perpetrated geno-
cides, created new polities, and suppressed local voices during the (post)imperial
and (post)colonial histories of these regions. And it is evident that Western and
regional imperial agents have never ceased to interfere with and influence Middle
Eastern politics.
Yet the local actors, both subjects/citizens and states, have never been the
‘gullible objects’ or ‘bargaining chips’ merely in need of foreign aid. Nor has the
region been passive grass, so to speak, trampled by the elephants wrestling above.
Quite the contrary: in the nineteenth century, in the age of the Eastern Question,
local actors were always the prime agents of oligarchical, strategic, class, and
sectarian violence during the aforementioned civil wars. Even though it is true
that, amongst others, the British promised the Mamluk beys protection ‘in the
most solemn manner’, the Russians to the Porte, and the French to Mehmed Ali
and the Maronites before turning their back on their Levantine interlocutors, it
was as much through local agency that Great Power interferences were procured,
that the civil wars in question were transimperialized, and that Levantine actors
became conscious proxies.
Again, what I mean by this is not the fact that the local actors have simply to be
attributed the role of troublemakers. What I suggest here is a need to inquire how
violence prevailed and how it could have been quelled, first and foremost, in the
rational and emotional positions that the local actors adopted towards each other.
An early example of this is the collective resistance of the Egyptians in the 1800s.
Shattered by years of inter-imperial wars and anarchy, a wide coalition formed by
Cairene merchants, ulama, and the fellahin brought Mehmed Ali to power, and
kept him there, despite British opposition and Ottoman reluctance, helping to
subsequently end the strife in the country.
¹² For the origins of the term ‘Middle East’, see Alfred Thayer Mahan, ‘The Persian Gulf and
International Relations’, National Review 40 (Sept. 1902): 39; T. E. Gordon, ‘The Problems of the
Middle East’, The Nineteenth Century 37 (Mar. 1900): 413; Clayton R. Koppes, ‘Captain Mahan,
General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term “Middle East” ’, Middle Eastern Studies 12(1) (1976):
95–8. This ‘paranoia-turned-myth’ is manipulated time and again in contemporary politics. For
example, the Kurdish question in Turkey has long remained unaddressed and even undisputed, mainly
because the nationalist official narrative has tended to view it as a by-product of (British, American, and
Russian) imperialist designs, heedless of the democratic aspirations of the Kurds, while Kurdish
politicians have insistently sought foreign material and political assistance in obtaining their ends,
although such efforts have usually proved counterproductive as they have only bolstered exclusionary
Turkish nationalism.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 21/6/2021, SPi
362  
Another example is the fact that peace in Lebanon endured from the 1860s until
the First World War even though the Eastern Question was not definitively settled
and inter-imperial competition had not come to an end. In fact, as of the late
1870s, during the so-called era of high imperialism, when the annexationist
nibbling of the Ottoman territories became rampant, and especially after the
British occupation of Egypt in 1882, Lebanon played host to a contest for
domination between the Hamidian, conservative Ottoman pașas who tried to
establish a more direct rule, and French agents looking to bolster their regional
influence.¹³ The inter-imperial struggle again became religiously tinged, and even
overlapped with the decline of the silk industry (as at the time silk prices were
dampened by increasing supply from Japan and China).¹⁴ Yet, due in part to a
change in political attitudes towards sectarian and class differences since the early
1860s, and in part because of the appalling memory of the recent conflicts and the
improved security apparatus, local response to the difficulties proved to be more
pacific, and tended to emigration rather than violence.¹⁵
*
The early history of Great Power interventions in the Levant provides us with
important lessons. To borrow from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844–1900), these lessons constitute ‘the classical set of examples for the inter-
pretation of our entire culture and its development. [They are] the means for
understanding ourselves, a means for regulating our age—and thereby a means for
overcoming it.’¹⁶ Taking into account the temporal and sectoral continuum that
historical actors saw in the affairs of the Levant in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries enables us to discern and apprehend that the degree of
complexity of regional affairs at the time was even greater than has been previ-
ously recognized. This complexity repeatedly left the historical actors uncertain as
to how to act, react, secure their interests, and ward off perceived threats.
We must recall the British consul Colonel Rose’s bemusement in 1844, and his
questions as to when the moral obligations that induced the Great Powers to
interfere in the governance of another state began and ended; whether the Great
Powers could creditably further interfere if the locals, albeit only some of them,
were opposed to their political schemes; and whether it was fitting that the Powers
should be occupied in endeavouring to conciliate the jarring interests and the
¹³ Akarlı, The Long Peace, 41–57.
¹⁴ Andrew Arsan, Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa
(London: Hurst, 2014), 33.
¹⁵ Ibid. 30; Makdisi, The Age of Coexistence, 64–74; Hakim, Lebanese, 149–158. For a skilful analysis
of the Lebanese emigration, see also Akram F. Khater, Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the
Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, The Struggle between Science and Wisdom (1875); cf. Nandita B. Mellamphy,
The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 125.
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animosities of locals in a foreign country.¹⁷ These questions constitute the core of
the discussions over foreign interventions today that tend to overlook ‘what
imperialism has done and what orientalism continues to do’.¹⁸
The experience amassed in the period between the late eighteenth century and
the early 1860s served as a model or inspiration for generations. For example, as
early as 1866–9, when another Great Power intervention took place in Ottoman
Crete, the ‘Lebanese solution’, as a contemporary put it, was implemented and a
consociational administrative system inspired by the Règlement organique of
Lebanon was introduced in Crete with the mediation of the Powers.¹⁹
In the early twentieth century, the 1860 intervention was considered a potential
prototype when, in 1912–14, the five Great Powers intervened again in the
Armenian–Kurdish civil war in eastern Anatolia.²⁰ But the February 1914 settle-
ment was never set in motion, as the First World War broke out. The following
year, when hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished as Ottoman authorities
‘dared to annihilate the existence of [the] entire [Armenian] nation’ of the empire,
to cite the Ottoman minister of finance, Mehmed Cavid Bey, British diplomats
explicitly turned to the 1860 model, and discussed a plan to stop the ‘Armenian
massacres’ in the same fashion as the intervention in Syria, i.e. by persuading the
Ottoman authorities to end the massacres.²¹ But they quickly withdrew the idea of
‘taking inspiration from 1860’ from the agenda, and decided to ‘provide the
parallel to that by defeating the Turks, not by writing to them’.²²
Historical actors repeatedly turned to early instances of foreign interventions to
make sense of and grapple with the bewildering realities of the Levant. Yet, despite
their insufficient grasp of these realities, limiting the Eastern Question to a
strategic dilemma and ignoring the intricacies of local politics ‘as questions of
detail’ to be addressed eventually, they foolhardily carried on staging interventions
that went to such lengths as carving out new, inorganic mandates or (semi-)
independent states out of the Ottoman Empire in the 1910s.
As the Eastern Question was arguably terminated with the fall of Osman’s
dynasty just before the Lausanne Conference in 1922–3, what we may term as its
successor in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Middle Eastern
Question, has likewise proved to be a very long list of much more fragmented
yet still interconnected issues and questions, cutting across time and sectors:
¹⁷ Rose to Canning, 25 Mar. 1844, CRAS 46–8.
¹⁸ Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), xvi–xvii; cf. Jessica Whyte, ‘ “Always on
Top”? The “Responsibility to Protect” and the Persistence of Colonialism’, in The Postcolonial World,
ed. Jyotsyna G. Singh and David D. Kim (London: Routledge, 2016), 311.
¹⁹ Rodogno, Against Massacre, 126.
²⁰ Ozan Ozavci, ‘Honour and Shame: The Diaries of a Unionist and the “Armenian Question” ’, in
The End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism, ed. Hans-Lukas
Kieser, Margaret L. Anderson, Seyhan Bayraktar, and Thomas Schmutz (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019),
193–220.
²¹ Ozavci, ‘Honour’, 213.
²² ‘Massacre of Armenians by Turks’, 28 Apr. 1915, TNA FO 371/2488/51010.
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demographic engineering, population exchanges, insecurity in the mandate states,
violent independence struggles and their brutal suppression, oil (and other
energy) competition, the Arab–Israeli controversy, sectarianism, (militarist)
authoritarianism, etc. A new superpower rivalry during the Cold War in the
global north provoked new interventions, further political instability and violence,
and further quests for power and influence among the global powers like the
United States, Russia, and (to a lesser extent) the European Union and China, as
well as among the historically, strategically, economically, and/or religiously
motivated aspirant regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
The actors on the stage have changed and increased in number since the
nineteenth century. Empires have collapsed. Time and space have been com-
pressed to an unprecedented degree thanks to technological advances. But, with its
institutionalized hierarchies and repertoires of power that have persisted through
the changing pecking order of international security institutions, cross-border
interventions (now usually through remote warfare, with missiles and drones),
proxy wars, the manipulation of civil wars, (neo-)liberal advances, and an inter-
national law with neo-imperialist and unequal undertones, the pattern has
remained. In this specific sense, we today share with actors of the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries a common, counterproductive culture of security. We
are their contemporaries.
Remember the discussion in the run-up to the United States-led occupation of
Iraq in 2003. The ambitions of the neo-conservative administration in
Washington, DC, the ‘altruistic’ and ‘noble’ role self-tailored by the United
States as a transformative global power and the latter’s appeal to coercion to
achieve its security objectives, were likewise regarded by many, including the neo-
conservatives themselves, as properly imperialistic.²³ Even though the British
prime minister, Tony Blair, would, four months into the occupation, state before
the US Congress that ‘a study of history provides so little instruction for our
present day’, Middle East experts, even proponents of war, would turn to the
recent past in an attempt to justify the intervention.²⁴ Among them was the late
Fouad Ajami, the American-Lebanese Middle East expert, and one of the most
popular and influential proponents of the Iraqi war to reportedly advise neo-
conservative leaders in Washington, DC.
Before the intervention, Ajami wrote that the British Empire’s moment in Iraq
had come after the First World War when she was economically exhausted, and
²³ See e.g. Michael Cox, ‘Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine’, Review of International
Studies 30(4) (Oct. 2004): 585–608; Caroline Daniel, ‘Bush’s Imperial Presidency’, Financial Times, 5
July 2006; Richard N. Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 553, n. 61. For a critique of this categorization, see Daniel H. Nexon and
Thomas Wright, ‘What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate’, Political Science Review 101(2)
(May 2007): 253–71.
²⁴ Louise Kettle, Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 1.
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had therefore failed.²⁵ It was now the United States’ moment in Iraq and its
driving motivation (that ‘imperial burden’) should have been ‘modernising the
Arab world’, above and beyond toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein.²⁶ Three
years into the war, in 2006, Ajami argued that since the war was an effort to
decapitate the despotic, sclerotic, and lethal regime of Saddam Hussein, which
‘would have lasted a thousand years’ had the occupation not happened, it was a
legitimate ‘imperial mission,’ ‘a foreigner’s gift’ to the Iraqi inhabitants.²⁷ It was
a ‘noble war’, the outcome of which would ‘determine whether it is a noble success
or a noble failure’.²⁸
Given the death toll during and after the war, the descent of Iraq into further
disastrous strife since the mid-2000s, and the economic losses incurred because of
the intervention, hindsight suggests that it is quite evident whether the 2003
occupation and the subsequent military and naval missions in Iraq have been a
success or failure. Even so, foreign armed interventions in the Middle East
continue in an equally foolhardy fashion. Almost every Middle Eastern society,
especially Syria, Yemen, Libya, and to a lesser extent Lebanon, Turkey, and
Palestine, is engulfed in internationalized civil wars or political and economic
tragedies.²⁹ The political actors, both Western and regional, keep tossing
their resources into the infinite complexities of the region, at the expense of
exhausting their economies and polities and provoking even greater misfortune
on the ground.
Seen from the perspective of the last two centuries, we can conclude that they
do so with a haughtiness and pomposity akin to that of their imperial forebears in
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Just as Ajami and the neo-
conservatives depicted the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a ‘foreigner’s gift’, despite
their ‘push-and-pull’ factors, each historical intervention covered in this book was,
almost without exception, also initiated by their entrepreneurs under the façades
of ‘disinterested’ ‘service’, ‘aid’, ‘favour’, ‘priceless grace’, or ‘friendly assistance’ to
the Levantine inhabitants. Needless to say, the discourse of noble disinterestedness
was always a beguiling delusion. In reality, each of these interventions was formed
through manifold layers of threat perceptions and interests which I have tried to
peel away in this book. The immense historical and global complexities of the
²⁵ In Aug. 2002, Ajami was cited by then US Vice President Dick Cheney on how Iraqi inhabitants
would welcome the Americans, in the aftermath of the expedition, with kites and boom boxes. L. Carl
Brown, ‘The Dream Palace of the Empire: Is Iraq a “Noble Failure”?’ New York Times, 12 Sept. 2006.
²⁶ Fouad Ajami, ‘Iraq and the Arabs’ Future’, Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2003), accessed 20 Mar.
2018: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2003-01-01/iraq-and-arabs-future
²⁷ Brown, ‘Dream Palace’; Fouad Ajami, The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, the Arabs and the
Iraqis in Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2006). Emphasis mine.
²⁸ Brown, ‘Dream Palace’.
²⁹ For a detailed study of the inter-connectivity of civil wars in the Middle East in the 2010s, see
William Harris, Quicksilver War: Syria, Iraq and the Spiral of Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2018). For a global outlook on the civil war in Yemen, read esp. Isa Blumi, Destroying Yemen:
What Chaos in Arabia Tells Us about the World (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018).
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region, and the political and diplomatic incapacity to deal with them holistically,
were precisely why, as is the case today, Great Power interventions tended to bring
to the nineteenth-century Levant only further vulnerability and insecurity through
heightened antagonisms, new rivalries, and contentions. However goodwilled they
might have been, the repercussions of these ‘gifts’ proved to be nothing but
detrimental and dangerous.
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